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This research aims to evaluate changes in restructuring and insolvency practices in 
Africa, in the light of the trend towards global convergence in the field of insolvency. 
Notwithstanding the claim that the convergence of insolvency norms has gone 
relatively well among global powers, some questions are yet to be fully settled- which 
economies matter in harmonisation process and why? Is global convergence in 
insolvency truly achievable or desirable? Because they are often the target of global 
norms, the experience of developing regions is crucial to this debate. Accounts of 
reform in economies in Asia, Latin America and other emerging regions have 
contributed to the understanding of both the global harmonisation process and the 
development of insolvency in those jurisdictions.  Conspicuously missing from the 
debates are African countries, where a wave of reform is now happening as countries 
on the continent catch up with the global impetus for insolvency law reform. To paint 
a complete picture of global trends in restructuring law and practice, an African 
perspective is important, especially as global interests in the continent increases. This 
is what motivates this thesis.  One of the most significant contributions of the thesis is 
that it fills a gap in the harmonisation process, by revealing Africa’s contribution to 
the building of global norms while also evaluating the impact of the harmonisation 
trend on restructuring and insolvency practices in Africa. The thesis evaluates recent 
reforms and the debt restructuring frameworks they introduce. It also considers 
changes in local practices, using an empirical study in Africa’s largest economy, 
Nigeria. While it finds that that Africa is indeed contributing to the harmonisation 
process in insolvency, it questions whether reforms are aiming to meet development 
needs in African countries or whether they are merely driven by the pressure to keep 
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The subject of this thesis is the development of corporate debt restructuring 
frameworks in Africa.1 With the growing trend towards the global convergence of 
commercial laws,2 International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have sought to develop norms about what 
ideal corporate insolvency3 and restructuring laws should aim to achieve, and how 
they should be designed. These norms are propagated in the form of models, 
principles, guidelines and normative standards and they influence insolvency reform 
in many countries.4 Notably, the rehabilitation of viable businesses, rather than 
wasteful liquidation has come to gain centre stage in these prescriptions. This has 
occasioned a shift from liquidation to debt restructuring and other rescue-oriented 
mechanisms.5 Reforms that aim to bring insolvency regimes into conformity with 
these norms have now spread across different regions of the world.   
 
African countries have been sideliners in these developments as their insolvency laws 
have been obsolete for many decades. Now that Africa is experiencing significant 
economic growth, insolvency jurisprudence and practice are also evolving and nations 
across the continent have begun to reform their insolvency laws. One of the concerns 
of this research is how global norms and actors are impacting these reforms. It also 
seeks to understand if and how Africa is navigating the trend towards global 
convergence to establish insolvency regimes that meet their development needs. 
                                                          
1 The thesis focuses on companies other than financial institutions (which often have special legal regimes 
regulating them). 
2 Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crisis (Stanford 
University Press 2009) 339- 380. 
3 Known as bankruptcy law to most American scholars and practitioners. Insolvency is adopted here because it is 
the term common to the UK where this thesis is completed and many African countries to which the research 
relates. 
4 For example, The World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems World 
Bank (ICR Principles) (April 2001 as revised in 2015); The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005); 
The World Bank Guidelines for Out of Court Restructuring; IMF, Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures; Key 
Issues (IMF 1999) 5(Orderly Procedures). 
5 These concepts are briefly described below. 
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This chapter provides an overview of the discussion and lays out the structure of the 
thesis. It is divided into three parts. The first part engages in a background discussion 
of the general area of research, including developments in African economies and 
their impact on insolvency law reform. It also outlines the central questions and 
objectives of the research, the methodology and the significance of the research. The 
second part discusses the empirical aspect of the research. It introduces Nigeria as case 
study for the empirical research and describes existing insolvency frameworks in the 
country. The third part clarifies the meanings of concepts that are central to the thesis 
and concludes with an organisational structure of the chapters.  
 
1.1.  Background and research justification. 
African countries are often classified as developing economies. 6 The past decade has 
brought a boost in the growth of African economies with the continent being 
recognised as the second fastest growing region in the world after South Asia.7 Some 
                                                          
6 The precise definition of ‘developing economy/country’ is not free of controversy. It is rooted in the idea that 
countries are at different stages of development and as undeveloped countries undergo economic transition, they 
will eventually evolve to a state of development that mirrors the economic, political and social characteristics of 
the more advanced economies. (See Walt Whitman Rostow, The stages of Economic Growth; A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (3rd edn 1990 CUP). However, there is no universally accepted criterion for making the distinction, 
especially when other terms like least developed, less developing, transitioning and emerging economies are 
thrown in the mix. The United Nations declares that the distinction between developed and developing countries 
is intended for statistical convenience and does not express a judgement about stage of development of a country. 
However, the distinction is tied to the Sustainable and Millennium Development Goals. 
<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>;<www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>; accessed 8 September 
2018.  Economic development is commonly measured by the Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product, 
and Gross National Income per capita of countries to determine rate of growth, expansion and recovery. These 
typically describe the total income value of goods and services produced or consumed by an economy in a given 
period, usually one year. The World Bank, ‘Beyond Economic Growth: Meeting the Challenges of Global 
Development’ <www.worldbank.org/depweb/beyond/global/chapter2.html> accessed 8 September 2018. The 
Human Development Index has also gained some popularity in more recent times (The focus on human welfare 
and use in statistics was popularised by Amartya Sen who argued that development includes the right every 
individual has to make their own choices and use their capabilities. See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (OUP 
1999); Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock, ‘What Role Do Legal Institutions Play in Development?’ October 20, 
1999, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto Draft prepared for the International Monetary Fund’s Conference on 
Second Generation Reforms, 8-9 November 1999) 4-5. Acknowledging the nebulous nature of the term, this thesis 
uses the term loosely to describe countries that (i) are recognised to have lower standard of living, low per capita 
income, underdeveloped industrial base and HDI relative to economies that measure higher in these areas 
(developed economies); and (ii) are striving to transform their economies and institutions to catch up with 
developed economies. 
7 AfDB, ‘Africa remains world’s second fastest growing region’ (Africa Development Bank Group, 24 May 2017) 
<www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africa-remains-worlds-second-fastest-growing-region-17036/>; AfDB, 
‘Africa is Now the Fastest Growing Continent in the World’ (2013) <www.afdb.org/en/news-and-
events/article/africa-is-now-the-fastest-growing-continent-in-the-world-12107/> all accessed 8 September 2018. 
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economies in Africa have been named among the fastest growing in the world.8 With 
the increase in economic growth and huge developmental projects coming out of 
Africa, the continent has received more global attention. Massive projects are 
accompanied with financial innovations such as derivatives, compound 
securitisations and syndicated lending involving financial institutions and investors 
from across the world.9  
However, rapid changes in African economies are also attended by economic 
volatility and instability, which put many businesses at the risk of financial distress.10 
This makes it necessary for economic growth and new financial arrangements to be 
complemented by sound and responsive mechanisms for resolving financial 
distress.11   
Until recently, African countries have been lax about putting up supportive structures, 
like frameworks for rehabilitating viable businesses to help cushion the impact of 
financial distress.12  Many countries have retained liquidation-based insolvency laws 
which were received decades ago as part of their colonial heritage. Before recent 
reforms, countries like Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Cape Verde, 
Liberia, Namibia all had liquidation and or receivership-based laws with some dating 
back to the 1920s and falling into disuse.13  
                                                          
8 Nigeria for example has been declared one of the next eleven emerging economies of the world by Columbia 
University analysts. Steven Radelet, Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way (Centre for Global 
Development, September 2010) 9-26. 
9 For example, Nigeria, like many other African nations has in the past few years begun implementing plans to 
privatise major sectors of its economy. This includes the privatisation of transport, water, electricity and other 
utility sectors. Ernest Harsch, ‘Privatization shifts gears in Africa’ (2000) 14(1) Africa Recovery 8-17; George 
Schoneveld and Annelies Zoomers, ‘Natural Resource Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Challenges for 
Inclusive Green Growth’ (2015) 37 International Development Planning Review 95-118.  
10 Giovanni Melina and Rafael Portillo, ‘Economic Fluctuations in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2018) Monetary Policy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 61. See for a robust analysis, Adebayo Adedeji and Timothy Shaw, ‘Economic Crisis in Africa; 
African Perspectives on Development Problems and Potentials’ (1985) FAO UN Papers. 
11 Thomas Laryea, ‘Approaches to Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Wake of Financial Crises’ (IMF Staff 
Position Note, 26 January 2010) 17. 
12 Nitesh Patel, ‘Insolvency Reforms Across Africa: Is it Happening Fast Enough?’ (Africa Round Table Highlight 
Article, 2014) available at 
<https://www.insol.org/_files/Africa%20Round%20Table/Highlight%20article%20EN%20June%202014.pdf> 
accessed 8 September 2018. 
13 For example, until recently Tanzania’s insolvency laws were part of its company law of 1929; The World Bank 
reported in 2012, that ‘Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest share of economies with little or no insolvency practice. 
Twelve of the region’s 46 economies (more than a quarter) have had fewer than five insolvency cases annually in 
recent years…judges have little or no experience in handling insolvency cases, and costs are prohibitive’. The 
World Bank, Making a difference for entrepreneurs (Doing Business Report 2011) 80. 
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It is therefore worthy of note that since year 2006 when Tanzania introduced an 
administration procedure (patterned after English law) and 2011 when South Africa 
(followed closely by Mauritius in 2009) reformed its insolvency law, a wave of 
insolvency law reforms has hit the continent. Now, over half of the fifty-four countries 
in Africa have new insolvency laws and others are in the process of reform.  
These developments raise a question about the major drivers of the reforms, both 
endogenous and exogenous. This question is important for two reasons - the first is 
that it seeks to understand whether insolvency law reforms are being informed by 
development needs that have become more prominent with economic growth in 
Africa. An answer in the affirmative provides some assurance that reforms can 
produce the benefits that effective insolvency systems offer, particularly to fast 
growing economies.14 Secondly, it uncovers the impact of the trend towards global 
convergence in insolvency regulation on these reforms thereby providing a fuller 
understanding of the harmonisation process. 
In their Transnational Legal Order (TLO) framework, Halliday, Carruthers and 
Shaffer paint a picture of how the trajectory and content of insolvency legislation 
across the globe are now being shaped by a set of norms developed by powerful global 
actors who propagate these norms transnationally.15 They study the operation of 
transnational insolvency norms in emerging economies, mostly in the context of Asian 
jurisdictions like Indonesia, China and South Korea. Halliday and Carruthers note 
that African economies are understudied in this regard, as they are never used as 
exemplars.16  Considering that twenty-three of the forty-four countries that have now 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency are African,17 this 
                                                          
<www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB11-
FullReport.pdf> accessed 8 September 2018. 
14 For the relationship between insolvency law and economic development, see Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt 
(n 2) 339- 380; Mariana Prado and Michael Trebilcock, ‘Path dependence, development, and the dynamics of 
institutional reform’ (2009) 59 (3) University of Toronto Law Journal 350; Kenneth Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus; 
The Rule of Law and Development (2006 Brookings Institution Press) 160-161. 
15 Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’ in Terence Halliday, Transnational legal 
orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 28-29. 
16 Terrence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National 
Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes ‘(2007) 112 (4) American Journal of Sociology 
1173, 1188. 
17 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) Status. 




thesis argues that the picture of the TLO and the narrative of global convergence in 
insolvency law are incomplete without an African perspective. The thesis closes some 
of this gap by applying their ideas to ongoing insolvency reform and restructuring 
experience in Africa.  
1.2. Research questions and objectives 
This thesis aims to answer three questions- 
- How is the drive towards global convergence in insolvency impacting 
corporate debt restructuring law and practice in Africa? 
- Is Africa contributing to the growth of a transnational legal order in insolvency?  
- What socio-cultural and institutional factors can impact the settling of global 
restructuring norms in an African economy? 
In answering these questions, the thesis evaluates the introduction of debt 
restructuring frameworks in African countries, while examining the role of global 
actors and norms in the reforms on one hand, and the interaction of new restructuring 
laws with local institutions on the other hand. It considers recent and ongoing changes 
in the way African countries are responding to financial distress in two dimensions. 
The first captures changes in restructuring practices among local stakeholders who 
are now opening up to more rehabilitative approaches and adopting new strategies 
within the boundaries of outdated laws and in their shadow. The second dimension 
describes formal efforts to introduce new insolvency and restructuring laws through 
national legislations in thirty-six countries.18 New laws are inspired by the 
restructuring laws of developed countries like England, France, New Zealand and the 
United States (US), that have had considerable success in incorporating the rescue 
culture into their insolvency regimes. 
 
 
                                                          
18 Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Seychelles, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia, South Africa, Cape Verde, Liberia, Namibia, Burundi, Rwanda, Lesotho, Djibouti and the OHADA 
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo). 
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1.3. Africa is (not) a country. 
This research acknowledges that varied distinctions among African countries make it 
difficult to speak of an African experience as if it were a single story. With fifty-four 
independent countries on the continent, Africa enjoys a lot of diversity as 
demonstrated by the varying sizes,19 economic performance, political,20 social and 
cultural features of different countries in the region. The continent is divided along 
the lines of language, religion, colonial heritage and geographic location.21 For 
example, the term ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ is commonly used to separate North Africa 
from the rest of Africa.22 Countries in West Africa share a lot of affinity because of 
their geographical proximity but at the same time are divided by colonial history, with 
some West African countries being francophone and others anglophone.23 One 
important effect of this is that some countries adopt a common law system and others 
operate civil law.24 
In terms of economic diversity, the three largest economies are South Africa, Nigeria 
and Angola.25 While the economies of oil producing Nigeria and Angola took a 
massive hit following the oil crisis in 2016, non-oil countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, 
                                                          
19 Compare for example, the population of Madagascar (24 million), Seychelles (94 thousand) and Nigeria (181 
million). United Nations Population estimates (2015) 
<https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ > accessed 10 September 18 
20 Some countries in Africa struggle with a faltering democracy bordering on dictatorship, others go in and out of 
military rule while others have a fairly stable democracy. See for an overview, Emmanueal Gyimah-Boadi, ‘Africa's 
Waning Democratic Commitment’ (2015) 26(1) Journal of Democracy (2015) 101-113. 
21 North Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa and the Africa Island nations. See the 
New World Encyclopedia <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Sub-Saharan_Africa> accessed 10 
September 2018. 
22 Countries in Sub Saharan Africa lie south of the Sahara Desert while others are in the Northern area. The World 
Bank classifies forty-seven Sub Saharan African countries separately and the seven North African countries 
together with the Middle East. <https://data.worldbank.org/region/sub-saharan-africa> accessed 10 September 
2018. 
23 Also, there are Lusophone and Arabophone and Spanish speaking countries in Africa. This is in addition to the 
thousands of local languages across the continent. 
24 Principally dictated by whether a country was colonised by the British or French (and Belgium or Portugal in 
fewer cases). See Sandra Joireman, ‘Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial 
Legacy’ (2001) 39(4) Journal of Modern African Studies 571–596. 




Mali, Botswana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali have 
demonstrated significant economic growth and resilience.26  
Notwithstanding their differences however, there is a good volume of co-operation, 
shared history, shared institutions, commercial relations, laws, socio-cultural 
connections and institutional deficiencies that bind countries in the region together. 
For example, weak judicial systems, corruption, capacity gaps, poor governance and 
economic instability are common elements in African countries.27 
Beyond the struggles, there is also significant socio-economic integration in Africa, 
ranging from trade and investments to digital communications.28 For example, pan-
African businesses and financial institutions, led by South African companies, are 
rapidly growing to create cross border networks in the region.29  There have been 
many projects aimed at building regional/sub-regional cooperation and economic 
integration in Africa, including the Economic Community of West African States, 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, The African Union, Arab Maghreb 
Union amongst others30.  Of huge significance however is the AfCFTA, a recent 
initiative that seeks to establish among other things, free trade among all African 
countries.31 With forty-nine out of fifty-four countries having executed it, the 
agreement is poised to become the biggest trade agreement since the formation of the 
World Trade Organisation.32  This collaboration among African countries encourages 
                                                          
26‘Economic Growth in Africa is on the Upswing Following a Sharp Slowdown’ The World Bank (19 April 2017). 
<www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2017/04/19/economic-growth-in-africa-is-on-the-upswing-
following-a-sharp-slowdown> accessed 8 September 2018. 
27 Marcel Fafchamps, Market institutions in sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and evidence (MIT press 2003); Chantal 
Uwimana, ‘How corruption is stifling Africa’s growth’ World Economic Forum (9 December 2014). 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/12/how-corruption-is-stifling-africas-growth/ > accessed 8 
September 2018. 
28 For example, One Africa Network is a project aimed at facilitating intra-African communications and digital 
networks. Jean-Philbert Nsengimana,’One Africa Network – Ending Africa’s digital exploitation The New Times (8 
August 2018) <www.newtimes.co.rw/opinions/oan-digital-africa  > accessed 10 September 2018. 
29 For example, it is not unusual to find a commercial bank headquartered in one African county operating across 
a few other African countries- Ecobank, United Bank for Africa and Diamond Bank are examples. 
30 See Trudi Hartzenberg, ‘Regional Integration in Africa’ (October 10, 2011) < https://ssrn.com/abstract=1941742 
> accessed 10 September 2018. 
31 The Africa Continental Free Trade Area, an agreement that is part of AU’s initiative for closer economic 
integration in Africa. The agreement was signed by 44 countries in March 2018 at an AU summit in Rwanda. AU, 
AfCTA <https://au.int/en/CFTASummit2018> accessed 10 September 2018. 
32 African continental free trade Area:  Policy and negotiation options for trade in Goods  (UNCTAD 2016); Justina 
Crabtree, Africa is on the verge of forming the largest free trade area since the World Trade Organization’ CNBC 
(20 March 2018) <www.cnbc.com/2018/03/20/africa-leaders-to-form-largest-free-trade-area-since-the-
wto.html>; Nigeria abstains as 49 AU members sign free trade pact’ News Agency of Nigeria (July 3, 2018). 
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horizontal movement of experiences, methods and regulatory strategies across the 
continent.33 
While this thesis does not claim to provide an in-depth account of the reform 
experience in all fifty-four African countries, it discusses reforms and changes 
introduced to restructuring law in thirty-six countries.34  One of the benefits of 
consolidating the discussion of reform and restructuring law developments in Africa 
is the opportunity to analyse the regional efforts of global actors on the continent. 
Also, it provides a basis for determining the general direction of insolvency 
developments in Africa, in the same way reform in Asian countries like South Korea, 
Indonesia, China and India has driven the Asian insolvency story, as told by Halliday 
and Carruthers.35 The discussion helps to paint a more complete picture of the trend 
towards convergence. In the process, it makes the original contribution of revealing 
the role of the African continent in the harmonisation trend and conversely, showing 
the impact of the movement on the continent.  
It also does the important work of laying the foundation for a deeper, multi-country 
discussion of the evolution of insolvency law and practice in Africa, as insolvency law 
and jurisprudence begin to take shape on the continent. However, because reforms 
are in their early days, the tensions between the law on the books and the law in 
practice are not extensively discussed in this research. Rather, what the thesis does is 
to identify potential challenges to the settling process by shedding some light on 
existing local institutions and practices. To allow for an in-depth analysis, this 
investigation of existing restructuring practices, institutions and the perspectives of 
stakeholders is limited to Nigeria.  
                                                          
<www.today.ng/news/nigeria/nigeria-abstains-49-members-sign-free-trade-pact-128821 > all accessed 10 
September 2018. 
33 PwC, Africa Asset Management 2020 <www.amafrica2020.com/amafrica2020/docs/am-africa-2020.pdf>; 
OECD, ‘Africa Economic Outlook 2015’ 
<www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2015/PDF_Chapters/Overview_AEO2015_EN-
web.pdf>  all accessed 10 September 2018. 
34 This is not intended to suggest that reforms are not happening in the other 18 countries. The selection of these 
countries is based on accessibility of information from different sources and is representative for the purpose of 
the research. 
35 Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday, ‘Negotiating globalization: Global scripts and intermediation in the 
construction of Asian bankruptcy regimes’ (2006) 31(3) Law & Social Inquiry 521-584; Terrence Halliday and Bruce 
Carruthers, ‘Foiling the Financial Hegemons: Limits to the Globalisation of Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes in 




1.4. Methodology  
Underneath the movement for global convergence in insolvency law lies unanswered 
questions about the theoretical foundations of insolvency regulation, the goals of 
insolvency and restructuring law and the roles of state and private actors in achieving 
them. The research considers conventional insolvency theories and how these theories 
are evolving with the increasing role of private bargaining in resolving financial 
distress, high creditor control, financial innovations and the use of corporate debt 
restructuring as an emerging response to financial distress. In presenting these 
debates, it considers the key elements of corporate debt restructuring and important 
considerations in the choices made by countries (particularly developing countries) in 
the design of restructuring law.    
The research also examines the trend towards global convergence in insolvency and 
the propagation of insolvency norms which have corporate rescue and restructuring 
at their core. Using the framework adopted by Halliday and Shaffer in their work on 
transnational legal orders, it discusses corporate debt restructuring in Africa as socio-
legal phenomena both in a global and local context.  In critiquing the trend towards 
global convergence, this research also engages the neo-institutional theory in the law 
and development literature, to unearth the challenges that the propagation of 
insolvency scripts by global actors presents for African countries.  
 
The empirical study in Nigeria provides material for discussing the relevance of so-
called global restructuring norms and guidelines to an African country. The study 
adopts a qualitative approach which is suitable for exploring the complex interaction 
of stakeholders with laws and institutions and their perspectives about new 
developments and proposed reforms. The findings from the study are of relevance to 
scholars and global actors involved in the formulation and propagation of insolvency 
norms transnationally. Likewise, it provides context-specific guidance to insolvency 
policymakers, stakeholders and researchers in Nigeria and other parts of Africa, as 




Choice of Nigeria for empirical case study 
Nigeria is the most populous and largest economy in Africa. The country has been 
recognised as one of the fastest growing on the continent, earning it a place on lists of 
emerging and frontier economies like the MINT, the Next Eleven and FTSE frontier 
markets list.36 Over the last decade, Nigeria has witnessed impressive economic 
growth engendered by economic reforms and increased foreign direct investment 
inflows. During this period, the average annual growth rate was over seven per cent, 
placing Nigeria amongst the fastest-growing economies of the world.37 Unfortunately, 
Nigeria recently plunged into economic recession, following the oil price drop and a 
forex crisis.38 This recession had an adverse effect on businesses, crippling small and 
big businesses alike. Large companies in the oil and gas, manufacturing, 
telecommunications, hospitality and aviation sectors received a hit.39  This had a ripple 
effect on smaller companies who built their business around servicing the larger 
companies.  The distress experienced by corporate bodies was also passed on to banks 
and other financial institutions, creating the risk of a systemic breakdown.40  
Nigeria is a highly influential country in Africa and it exhibits many of the issues that 
growing African countries grapple with. Despite its growth, it continues to suffer from 
weak institutional infrastructure, poor governance, professional capacity gaps, a 
defective judicial system and low transparency.41 The country is now in the middle of 
                                                          
36 The MINT countries: next economic giants? BBC (6 January 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
25548060>; accessed 10 September 2018; Goldman Sachs, ‘Beyond The Brics: A Look At The Next 11’ Insights (April 
2007) Ch 13. 
37 Reinaldo Fiorini and others, Africa’s Growing Giant: Nigeria’s New Retail Economy (McKinsey & Co, December 
2013) <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-insights/africas-growing-
giant-nigerias-new-retail-economy> accessed 10 September 2018. 
38 Maggie Fick, ’Nigeria economy suffers first annual contraction in 25 years’ Financial Times (28 February 2017) 
<www.ft.com/content/12698e60-fdb4-11e6-8d8e-a5e3738f9ae4> accessed 10 September 2018. 
39 For instance, Arik Air, West Africa’s biggest carrier recently went into receivership. Intercontinental Hotels and 
Etisalat Communications also suffered the same fate. Editorial, ‘Arik Air owes creditors N376 billion’ Vanguard 
Newspapers (12 April 2017); Yinka Ibukun and Tope Alake, ‘InterContinental Exits Nigeria Over Debt Fallout with 
Partners’ Bloomberg (10 January 2018) <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-10/intercontinental-hotels-
group-exits-nigeria-jan-18-over-debt> ; Bassey Udo, ‘Why we intervened in Etisalat debt crisis — CBN, NCC’ 
Vanguard (23 May 2017) <www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/234951-intervened-etisalat-debt-
crisis-cbn-ncc.html > all accessed 8 Septemeber 2018. 
40 Babajide Komolafe, ‘How economic recession constrained banking in 2016’ Vanguard News (1 January 2016) 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/01/economic-recession-constrained-banking-2016/> accessed 8 
Septemeber 2018. 
41 Onyenekenwa Cyprian Eneh, ‘Failed development vision, political leadership and Nigeria’s underdevelopment: 
A critique’ (2011) 1(1) Asian Journal of Rural Development 63-69. 
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an insolvency law reform and at the same time, stakeholders increasingly attempt to 
restructure distressed companies informally.42  These qualities make Nigeria a 
suitable case study for investigating the evolution of restructuring and insolvency 
practice in an African economy. As a debt restructuring system is being constructed 
both informally and formally, the country offers an opportunity to study the 
relationship between global norms and local practices and institutions, and between 
global actors and local actors.  
In terms of generalising the outcome of this study to other parts of Africa, there are 
limitations which relate to the previously mentioned diversity of the continent. 
Business culture, institutions and legal institutions can vary across Africa, therefore 
the experience in Nigeria is not expected to be on all fours with other countries. While 
acknowledging that not all the experience in Nigeria is generalisable, the thesis 
however emphasises issues that have been found to apply in many African countries, 
particularly relating to institutional quality and its effects on insolvency practices. The 
cumulative experience of a fast-growing African economy that is aiming to meet its 
development needs while navigating institutional deficiencies and the external 
pressures to conform to global standards, is one that other African countries at 
different stages of development can relate to. 
The empirical study: objectives, design, conduct and limitations. 
The qualitative research was conducted in Lagos state, Nigeria’s commercial hub 
where most businesses (including all commercial banks) have their head offices. 
The goals of the empirical study were to (i) understand how local actors experience 
corporate debt restructuring; (ii) learn how they interact with existing insolvency laws 
and institutions; and why these interactions have developed in the way they have; (iii) 
explore the views of local actors about proposed/ongoing insolvency law reform and 
(iv) investigate the impact (if any) of global norms and actors in insolvency and 
restructuring practice in Nigeria. 
                                                          
42 See INSOL, Africa Round Table 2015, Full Program <https://www.insol.org/library/opendownload/377 > 35-
36; Damilola Odetola, ‘Corporate insolvency reform in emerging Africa: the need, challenges and prospects’ (2017) 




In 2012, Adebola conducted empirical research on corporate rescue in Nigeria, 
interviewing lenders, judges, IPs and debtors.43 Adebola’s work sought to explain the 
gaps between the rescue laws (mostly receivership) on the books and the law in action 
by investigating the factors informing the actions and attitudes of stakeholders. Some 
of Adebola’s findings about the challenges that stakeholders identified with corporate 
rescue in general are confirmed in this thesis.  
This study however goes further to tell the story of an ongoing construction of a 
corporate debt restructuring practice in Nigeria. Beyond investigating the practice of 
extant laws, it investigates the actions of stakeholders in the shadow of the law, 
especially where informal debt restructuring is concerned. It also explores emerging 
developments in restructuring practice and the roles of global actors, local actors and 
professionals in these developments. In doing this, it captures the socio-cultural and 
institutional complexities of the transition from a traditional insolvency regime to a 
modern, restructuring system. In addition, it investigates the engagement of 
stakeholders with proposed insolvency law reform.  
Participants and conduct of study 
One of the most important set of actors in corporate debt restructuring are creditors. 
The interviews therefore focus on creditors, with commercial banks (which dominate 
corporate lending in Nigeria) accounting for fifty per cent of the participants. There 
are currently twenty-two commercial banks in Nigeria.44 Five out of these are top tier 
banks that engage in large corporate lending, syndicated lending, sovereign lending, 
issuing bonds and financing ground breaking infrastructural projects.45 Mid-range 
banks lend on a lower scale to a mix of large companies and SMEs and participate in 
                                                          
43 Bolanle Adebola, ‘Corporate rescue and the Nigerian Insolvency System’ (PhD thesis, UCL 2013) 191. 
44 Access Bank Plc, Citibank Nigeria Limited, Diamond Bank Plc, Ecobank Nigeria Plc, Enterprise Bank, Fidelity 
Bank Plc, First Bank Nigeria Limited, First City Monument Bank Plc, Guaranty Trust Bank Plc, Heritage Banking 
Company Ltd., Key Stone Bank, Mainstreet Bank, Skye Bank Plc, Stanbic IBTC Bank Ltd., Standard Chartered Bank 
Nigeria Ltd., Sterling Bank Plc, SunTrust Bank Nigeria Limited, Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, United Bank For Africa 
Plc, Unity Bank Plc, Wema Bank Plc, Zenith Bank Plc. See Central Bank of Nigeria Website 
<www.cbn.gov.ng/supervision/Inst-DM.asp> accessed 8 Septemeber 2018 (Note  that in 2015, Heritage Bank 
acquired Enterprise bank. Also, Mainstreet Bank was acquired by Skye Bank in 2014 as part of the restructuring of 
financial institutions in Nigeria).  
45 Zenith, First Bank, UBA, Access Bank and GTB are top tier banks rated by Tier 1 capital.The Banker (Global 1000) 
<https://www.thebanker.com/Top-1000 >; Aderemi Ojekunle, ‘Five Nigerian banks make it to the list of top 1,000 
global banks, here they are’ Business Insider (6 July 2018) <https://www.pulse.ng/bi/finance/5-nigerian-banks-
make-it-to-the-list-of-top-1-000-global-banks-id8585854.html> all accessed 8 Septemeber 2018 
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some syndicated lending and project finance.46 Smaller banks have lower credit 
ratings and capacity to participate in large syndicated lending.47  Participants in the 
empirical study were key officers in fifteen of the twenty-two banks (four of the five 
top tier banks, five mid-range banks and six of the smaller banks). The selection helped 
to achieve a balanced representation of practices by involving banks that deal with 
different sizes of companies and corporate debts. A representative sample also 
provided information on which practices can be said to have become embedded in the 
Nigerian lending industry. In addition, it provided material for discussing the 
practicality of a multi creditor restructuring framework that relies on unanimity. 
Finally, the bank interviews helped to gauge the involvement, both in terms of 
numbers and degree, of this important group of actors with proposed law reform.48  
The participants from the banks were the heads of the departments that handled loan 
defaults, often described as loan restructuring and review, remedial assets or recovery 
department. Because all the interviews were conducted in head offices, the 
participants had an informed understanding of not just how things worked in the 
head office but also in the thousands of branch offices across the nation. Many of them 
had been in the industry for decades.  
The next group of participants are insolvency practitioners (IPs), lawyers and 
accountants by profession. IPs were interviewed to gain some insight into the role of 
professionals in shaping debt restructuring and insolvency practice. There were 
eleven participants who had acted as receiver, liquidator, restructuring practitioner or 
all three. As insolvency practice is significantly dominated by lawyers in Nigeria, eight 
of the IPs were lawyers while the remaining three were accountants. In addition to 
explaining the challenges with corporate debt restructuring and their views on 
proposed law reform, IPs shared their experience with both lenders and corporate 
                                                          
46 See Global Credit Rating Co for Nigerian Bank ratings <http://globalratings.com.ng/news/article/gcr-
publishes-its-nigeria-bank-bulletin2> accessed 8 Septemeber 2018.  
47 ibid.  
48 For example, out of the fifteen bank officers, only two had some idea that a bill for insolvency law reform had 




debtors having represented both sides on different occasions. This was important 
because there were no debtor interviews in this study. 
Because the empirical study aimed to understand the drivers of reform in Nigeria and 
the role of global and local actors in the reform, it was important to speak to the 
Business Recovery and Insolvency Practitioners Association of Nigeria (BRIPAN),49 
the association coordinating insolvency law reform in Nigeria. Three members of the 
executive committee were interviewed, and they provided information regarding the 
proposed reform and its challenges.  
In total, twenty-nine interviews were conducted. The participants were contacted in 
different ways, mostly through social and professional networks. Bankers were 
particularly eager to participate in the research and provided information and access 
to their colleagues in other banks.  While none of the participants declined the request 
for an interview, four interviews had to be rescheduled on short notice because of 
busy schedules. Two participants (lenders) agreed to follow-up interviews for further 
clarification.  Participants were asked an average of ten questions and the interviews 
typically lasted between 0.45 and 1.30 hours. The interviews were semi-structured, 
though all participants had been contacted beforehand by email or phone and 
informed about the aim of the research and the information expected from them. This 
gave them some time to reflect on their work and articulate their views.  Participants 
had no difficulty understanding the questions and required little guidance in 
addressing the issues that the interviews sought to address.  
Limitations of empirical study 
The main limitation was difficulty in accessing companies that had gone through or 
were going through a debt restructuring. The first challenge with this was identifying 
such companies. There are over a million companies registered in Nigeria, spanning 
several sectors of the economy.50 Debt restructuring is often done informally and 
                                                          
49 BRIPAN currently represents the only form of organisation among Insolvency Practitioners in Nigeria. BRIPAN 
is a member association of INSOL International and engages in training and development of practitioners. 
Membership of BRIPAN is however not a prerequisite for practising as an insolvency practitioner in Nigeria. 
<http://bripan.org.ng/ >; < https://www.insol.org/ma-profile/7 > accessed 8 September 2018. 
50 As at 2017, the Corporate Affairs Commission had 1.5 million companies registered on its database. Harrison 
Edeh, ‘CAC has so far registered 1.5 million companies  in its database’ This Day (22 May 2017). 
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where attempted within a receivership, there is no database from which this 
information can be readily accessed. Banks and IPs were understandably reluctant to 
provide information about distressed companies with which they were working or 
had worked.  They alluded to the culture of shame around debt and distress, as no 
debtor would be proud to speak about their situation.  In the few cases where big 
companies were being restructured (usually as part of a formal procedure such as a 
receivership), identification was easy but there remained the issue of accessing the 
managers of such companies. Two companies that had recently gone through a 
restructuring were contacted but did not respond.  
Although interviews with managers of distressed companies would have provided 
more balanced material, this limitation is mitigated in two ways. First, while company 
representatives were impossible to reach, the interviews indirectly recorded their 
perspectives through insolvency practitioners that routinely represent them. 
Secondly, one of the IPs provided the opportunity for participant observation in an 
ongoing debt restructuring of a large manufacturing company.  While there was no 
opportunity to interview representatives of the distressed company, the observation 
which occurred over a four-week period provided an opportunity to listen to 
managers speak about their challenges. It also provided access to the financial history 
of the company including details of its borrowing, negotiation documents between 
the company and its lenders, restructuring schedules, and involved visits to the 
company’s premises for the inspection of its fixed assets.  This provided a unique 
insight into financial distress and issues around restructuring from the debtor’s 
perspective.  
Another group that was not included in the interviews were judges. Although judges 
are important because of the role they play in one of the primary institutions in 
insolvency regulation- the courts, this empirical study aimed to interview judges only 
on the condition that initial interviews revealed the need to do so; they did not. None 
of the questions that were central to the study needed to be directed to judges 
                                                          




specifically. Judges play a limited role in informal debt restructuring and where debt 
restructuring occurs within a formal process, lenders, lawyers and IPs often have the 
power to determine how the courts serve them. Furthermore, the constraints of the 
Nigerian judicial system are well documented, including in an empirical research 
conducted on corporate rescue in Nigeria.51   
Also, it would have been useful to obtain some statistics to support qualitative data 
obtained from the interviews. While interviews explained how stakeholders use the 
legal system, information about the frequency of entry and exit from insolvency 
procedures in Nigeria is shrouded in mystery. Participants hinted at the frequency 
with which insolvency procedures are used but it was impossible to get accurate 
numbers or even estimates from the interviews. Such data would be best obtained 
from the Corporate Affairs Commission, as all company information including 
receiverships and winding ups are required to be filed at the CAC. There is however 
no evidence that the CAC collate, organise or publish this information. A request was 
made to the CAC for information on the number of receiverships and winding up in 
Nigeria within a 5-year period, but this was not successful.52  
Some findings from the empirical study. 
Largely, the interviews achieved their aim and produced more than enough material 
to ground a thorough analysis of the issues highlighted for discussion and the 
conclusions reached. It was found that the restructuring environment in Nigeria can 
be difficult because of a combination of factors, some of which are systemic. For 
example, many participants identified courts, corruption and poor regulation as the 
key challenges in financial distress resolution. 
                                                          
51 Oko Okechukwu, ‘Seeking justice in transitional societies: an analysis of the problems and failures of the 
judiciary in Nigeria’ (2005) Brook. J. Int'l L. 31; Jude Cocodia, ‘Identifying causes for congestion in Nigeria’s courts 
via non-participant observation: A case study of brass high court, Bayelsa State, Nigeria’ (2010) 1 (11) International 
Journal of Politics and Good Governance 1-16; Adebola (n 43) 191. 
52 The CAC requested some documentation to allow them to process the request. The documentation was supplied 
but there has been no significant progress. The researcher intends to continue to pursue this data for future research 
in the area. 
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‘Instead of invoking confidence, the mention of court only invokes signs of 
uncertainty and resignation. If local people dread the courts that much, imagine 
how foreign investors would feel.’ 
Contrary to the common narrative, creditors do not go about liquidating companies 
at the earliest sign of trouble. The interviews show that winding up and receivership 
are often no more than a tool to exact some repayment or promise if it.  
‘I must be honest, I cannot recall any winding up where we went through with the 
process. At first, they think we are not serious but once we get a court order to 
advertise the petition, they quickly come to discuss a restructuring plan’. 
Participants identified some issues as ‘cultural’ and made some assertions based on 
anecdotal rather than real evidence.   While these are taken with caution, it gave a 
glimpse into their attitude towards distress and how their perspectives have shaped 
restructuring practice. 
‘Lenders are swayed by big names, I think it is a cultural thing’. 
There is a growing acknowledgment of the need for and importance of debt 
restructuring. There is however a pervasive distrust among stakeholders, coupled 
with regulatory and structural difficulties that make this difficult to achieve. Apart 
from weak institutions, stakeholders displayed a lack of confidence in the skills of 
other stakeholders in the lending industry. 
 ‘At the point of lending or restructuring, most banks assume that their in-house 
loan review department can do a good job of assessing the viability of a business, 
but they cannot. They are not trained to and are often too overwhelmed to do a 
thorough job’. 
The study also answered questions around the role of local actors and global norms 
in reform and how the roles of local practitioners in restructuring might be evolving.    
Data 
Data from the interviews was recorded either digitally or manually by note taking. 
Five of the interviews were conducted over the phone, and notes were taken over the 
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course of phone calls that lasted between 30-45 minutes. Where notes were taken, they 
were re-written immediately after the interview. 
The interviews were subsequently transcribed by the researcher. All data was 
completely anonymised even though personal details were obtained from all 
participants for organisation. Identifying factors have been completely removed from 
all data and quotes. The data was analysed using the Nvivo application. With the 
Nvivo application, trends and themes in the data became clearer, making it easier to 
eliminate repetition and structure the study coherently.  
1.5. Overview of Nigeria’s existing insolvency and restructuring framework  
Corporate insolvency in Nigeria has seen very little development since the enactment 
of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (CAMA), 53 where most of the legal 
framework for corporate insolvency is found. With growing markets, commercial and 
corporate issues dealing with capital markets, securities, investments, mergers and 
acquisitions have gone through relatively rigorous reform, resulting in separate 
legislations to deal with these market activities.54 The provisions on corporate 
insolvency however remained untouched. Corporate insolvency and restructuring 
procedures in Nigeria include winding up, receivership and the arrangement and 
compromise procedures.  
1.5.1. Winding up: A Nigerian company can be wound up in three ways- voluntarily, 
by the court or under court supervision.55 The most common form of winding up for 
a distressed company is a court winding up. A court winding up petition can be 
brought by the company, a creditor, the official receiver, a contributory, a trustee in 
insolvency, the Corporate Affairs Commission and /or a receiver.56  One of the 
grounds for a court winding up is the inability of a company to pay its debts. This is 
                                                          
53 Cap C20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (particularly sections 387 to 580).  
54 The Investment and Securities Act 2007 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rules 2013 regulate mergers, 
takeover and acquisitions of shares in publicly quoted companies in Nigeria. other relevant legislations - The Banks 
and other Financial Institutions Act (the BOFIA) 2004 regulates restructuring, reorganisation, mergers and disposal 
of banks; The Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Act 2004 regulates insurance of deposit liabilities of licensed 
banks and other financial institutions to protect interest of depositors in the event of imminent or actual financial 
difficulties of banks.  The Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria Act 2010 (as amended), established the 
Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria to efficiently resolve non-performing loan assets of banks.  
55 CAMA, s 401; The Federal High Court Act 2004, s7 and the Nigerian Constitution 1999, s251 (1) (e) confer 
jurisdiction to hear insolvency proceedings on the Federal High Court. 
56 CAMA, s 410. 
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defined in three ways- (i) where the company has neglected to pay a debt exceeding 
N2000 (USD 5) for three weeks, after a written demand has been made (ii) where a 
judgment debt made against the company has remain unpaid and (iii) when 
considering its contingent or prospective liability, the court is satisfied that the -
company is unable to pay its debts. Before a winding up order is given, the petition 
must be advertised in the national gazette, national and state newspapers.57 A 
liquidator may also be appointed to coordinate the winding up and is vested with 
powers such as audit of the company, asset sales, payment of creditors, litigation etc.   
Alternatively, a distressed company may be wound up without the involvement of 
the court. This is called a creditors’ voluntary winding up.58 The creditors can decide 
in a meeting that a resolution to wind up the company be passed.59 There is very little 
scope for court involvement in a voluntary winding up.60 It can however be quickly 
converted into a court-supervised process on the petition of creditors, the company or 
a contributory.61     
1.5.2. Receivership: a Nigerian company can borrow money by issuing a debenture62, 
which could be secured or naked, to the lender(s).63 A series of lenders can hold a 
debenture over the same asset(s). In this case, a debenture trust deed is executed, 
appointing a trustee to hold the assets for the benefit of the debenture holders.  Also, 
lenders can create a fixed and floating charge over all the assets and undertakings of 
the company, commonly called an all-asset debenture.64 A fixed charge allows the 
holder(s) to appoint a receiver while the holder of a floating charge can appoint a 
                                                          
57 CAMA, s 486. 
58 In a members’ voluntary winding up, the company is required to provide a declaration of solvency. 
59 Companies Winding up Rules 2001, s 117. 
60 For instance, where there is a disagreement over liquidator appointed by creditors and by the company. CAMA, 
s 474. 
61 CAMA, s 483. 
62 CAMA, s 176 (a debenture is a debt instrument that is executed in favour of a creditor by a company and 
evidences the company’s indebtedness to the holder, including the rights of the holder against the company. It 
could be secured or unsecured). 
63 CAMA, s 173. 
64 Floating charge is defined as an equitable charge over the whole or a specified part of the company's 
undertakings and assets, including cash and uncalled capital of the company both present and future and becomes 
enforceable on the occurrence of certain events including the appointment of a receiver manager. 
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receiver and manager ‘RM’, if the company defaults or becomes unable to pay its 
debts.65  
CAMA does not stipulate who should be appointed a receiver, it however precludes 
infants, persons of unsound mind, corporate bodies, undischarged bankrupts and 
persons convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty from acting as 
receiver.66 A receiver or RM can be appointed out of court, pursuant to an instrument 
such as a debenture. Although the law provides that such a receiver or RM can apply 
to court for directions for matters concerning his performance as receiver, his 
appointment requires no court sanction or involvement.  
When a RM is appointed, the law makes it clear that he is not a mere debt collector or 
debt recovery agent. Both receivers and RMs are deemed to be an agent of their 
appointor(s) but a RM owes the company a special duty to, ‘act at all times in what he 
believes to be the best interests of the company as a whole so as to preserve its assets, 
further its business, and promote the purposes for which it was formed’.67 The law describes 
the ‘best interest of the company’ to include the interests of the employees, members 
of the company and finally, special but not exclusive consideration to a special class 
of members or creditors that he is appointed to represent. Thus, even though not 
clearly spelt out, there is a scope for a RM to aim to rescue a distressed company.  
In practice, the receivership is a court-driven process, often characterised by unending 
litigation, unwritten rules and inconsistent decisions. One of the problematic aspects 
of the procedure concerns duties and powers of the receiver.68 While CAMA specifies 
that the receiver is an agent of the appointor, courts (in some cases, the Supreme court) 
have remained inclined to the common law position of holding the receiver to be an 
agent of the company.69 Similarly, the duty of a receiver to manage a company is not 
                                                          
65 Other means by which a debenture holder can realise their security is by a foreclosure action or winding up 
proceeding. 
66 CAMA, s 387. 
67 CAMA, s 390(a). 
68 Bolanle Adebola (n 43) 109, 117-119; E.S Nwauche,’The Duties of a Receiver/Manager in Nigeria and Ghana’ 
(2005) 14 (1) International Insolvency Review , Journal of the International Association of Insolvency Practitioners  
79-89. 
69 Unibiz (Nig) Ltd v CBCL Nig. Ltd [2001] 7 NWLR (pt 713) 534; [2003] 6 NWLR (pt816) 402. This was the previous 
position under Nigeria’s 1968 Companies Act. One of the changes made by CAMA is the alteration of the receiver’s 
agency to appointor rather than company. 
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free from controversy. Although the courts have on occasion reiterated that the RM 
must act in the best interest of the company while pursuing beneficial realisation for 
the appointor, they have not provided clear guidance on how the conflict between 
these duties are resolved.70  There has also been some confusion around the scope of 
a receiver’s powers, where rules not contained in CAMA have been developed by the 
courts and become embedded in practice. For example, in Intercontractors (Nig) v 
NPFMB71, the Supreme Court ruled that a receiver must seek the leave of court to 
institute an action on behalf of the company.72  
Insolvency is one area of law where there is a shortage of robust analysis, and this has 
further exacerbated the uncertainties and inconsistencies surrounding procedures like 
receivership.73 Scholars have pointed out that the procedure suffers from lack of 
expertise on the part of receivers/managers, underhanded practices and an 
overwhelming focus on debt recovery to the detriment of the company. This has 
motivated calls for insolvency frameworks that provide clearer guidance to actors and 
balance the rights of parties more effectively.74 
1.5.3. Arrangement and compromise: Nigerian law provides for an equivalent of the 
English scheme of arrangement, the arrangement and compromise procedures 
(referred to here as schemes). Section 537 of CAMA provides for an arrangement 
                                                          
70 See West African Breweries v Savannah Ventures Ltd [2002] 10 NWLR (pt 775) 401, 432 where the court held that 
the receiver manager breached his duty to manage the company by not striking a balance between the receivership 
and managing the company. As Nwauche suggests, the case seems to suggest albeit unclearly, that a decision to 
sell rather than manage what appears to be a going concern may lead to a conclusion that there has been a 
dereliction of the duty of care by the receiver/manager, thereby showing some commitment to corporate rescue 
goals. Nwauche (n 68) 84; In  Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd v Tropic Foods Ltd [1992] 3 NWLR (pt 228) 231, 245-246, the 
Nigerian Court of Appeal emphasised that a receiver/manager in the management of the company cannot ignore 
the interest of the company. 
71 [1988] 2 NWLR (pt 76) 280. 
72 A reiteration of its decision in Intercontractors Nig Ltd v UAC (Nig) Ltd (1988) 2 NWLR (pt 76) 303. See also Standard 
Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v. N.A.B Ltd (2003) F.W.L.R (pt 137) p. 1097. This position has since been changed by 
the decision in Wema Bank Plc v Onafowokan (2005) 6 NWLR (pt 921) 410, where the need for leave was dispensed 
with. Nwauche submits that a receiver/manager should obtain leave of the court to institute or defend actions. See 
Nwauche (n 68) 87 Some of these interpretational challenges may have stemmed from continued reliance on 
common law precedents and the repealed Companies Law Decree 1968 which was replaced by CAMA in 1990. 
73 Adebola (n 43) 111. 
74 Iyiola Oyedepo, ‘The Imperatives of a Vibrant Insolvency Practice in Nigeria’ (February 2008) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089345> accessed 10 September 2018; Akingbolahan 
Adeniran, ‘A Mediation-Based Approach to Corporate Reorganisations in Nigeria’ (2003) 29 NCJ Int’l L & Com 
Reg 291; Anthony Idigbe and Okorie Kalu,’ Nigeria: Recent Strides in Nigerian Insolvency Law - Banking 
Insolvency & AMCON Act’ Mondaq (5 October 2015) 
<www.mondaq.com/Nigeria/x/431946/Insolvency+Bankruptcy/Recent+Strides+In+Nigerian+Insolvency+La
w+Banking+Insolvency+AMCON+Act > accessed 10 September 2018. 
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which is defined to mean ‘any change in the rights or liabilities of members, debenture 
holders or creditors of a company or any class of them…other than a change effected 
under any other provision of the Act or by the unanimous agreement of all parties 
affected’.  The ‘change’ referred to in section 537 may be in the form of a compromise 
by the creditors (and or members).75  
The courts have an important role to play in the process. When the proposal for the 
scheme is made, an application is made to the court to order a meeting of the relevant 
parties- creditors or class of creditors, members or class of members.76 For the purpose 
of making decisions at this meeting, the majority is set at three quarters of the value 
in shares or interests of the members of the relevant class.77 If the court is satisfied as 
to the fairness of the scheme, it sanctions it and it becomes binding. 78 
 
Schemes proved particularly useful in the banking industry during the 2004 Central 
Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) consolidation exercise which aimed to clean up the 
operations of commercial banks.79 Many Nigerian banks executed compliance with 
the CBN’s regulations by using schemes of arrangement to restructure their 
operations.80 Given their non-contentious nature and the involvement of the CBN, 
these schemes were executed within as little time as possible.81  
                                                          
75 CAMA, s 539.  It is useful to draw a distinction between an arrangement/compromise and an arrangement on 
sale as defined by section 538 of the Act. The section 539 procedure on first look seems to have the characteristics 
of an insolvency procedure as it expects that a members’ voluntary winding up be conducted, and a liquidator 
engaged to sell the undertaking of the company wholly or in part to another company. The members are paid their 
consideration in the form of shares in the transferee company, debentures, policies, cash or other interests. This is 
a useful restructuring tool as it allows the arrangement to be made by special resolution with minimal court 
involvement.  However, the Act in different section, requires that a members’ voluntary winding up be 
accompanied by a declaration of solvency. This makes it difficult to reconcile the use of this device when the 
company is distressed or on the brink of insolvency.  
76 CAMA, s 540. 
77 CAMA, s 539(2). 
78 CAMA, s 539 (3) 
79 K.S Adeyemi, ‘Banking sector consolidation in Nigeria: Issues and challenges’ (2006) 9(3) Union digest 1-19. 
80 Scope of Banking Activities & Ancillary Matters, No. 3, became effective on November 15, 2010, prohibiting 
banks from undertaking non-banking activities. See Tunde Ogowewo and Chibuike Uche,’(Mis) using bank share 
capital as a regulatory tool to force bank consolidations in Nigeria’ (2006) Journal of African law (2006) 50 (2) 161-
186. 
81 The timeline for the UBA (one of the banks) scheme of arrangement for instance was three months- between 
November 2012 and January 2013. See scheme documents at 
<https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/51496585/scheme-of-arrangement-between-united-bank-uba-
pl c> accessed 12 July 2018. 
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With the tension and pressures that come with financial distress, the seemingly 
straightforward scheme provisions can quickly become complicated.82 Design 
challenges such as the lack of a moratorium also contribute to this. As schemes are not 
exclusively designed as a rescue or even insolvency tool, the kind of philosophy that 
seeks to restrict the race to collect by imposing a ‘stay of proceedings’ is absent. Also, 
the voting mechanism in a scheme allows for a three-quarter majority within each 
voting class. This creates a challenge with cramming down a whole class of creditors 
who can hold the whole scheme to ransom irrespective of the nature of their stake.  
There are very few reported cases on the procedure in Nigeria83 and it has been 
pointed out that the lack of case law suggests its unsuitability and resulting disuse.84 
Another scholar argues that the Nigerian scheme provisions are laced with absurdities 
resulting from defective legislative drafting and poor grasp of the procedure by 
policymakers.85 More complexity is introduced by the involvement of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in sanctioning a scheme.86 The time and effort 
required to obtain the court and regulatory sanctions makes it difficult to use for the 
resolution of financial distress.  
1.6. Key concepts in corporate restructuring and insolvency. 
This section aims to clarify the meanings of some fundamental terms and concepts and 
the senses in which they are used in this thesis.  
Insolvency generally refers to the inability (rather than refusal or unwillingness) of a 
debtor to pay its creditors. However, there are different senses in which the term might 
be used. A company may be balance sheet or cash flow insolvent. The former is a 
                                                          
82 Schemes have been used to relieve distressed companies but mostly for capital restructuring. See for example 
the capital reduction of the troubled telecommunications company, Starcomms Plc in Dipo Okuribido,’The Scheme 
of Arrangement:  A Viable Option for Nigerian Companies in a Downturn’ (2018) 1 Emerging Markets 
Restructuring Journal 27; Adeniran (n 74) 291. 
83 Adeniran (n 74) 299; for example Oceanic Int Bank v Victor Odili [2005] FHC/L/CS/1361/;  Andrucchue Investment 
Plc v Financial Mediators [1994] FHCLR; Re-Interfirst Finance Securities Limited [1993] FHCLR 421, 424-425; Yinka 
Folawiyo & Sons v Hammond Projects Ltd [1977] 3 FRCR 143; Finbank plc V BGL [2011] FHC/CS/L/1367/. 
84 Adeniran (n 74) 292-293. 
85 Tunde Ogowewo, ‘The Dual Statutory Procedure for Effecting a Scheme of Arrangement in Nigeria: Law Reform 
or Retrogression’ (1994) Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 6 (1994) 594; Ogoewo and Uche (n 80) 180-183,  For example, the 
effort to distinguish between internal restructurings and amalgamation was so poorly executed that it has created 
some confusion in relation to the duties of the courts and SEC. 
86 The Court may refer a scheme to SEC ‘which shall appoint one or more inspectors to investigate the fairness of 
the said compromise or arrangement and to make a written report’ to the court. CAMA, s 539 (2). 
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technical accounting term that describes a situation where the book value of 
company’s assets is less than its liabilities. Cash flow insolvency on the other hand 
refers to a company’s inability to pay its debts as they fall due.87 This can be proved in 
a number of ways including the company’s non-payment of obligations, the presence 
of a large amount of unpaid debt or its admission of inability to pay. Thus, a company 
which is not yet balance sheet insolvent may be cash flow insolvent, if its assets are 
illiquid. Conversely, a company that is balance sheet insolvent may be able to continue 
paying its debts as they fall due, for a period of time. 88 In addition to being a factual 
situation, insolvency is also a legal concept, where the law defines the criteria that can 
trigger an insolvency procedure. For example, an insolvency law may require cash 
flow insolvency evidenced by inability to pay a specified minimum upon demand, as 
the requirement for commencing an insolvency procedure.89  
In relation to insolvency procedures, a distinction is made between liquidation and 
restructuring, which is discussed in some detail in chapter three. A liquidation refers 
to the sale of a company’s assets for cash or cash equivalent.90 A restructuring is the 
rearrangement of a firm’s financial obligations (and of its operations in some cases), 
which is often attended by a rehabilitative goal to keep the company or its business 
functioning as a going concern.91 
Also, financial distress, a term which is often used to describe cash flow insolvency, is 
distinguished from economic distress.92 A financially distressed business is one that is 
                                                          
87 John Armour, ‘The law and economics of corporate insolvency: A review’ (2001) ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge 3-4. 
88 ibid 3-5. This may be misleading as to the company’s health or long-term viability and explains why countries 
like the UK include contingent and prospective liabilities in their definition of cash flow insolvency. Insolvency 
Act 1986, s 123(c ); see also the Supreme Court’s decision in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail [2013] 
UKSC 28, which clarifies the meaning of balance sheet insolvency  under s123(2). The Supreme Court rejected the 
“point of no return” formulation of the Court of Appeal, holding instead that the balance sheet insolvency test 
requires a detailed consideration of a company’s position, and the court cannot be satisfied simply because the 
aggregate value of its liabilities exceeds the value of its assets.  
89 Nigerian law for example defines inability to pay debt to include indebtedness in a sum exceeding N2,000 which 
has remained unpaid for three weeks after demand. CAMA, s 409. 
90 The term is often used interchangeably with ‘winding up’ but they are slightly different. While liquidation can 
(and often occurs) within a winding up procedure, in the technical sense, it is not restricted to a winding up and 
can also occur in other procedures such as receivership.  Armour, ‘The Law and Economics’ (n 87) 4. 
91 Jennifer Payne, ‘Debt Restructuring in English Law: Lessons from the US and the Need for Reform’ (2014). 
Legal Research Paper Series Paper No 89/2013 2. 
92  Armour, ‘The Law and Economics’ (n 87) 3. 
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suffering from liquidity issues but remains viable i.e. has prospects of making profits.93  
On the other hand, an economically distressed business lacks profit making capacity 
and has no going concern value.94   
The importance of this distinction is that the optimal choice between liquidation and 
restructuring is predicated on a determination of the true state of the company- 
whether economically or financially distressed. For a firm in economic distress, the 
net present value will always be negative regardless of management or operational 
changes.95 Thus, there is nothing to be gained from keeping the firm or its assets 
together by restructuring it or selling as a going concern. A financially distressed firm 
however has a going concern value and merely suffers a liquidity problem.96 This firm 
is worth keeping together as its problems may be solved by operational changes, debt 
restructuring, debt-rescheduling and/or change in management.  
Finally, reference to law in this thesis means corporate insolvency and restructuring 
law- legislations that establish frameworks/mechanisms for winding up 
insolvent/distressed companies or provide an alternative to liquidation. On a broader 
scale, insolvency regimes or systems capture three elements (i) insolvency laws and 
the frameworks they establish (for example, the English administration procedure) (ii) 
institutions that implement them such as courts and professionals (iii) other corporate 
debt restructuring mechanisms, formal and informal, that aim to resolve financial 
distress and are therefore connected to insolvency law. 97 When the argument requires 
it, a distinction is made among these elements.  
 
 
                                                          
93 From this point, reference to distressed companies in this chapter should be understood to mean financially 
distressed companies operating viable businesses. 
94 See Douglas Baird, ‘Bankruptcy's uncontested axioms’ (1998) 108(3) The Yale Law Journal 573-599; Paul 
Goldschmid, ‘More phoenix than vulture: The case for distressed investor presence in the bankruptcy 
reorganization process’ (2005) Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 191, 198. 
95 Régis Blazy and Bertrand Chopard, ‘Ex post efficiency of bankruptcy procedures (2004) 24(4) International 
Review of Law and Economics 448-449; Armour, ‘The Law and Economics’ (n 87) 3-4; Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s 
uncontested axioms’ (n 94) 581-583. 
96 ibid. 
97 As discussed earlier, some restructuring mechanisms do not require factual insolvency and are not regarded as 




1.7. Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured in seven chapters. This first chapter provides a general 
overview. It explains the research questions and objectives and the methodology 
adopted in resolving them. The chapter sets the agenda for understanding the 
relationship between developments in African restructuring law and practice and the 
global convergence of insolvency laws. It identifies a primary concern for ongoing 
reforms- whether they are responding to development needs in Africa or to the 
pressure to keep up with the rest of the world. The chapter also introduces Nigeria as 
a suitable case study for generating a focused discussion on corporate debt problems 
and the construction of corporate debt restructuring practice in a growing African 
nation.  
Chapter two explores theories about the regulation of corporate insolvency. It 
discusses the growing connection between private bargaining and insolvency, and the 
debates that the role of the law in insolvency regulation might be exaggerated. The 
chapter considers the significant role of creditors in determining how financial distress 
is resolved (both before and after the distress occurs). This creditor control has gained 
more significance due to innovative financial structuring and increased emphasis on 
debt restructuring as a viable alternative to liquidation.  
Following the discussion in chapter two, chapter three focuses on debt restructuring 
as an emerging response to financial distress. Discussion here reinforces the 
arguments made in chapter two about the ability of creditors to determine the 
outcome of financial distress by private bargaining. The chapter discusses the 
relationship between debt restructuring and corporate rescue and revisits questions 
about the role of law (and courts) in the resolution of financial distress. The chapter 
also discusses key elements in the design of debt restructuring mechanisms, drawing 
from different legal frameworks and principles and guidelines developed over time 
by institutions like the World Bank, IMF and UNCITRAL.  It highlights the 
considerations for developing countries in choosing between alternative systems of 
debt restructuring.  
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Chapter four builds on the discussion of restructuring principles and norms which 
have become influential in insolvency law reforms across the globe. Using Halliday 
and Shaffer’s work on Transnational Legal Orders (TLOs), this chapter considers how 
the activities of certain actors propagate insolvency norms transnationally. It also 
considers Carruthers and Halliday’s ideas about the settling of these norms at national 
and local levels. This analysis resonates with broader socio-legal research about the 
influence of underlying cultural values, social relations, local peculiarities and 
political processes embedded in each jurisdiction, on law reform. The contribution of 
this chapter is two-fold, it promotes an understanding of global influence on 
insolvency law and at the same time emphasises the need to understand socio-
economic peculiarities at the local level. It provides a framework for considering how 
the trend and content of insolvency reform in Africa is influenced by so-called global 
norms. Also, the analysis on the settling of insolvency law at the local level provides 
the tools to question whether so-called best practises and ideal forms are suitable for 
African economies. 
Chapter five examines insolvency and restructuring developments across Africa in 
two dimensions. One is the evolution of restructuring practice and the other is the 
trend of insolvency law in thirty-six countries. This chapter examines observable 
patterns in these reforms vis claims of the emergence of an insolvency TLO.   
One lesson from the discussion in the thesis is that although emerging African 
countries are faced with an array of choices of debt restructuring mechanisms, they 
are potentially subject to the pressure to comply with certain ‘ideal’ frameworks. 
Consequently, a clear understanding of their local institutions and peculiarities is 
necessary for making the most efficient choices while navigating the globalised world 
of insolvency. Thus, chapter six seeks to better understand these local peculiarities by 
studying the restructuring experience in Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria.  
The qualitative study explores the experience of actors (corporate lenders, debtors and 
insolvency practitioners) with insolvency law, proposed restructuring reform, 
emerging restructuring practices and the influence or role of global actors and norms 
in these. It also seeks to understand how local peculiarities such as institutional 
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factors, social values and political processes affect insolvency practice and 
restructuring.  
Chapter seven outlines the findings of the thesis and extracts important considerations 
in the design of context-specific restructuring guidelines in Nigeria and other African 
countries. It discusses ways by which countries in Africa can adapt transnational 
norms of insolvency to meet their restructuring needs. The chapter concludes that 
while reforms in African countries are ostensibly furthering the global trend towards 
convergence by adopting ideal insolvency frameworks, the compatibility of these laws 
with local institutions are in question. This can pose significant challenges for 
implementation, which if not corrected may deprive these countries of the benefits of 



















THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN INSOLVENCY REGULATION AND 
POLICYMAKING 
Introduction.  
Insolvency regulation has come to be regarded as an important part of social life. It 
has gained even more importance after series of financial crises hit the global 
economy.98 Now, almost every country has mechanisms for dealing with insolvent or 
distressed companies.99  
While the need for insolvency systems may be fairly settled, many questions linger 
regarding the form, goals and content of insolvency law. Throughout the 
development of the field of insolvency law, three questions have been persistently 
asked; what purpose does insolvency law serve? What purpose should it serve? How should it 
achieve its goals?100  These questions have survived many decades and may never grow 
old.101 Not only do they have theoretical appeal in the academic field, they also have 
practical significance. As times change and markets evolve, there is a constant need to 
revisit insolvency policy.102 Also, each financial or economic crisis teaches the world 
new things about insolvency law and policy.103  Furthermore, as our understanding 
of institutions and how they operate in different economic, social and political settings 
improve, there is a need to adapt insolvency frameworks to the peculiarities of 
different jurisdictions. At the same time, powerful global actors, spurred on by rising 
                                                          
98 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 70; Laryea (n 11) 17.  
99 World Bank Doing Business Reports provide country specific information.  Out of about 196 independent 
countries in the world, the Doing Business 2018 rank 190 countries, all of which have some form of insolvency 
mechanism <www.doingbusiness.org/rankings > accessed 22 August 2018. 
100 Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 94) 580-583 gives a summary of debates between the competing 
groups. 
101 The debates about the goals of insolvency law gained momentum with Thomas Jackson’s formulation of the 
Creditors’ Bargain Theory in 1982. Thomas Jackson in Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the 
Creditors' Bargain (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal. 
102 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 28; The American 
Bankruptcy Institute, Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (2012-2014) Final Report 18. 
103 One vital lesson that has been learnt from financial crises is the importance of rehabilitative frameworks and 
corporate rescue. Laryea (n 11) 17-19; many jurisdictions have sought to develop appropriate responses to financial 
distress and have had considerable success in adopting viable insolvency alternatives. Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate 
Rescue in a World of Debt’ (2008) JBL 756; Armour and Deakin,’ Norms in Private Insolvency: The "London 
Approach" To the Resolution of Financial Distress’ (2001) 1 J. Corp. L. Stud. 21, 23. 
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international collaborations and integration of markets, push the need for 
convergence in insolvency regulation across jurisdictions.104   
This chapter has three objectives, the first of which is to discuss mainstream theories 
with which scholars have sought to provide theoretical guidance and justification for 
insolvency law and policy. The first part of the chapter discusses the main theories in 
two broad categories, the exclusive, creditor-focused view of insolvency and the 
inclusive perspectives that advocate for the inclusion of wider interests in 
insolvency.105  It finds that while the former primarily thrives on efficiency, the latter 
is anchored on fairness and inclusion. Also, these theories are not free of policy 
influences and value choices, and they have been significantly inspired by the 
experience in influential jurisdictions like the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK).   It is expected that insolvency laws of countries share some 
similarities but also have differences that reflect the different underlying policy 
considerations, socio-economic realities, values and needs.  
The second part of the chapter considers the less conventional ground for contestation 
in insolvency theory, the argument for a contractual insolvency system that gives 
creditors considerable freedom to determine how financial distress is resolved. This 
proposition challenges the foundations of the mainstream theories of insolvency, as 
they proceed from an assumption that the law has a direct regulatory role to play in 
insolvency. The chapter finds that criticisms of contractual insolvency echo the 
criticisms that have been levelled against the creditors’ bargain theory. 
It points out that the arguments are heavily influenced by US law and do not consider 
the use of debt structures to achieve creditor control in the other countries like the UK, 
and the innovative means by which creditors bypass the effects of insolvency law even 
in the US. Thus, the contractualist proposals may not be as radical as critics suggest. 
The chapter also finds that restrictions on creditors’ rights which are often informed 
by fairness concerns, elicit ingenious ways of circumventing the law. Consequently, 
                                                          
104 Halliday and Carruthers, ‘The recursivity of law’ (n 16) 1135-1202; Roman Tomasic, ‘Insolvency Law Reform in 
Asia and Emerging Global Insolvency Norms’ (2007) 15 Insolvency Law Journal 229-242. 
105 The economic approach (described as free marketers by Baird) exalt the goal of efficiency above all else, a goal 
best achieved by maximising the wealth of consensual creditors. Advocates of the inclusive view on the other hand 
view it as a forum for ensuring that all affected parties receive fair treatment. Baird (n 94) 580-583.  
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creditors can achieve different results from what the theories and policies envisage 
and what insolvency law intends.  
2.0. The economic account of insolvency law. 
2.1. The goal of efficiency in insolvency 
Economic theories are strongly driven by the goal of efficiency.106 Efficiency is 
however a multifarious concept and it is important that the different senses in which 
this term is used are set out early in this work. The word ‘efficiency’ can be explained 
in terms of allocation of wealth. This stipulates that the value of assets be maximised 
by allocating them to their highest use.107 There are two broad concepts of allocative 
efficiency. A pareto efficient situation refers to one where the welfare of one individual 
cannot improve without another member of the group being made worse off.108 This 
understanding of efficiency has been used to justify the principle of equality in wealth 
distribution.109 Kaldor–Hicks efficiency on the other hand is when the value received 
by one party outweighs the losses suffered by the other. In both cases, value is 
measured by the willingness of the parties to pay for the benefit. Those who gain could 
in principle compensate the losers and still be better off. Because these forms of 
efficiency are judged according to the value placed by economic actors on wealth, an 
action is considered efficient as long as it maximises collective wealth and not 
individual gains.110 Thus, allocative efficiency is achieved when the people that value 
a benefit the most and are willing to pay for it, receive it. This is proof that wealth has 
been put to its most valuable use.  
Specifically in insolvency, efficiency is often evaluated in two senses- ex ante and ex 
post efficiency. An optimally-efficient insolvency framework is determined by both 
                                                          
106 Stephen e. Margolis, ‘Two Definitions of Efficiency in Law and Economics’ (1987) 16 J. Legal Stud. 471. 
107  Guido Calabresi, ‘About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin’ (1980) Hofstra L. REv. 553. 
108 It is however difficult to conceive of many situations in practical terms where redistribution can be made 
without someone else being made worse off. Trina Bose, ‘Resolving Financial Distress -Justice as Fairness and 
Reciprocity’ (2004) UCL Jurisprudence Rev. 230, 234. 
109 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner’ (1980) 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563, 
566.  
110 This is a reflection of Posner’s definition of Efficiency as a ‘means exploiting economic resources in such a way 
that value-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate willingness to pay for goods and services is maximized’ 
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977) 10; Posner, 'The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency 
Norm in Common Law Adjudication' (1980) 8 Hofstra Lair Review 487. For a criticism of this view, see Margolis 
(n 106) 472-473 (it is impossible and undesirable to achieve as it takes no account of transaction costs).  
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its ex ante and ex post efficiency implications.111 Ex ante efficiency refers to the 
incentives (or disincentives) that an insolvency regime creates for creditors and 
debtors before the company goes insolvent. Insolvency regimes can affect the cost and 
availability of credit by informing the willingness of creditors to lend, the terms on 
which they are willing to lend and the commitment of creditors to monitor the 
activities of debtors.112 They can also affect the incentives of managers and 
entrepreneurs.113 Thus, it is claimed that the protection of creditors’ interests in 
insolvency procedures affects the cost of credit ex ante.114 The protection of creditors’ 
interests here concerns the returns they receive in insolvency and how much control 
they have in the process. Qian and Strahan argue that strong creditor rights expand 
loan availability which in turn increases the potential for economic growth. This is 
because with better legal protection during insolvency, lenders are willing to extend 
credit on favourable terms ex ante.115 As we consider shortly, this idea of creditor 
protection often sets the goal of efficiency against fairness concerns in insolvency.  
Ex post efficiency is achieved when the optimal choice is made in relation to an 
insolvent company. Broadly, the choices are between a liquidation and a 
restructuring. The choice between liquidation and restructuring, or who is in the best 
position to make it is not always a straightforward one.  Making the optimal choice 
requires a determination of whether the company is financially or economically 
distressed.116 The next chapter considers how conflicting self-interests can complicate 
the process of making an efficient choice. 117 
                                                          
111 Cornelli Francesca and Leonardo Felli, ‘Ex-ante efficiency of insolvency procedures’ (1997) 41 (3) European 
Economic Review 475-485. 
112 Blazy and Chopard (n 95) 448. 
113 Some research has been done on the relationship between the incentives of managers/entrepreneurs and 
insolvency law. They are not discussed here as this thesis focuses on creditors. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, 
‘An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting’ (1992) 59 (3) The Review of Economic Studies 473-494; 
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114 Lawrence Weiss, ‘Bankruptcy resolution: Direct costs and violation of priority of claims’ (1990) 27 (2) Journal of 
Financial Economics 285-314; Cornelli and Felli (n 111) 476. 
115 Where creditor protection is strong, bank loans tend to have longer maturities and lower interest rates. Jun Qian 
and Phillip Strahan, ‘How laws and institutions shape financial contracts: The case of bank loans’ (2007) 62 (6) The 
Journal of Finance 2803, 2805. 
116 See Chapter 1, page 25. 
117 Thomas Jackson and Robert E. Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the 
Creditors' Bargain’ (1989) 75 Va. L. Rev. 169-170. 
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Apart from making the optimal choice, an important aspect of ex post efficiency is 
transaction cost efficiency.118 Technical or transaction cost efficiency is concerned with 
achieving desired results with the minimum use of resources and costs and minimum 
wastage of effort.119 The cost-benefit analysis provided by transaction cost efficiency 
is important in the implementation of any normative theory.120  The choice of an 
insolvency procedure and the process itself are technically efficient when wastage of 
efforts, time and resources are eliminated. Summarily, an efficient insolvency 
framework is one (i) that provides the right incentives for creditors ex ante by 
reducing (or not increasing) the cost of credit (ii) that makes the right choice between 
liquidation and restructuring and (iii) where the benefits of the procedure exceeds its 
costs.  
2.2. The Creditors’ Bargain Theory- an efficiency-driven theory. 
The most widely referenced economic account of insolvency law is the Creditors 
Bargain Theory “CBT”, developed by Thomas Jackson and later, Douglas Baird and 
Robert Scott.121 The proponents of this theory who have been referred to as free 
marketers,122 adopt efficiency in its different forms as described above. The CBT is 
backed by neoclassical economics ideas such as the assumption that every individual 
is rational and will make rational choices to promote their self-interest.123 In its 
simplest formulation, the theory views insolvency law as a representation of what the 
creditors of a company would agree to ex ante, if they were to bargain for the rules 
that will apply to them upon the debtor’s insolvency.124  Like a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance,125 creditors at the point where the bargain is made, are unaware of the 
                                                          
118 Armour, ‘Law and Economics’ (n 87) 15-19. 
119 Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (n 102) 61, footnote 110. Dynamic efficiency refers to the capacity of a given 
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120 Armour, ‘Law and Economics’ (n 87) 15. 
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Donald Korobkin, ‘Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates’ (1996) 82 Iowa L. Rev. 75.  
123 Robert K Rasmussen, ‘Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of 
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124 Jackson, ‘Entitlements’ (n 101) 857. 
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people would choose if they did not know what their place in society and the amount of wealth or natural abilities 
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position they would be in relation to the other creditors or where the operations of the 
debtors’ business would place them in the future. On the assumption that these 
creditors are risk averse, the uncertainty motivates them to consent to a bargain that 
allows equal treatment with creditors having similar claims, in the event of 
insolvency.126      
The main argument and probably the most controversial claim of the CBT is that the 
sole aim of insolvency law is (or should be)127 to solve creditor coordination problems 
by providing a collective mechanism for settling creditor claims.128 Collective action 
in insolvency law is necessitated by the ‘common pool problem’ which sets several 
entitled creditors with legitimate claims against a pool of limited assets.129 The 
knowledge that the assets are insufficient to fully satisfy each claim triggers what is 
described as ‘the race to collect’, a potentially destructive move by creditors to beat 
others to enforce their rights against the company’s assets, prematurely driving the 
debtor off the cliff. Collective action provides the space to determine how best to 
allocate and maximise value.  
Individual enforcement actions also come at a cost to an enforcing party. In different 
jurisdictions (some more than others), debt enforcement actions are quite problematic 
and demanding in terms of time and money.130 Furthermore, if parties are to get the 
best from individual enforcement, they would need to monitor the debtor closely.131 
Such monitoring comes with costs of its own. Jackson regards these costs as strategic 
                                                          
would be, they would choose a system is one that caters to the welfare of the least-advantaged members of the 
society.  This is what he refers to as the ‘veil of ignorance’. John Rawls, A theory of Justice (1971).  
126 David Carlson, ‘Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors' Bargain’ (1993) 61 U. Chi. L. Rev 486; this equal treatment 
is pareto efficient as no consensual creditor is left worse off. Other interests (non-consensual creditors) affected by 
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‘Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth’ (2000) 60 (3) Cambridge Law Journal 581 – 621. 
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Theory (n 126) 480. 
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129 ibid 862-864.  
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of doing business in about 190 countries is ranked based on criteria such as debt enforcement. Doing Business 
Report 2018 (Resolving Insolvency Methodology) <www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/resolving-
insolvency> accessed 22 August 2018; see also Simeon Djankov and others, ‘Debt Enforcement around the World’ 
(2008) 116 Journal of Political Economy 1105. 
131 Jackson, ‘Entitlements’ (n 101) 862- 864. 
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costs that can be reduced by mandatory collective action.132  For mandatory collective 
action to be effective however, the incentive for individual enforcement must be 
removed. Consequently, no creditor should be able to opt out of the collective 
procedure contractually or by other means.133 
The CBT is committed to the maintenance of pre-insolvency entitlements. This means 
that insolvency law tries as much as possible to mirror the pre-insolvency rights of 
creditors (of course with the exception of individual enforcement rights) in a bid to 
eliminate strategic actions by creditors.134 Only creditors whose claims originate from 
a contractual relationship should be included in the collective bargain.135 This aversion 
to distributional motives in insolvency law has been debated by academics, 
particularly in relation to security interests.136 With few exceptions, secured creditors 
are not subjected to the collective enforcement rule in the same manner as unsecured 
creditors. This is because they can look to their security which is considered outside 
the reach of the common pool. Underlying the priority of secured credit is the 
perceived efficiency of security interests in commercial lending.137  
A popularly held view in Law and Economics is that secured creditors can charge 
lower interest rates because they are certain of their position in the event of the 
debtor’s insolvency. For unsecured creditors, they can adjust to the uncertainty and 
any adverse effect of security interests on their claims, by charging higher interest 
rates.138 For this reason, security interests are pareto efficient because no one is made 
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worse of as a result of the benefit to another.139 They also argue that security helps to 
reduce the cost of credit for the borrower.140 A security interest can help to prevent or 
reduce an inefficient run on the borrower’s assets. Because the secured creditor has 
priority over all other creditors in relation to the security, there is no incentive for 
unsecured creditors to make a move on the assets if the company gets into financial 
trouble.141  Additionally, secured credit enables a company to fund risky but profitable 
projects for which it would otherwise be unable to obtain loans.142 Based on the 
efficiency arguments they make, law and economics scholars caution that tinkering 
with the priority rights of secured creditors would have a disruptive effect on non-
insolvency behaviour (i.e. distort their incentives ex ante) and may impose costs 
‘elsewhere in the debtor-creditor’ system.143   
The efficiency attributed to security interests has been labelled as ‘overrated’ by some. 
Secured credit comes with costs of its own, which may cancel out its efficiency 
benefits. Bebchuk and Fried outline some of these costs.144 First, they identify 
contracting costs, incurred in the process of negotiating and perfecting the security 
interest. In some jurisdictions, perfection of security could be a very cumbersome and 
costly process.145 Costs may also be incurred in the process of ‘policing the collateral’ 
to ensure that the right of the security holder to reclaim the collateral above every 
other interest is not put at risk through an illegal transfer, destruction, waste or 
                                                          
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1997) 47 Duke Law Journal 425; Riz Mokal, ‘The Search for Someone to 
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subordination.146 Opportunity costs also arise because security interests may prevent 
the borrower from pursuing more efficient activities.147  
Even in the absence of mandatory rules to that effect, enforcement difficulties may 
incentivise secured creditors to participate in the collective process. The rate and ease 
of enforcing security differs with jurisdictions.148 For instance, enforcement is known 
to be particularly problematic in some developing jurisdictions.149 This may provide 
a strong incentive for all creditors, including security holders, to seek the protection 
of insolvency law. Warren paints a picture:  
‘…collateral may be hard to find. Some of it may be in another jurisdiction. 
The debtor may resist the creditor's self-help repossession, requiring the 
creditor to file a lawsuit. Some debtors seek restraining orders to prevent 
court-ordered repossession. State courts can be quick to restrain 
repossession and excruciatingly slow to give final effect to repo 
orders...Notwithstanding any contractual agreements, the debtor may sell 
the collateral or give it to another creditor to satisfy loan obligations’.150  
While Warren’s picture is realistic, it is noted that in such jurisdictions, there is often 
a systemic institutional weakness which also affects the administration of insolvency 
law. The implication of this is that insolvency law is not necessarily an attractive 
alternative as creditors may prefer to circumvent formal mechanisms altogether and 
explore other alternatives.151   These institutional difficulties may also lead secured 
creditors to demand higher interests than they ordinarily would, considering that they 
often have the influence to do so. 
2.3. Inclusive views of insolvency law 
The CBT has been criticised most prominently for its exclusion of interests other than 
the creditors’. These criticisms have come from scholars who contend the utilitarian 
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approach of the CBT and argue that more than being a collective mechanism for 
consensual creditors, insolvency law is also a loss allocation mechanism that spreads 
the losses from business failure among all affected parties, including but not limited 
to creditors.152  Unlike the CBT which pursues the single value of efficiency through 
creditor wealth maximisation, these theories are driven by ideas of fairness, 
communitarian values and inclusivity.153 The fairness element of this view of 
insolvency is both procedural and substantive. It not only requires a forum to 
accommodate the views of other interests, it also demands that the outcome of the 
process be fair to them.154 They justify this distributive goal of insolvency law by 
arguing that there are other legitimate interests that deserve the protection of 
insolvency law apart from the interests of consensual creditors. Such interests include 
employees, the community,155 taxing authorities, tort creditors and the company 
itself.156 Although unified in the belief that there are other goals apart from efficiency 
that are worth pursuing, these theories are different because there is no consensus 
among them on what values insolvency law should seek to achieve and in what order 
of priority.157    
Korobkin takes an all-encompassing view of insolvency and argues that the economic 
account of insolvency misidentifies the problem to which insolvency law responds.  
By making insolvency law solely about debt collection, proponents of the CBT suggest 
that insolvency law becomes redundant if creditors find a cheaper means of solving 
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the coordination problem.158 Korobkin offers an alternative theory which views 
insolvency law as a ‘response to the many aspects of financial distress-moral, political, 
personal, social, and economic- and, in particular, to the grievances of those who are 
affected by financial distress.’ 159 These interests range from creditors, managers and 
shareholders to employees and the wider community.160  He however offers no 
guidance on how these complex interests must be prioritised.161  
Warren’s multiple value approach on the other hand, admits that efficiency is an 
important normative goal in insolvency. Warren however maintains that the 
insolvency system is designed to cater for more complex situations than the protection 
of consensual creditors.162 Larger social and economic issues arise as workers may lose 
jobs, taxing authorities may lose income, trade creditors and suppliers will lose 
customers and property owners will lose beneficial neighbours.163 Without denying 
the value-enhancing characteristics of collective action in insolvency, she claims that 
insolvency laws are organised to minimise losses to the public following the failure of 
a business. This is done by forcing parties (consensual creditors) dealing with the 
debtor to bear the burden of its failure, thereby cushioning the effect of failure on other 
persons and interests. This would involve distribution from the common pool to the 
other interests thought deserving of protection. Warren meets the CBT on its terms 
and argues that consensual creditors are in the best position to bear the costs of 
insolvency, therefore it is more efficient to allocate the costs to them. Warren bases this 
argument on the premise that consensual creditors can make carefully considered 
lending decisions and monitor the debtor. Their ability to externalise their losses 
significantly blunts the incentive to carry out this monitoring.164 
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The difficulty with Warren’s premise is that it suggests that financial distress is almost 
always a result of mismanagement and can always be prevented by intensive 
monitoring.165 Even if it were, not all consensual creditors are in a position to carry 
out this sort of monitoring. If the CBT is criticised for being too exclusive to consensual 
creditors, this argument suffers from a similar shortcoming in relation to non-
consensual parties, as it attempts to limit the cost of insolvency to consensual 
creditors. 
It has been argued that because they fail to provide clear guidance on how the 
different interests that they identify may be managed, the approaches that advocate 
for inclusion escape the narrowness of the CBT but also encounter the problem of 
indeterminacy.166 Apart from the problem of indeterminacy, the inclusive views of 
insolvency have been criticised for their tendency for inefficient redistribution.167 Such 
redistributions botch important marketplace arrangements, particularly the cost and 
availability of credit. Economic scholars argue that the choice of insolvency law should 
consider the ex ante incentives it creates for creditors rather than aiming to achieve 
fairness ex post. This is more so because distributional goals can be more efficiently 
achieved through other state instruments. Rather than overtaxing consensual 
creditors, the burden is more easily borne by tax payers and other insurance 
schemes.168  
2.4. Insolvency law and underlying policy. 
Insolvency regulation requires policy choices among different competing interests, by 
the stakeholders who are in the position to make these choices.169 This means that 
insolvency law responds to a set of underlying values and are designed to promote 
these values by incentivising behaviours that do so. For example, US reorganisation 
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law grew organically out of a liberal, forgiving attitude towards debt and a culture 
rooted in capitalism, consumerism and entrepreneurship.170 Also, France’s strong 
history of state intervention in corporate affairs is reflected in its rescue-oriented 
insolvency law which tends to favour the preservation of jobs at almost any cost.171 
As gleaned from the discussion of insolvency theories, some of the choices to be made 
include the preservation of jobs versus protection of creditor rights and investment; 
the adoption of a pro-debtor approach or a pro-creditor one; having a wider 
communitarian or social purpose versus focusing on the welfare of residual claimants.  
Thus, if a country considers the availability of credit to corporate entities more 
important to its current development needs than the protection of employees, it is 
likely to choose pro-creditor insolvency laws that incentivise creditors to lend 
willingly and on favourable terms.  
 
The implication of this premise is that while a set of principles and theories of 
insolvency have emerged out of the experience of a few influential countries over time; 
and while these theories and principles may have become popular enough to suggest 
that they are universal, the needs, values and priorities of jurisdictions can call for 
different approaches, whether in little or more significant ways. As Martin puts it, 
insolvency systems ‘are value-laden and must be drafted with care to reflect the 
particular values of a culture.’172 
 
Two developments challenge this proposition. The first is the aforementioned 
propagation of a set of insolvency norms globally. Chapter four considers that the 
drive towards global convergence of insolvency laws which persuades countries to 
adopt insolvency laws that are presented as ideal forms, can erode the connections 
between a country’s values and its insolvency laws. One may argue that the decision 
to conform to global standards in this manner is in itself a policy decision. However, 
such a policy choice has less to do with insolvency regulation and is more connected 
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to a broad need for international approval or signalling to potential commercial 
partners that a country is open for business. It may then boil down to a mere choice of 
template without thinking in advance about what goals, needs and values must be 
met in insolvency regulation. But despite not making conscious policy decisions on 
the content of insolvency law, the transplant of an insolvency law imports underlying 
values and policy orientations with it. The question would then be whose values and 
policies they are, and whether they reflect or are compatible with local needs and 
values.  
The second challenge is the subject of the next section. It is the contention that the 
relevance of law and policy to insolvency resolution is limited. Contractual theories 
propose that the inefficiencies in insolvency regulation can be eliminated by greater 
creditor control of the insolvency process. With the growing connection between 
private bargaining and financial distress resolution, they suggest that the role of 
insolvency law in the resolution of financial distress is exaggerated.173 If this premise 
is accepted, arguments around theories and goals of insolvency law become less 
important, as the only guiding principle would be that creditors resolve corporate 
distress privately and as each case requires. 
2.5. A contractual approach to distress resolution 
A group of scholars, (referred to here as contractualists) have argued for a more 
prominent role for private contracting in insolvency.174 Though based on the goal of 
efficiency, the contractual theories question the insistence of the early economic 
theories on a mandatory insolvency regime.175 The contractualists see no reason for a 
hypothetical bargain when the creditors can make actual bargains. They are also 
unconvinced that the outcome of such actual bargains would necessarily be 
submission to a mandatory insolvency system. They however stand with the 
proponents of the CBT in rejecting the view that insolvency law should seek to achieve 
distributional goals. 
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Theories that call for the privatisation of insolvency have been formulated in a range 
of ways.176 Broadly speaking, there are those who argue for complete privatisation of 
insolvency law, dispensing with every form of state control. Barry Adler imagines a 
world without debt, state collection or insolvency laws.177 In this world, a financing 
structure which he terms the chameleon equity is used. Chameleon equity acts exactly 
like debt until the company is insolvent. Upon default, claims are converted into 
equity in a pre-agreed priority system. This would eliminate nearly all costs associated 
with formal insolvency laws. Also, the common pool problem does not exist because 
there is no right to collect upon insolvency.178  
Some of the contractual proposals retain the state-controlled system but only as a 
default rule that parties may choose to opt out of.179 Rasmussen suggests a menu 
option that allows debtors to choose what insolvency regime will apply to them ex 
ante. Included in the menu is the option that allows them to completely opt out of the 
insolvency regime and come up with their own framework.180 This is a more efficient 
scheme because some firms have nothing to gain from a mandatory insolvency 
regime.181 Rasmussen further argues that mandatory insolvency rules are inefficient 
because they worsen investment incentives. Creditors are wary to fund projects when 
they do not have the freedom to choose the optimal means of dealing with default.182  
Alan Schwartz’s model also proposes the adoption of insolvency legislation as a 
default rule. For him, ‘parties who feel themselves unable to foresee future events well 
enough to write insolvency contracts could use the default procedure while the others 
would not’.183  
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2.5.1. Ex ante and ex post efficiency 
Although the options proposed by the contractualists vary in their details, they are 
unified by a set of norms.184 Like the law and economics scholars, they maintain that 
the cost of debt capital will be reduced as a result of an all-round reduction in the cost 
of insolvency.185 Contractual insolvency is both transaction cost and ex post efficient 
because it saves time and money spent determining the best course of action for the 
failing company, administrative costs that go into judicial action and deadweight costs 
for insolvency practitioners, attorneys and accountants.186 They also argue that private 
insolvency will eliminate insolvency loss in the form of redistribution to employees, 
tax authorities and regulatory bodies under current law. All these cost savings 
enhance creditor returns and ultimately result in a reduction in the cost of credit. 
Contractualists admit that there would be costs at the point of contracting, but they 
argue that these costs are trivial compared to the costs of insolvency legislation.187 This 
is more so because companies already negotiate commercial contracts extensively, 
often in reaction to perceived insolvency risk. Therefore, contract insolvency is not 
expected to add any significant level of costs to these negotiations. 
2.5.2. Freedom of contract  
Traditionally, two normative goals have wrestled for dominance in insolvency 
scholarship- creditor-wealth maximisation and distributive justice. Contractualists 
seek to throw party autonomy/ freedom of contract into the mix.188 Commercial 
parties ought to freely decide not only the terms of their financing but also how any 
resulting distress should be resolved.  They argue that where a pre-insolvency contract 
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is voluntary, intelligently made, for value and between parties of equal bargaining 
power, it should be enforceable. This is because ‘the law presumes that business 
people are fully competent to enter into contracts and obligate themselves to perform 
in any manner they wish’.189  Adequate justification must be provided for any 
incursion into contractual freedom and no insolvency theory has provided this 
justification.190 The paternalistic premise of the CBT is faulty because the collective 
action problem may be eliminated by private action. Also, the protection of broader 
interests can be more efficiently achieved outside insolvency law. 
 
2.5.3. Social welfare 
Some contractualists attempt to incorporate a social welfare perspective into their 
narratives. They speak about the social costs and benefits of the systems they propose, 
thereby drawing an intersection between the seemingly mutually exclusive goals of 
fairness and efficiency. They argue that suboptimal insolvency decisions adversely 
affect social welfare. Bradley and Rosenzweig for example, maintain that current 
legislation reduces social welfare because it enhances the wealth of managers at the 
expense of creditors and this affects the cost of credit.191 When insolvency costs are 
saved, these cost savings are passed on to all affected interests in the form of lower 
interest rates and increased availability of credit which means better business for the 
firms, its customers, suppliers and employees.192 Rasmussen also argues that treating 
insolvency as a default rule aligns with notions of social justice.193 Rasmussen seeks to 
equate efficiency with fairness by arguing that adopting a insolvency regime that is 
designed to promote efficiency would inadvertently promote social justice.  In 
Rasmussen’s view, insolvency legislation ties parties to suboptimal arrangements and 
the cost of this is ultimately borne by the creditors, the borrowing firms and those that 
deal with them.194  
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2.6. Criticisms of the contractual approach. 
Unsurprisingly, a good amount of the criticism received by the contractual theories 
has come from scholars that argue for a wider role for insolvency law.  They contend 
that this system is bound to shift the costs of insolvency from strong creditors to weak 
ones such as tort victims and unsophisticated creditors.195 Although they aim to point 
out the impracticalities and cost implications of some of the contractual models,196 
their criticisms largely revolve around these fairness concerns.  
In response to calls for private insolvency, scholars like Warren, Korobkin and 
LoPucki argue with the same force they have thrown at the CBT that the contractual 
theory produces the undesirable outcome of leaving non-adjusting creditors and other 
third parties stranded.197 LoPucki particularly opposes their attempt to equate the 
welfare of consensual creditors with social welfare. Citing instances of current 
experience with bargaining such as private workouts where secured creditors often 
fail to include unsecured creditors, LoPucki maintains that private bargaining is 
motivated by the desire of stronger creditors to redistribute wealth from weaker 
creditors.198  
It has also been pointed out that secured credit is an instance of pre-insolvency 
contract. As Steven Schwarcz notes, ‘a certain type of pre-insolvency contract, 
unrecognized as such, has long been a permissible private law exception. Whenever a 
company gives collateral to a creditor, it enters into a pre-insolvency contract in the 
form of a security agreement, which prefers that creditor at the risk of prejudicing 
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nonconsenting creditors and impairing the company's ability to reorganize’.199 
Warren and Westbrook argue that secured credit, which currently operates within the 
limits of insolvency’s mandatory rules, already shifts some of the costs of insolvency 
to weaker interests. It would be catastrophic to further worsen the situation by 
withdrawing what little protection they have under insolvency law.200 
Also, critics challenge the argument that contractual systems are less costly to 
administer and enforce.201 While some enforcement costs might be saved, private 
action has its own costs such as the internal decision-making costs among parties. 
Contractualists either underestimate these costs or remain vague about how to deal 
with them. 202  Warren and Westbrook argue that unlike a relatively straightforward 
security interest, pre-insolvency contracts are bound to vary very widely in terms of 
content and structure. A contractualist proposal would embrace many alternative 
insolvency schemes.  Warren and Westbrook predict that this would further increase 
the information costs for other creditors.203 
Clearly, the contractual proposals have their shortcomings but as LoPucki argued in 
relation to Schwartz’s model, ‘Schwartz's failure to deliver a model of insolvency 
contracting that works does not mean that such a model is impossible’.204 The next 
section explores what these possibilities might be.  
2.7. A practical outlook on the contractual approach. 
The theoretical debate generated by the contractual theories has been described as 
entertaining largely because of their unconventional proposals.205 Most of the literature 
on insolvency theory have emanated from the United States. Consequently, they are 
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heavily informed by insolvency law and practice in that jurisdiction. When 
considering the value of the theoretical propositions of the contractual theories 
therefore, it is important not to get carried away with the US-centric view of 
insolvency. As Armour and Deakin note, it is too soon to conclude on the 
impracticality of the contractual theory as its application is yet to be given sufficient 
consideration in the context of jurisdictions with less restrictive insolvency systems.206 
This is true of the United Kingdom for example, where there has been less contribution 
in terms of theoretical analysis but useful lessons on the practical operation of 
contractual insolvency.207 Franks and Sussman point out in their seminal research that 
the UK insolvency system contrasts strikingly with US law and may be described as 
‘contractual’ to a large extent. They note about the UK system, ‘insolvency law is little 
more than the strict enforcement of the default clauses in the debt contract, as 
negotiated ex ante by the lender and the borrower.’208  
Unlike US law which is heavily regulated by the Bankruptcy Code and courts, the UK 
has traditionally been less restrictive with scarce court involvement.209 Although 
limited to small and medium businesses in the UK, Franks and Sussman’s research 
provides some insight into the insolvency privatisation debate. First, they show how 
the debt structure of a company without more, can determine the outcome of the 
insolvency process. This is usually because parties are able to prioritise and allocate 
liquidation rights with less restrictions.210 Before 2003, the floating charge holder had 
extensive decision-making powers and enjoyed substantial priority in the insolvency 
process.211 The floating charge holder was able to appoint an administrative receiver 
who would act on their behalf and had the powers to realise the company’s assets by 
effecting a private liquidation. Unlike US insolvency legislation which tends to dilute 
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the powers of secured creditors by giving managers and the court extensive decision-
making powers, the balance of power was considerably tilted in favour of the senior 
security holder in the UK.  
Secondly, they show that the common pool problem can be controlled by pre-
insolvency contracts. With the controlling creditor having substantial control of 
liquidation rights, they found no evidence of asset grabbing or creditor runs as 
predicted by the CBT. Like the contractualists propose, ‘the problem of asset grabbing 
has a contractual solution, which is successfully applied in practice’.212 From their 
studies, debt contracts in the U.K. were drafted to avoid coordination failures through 
a careful allocation of liquidation rights. A senior lender who typically took a floating 
charge over all the company’s assets and had a relationship with the debtor was often 
in the best position to coordinate the insolvency process.   
Even in more restrictive jurisdictions like the US where insolvency procedures are 
heavily supervised by the court and the law is pro-debtor, private bargaining plays a 
bigger role than is often acknowledged.  The US National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission observed that ‘lenders increasingly include contingencies in loan 
documents, indentures, and workout, forbearance, and settlement agreements that 
waive certain rights of the borrower upon filing for bankruptcy’.213 With time, the 
frequency and sophistication of financial arrangements that have the effect of 
bypassing bankruptcy law have increased.214 Lending contracts determine 
bankruptcy outcomes more clearly by allocating control rights among creditors. For 
instance, there are provisions that allow a creditor to appoint an outsider as director 
or turnaround manager.215 Also, venture capital contracts would usually specify the 
movement of control rights in the event of distress. These fund providers may hold 
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the power to change management if the company shows signs of distress.216 
Additionally, with the growing popularity of Distressed Debt Investors (DDIs) who 
specialise in buying off claims in distressed companies, creditors can now exit the 
bankruptcy process more easily.217 
2.8. Achieving the goal of fairness  
Fairness concerns dominate the resistance to both the CBT and the contractual 
approach to insolvency. The view that certain interests, other than creditor interests 
deserve legal protection is not unfounded. However, developments in insolvency 
practice suggest the need to revisit how these fairness concerns are addressed.  
Professors Westbrook and Warren present an empirical account with which they 
intended to test the efficiency claims of the contractualists.218 Their arguments 
however provide little or no new knowledge about contractual insolvency specifically. 
Their work focuses on the thoroughly-debated fact that certain creditors do not adjust 
properly or at all.219 In reaching this conclusion, they analyse data from 40per cent of 
the business insolvency cases filed in the US in 1994 and a smaller amount of cases 
filed in 2002.220 They find that trade creditors make a ‘substantial’ percentage of the 
creditors and remain unpaid in 75.6per cent of the cases. For tort victims, they admit 
the difficulty in determining for sure what percentage they constitute as the 
companies’ books hardly described tort claims in detail and would typically lump 
them into ‘unliquidated or unknown’ amounts.221 They record that employees are not 
listed as creditors in more than 90 per cent of the cases, suggesting that employers 
were meeting their payrolls consistently. In total, they conclude that pre-insolvency 
contracts are likely to leave at least 20 maladjusting creditors stranded in each case as 
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they do not envisage that these creditors would be involved in negotiations with the 
company.   
Armed with these facts, they conclude that contractualists have ‘given us an 
entertaining debate, but it is time to move on.’222 For many reasons however, it is far 
from clear that Warren and Westbrook’s empirical intervention has settled the matter. 
In fact, more questions linger.  First, although they declare an intention to focus on 
efficiency rather than principles of fairness in making their arguments against 
contractual insolvency,223 their arguments ultimately border on fairness. They go to 
lengths to show that a high percentage of weakly adjusting creditors will be the 
ultimate losers and such imbalance is clearly unfair. They do not show how or why 
this outcome is inefficient.224 They do claim that maladjusting creditors are too weak 
to demand good bargains for themselves and this suggests a disposition to raising the 
cost of credit ex ante. However, from their data, employees were hardly classified as 
creditors, and even if they were, the research does not show how protecting employee 
claims achieves an efficiency rather than fairness goal. If one agrees that the objections 
are mostly based on fairness even when they claim to be efficiency-based, it becomes 
important to question whether current insolvency policy addresses these concerns 
sufficiently. 
It must be recognised that fairness can be fluid and the ideas about what is fair in 
different circumstances should neither be left to intuition or assumed as fixed.225 For 
instance, fairness concerns in a restructuring would be different from concerns in 
liquidation.226 Fairness to one group may be perceived as producing unfair results for 
another. Even among the same group in a restructuring or liquidation, fairness 
concerns can differ based on the size and business of the companies involved.227 Also, 
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different jurisdictions have different experiences in terms of groups that truly need 
protection. Armour reports from an empirical study conducted in the UK from 1999-
2000 that none of the insolvency practitioners interviewed had ever had to deal with 
significant tort liabilities in relation to insolvency cases conducted.228  The alteration 
of long-standing rules can be daunting, but it is by no means impossible. A good 
example of how such a change has been made is with the removal of the preference of 
tax authorities in the UK. While they remain classified as non-adjusting creditors that 
require protection in insolvency under US law, the UK has applied the good logic in 
altering their preference, considering that the government is the ultimate adjusting 
creditor.229  Thus, in the process of formulating insolvency legislation, it is important 
to identify what the goals of the law are and the immediate interests involved, in order 
to ensure that the right fairness concerns are formulated into the law.   
 
Given the evidence that strong creditors continue to device ways to circumvent the 
insolvency system, it is highly likely that the in-built protections in existing law do not 
always serve their purpose.230 Armour cautions that redistributions to so-called non-
adjusting creditors hardly ever get to the intended beneficiaries. There is a risk of 
adjusting, unsecured creditors free-riding on benefits intended for non-adjusting 
creditors.231 Armour concludes that, ‘this has resulted in relatively little money 
reaching the intended beneficiaries of the statutory redistribution. It has also 
engendered significant costs: the direct costs of litigation and the opportunity costs of 
a constrained choice of financial structures’.232 Surely, fairness concerns among 
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consensual creditors remain, as there is no guarantee that powerful creditors will not 
attempt to subordinate the claims of weaker creditors. However, if interests that can 
be better protected outside insolvency law are taken out of the equation, more clarity 
can be achieved in achieving fairness among consensual creditors.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter considers debates about the goals and structure of insolvency law. The 
theoretical perspectives revolve around the goals of coordination, efficiency and 
fairness.  While some theories focus on consensual creditors and their interests and 
others advocate for the inclusion of wider interests like communities and employees 
in the resolution of financial distress, some advocate for private bargaining in the 
resolution of financial distress. The design of insolvency frameworks in different 
jurisdictions is informed by the prevailing underlying values and policy goals. At the 
same time, pressure created by the propagation of certain insolvency norms around 
the world, which are discussed later in the thesis, suggest that these differences are 
not significant enough to preclude convergence.  
 
The chapter considers proposals from contractualists which suggest that insolvency 
law need not be mandatory, as creditors can effectively determine the outcome of 
financial distress by contract before it occurs. The arguments against a contractual 
insolvency system largely originate from fairness concerns and they inform the legal 
restrictions placed on creditor control. However, the role of private bargaining in 
insolvency law is more prominent than the traditional theories admit.  
 
The chapter discusses the use of contract pre-insolvency, in the UK and the US and 
finds that the proposals have some application in practice. Often, restrictive rules of 
insolvency law are keenly resisted by creditors through innovative structuring of 
financial structures to avoid the redistributive effects of insolvency law. Efforts to 
                                                          
study conducted to determine the effects of the changes to the floating charge, their core finding was that while 
the amount of recoveries was vastly improved in administration, these benefits were immediately lost in the costs 
of the procedure.   
54 
 
protect broad interests through the imposition of restrictive rules and taxing 
consensual creditors often meet with resistance from consensual creditors. Resistance 
comes in the form of ex ante innovative structuring of financial structures to avoid the 
redistributive effects of insolvency law, complete circumvention of the law by selling 
off debt claims to distressed debt investors, pre-packaged deals and informal and 
semi-formal restructuring. 
 The chapter finds that insolvency law does not always achieve its goals, especially 
those driven by notions of fairness. Thus, in a world of resistant creditor control and 
financial innovation that may not have been contemplated by the traditional 
insolvency theories, there must be an honest assessment of the goals that insolvency 
law can realistically achieve and the most efficient ways to achieve them. As the next 
chapter discusses, alternatives to insolvency law are becoming more prominent. Debt 
restructuring is one of those alternatives and it has private bargaining at its core, even 




















CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING: AN EMERGING RESPONSE TO 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
Introduction  
The previous chapter considered theoretical perspectives of insolvency regulation 
including the recent debates about contractual insolvency. As the law and practice of 
corporate insolvency expands beyond liquidation to capture the rehabilitation of 
financially distressed companies, debt restructuring has gained more prominence. 
This chapter situates debt restructuring within previous discussion about the the role 
of the law and the place of private bargaining in the resolution of financial distress.  
The chapter finds that debt restructuring is often compatible with a corporate rescue 
aim, but creditors are ultimately driven by the need to achieve the best results for 
themselves. The use of purely private workouts, which are largely within creditors’ 
control, demonstrates the operation of a contractual approach in distress resolution. 
True to Korobkin’s observation, insolvency law may be rendered redundant if 
creditors find a cheaper means of resolving financial distress.233   
However, the role of the law cannot be ruled out, as bargaining is done in the shadow 
of the law, and this is not limited to insolvency law. Also, private workouts have 
shortcomings that restructuring law can ameliorate. The chapter also finds that as 
financial innovation and globalisation intensify, it becomes more difficult for 
economies to depend on purely contractual mechanisms. Thus, informal and formal 
restructuring present as a continuum with varying degrees of formality. To combine 
the relative advantages of both informal and court-supervised work-outs, 
stakeholders commonly opt for semi-formal arrangements, widely inspired by the US 
Chapter 11 pre-packaged reorganisation procedure. 
Acknowledging the need for restructuring laws, the chapter discusses some key 
elements of restructuring frameworks- commencement, control, decision making, 
restructuring plan and restructuring finance. It considers the different ways by which 
                                                          




jurisdictions address these elements, the levels of court involvement and the factors 
that inform these choices. The chapter finds that powerful creditors in most 
jurisdictions are often able to influence the outcome of a restructuring, particularly 
when they are in a position to fund the process. Contrary to what the CBT envisages, 
creditors are able to bargain their way out of the collective process, by selling their 
claim to a distressed debt investor, for example. The chapter highlights some 
implications of different choices in the design of restructuring law for developing 
economies, emphasising that existing institutional infrastructure be considered as 
these countries embark on insolvency law reform.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section describes debt restructuring, 
and the relationship between restructuring and corporate rescue. The second section 
discusses informal debt restructuring drawing from the experience in countries like 
the UK with the London Approach and variants of it in other jurisdictions. The third 
section examines the role of law and the courts in debt restructuring. The fourth 
section highlights the key elements of a restructuring framework and the implications 
of different alternatives in the design of restructuring frameworks, particularly for 
developing countries.  
3.1. Debt restructuring and corporate rescue: one side of the same coin? 
There are two broad options open to a financially distressed company, liquidation and 
restructuring.234  Liquidation describes a situation where decisionmakers resolve to 
dissolve the company and strip its assets. Here, the business of the company is no 
longer considered viable. Consequently, some or all the existing stakeholders who 
finance the company no longer wish to support it and new financiers cannot be 
found.235  In a restructuring, most of the existing financial stakeholders wish to remain 
invested in the company but must agree a new bargain (because their old bargain no 
longer accurately reflects the risks of the business).236   
                                                          
234  Also referred to as reorganisation popularly associated with the US Chapter 11 reorganisation procedure. 
Paterson, ‘Rethinking the role of the law’ (n 217) 2-4 
235 ibid. 
236 ibid. Payne, ‘Debt Restructuring’ (n 91) 2 
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Debt restructuring is strictly speaking, financial restructuring which involves the 
rearrangement of a company’s debt obligations including the postponement of 
imminent liabilities, the conversion of fixed liabilities to more flexible ones (such as a 
debt-for-equity swap and debt asset swap), debt write-downs, debt forgiveness or 
waiver. Though the term debt restructuring suggests that it is merely the debt 
obligations of the company that are being restructured, it is likely to be accompanied 
by some restructuring of the company’s capital structure and or operations.237 This is 
because while mere debt restructuring without more can be useful for giving the 
company enough space to recover, a distressed company may often require in 
addition to the restructuring of debt obligations, a restructuring of its corporate 
activities.238 
Of the different normative goals of insolvency law, corporate rescue has gained 
considerable global attention.239 Corporate rescue prescribes that businesses be 
rehabilitated and offered a second chance if they are still economically viable.240 This 
raises the assumption that where viable companies are concerned, the goal of 
corporate rescue is always driving the response to financial distress, including 
restructuring. Thus, frameworks like the US Chapter 11 and the UK administration 
procedure are often referred to as corporate rescue laws.241  The preoccupation with 
giving viable companies a second chance suggests that restructuring law gravitates 
away from the efficiency-focused goal of the CBT to give the health of the company 
primacy over the interests of consensual creditors. This has been the subject of 
controversy among the competing theories of insolvency.  
                                                          
237 Debt restructuring in this chapter captures the restructuring of debt obligations and other restructuring that are 
incidental to this.   
238 Adolfo Rouillon,’Formal Processes and Alternative Mechanisms in International Initiatives on Insolvency’ in 
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal (ed), Expedited Corporate Debt Restructuring: An International Comparative Analysis 
(Kluwer Law, 2007) 3. 
239 Helped along by the series of global financial crises, corporate rescue has been stamped with the seal of 
legitimacy in the global bankruptcy script. Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 43. 
240 As discussed in the introductory chapter, this is financial distress as opposed to economic distress.  See Baird, 
‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 94) 573-599; Goldschmid, ‘More Phoenix than Vulture’ (n 94) 191, 198. 
241 There are other frameworks that are used for restructuring such as the UK Company’s Voluntary Arrangement 
(CVA) and the scheme of arrangement which is not an insolvency device but has been used for restructuring both 
in the UK and other jurisdictions like Hong Kong. See Booth, Briscoe and Smart, ‘Corporate Rescue in Hong Kong’ 
in Olivares-Caminal (ed), ‘Expedited Restructuring’ (n 238) 299-322. 
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While antagonists of the CBT attempt to lay claim to rescue law as evidence of 
insolvency law’s recognition of broader interests,242 law and economics scholars have 
attempted to provide economic justifications for restructuring law. Left to them, 
restructuring is set up to achieve the same economic goals as liquidation. The choice 
between a piecemeal sale and a restructuring is strictly connected to the option that 
generates more value for creditors at the least cost. In other words, the choice that 
achieves ex post efficiency.243 Where there is a going concern surplus to be derived 
from keeping the company together, then the rational choice for creditors is 
restructuring. Outside this, they reject values such as preservation of jobs and 
businesses as independent goals worth pursuing.244 The problem with giving these 
goals priority in insolvency law is that in the absence of an assessment that a company 
has a going concern surplus, restructuring attempts will ultimately fail, but not before 
resources have been wasted.245 As Armour argues,  
‘In many cases of business insolvency, the firm is ‘economically 
distressed’—that is, its assets are worth more in some other use. Under such 
circumstances, there will be no necessary synergies to liquidating the firm’s 
assets together, as opposed to piecemeal. Staying secured creditors will not 
lead to higher realisations for the firm’s assets. It will, however, impose 
delay costs on secured creditors, and hence a net social loss. To be sure, it 
may not be apparent at the commencement of insolvency proceedings 
whether a going concern exists.’246  
Warren also concurs that restructuring should only be pursued when the cost of 
achieving it is less than the value obtained. In terms of conflicting values, Warren 
                                                          
242 Korobkin rejects the economic approach to restructuring, arguing that restructuring is not solely aimed at 
solving economic problems. Rather, it creates an avenue for a rehabilitation of the firm’s values and a coherent 
vision of its aims. The outcome would not matter if this is successfully achieved. Korobkin ‘Rehabilitating Values 
(n 136) 739-742. Riz Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain, and corporate 
liquidation’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 400, 23 (argues that such ‘benevolence is arbitrary and misguided’) 
See Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 121) 211; Douglas Baird, ‘The uneasy case for corporate reorganizations’ (1986) 
15(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 136-139; Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory’ (n 174) 1807. 
244Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case (n 242) 137; Schwartz ‘A Contract Theory (n) 1807; Rasmussen, ‘Optimal Bankruptcy 
Rules’ (n 167) 16. 
245 Rasmussen, ‘Optimal Bankruptcy Rules’ (n 167) 19-37. 
246Armour, ‘Debate about secured lending’ (n 168) 20. 
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admits that ‘the protection given to parties without formal legal rights is 
derivative in nature and limited in scope.’247   
One contention here is whether a company may only be ‘rescued’ by making certain 
operational changes and debt renegotiations, leaving it to carry on operations as the 
same corporate entity (company rescue); Or whether corporate rescue also captures a 
situation where the business of a company is transferred to a new company to carry 
on business as a different entity (business rescue). 248  The UK administration law 
prioritises the sustenance of a company as a going concern as the ideal rescue goal.249 
Alternatively, the IP is expected to pursue a course of action that achieves a better 
result for the creditors than would be likely in liquidation, failing which the assets of 
the company may be sold in piecemeal.250 Thus, the law acknowledges that while 
company rescue is a desirable aim, it may not always be compatible with the best 
interests of the creditors. The better choice for them may be a business rescue which 
does not save the company in its current form but preserves its business in a new 
entity.251 In contrast to English law, US restructuring law (the Chapter 11 
reorganisation procedure) is more focused on preserving the corporate structure of 
the restructured entity. While English administration often results in the sale of the 
business as a going concern,252 this is hardly restructuring as contemplated by Chapter 
11. American practitioners are more likely to consider a business rescue as a 
liquidation rather than a restructuring.253 
These distinctions are important for developing countries who are newly introduced 
to the concept of corporate rescue and confronted with a range of options and 
terminologies in the design of their restructuring laws. Much of restructuring law 
                                                          
247 Warren, ‘Imperfect world’ (n 136) 355. 
248 Franks and Sussman caution against a preoccupation with company rescue in their work. They note that the 
real ‘economic value lies in the combination of physical assets and human capital rather than in the corporate 
name...’. Franks and Sussman (n 207) 65-96. 
249 Insolvency Act 1986, section 3, schedule B1. 
250 ibid.  
251 Corporate Insolvency Act, sch B1. 
252 Sloan Beckner, ‘Current Problems in International Insolvency’ (1995) 2 Sw. J. L.& TRADE AM (book review) 
173. See for examples, Re MyTravel Group Plc [2004] EWHC 2741 (Ch); Re Bluebrook Ltd [2010] 1 B.C.L.C. 338. 
253 Nathalie Martin, ‘Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences’ (2003) 11 Am. Bankr. Inst. 
L. Rev. 367. 
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reform is driven by the idea of corporate rescue.254 Calls for reform by international 
organisations emphasise the goal of corporate rescue and its benefits for the economy, 
highlighting its potential to save jobs and provide stability.255 This desire to 
accommodate wider economic interests is not always incompatible with maximising 
wealth for creditors.256 However, it can colour the expectations that come with debt 
restructuring.  
While the requirements and outcome of corporate rescue and debt restructuring often 
coincide, the main intent of creditors in a debt restructuring may not always be the 
rescue of the distressed firm and the saving of jobs. This has some implications for 
how restructuring law should be framed.  One is whether corporate rescue should be 
mandatory, such that creditors have no option than to pursue the goal of corporate 
rescue, even if they consider alternative methods more beneficial to them.257 Also 
relevant is whether control should lie with creditors or more powers be given to the 
debtor who is more likely to be inclined towards the rescue goal. These issues are 
discussed later in the chapter.  
3.2. The use of private workouts in resolving financial distress.258 
The role of insolvency law versus private bargaining in the resolution of financial 
distress has been debated. While the contractual theories focus on the use of pre-
insolvency contracts, private workouts relate to bargaining that occurs after the fact. 
Regardless of when it occurs, private workout provides an alternative that a 
company’s creditors may elect to pursue in the event of distress, lending some 
strength to Rasmussen’s picture of a menu of alternatives from which creditors may 
choose.259 Creditors who agree to a private workout do not act under a legal 
                                                          
254See for example, Cork Report: Report of the Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982) 
para 198; Insolvency Service, A review of the corporate insolvency framework: A consultation on options for 
reform’ (May 2016). 
255 World Bank, ICR Principles (2015) para 72, principles 6 (3), 8, 17; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 209. 
256 Creditors, especially financial institutions who are repeat lenders can benefit from keeping distressed companies 
in business. 
257 As discussed in the previous chapter, the potential effect of such mandatory rules may produce outcomes 
unintended by the law. 
258 Also informal workout, out-of-court restructuring or multi-creditor workout. 
259 Rasmussen, ‘Debtor's Choice’ (n 138) 51. 
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compulsion to save the company or achieve wider objectives attached to rescue law, 
they do so because they have recognised the benefits they stand to gain.260 
A workout allows a company to privately negotiate a restructuring with its creditors 
without the involvement of formal restructuring law or the courts. It could occur 
unilaterally i.e. between a debtor and one creditor, or multilaterally, between a debtor 
and a group of creditors (multi creditor workout).261 This purely contractual 
arrangement offers some advantages for the restructuring process. It is flexible and 
easily adapted to the business of the distressed company.262 As it does not typically 
involve courts and regulatory authorities, it can be done within as little time and as 
privately as possible, thereby preserving the goodwill of the company while seeking 
efficient ways to keep it alive.263 Also, negotiation is easier because the process is less 
confrontational, and it does not usually trigger regulatory or contractual sanctions.264     
The London Approach is perhaps the most prominent example of a multi-creditor 
workout system. This describes how banks in the city of London achieve out of court 
restructuring for larger companies,265 with reference to social norms rather than the 
law.  Armour and Deakin point out how regulatory institutions (which in the case of 
the London Approach is the Bank of England) help to ‘seed’ certain norms until they 
become acceptable rules of behaviour in the environment within which they 
operate.266 Under the London Approach, there is an unwritten understanding among 
all participants that individual enforcement is unacceptable. The main creditors often 
sponsor an independent review of the company's long-term viability. They then reach 
a joint view as to whether, and how the company may be restructured.267 A lead bank 
(usually the bank with the biggest exposure and the company’s main banker) may be 
                                                          
260 Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate rescue: a game of three halves’ (2012) 32(2) Legal Studies 307-308. 
261 Multi-creditor workout is the focus here as unilateral restructuring pose relatively little challenges. 
262 Jose M. Garrido, Out-of-court debt restructuring (World Bank, 2012) 8-12; P Omar ‘The convergence of creditor-
driven and formal insolvency models’ (2005) 2 International Corporate Rescue 251. 
263 Garrido, Out-of-court debt restructuring (n 262) 8-12. 
264 ibid. 
265 SMEs are not left out of informal workouts in London. Frank and Sussman that the head offices of banks operate 
a Bank Support Unit (BSU) which are tasked with the turnaround of distressed SMEs. Franks and Sussman, (n 207) 
65-96. 
266 Armour and Deakin,’ Norms in Private Insolvency’ (n 103)48. 
267 Peter Brierley and Gertjan Vlieghe, ‘Corporate workouts, the London Approach and financial stability’ (1999) 
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designated to facilitate the discussions. A steering committee of creditors which 
represents the creditors in decision making is formed. To meet the company’s 
financing needs, lenders agree to maintain existing credit facilities and may provide 
additional finance when needed.268 
The London Approach is a flexible framework rather than a detailed set of rules. As a 
Bank of England Executive stated;  
‘The London Approach is not a statutory process and has nothing to do with 
regulation...The Bank has no statutory powers for what we do as an 
intermediary in the context of workouts. We rely instead on the authority 
vested in us by the constituent members of the London banking community 
who continue to seek our assistance in resolving difficult issues.  The 
London Approach is voluntary, and it is widely used because it is seen to 
work and to be fair’.269   
Nonetheless, because creditors are an identifiable group of repeat players in the 
lending industry, the threat of being ostracised from the ‘group’ in future 
transactions and perhaps tacit threats from the regulatory body have helped to 
elicit cooperation.270  
The flexibility of the London Approach has been identified as efficient because it 
makes for easy transplant and adaption to other jurisdictions.271 In a bid to propagate 
the principles of the London Approach more widely, INSOL International developed 
the London Approach further and published its Global Principles for Multi-Creditor 
Workouts.272 The eight principles prescribe that creditors of a distressed company be 
prepared to cooperate and give a standstill period during which they refrain from 
enforcing their claims or do anything to affect return to other creditors adversely. The 
standstill period should be used to obtain relevant information about the debtor to 
                                                          
268 ibid; Michael Smith, ‘The London Approach and Trading in Distressed Debt’ (May 1996) Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin 223. 
269 Smith (n 268) 223. 
270 Armour and Deakin,’ Norms in Private Insolvency’ (n 103) 45-46. 
271 ibid 50-51. 
272INSOL International is a global association of practitioners (lawyers and accountants) who specialise in 
insolvency and turnaround. INSOL International, Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor 
Workouts II (2000, revised in 2017). 
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allow proposals to be made for resolving the distress. Such information should be kept 
confidential as much as possible. They also prescribe the facilitation of co-ordination 
using creditor representatives and committees; and that any additional funding be 
accorded priority status.273 
Indeed, countries at different stages of economic development have been inspired by 
the London Approach and the INSOL Global Principles in dealing with multi-creditor 
workouts.274 In addition to their formal insolvency frameworks, East Asian countries 
like Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Korea and Japan have adopted guidelines for 
out-of-court restructuring.275    
In Indonesia, the Jakarta Initiative was introduced by the Indonesian government, 
assisted by the World Bank and the IMF, to avoid the costs and difficulties associated 
with court processes.276 The initiative adopts non-binding procedures aimed at 
helping creditors and debtors negotiate an out-of-court restructuring plan.277 As 
prescribed by the INSOL Principles, the Jakarta initiative provides for the 
representation of the company by advisors, a restructuring plan and procedure for 
approval. Regulatory support comes in the form of the Indonesian Debt Restructuring 
Agency where agreed restructuring plans are registered; and the Jakarta Initiative 
Task Force (JIFT) mostly composed of senior central bank officials who oversee 
restructuring. Departing from the London Approach, the Jakarta initiative starts off as 
an out of court restructuring but where a unanimous decision cannot be reached 
among creditors, the plan may be presented to court for approval.278 The   JITF uses a 
combination of carrots and sticks to elicit cooperation. Such that noncooperative 
companies can be penalised by shaming or referred to the Attorney General for 
                                                          
273 The World Bank Guidelines for Out of Court Debt Restructuring similarly emphasise the need for independent 
experts and advisors to ensure independent professional information.  Garrido, Out of Court Restructuring (n 262) 
Para 59. 
274 Developing economies who suffer from institutional deficiencies and economic volatility particularly stand to 
benefit from informal resolution mechanisms. World Bank, ICR Principles (n 255) 3. 
275 Dr Shinjiro Takagi, ‘Debt Restructuring by Out-of-Court Workouts in East Asia’ (2012)3 9(3) International 
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276 See Letter of intent from Indonesian government to the IMF (19 October 1988) at 
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277 Stacey Steele, ‘The New Law on Bankruptcy in Indonesia: Towards a Modern Corporate Bankruptcy Regime’ 
(1999) 23 Melb. UL Rev 144. 
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insolvency proceedings, and cooperative parties can enjoy tax incentives and other 
regulatory concessions.279 
In India, the Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR) mechanism was designed by the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s regulator of banks and financial institutions, in 
2001. With the government backing it, the RBI has the power to facilitate restructuring 
and it has been known to oversee many.280  The CDR is a well-structured, three-tier 
mechanism. The top tier is the CDR Standing Forum, consisting of top bank executives 
who prescribe general guidelines for restructuring. At the second tier, the Empowered 
Group consists of middle range managers that have a more direct connection with 
debtors, dealing with the specifics of debt restructuring as they come up. The CDR 
Cell consists of participating banks in each restructuring. They jointly bear the cost of 
the process, deliberate on restructuring plans and refer the plan for the Empowered 
Group’s final decision.281 Plans often consist of concessions on the part of shareholders 
and creditors, including a commitment by creditors to provide additional finance.  
While the CDR is not backed by statute, the guidelines have some force because of the 
influence of the RBI and an Inter Creditor Agreement which binds major financial 
institutions through enforcement clauses.282 The CDR has recorded success in turning 
around companies, particularly because of the strong control of the RBI over the 
financial institutions, allowing the CDR to impose the requirements necessary for 
successful restructuring. The fact that most of the big lenders tend to be government 
owned or controlled also makes it easier to control creditor action in restructuring.283 
In Hong Kong, the Joint Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) and Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority (HKMA) developed the Guidelines to the Hong Kong approach 
to Corporate Difficulties in 1998 and 1999.284 Like the INSOL Principles, the 
                                                          
279 Financial Sector Policy Committee can make these directions. See Indonesia, Selected Issues (IMF Staff Country 
Report, 16 August 2000) 120-121. 
280 Rajiv Luthra, ‘The Corporate Debt Restructuring Mechanisms in India’ in Olivares Caminal (ed), Expedited Debt 
Restructuring (n 238) 333. 
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282 ibid 339. 
283 ibid 340. 
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HKAB/HKMA Guidelines seek to achieve a standstill and representation from the 
creditor body in making a restructuring plan and provide for the appointment of a 
lead bank to head negotiations.285 Japan’s Guidelines for private workout was 
established by the National Bankers Association in 2001, expanding INSOL principles 
to stipulate procedural guidelines including rules for commencement, content of a 
rehabilitation proposal, conduct of meetings, amongst others.286  Similarly, the Italian 
Banks’ Association issued a code of conduct for debt restructuring agreements in 
2000.287  
In prescribing guidance for private workouts, these guidelines adopt slightly varied 
ways of achieving the core prescriptions for successful workouts. An observable trend 
among them is the influence of some regulatory or government authority in the 
restructuring process. While their presence is more tacit in some jurisdictions like 
London, others like India and Indonesia have government authorities adopting a 
more prominent role in the process.288 
3.3. Do we need law for restructuring? The role of the law and courts 
If stakeholders can bargain for the outome they want via a contractual workout, why 
do the law and the courts need to be involved in debt restructuring? A cursory answer 
may be that without the law’s intervention, creditors cannot always be trusted to 
pursue corporate rescue or that stronger creditors are likely dominate the process and 
exclude weaker ones. In addition to these fairness and rescue concerns however, 
coordination issues and efficiency also account for the need for a legal framework for 
restructuring.   
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3.3.1. The limitations of private workouts 
Notwithstanding the benefits they offer, private workouts present challenges of their 
own, one of which is the hold out problem.289  A hold out occurs when certain creditors 
withdraw their support from a restructuring plan (usually in hopes for a payoff), 
thereby preventing the implementation of the plan.290 Guidelines for private workouts 
are often non-binding and lack a decision-making mechanism. This means that 
creditors may decide to reject the restructuring proposal at any point in the process.291 
Even if enforcement were possible under contract law, there is no mechanism for 
involving other stakeholders who are not part of the bargaining process but whose 
cooperation may be crucial to the restructuring.292    
Information asymmetry also presents a problem. Where all the parties involved are 
not (or perceive that they are not) well-informed about the financial prospects of the 
firm and the interests of the other creditors, it may become difficult for them to reach 
an agreement.293 Other difficulties include challenges that may prevent creditors from 
retaining the benefits of the workout if the company eventually enters into a formal 
process.294  
The need for restructuring law has been predicated on these shortcomings and the 
inefficiencies they can create.295 As we discuss in some detail shortly, the law offers a 
binding effect in the form of a moratorium that stays actions by all creditors during 
the period of the restructuring. Also, the law can prevent hold out problems and 
eliminate the need for unanimity by imposing a system that allows dissenting 
                                                          
289 Whether in liquidation, reorganisation, or out of court restructuring, scholars of all persuasions would agree 
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creditors to be overruled. Importantly, the participation of secured creditors, who 
hold assets that might be fundamental to the success of the restructuring can be 
compelled by law. In the same vein, the law attempts to prevent abuse and achieve a 
fair result by ensuring that dissenting creditors are offered some protection.  
Also, the problem of information asymmetry can be eliminated or reduced by the 
imposition of disclosure requirements about the financial condition of the company.  
Restructuring law can also facilitate the provision of restructuring finance by offering 
incentives to providers of new credit and binding existing creditors to priority rules.  
To ensure long term competitiveness of a restructured company, it is important that a 
wide variety of restructuring options are open to the company. Restructuring laws can 
provide a framework that ensures that the ability of the stakeholders to pursue options 
such as debt equity swaps, debt forgiveness, and distressed debt investment is not 
constrained.296 
 
Under the London approach, the tacit threat of ostracisation and the backing of the 
Bank of England had been effective in dealing with hold outs.297 The group model also 
ensured that information about the financial prospects of the firm was made available 
to the creditors.298 Over time, the uncertainties created by coordination and 
enforcement limitations in workouts have however become more prominent across 
jurisdictions, including London.299  The use of the London Approach and its variants 
have seen a decline with shifts in the market caused by financial globalisation and the 
growth of distressed debt investment in insolvency.300 Paterson describes how these 
changes have ushered in new entrants with different values into the London market.  
Their entrance has eroded some of the shared understanding that once existed 
between London’s banks, and the proliferation of secondary debt markets have now 
                                                          
296 For instance, exceptions to restrictions imposed by company, securities and labour laws can be provided for 
under a restructuring law. 
297 Armour and Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency’ (n 103) 45 – 46. 
298 ibid 34 -35 (Armour and Deakin report how accountants are often hired to do a comprehensive assessment of 
the financial health and prospects of the distressed firm and report back to the creditors). 
299 Reporting the experience in Canada, McElcheran submits that private restructuring is increasingly a fragile and 
uncertain process, making many creditors reluctant to participate in it. McElcheran, ‘Canada’s Expedited Debt 
Restructuring’ in Olivares-Caminal (ed) (n 238) 142. 
300 Armour and Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency’ (n 103) 50, 51. These are discussed in detail below.  
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diluted the influence of group expectations. 301 Although informal restructuring still 
has its place, parties who previously bargained in accordance with group norms and 
values are now more likely to take a more legal stance, bargaining with greater 
reference to their legal rights.302  Emerging economies are not left out; in India, the 
continued efficacy of the RBI has become more doubtful with the growth of the 
corporate bond market and financial intermediaries that are independent of 
government control, making it difficult for the CDR to carry on in its current form.303  
3.3.2. The unavoidable shadow of the law. 
To varying degrees, and whether parties acknowledge it or not, the influence of 
insolvency and or other laws is present in the bargaining process.304 Jackson makes 
the point that insolvency law stipulates ‘a minimum set of entitlements for claimants 
that, in turn, provides a framework for implementing a consensual collective 
proceeding outside of the insolvency process.’305    
Schwartz accords an implicit but important role to the law by arguing that creditors 
are bound to agree to offers that maintain a similar order of priority as they would 
receive under formal insolvency procedures.306 For example, under the London 
Approach, pay offs are determined against what is obtainable in formal insolvency. 
Thus, Armour and Deakin admit that the substitution of legal rules with norms cannot 
be absolute.307 The goal is that ‘each unsecured creditor will be at least as well off as 
they would be in winding-up proceedings. This makes it individually rational to 
participate in the workout.’308  
                                                          
301 Sarah Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market Norms, Legal Rights and Regulatory Standards, 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies’ (2014) 14 (2) 333, 338. 
302 Armour and Deakin however predict that new entrants would eventually settle in, become repeat players and 
part of market associations, making them subject to threats of ostracization as in the London Approach. Armour 
and Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency’ (n 103) 50, 51; See John Armour, ‘The Rise of the ‘Pre-Pack’: Corporate 
Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for Reform’ (2012) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2093134 > accessed 8 
September 2018 (arguing that fragmented debt structures make informal renegotiation much more difficult to 
coordinate in times of financial distress. This has increased the incidence of formal insolvency proceedings and the 
use of pre-packaged administration). 
303 Luthra (n 280) 340-341. 
304 Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring’ (n 301) 338; Armour and Deakin, ‘Norms in Private 
Insolvency’ (n ) 39. 
305 Thomas Jackson, ‘Entitlements’ (n 102) 867. 
306 Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy Workouts’ (n 290) 595, 598. 
 307 Armour and Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency’ (n 103) 50. 
308 ibid 39. 
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It is not only creditors that bargain against their position under insolvency law. The 
debtor (management) armed with the knowledge of the creditors’ preference for a 
renegotiation, may strengthen their position by threatening to initiate insolvency 
proceedings if the creditors do not consent to their offer.309 Conversely, private 
workouts may be unappealing to managers if they perceive that they might receive 
‘better’ treatment under formal restructuring law.310   
As suggested above, the ‘shadow of the law ‘here goes beyond insolvency laws and 
captures other legal rules and institutions that can impact the distressed company and 
those that deal with it. For example, laws regulating secured transactions, securities 
law, company law and corporate governance rules, industry -specific regulations and 
labour laws can determine the choices available to parties in a workout, thereby 
informing decision making. The enforcement infrastructure such as courts and 
regulators can also affect outcomes.  For example, reports on the outcome of informal 
workouts in Asia reveal that most of them often ended up in fictive debt rescheduling 
with the creditors having no real faith that the debtor would be able to comply with 
the new schedule. Reasons for this include the weak creditor rights, supporting laws 
(including insolvency law) and institutions.311 Thus, the INSOL Principles maintain 
that the Principles ‘will be most successful in facilitating rescues and workouts if an 
appropriate legal, regulatory and governmental policy framework supports them.’ 312 
3.3.3. The formal-informal continuum. 
The relationship between formal and informal restructuring mechanisms is rightly 
described as a continuum, which may feature different mixes of formality.313 
Jurisdictions in both advanced and developing economies, have explored this 
relationship in order to reap the benefits of both systems while avoiding their 
                                                          
309 It has however been pointed out that such a threat must be credible for it to be effective. Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy 
Workouts’ (n 290) 602; Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring’ (n 301) 345. 
310 Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy Workouts’ (n 290) 605; This argument is of selective application because restructuring 
laws are not always patterned after the Chapter 11 Debtor in Possession model. Also, see argument below that 
creditors increasingly displace manages even in Chapter 11. 
311 Robert Zafft and Lampros Vassiliou, ‘Policy Implications from the Second Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform’ 
in Informal Workouts, Restructuring and the Future of Asian Insolvency Reform Proceedings from the Second Forum for 
Asian Insolvency Reform (OECD December 2002) 8-9. 
312 INSOL, Statement of Principles (n 272) 5. 
313 Garrido, Out of Court Debt Restructuring (n 262) 7-11. It is not strange for a restructuring to begin as an informal 
procedure and later transition into a fully formal procedure. 
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shortcomings. This is most evident in the use of pre-packaged and pre-negotiated debt 
restructuring mechanisms.314 
 
What these mechanisms have in common is the moderation of court and regulatory 
involvement in the restructuring process, allowing parties to agree privately and 
subsequently take advantage of the court’s enforcement powers. The US has inspired 
other jurisdictions in its use of a semi-formal restructuring through the pre-packaged 
reorganisation device in Chapter 11. The provision allows distressed companies to 
negotiate with creditors and obtain their support for a reorganisation plan before 
entering into Chapter 11, upon which the plan is filed for confirmation.315 In the UK, 
though not explicitly provided for by law, companies in administration have been 
found to increasingly make  arrangements where the sale of all or part of a company's 
business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the appointment of an 
administrator, and the administrator effects the sale immediately, or shortly after, his 
appointment.316 In addition, the composition and scheme of arrangement procedures 
are company law tools that also allow a company to agree a restructuring with its 
creditors with the approval of the court.317  Australia provides for a creditor-controlled 
voluntary administration system that allows a company to be restructured with no 
mandatory role for the court. Although the powers of the court can be invoked during 
the administration, a company may commence administration, agree to a plan and 
pass a deed of company arrangement without the participation of the court.318  
 
A case can be made for the use of semi-formal mechanisms in developing countries 
where problems of weak and inefficient institutions is often a challenge. For these 
countries, finding the right balance between court involvement and private 
                                                          
314 The difference between the prepackaged reorganisation and the prenegotiated plan is that the former is 
prevoted before the formal procecure while the latter is postvoted i.e after the formal procedure commences. M. B. 
Jacoby, ‘Prepacks and the Deal-Litigation Tension’ (2004) 23(2) American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 34. 
315 11 U.S.C 1125 (g). 
316 Statement of Insolvency Practice 16, England and Wales (Association of Recovery Processionals November 2015) 
1. 
317 See Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006. 
318 Part 5.3A Administration, Australian Corporations Act 2001. It has been observed that where the court is 
involved, its role is often supervisory. Ian Walker, ‘Voluntary Administration Leading to a Deed of Company 
Arrangement’ in Olivares-Caminal (n 238) 69. 
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bargaining can be particularly beneficial in expediting the restructuring of distressed 
companies.319   
Argentina’s APE (Acuerdo Preventivo Extrajudicial) is an expedited restructuring 
mechanism contemplated under the Argentine Bankruptcy Law320 which allows a 
distressed company to agree with its creditors for a range of restructuring options and 
thereafter submit such an agreement for judicial homologation.321 Agreements can 
often be reached with little or no supervision from the court, except where proposals 
are abusive or illegal.322 Brazil has followed a similar path with its two out-of-court 
reorganisation procedures - Homologation of Consensus and Enforcement of 
Agreement, provided by its Insolvency and Reorganisation Law of 2005. As with 
Argentina’s restructuring law, parties are able to privately bargain and make a 
reorganisation plan, which is subsequently homologated in court. The main difference 
between Brazil’s two reorganisation procedures is that while the former requires 
unanimous agreement by all affected creditors, under the Enforcement of Agreement 
system, dissenting creditors can be crammed down once a sixty per cent vote is 
achieved.323  
For developing countries in Africa undergoing insolvency law reform, the role of the 
law in restructuring becomes more difficult to deny, especially as markets and foreign 
investment grow.  The real question then becomes what the structure of such 
restructuring laws would be, what degree of formality and court involvement would 
be appropriate considering the institutional infrastructure, socio-economic realities 
and the underlying policy orientation of the economies.324  
                                                          
319 As seen in some Latin and South American economies. See Olivares-Caminal and Frigerio, Expedited Debt 
Restructuring in Latin America; a Regional Overview’ (2010) IDB Working Paper Series, No 113. 
320 Argentine Bankruptcy Law No. 24.533 (ABL), ss 69-76. 
321 ABL, s 73. Voting is two-tier, an absolute majority on head count basis and two thirds by value of interests. The 
law gained some notoriety after the Argentine crisis of 2001 to 2002 that resulted in the restructuring of up to USD 
31.5 billion. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal,’ Expedited Debt Restructuring under Argentine Law: Acuerdo Preventivo 
Extrajudicial (APE)’ in Olivares-Caminal (ed) (n 238) 21. 
322 The success of expedited restructuring in this jurisdiction has been hinged on factors such as fair proposals and 
fluent dialogue among stakeholders. ibid 50-51. 
323 Luiz Fernando Valente-de-Paiva, Brazil’s Two New Mechanisms for Out-Of-Court Reorganizations: 
‘Homologation of Consensus’ and ‘Enforcement of Agreement’ in Olivares-Caminal, (n 238) 102. 
324 In designing legislation, Armour and Deakin propose that the frame of reference should be expanded to include 
social norms to ensure that these laws interact effectively with the norms that exist in the market place. Armour 
and Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency (n 103) 50. 
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The next section discusses how key issues in restructuring are addressed, the factors 
that inform different choices in restructuring frameworks and the role of the law and 
courts. 
 
3.4. Key Elements of a (formal) debt restructuring process.  
While it may be widely accepted that law plays an important role in facilitating debt 
restructuring, the features of a restructuring framework must be sufficiently attractive 
to encourage stakeholders to participate in it. They must also be compatible with 
existing laws and institutional infrastructure.  The key elements of restructuring 
frameworks discussed here are commencement, decision making, control, 
restructuring plan and restructuring finance.325  
3.4.1. Commencement 
Commencement raises two important questions- who can initiate a restructuring and 
when they may do so. It remains unsettled who is in the best position to make the 
optimally efficient choice regarding the fate of a distressed company.  It is debated 
whether this task should fall on management,326 the senior creditors, the market or the 
junior creditors.327 Rational, self-interested behaviour dictates that senior lenders and 
secured creditors who are in the money have no incentive to engage in value-
maximising restructuring. They would therefore have a bias for an inefficient 
liquidation.328  Hahn argues that where commencement is left to creditors, debtors are 
able to delay timely restructuring of a distressed company by strategically avoiding 
                                                          
325 It is noted that there are other relevant considerations for establishing a restructuring framework that are not 
discussed here. Some of them are treatment of ongoing contracts, accountability of managers and the relationship 
of the procedure with other insolvency procedures including a transition from restructuring to liquidation. See 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide for a discussion.  
326 Warren, ‘Imperfect World’ (n 136) 359 (She defends the decision-making powers given to managers because it 
incentivises them to submit to restructuring early enough and limits risk aversion). 
327 This is the residual actor problem. Jackson suggests that the ideal decision maker would be a claim holder whose 
single residual claimant whose wealth, when a firm's balance sheet's assets are worth less than its liabilities, directly 
increases or decreases from any movement upwards or downwards in the company's value. Jackson and Scott, 
‘On The Nature of Bankruptcy’ (n 117) 155. This suggestion has been criticised as cumbersome and impractical. 
Goldschmid (More Phoenix than Vulture) (n 94) 195-199 (arguing that there is no easy way to identify and shift 
decision making to this ideal residual claimant; He refers to Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: 
An Empirical Study, No. 3-11, (2003) (unpublished manuscript) 15 who points out that there may be a number of 
people who qualify for this role and there is no certain standard for deciding who gets it). 
328 Ivor Benveniste, ‘Receivers: Double Agents or Surrogate Liquidators?’ (1986) Accounting and Business Research 
245; Aghion, Hart and Moore, ‘The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform’ (1992) 8 Journal of Law Economics and 
Organisation 523-546; Ayotte and Morrison, ‘Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11’ (2008) Columbia Law 
and Economics Research Paper No 321. 
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default through continued payment of specific debts.  ‘The more management 
succeeds in appeasing the secured lender the more likely that the latter will remain 
inactive and abstain from taking any action against the corporation.’329 
On the other hand, managers will prefer an option that allows them private benefits 
such as staying in control for as long as possible. They will seek to prolong the life of 
the company even where it is not efficient to do so. This continuation bias is also 
shared by junior creditors and equity holders who are out of the money and can only 
get their returns in the event of a miraculous turnaround.330  As a result of this, there 
is difficulty deciding who is in the best position to make the best value yielding 
decision.  Most restructuring laws solve this dilemma by allowing both creditors and 
debtors to initiate a restructuring procedure. 331  
In determining the ’when’ question i.e. criteria for commencement, early intervention 
is crucial to a successful debt restructuring, especially where the goal is to rescue the 
company, as many laws aim to do.  While some laws do not impose a substantive 
criterion, allowing procedures to open whenever the company is considered in need 
of it,332 others impose a condition based on prospective illiquidity- that the company 
or its creditors opens proceedings if they envisage illiquidity or insolvency in the near 
future. 333 A further question that arises here is what the test for solvency would be- 
whether balance sheet or cash flow test.334 While a cash flow test is much easier for 
                                                          
329 David Hahn, ‘Concentrated ownership and control of corporate reorganisations’ (2004) 4(1) Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 143. For a summary of the pros and cons of DIP systems, see 118-119. 
330 Jackson & Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy’ (n 117) 157. 
331 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), s 123(2). US Chapter 11 allows creditors to commence an involuntary reorganisation 
although it has been found that most reorganisations are voluntarily commenced by the debtor.   11 USC 301 & 
303.  See also, Insolvency Act 1986, s 12. This is the recommendation of the World Bank, ICR Principles (n 253) C4; 
The Doing Business rankings scores countries on the question of commencement, countries where both creditors 
and debtors can initiate a reorganisation receive a higher score in the efficiency of their insolvency frameworks. 
See Doing Business Report, Resolving Insolvency (Methodology)  
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/resolving-insolvency > accessed 8 September 2018. 
332 The English CVA for example. Insolvency Act 1986, s 1(1). There is no requirement of insolvency before a 
company can enter the US Chapter 11 process, but a case can be dismissed early if it has been filed in bad faith or 
without reasonable hope of success. 
333 The UK administration procedure stands in contrast to the CVA in this regard. It requires that the company is 
or is likely to become unable to pay its debts.  The English administration procedure requires prospective illiquidity 
as it must be shown that ‘the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts’. Insolvency Act 1986, s 11. 
In contrast, the Company Voluntary Arrangement allows a company’s directors to propose a restructuring when 
they wish. Insolvency Act 1986, s 1(1). Mauritian Insolvency Act requires directors to resolve that the company is 
insolvent or is likely to become insolvent. Insolvency Act 2009, s 215(6). 
334 See Ch 1, 24-25; Horst Eidenmüller, ‘Trading in times of crisis: Formal insolvency proceedings, workouts and 
the incentives for shareholders/managers’ (2006) 7(1) European Business Organization Law Review 239-258. 
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managers or creditors to demonstrate, a balance sheet test usually takes longer.335  
However, the company should not be expected to wait until payments or cash flow 
has ceased completely and the company can be described as illiquid, before a 
procedure for restructuring is initiated.336 
The ability to commence a restructuring without needing to wait till the company is 
insolvent has been commended as allowing distress to be tackled at an earlier stage.337 
On the other hand, there is a concern that debtors could abuse the procedure where 
the criterion for commencement is too lenient. For example, debtors could commence 
a restructuring proceeding to achieve other goals that are unconnected to the 
rehabilitation of the company, such as shedding some obligations that management 
considers onerous.338    
 Once a restructuring commences or is initiated, a moratorium in the form of a stay on 
the ability of creditors to exercise their legal rights to enforce legal actions is important. 
In the context of a restructuring, it is critical that enforcement actions are suspended 
to avoid depleting the value in the business. Secured creditors have been identified as 
having little incentive to participate in a collective process and therefore a bias for a 
quick liquidation rather than preserving the company as a going concern.339  This 
liquidation bias has informed attempts to force them into the restructuring process by 
legislation.  For instance, Chapter 11 imposes an automatic stay of action on all 
creditors including the secured creditors. The security holder’s priority in relation to 
the assets remain intact but they are unable to take the security out of the ‘pool’ 
without the court’s approval.340   
                                                          
335 IMF, Orderly Procedures (n 4) 54-55. 
336 Early intervention may be encouraged with either carrots or sticks. Some frameworks like Chapter 11 incentivise 
the company’s management to intervene early by allowing them to stay in control during the restructuring process. 
337 This is one of the reasons why scheme of arrangement is identified as a useful tool for rehabilitating distressed 
companies. See Jennifer Payne, Cross-border schemes of arrangement and forum shopping’ (2013) 14 (4) European 
Business Organization Law Review 563-589. 
338 IMF, Orderly Procedures (n 4)  54; For example, recent use of CVAs in the UK following the retail crisis has been 
resisted by landlords who consider the use of the Insolvency Act 1986, Sch 1, s 12(1)(f) by retail companies 
oppressive. Peter Walton, Chris Umfreville and Lezelle Jacobs ‘Company Voluntary Arrangements: Evaluating 
Success and Failure’ (May 2018, Empirical study Commissioned by R3, the insolvency and restructuring trade 
body, and sponsored by ICAEW) Para 7.2; Rhiannon Curry, ‘House of Fraser CVA faces resistance from landlords’ 
The Telegraph (26 May 2018). 
339 Nick Segal, ‘The Effect of Reorganization Proceedings on Security Interests: The Position Under English And 
U.S. Law’ (2007) 32 Brook. J. Int'l L. 927; Bebchuk and Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case’ (n 144) 881-887.  




Compared to liquidation which ousts the debtor’s management and puts a liquidator 
in place, the displacement of management is up for debate in a restructuring process. 
Some frameworks, notably the US Chapter 11, adopt a debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
system that leaves current management in control of the company while others like 
the UK administration procedure employ a practitioner-in-possession (PIP) system.341 
This is one of the most prominent distinctions in the way restructuring law operates 
in countries across the world. One common explanation for the choice between a DIP 
and PIP system is the postulation that there is a relationship between the predominant 
corporate shareholding structure in an economy and the structure of its restructuring 
law. In countries with a dispersed shareholding structure where control is often 
separated from ownership,342 management can be relied on to remain in control when 
the company is distressed. For jurisdictions with concentrated ownership, where 
owners closely control the firm, allowing management to retain control of the 
distressed company jeopardises the creditors and leaves them vulnerable to the 
manipulation of shareholders.343   
Hahn argues that the separation of ownership and control helps the debtor-in-
possession to discharge its fiduciary duties to creditors satisfactorily as managers can 
‘desert shareholders and cooperate with creditors in formulating a reorganisation 
plan’.344  With concentrated ownership, which is commonplace in less developed 
markets, companies are closely controlled by strong shareholders and predominantly 
financed by bank lending rather than capital markets. There, not only does senior 
management consist of appointees of the controlling shareholder(s), these appointees 
are the ‘flesh and blood’ of that controlling group. Because these executives display 
fervent loyalty to the controlling owner, leaving them in control exacerbates the risk 
                                                          
341 Vanessa Finch, ‘Control and Coordination in Corporate Rescue’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 375. 
342 Labelled the Berle-Means model of ownership propagated by Professors Berle and Means as a model where 
large companies are financed by a widely dispersed group of shareholders while the actual control is concentrated 
in the hands of a few management personnel. Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New 
York, Harcourt 1932); Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership’ (n 329) 120. 




of loss to creditors. Thus, in such systems, it is more beneficial that managers are 
displaced when companies become distressed.  
The Practitioner- in-Possession (PIP) system demands the displacement of managers 
and the installation of a restructuring professional to manage the company. English 
administration law is an example of a system that adopts this approach.345 Because its 
markets are developed, and ownership-management structure closely resembles that 
of the US, the UK has been regarded as an ‘anomaly’, a ‘problem child’ that challenges 
the proposition that jurisdictions with dispersed ownership are better off with a DIP 
system.346 Among the explanations given for this ‘anomaly’ is the fact that dispersed 
ownership is a relatively recent development in the UK (mid 1970s- 1980s), and 
reforms will soon catch up as ownership becomes even more dispersed. The projection 
is therefore that the UK is in transition and with cycles of reform, restructuring law in 
the UK is likely to conform more to the DIP system.347  
Some doubt has been cast on both this prediction and its theoretical foundation. The 
theory oversimplifies the matter because beyond corporate structure, attitude to 
entrepreneurship, risk-taking and corporate failure can also influence the structure of 
restructuring law.348 It has been observed that the UK shows a bias towards creditors 
because it is inherently believed that managers are responsible for corporate failure. 
The US system on the other hand views corporate failure more as a misfortune than 
                                                          
345 An administrator who is either appointed by the directors, the court or a qualifying floating charge holder 
displaces management to direct the procedure. Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1, ss22, 35. 
346 Some have sought to differentiate between shareholding structure in the UK and the US, for instance on the 
basis that institutional investors are more prominent and influential in the UK which ultimately results in strong 
shareholding. John Armour, BR Cheffins & DA Skeel, ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of 
Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’ (2002) 55 Vanderbilt Law Review 1699, 1747–1748.  Hahn 
however admits that these arguments are not completely convincing. Hahn ‘Concentrated Ownership’ (n 329) 135. 
347 The introduction of the CVA in 2000 which allows debtor to stay in control while the company is restructured 
(albeit limited to small companies), and proposals for reform in the UK have been identified as evidence of 
movement in that direction. Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership’ (n 329) fn 93.  (McCormack points out rightly that 
the CVA does not support the theory as it is small firms to which the procedure applies, that are more likely to 
operate a concentrated ownership system. Gerard McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue–An Anglo-
American Evaluation’ (2007) 56(3) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 544. It has also been pointed out 
that the prominent use of the London Approach where the debtor stays in possession while the company is 
restructured out of court indicates that the UK conforms to the theory more than is immediately apparent.  Here 
however, the creditors have significant control over the process. Armour, Cheffins & Skeel (n 346) 1754–1762.  
348 Gerard McCormack, ‘Anglo-American Evaluation’ (n 347) 533-538 argues that path dependence and historical 
circumstances can also explain the differences. McCormack points out that administration evolved from the age-
old administrative receivership procedure which was creditor-controlled. 
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wrongdoing.349  The same has also been noted about France and Germany, with the 
former adopting a forgiving, pro-debtor approach while the latter exhibits a culture 
of blame towards failing companies.350   
McCormack argues that the US is more of an outlier than the UK in its adoption of a 
DIP system, highlighting that other jurisdictions with dispersed ownership systems 
(such as Australia) adopt a creditor-controlled restructuring system.351 A study of 
common law insolvency systems suggests that corporate failures are attended by 
stigma and embarrassment, and these regimes are more inclined to be hard on 
company management and are sceptical of DIP systems.352 The argument that UK law 
would ultimately come to resemble the US system has thus been resisted by 
commentators who argue that if harmonisation would occur, it is likely to be half-way 
or for US law to tilt towards the English system.353  
It is instructive to consider the pros and cons of each approach on its merits. In contrast 
to a system that displaces managers, a DIP system is thought to encourage early 
intervention, because management do not have to be apprehensive of losing their 
place in the company when a formal procedure is initiated.  Secondly, it is believed 
that managers are better positioned to manage the company because they have all the 
information about the company and specific set of skills and expertise required for 
managing it.354 Also, reputational damage from financial distress is reduced where 
status quo is maintained.355 This is particularly important for jurisdictions where 
corporate distress is seriously frowned upon and formal procedures are attended by 
social stigma.356   
                                                          
349 ibid 525. 
350 Martin 'The Role of History and Culture’ (n 170) 46-48. 
351 McCormack, ‘Anglo-American Evaluation’ (n 347) 543. 
352 Nathalie Martin, ‘Common-Law Bankruptcy’ (n 253) 367, 374. 
353One of the arguments in support of this is the increasing trend of creditor control in the US.  McCormack, ‘Anglo-
American Evaluation’ (n 347) 516; Gerard McCormack, ‘Apples and oranges? Corporate rescue and functional 
convergence in the US and UK’ (2009) 18(2) International Insolvency Review 110. 
354 Hahn, ‘Concentrated ownership’ (n 329) 117-154. 
355 Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case’ (n 242) 136 – 139. 
356 Reports about the cultural realignment that formal insolvency mechanisms require in collectivist East Asian 
economies reveal that ‘taking a bankruptcy case to court is tantamount to a public admission of failure. It requires 
the disclosure of many private details of business practice, and it puts the fate of family businesses in the hands of 
unknown third parties. Above all, it brings public shame and loss of face.’ Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 
343; Asian Development Bank, ‘Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region’ in Law and Reform at the 
Asian Development Bank (Manila, ADB 2000). 
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On the other hand, a DIP restructuring may trigger perverse incentives such as the 
continuation bias discussed above.357 This is a particularly high risk where the 
commencement criterion is flexible.358 Also, where a company has been led into 
distress because of bad management, allowing such management to retain control can 
be counterproductive.359 Furthermore, managers may have become jaded and bereft 
of creativity in the running of a company. In such cases, new management with fresh 
ideas may be the most important ingredient for a successful restructuring.360 
Some safeguards have been adopted in dealing with some of these shortcomings. One 
of them is to accord the court a supervisory role that allows it to of its own volition or 
at the prompting of the creditors, convert the restructuring to a liquidation because 
there is no likelihood of a successful restructuring or for lack of good faith by the 
debtor management.361 Consequently, a DIP system must be accompanied by 
balancing mechanisms such as sound corporate governance provisions and/or court 
supervision.362 Regardless of who the law puts in control of management, senior 
creditors often have a strong influence in the restructuring process, ultimately making 
most restructuring creditor-oriented.363 Also, empirical studies on Chapter 11 have 
found that key officers in management are often displaced during or shortly after the 
restructuring process, at the creditors’ will.364 Thus, while DIP and PIP systems seem 
widely divergent doctrinally, the differences between them are less obvious in 
practice.  
                                                          
357 Stuart C. Gilson, ‘Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership 
and Control When Firms Default’ (1990) 27 Journal of Financial Economics 355. 
358 IMF, Orderly Procedures (n 4) 54. 
359 Allowing an alcoholic control of a pub as described by Gabriel Moss in G Moss, 'Chapter 11: An English Lawyer's 
Critique' (1998) 11 Insolvency Intelligence 17, 18-19. 
360 Goldschmid, ‘More Phoenix than Vulture’ (n 94) 187. 
361 Jennifer Payne, ‘The role of the court in debt restructuring’ (2018) 77(1) The Cambridge Law Journal 124, 127; 
Insolvency Act 1986, s 7A. 
362 As seen in the higher level of court involvement under US Chapter 11. 
363 The English administration procedure has not eliminated the control of floating charge holders in practice, they 
have been shown to retain control by exercising their power to appoint the administrator. McCormack, ‘Anglo-
American Evaluation’ (n 347) 544. Even in DIP systems, powerful creditors can hijack control of the process. Baird 
and Rasmussen, ’The end of bankruptcy’ (n 158) 751-789. Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen, ‘Antibankruptcy’ 
(2010) Yale Law Journal 648; McCormack, ‘Anglo-American Evaluation’ (n 347) 515. 
364 LM LoPucki and WC Whitford, 'Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Large, Publicly 
Held Companies' (1993) 141 UPa L Rev 669. 
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Some countries also find a middle ground between the two approaches in an effort to 
balance the incentives of creditors and debtors, and to extract the benefits of both 
systems.365 Here, management and control is split between the debtor and an 
independent, usually court-appointed professional. One power sharing formula is for 
managers to retain control of the everyday management of the company while the 
implementation of the restructuring plan and other significant transactions are 
supervised by the professional.366 The professional can be poised to fully displace the 
management if their actions warrant it. This approach however carries its own caveats, 
mainly the clarity of the power sharing formula between the independent professional 
and management.367 Questions such as who decides the limit of each party’s powers 
and the yardstick for making such determination arise. In the absence of clear and 
precise rules, the restructuring process will be tainted with a lot of uncertainty.   
Developing countries in the process of reforming insolvency legislations stand to learn 
from these considerations. In adopting a DIP system, it must be noted that corporate 
governance laws and mechanisms for holding directors accountable are important.368 
Also, the supervision of managers would require the judiciary or relevant authority 
to exercise some discretionary powers. The delegated authority must be equipped to 
make such decisions, with judges that are independent and well versed in complex 
                                                          
365 Hahn argues that this system enjoys the relative advantages of the DIP and PIP systems. Hahn ‘Concentrated 
ownership’ (n 329) 149. 
366 This approach is adopted by countries such as Canada, Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act 
(CCAA) a monitor (that is, a person licensed to act as a trustee) is appointed to supervise the debtor company and 
to assist the debtor company with the formulation of its plan of reorganisation. The debtor remains in control of 
its business and its property and assets but is subject to the monitor's scrutiny. See sections 11.7 and 23 of the CCAA 
1985. As discussed in Chapter five, the same approach has recently been adopted in African countries like South 
Africa and Liberia. 
367 Hahn proposes that the PIP sits on the board and has a veto power. The chairman of the board and CEO would 
be required to report to the trustee on all business matters of the corporation. Thus, the trustee would be involved 
in all business decisions of the debtor, except decisions involving ordinary course of business activities that did 
not reach the board. Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership’ (n 329) 148-153.  Adams on the other hand suggests a 
bifurcated system where management would retain the exclusive power to operate the business of the debtor and 
make all investment and financing decisions. The PIP on the other hand has the exclusive power to negotiate with 
the creditors and draft a reorganisation plan. Edward S. Adams, ‘Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganisations: 
Reducing Costs, Improving Results’ (1993) 73 Boston University Law Review 581. 
368Benjamin Mwanzia Mulili and Peter Wong, ‘Corporate governance practices in developing countries: The case 
for Kenya’ (2011) 2(1) International journal of business administration 14-17; Darryl Reed, ‘Corporate governance 
reforms in developing countries’ (2002) 37 (3) Journal of Business Ethics 223-247. 
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commercial issues. Institutional infrastructure like courts must also be competent and 
able to process decisions timeously.369  
3.4.3. The restructuring plan  
Once a decision to restructure is made, it is important that a clear plan is put in place. 
Questions that arise in this regard include the party that is tasked with the 
responsibility of drawing up a plan and whether they should be given exclusivity in 
doing so. US Chapter 11 deals with this issue by providing for an exclusivity period 
within which the debtor can propose a reorganisation plan.370 At the expiration of this 
period, the creditors may then propose a plan, if the court does not exercise its 
discretion to extend the exclusivity period. An independent professional may also be 
given the responsibility of proposing a restructuring plan. This is the model in 
jurisdictions that displace managers upon commencement of the formal procedure.371 
Whether the debtor or a professional proposes a plan, it is often subject to the approval 
of creditors.  Thus, debtors and IPs are unlikely to propose any plan that creditors are 
likely to disapprove of.372  
It is not settled what kind of information a restructuring plan should be required to 
provide. Most laws would impose disclosure requirements such as information 
regarding financial state of the company, how the rights of all stakeholders would be 
affected by the proposed plan, whether the plan protects the rights of dissenting 
creditors. 373  Substantive limits may also be imposed on the terms of a restructuring 
plan. A restructuring law may require that the restructuring plan be accompanied by 
a business plan detailing the changes and strategies for running the business over a 
period of time and projections on how these changes will realistically improve the 
financial condition of the business long term.374 This requirement is beneficial for 
                                                          
369If the claims about the concentration of ownership and control structures hold any credibility, it becomes 
relevant to note that markets in Africa are still developing and ownership and control are often concentrated. The 
implications of this for restructuring law are revisited later in this thesis. See Ch 5, section 5.7.2. 
370 The DIP enjoys a period of 120 days from the date of the order during which it has the exclusive right to propose 
a reorganisation plan, Chapter 11 USC, s1121 (a) (b). 
371 The administrator makes proposals for the restructuring. Section 49 Insolvency Act 1986. 
372 IMF, Orderly Procedures (n 4) 62. 
373 11 USC 1123 requires the plan to stipulate clearly the changes to be made, interests that would be impaired by 
the plan and plans for implementation. 
374 South African Law requires a projected three years financial statement from the time the plan is approved. 
Companies Act 2008, s 150. 
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effective restructuring that goes beyond mere debt rescheduling to include business 
strategies for enhancing the competitiveness of the business. It inspires creativity on 
the part of the company’s management and can be an important factor in obtaining 
fresh finance.375   The content of a plan may also be informed by other laws such as 
company, banking and labour laws.376   
 
3.4.4. The decision-making process 
There are often competing considerations in  restructuring, as the interests of debtors, 
different groups of creditors, employee groups and shareholders would not always 
align. Restructuring law offers mechanisms for enhancing decision making, including 
the creation of voting classes and majorities, the imposition of a decision on a 
dissenting minority, the protection of the interests of such minority, the cram down of 
whole classes and the intervention of the courts in approving a plan. 
One of the questions that will often arise is how secured creditors should be treated in 
the voting process. Secured assets can constitute a substantial portion of the assets of 
a distressed company. Thus, it may become important to include these assets in the 
restructuring plan while also protecting the interests of the secured creditors. 377  There 
can also be different economic interests among general creditors, for instance between 
ongoing creditors that have a long-term interest in the business and short-term 
creditors. It becomes important to create classes so that the restructuring plan can be 
structured to identify and accommodate different interests and have a better chance 
of receiving support.378  
Restructuring laws must also consider what the threshold for binding all the creditors 
in a class would be. Frameworks commonly adopt a three-quarter or two-third 
                                                          
375 However, this may not prevent the presentation of a merely cosmetic business plan which is only made to satisfy 
the requirement of restructuring law. 
376 For example, if company law restricts debt-equity conversions, a restructuring plan cannot include a debt-equity 
conversion except that prohibition is removed.  
377 Nick Segal, ‘The Effect of Reorganization Proceedings on Security Interests: The Position Under English And 
U.S. Law’ (2007) 32 Brook. J. Int'l L. 927; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 121. 
378 Chapter 11 USC 1129(b); IMF, Orderly Procedures (n 4) 65-66.  
82 
 
majority.379  Importantly, it must be determined whether it is a fraction of the total 
value of claims, the number of creditors voting or both. The English Scheme of 
arrangement is an example of a framework that adopts a two-tier voting system, 
requiring that the majority must represent three quarters in value of both the affected 
interests and their number.380  Although criticised for making the restructuring 
process more difficult, this requirement is driven by a fairness concern. The 
justification for a two-tier approval system is that if voting is solely based on the value 
of claim, a single creditor or a small group that hold a substantial value of the debt 
will dominate the decision making.381  
A key issue in decision making and the balancing of competing interests is whether a 
restructuring law should allow a plan to bind a whole class where a majority vote has 
not been achieved by that class.  Countries have different approaches to this question. 
While Chapter 11 allows restructurings to go on without the approval of a whole class, 
in the UK, no single mechanism allows for such cramdown.382  
Cram down provisions are increasingly regarded as useful for enhancing the chances 
of successful restructuring.383 While cramdown can help to speed up decision making 
in restructuring, it should be accompanied by mechanisms for protecting dissenting 
classes. At the minimum, it is ensured that the priority rules in liquidation are 
respected, such that no creditor of that class receives less than they would have in 
liquidation. In addition to this, the absolute priority rule, dictates that a dissenting 
                                                          
379 Under Chapter 11, creditors holding at least one-half in number and two-thirds in amount of the claims of that 
class. Chapter 11 USC, s1126(c) (e); For the English administration procedure, ‘a decision is not made if those 
voting against it include more than half in value of the creditors to whom notice of the decision procedure was 
delivered who are not, to the best of the convener’s or chair’s belief, persons connected with the company’.  
Insolvency (amendment) Rules 2017, r 15.34(2).  
380 Companies Act 2006 Pt 26. Under Nigerian law by contrast, it is only in relation to value of interests in the 
company that a three-quarters majority is required. Section 538 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
381 It has however been argued that creditors with small claims can be protected in other ways such as court 
oversight. Payne, ‘The Role of the Court’ (n 361) 133.  
382 Paterson, ‘Notions of Fairness’(n 225) 600- 623; In the UK, stakeholders have devised ways to achieve a cram 
down, notably by pairing a scheme of arrangement with an administration procedure, where a scheme is used to 
exempt creditors that are out of the money from voting while the process enjoys the moratorium and other 
protection that administration offers. Re MyTravel Group Plc [2004] EWHC 2741 (Ch); Re Bluebrook Ltd [2010] 1 
B.C.L.C. 338. Payne, ‘Debt Restructuring‘(n 91) 16- 20. 
383 Payne, ‘Debt Restructuring (n 91) 1-4; Consultations for restructuring law reform in the UK are now proposing 
a procedure that allows for a cramdown or the extension of an existing procedure. Insolvency Service, A review of 
the corporate insolvency framework: A consultation on options for reform (May 2016) para 9 
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class should not receive less than the full value of their claim if creditors of a junior 
class (applying the ranking applicable in liquidation) receive any value at all. 384 
On a final note, jurisdictions must decide what role the courts would play in the 
decision-making process. Where voting and decision making is concerned, different 
jurisdictions allocate varying degrees of involvement to the court.385 From the 
ordering of meetings, division of creditors into classes, determination of majorities, 
cram down, and a general oversight role to ensure fairness. For example, the court 
may be called upon to categorise creditors based on their economic interests or to 
approve a categorisation done by the company or a practitioner.  The court may also 
be required to determine if an absolute priority rule has been adhered to. To the extent 
that they further complicate the restructuring process and the role of practitioners and 
the court, these rules rely on a relatively developed institutional infrastructure. The 
class voting mechanism for decision making can be particularly cumbersome and 
complex, as dividing creditors into classes is not always a straightforward exercise.386 
Developing economies must be aware that while these mechanisms can potentially 
enhance the opportunity for successful restructuring, creditors must be confident that 
judges or other institutions are required to exercise these discretions are informed, 
knowledgeable and well-equipped to do so.387  
3.4.5. Restructuring finance  
The successful restructuring of distressed companies often requires fresh finance for 
both continued operation in the short term and long-term turnaround measures. 
Companies in financial distress have low credit ratings and find it difficult or costly 
to obtain financing. Suppliers are hesitant to continue to supply if there are no 
assurances of payment.388 The funding needs range from working capital 
                                                          
384 The absolute priority rule applies under the US Chapter 11 procedure. See 11 USC 1129; Douglas Baird, and 
Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bargaining after the fall and the contours of the absolute priority rule’ (1988) The University 
of Chicago Law Review 738-789. 
385 With frameworks like Chapter 11 relying on the court more heavily than UK administration. 
386 Sovereign Life Assurance Co v Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573; Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 2 BCLC 480 demonstrate 
these complexities. 
387 IMF, Orderly Procedures (n 4) 69. In the absence of such assurance, these mechanisms may erode creditor 
confidence and result in creative application or disuse. 
388 Raphael La Porta et.al, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) NBER Working Paper No. w5879; Janis 
Sarra ‘Financing Insolvency Restructurings in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Stalking Horses, Rogue White 
Knights and Circling Vultures’ (2011) Penn State International Law Review 582. 
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requirements to restructuring costs and long-term costs of financing the business plan. 
There are two main sources of new finance providers, pre-insolvency lenders that 
extend trade credit or new funds and lenders with no previous relationship with the 
company who seek a chance for a higher return on their investment in the distressed 
company.389  New money for the restructuring process variously described as rescue 
finance, short term financing, restructuring finance, DIP finance or post 
commencement finance, has increasingly become a central concern of insolvency law 
reform.390   
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the traditional views of insolvency 
regulation is anchored on a commitment to the maintenance of pre-insolvency 
entitlements. The major issue in restructuring finance is the tension between 
incentives that may be offered to a new finance provider vis the rights of existing 
creditors.  Restructuring laws have responded to the need for fresh finance in different 
ways. While some have left the provision of post commencement finance to the 
market,391 others have sought to incentivise existing or new lenders to provide finance 
by establishing a funding mechanism.  
The US DIP financing under the Chapter 11 is perhaps the leading example for 
designing a restructuring funding mechanism. DIP financing has different tranches of 
financing which debtors can explore in ascending order. One is to obtain credit on an 
unsecured basis in the ordinary course of business. Such credit is treated as an 
administrative expense which gives priority over other general creditors.392 Although 
it does not raise significant priority issues, it may be difficult for a troubled company 
to find lenders willing to extend unsecured finance.393 Where the debtor is unable to 
                                                          
389 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 4) Para 99. 
390The influential World Bank Doing Business project has now included the availability of post commencement 
finance as one of the basis for measuring the strength of restructuring frameworks across the world. Doing Business 
Report 2018 (Resolving Insolvency Methodology) <www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/resolving-
insolvency> accessed 22 August 2018.  
391 English administration law for example does not provide a mechanism for prioritising restructuring finance. 
Smith (n 268); See proposals for reform, Insolvency Service, A review of the corporate insolvency framework: A 
consultation on options for reform (May 2016) para 10. 
392 11 USC 364 (a)(b). 
393 It is reported that the provision is mostly used to obtain credit from suppliers Michael Rochelle, ‘Post-Filing 
Loans to the Chapter 11 Debtor: Good Money after Bad’ (1990)107 Banking LJ 344. Most lenders instead insist on 
a lien that equals or outranks senior liens.  
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obtain credit in this way, the law allows the new credit to have priority above other 
administrative creditors.394 New credit may be obtained on a secured basis, and where 
a security interest is involved, the question of priority becomes crucial. If the assets 
are encumbered, a second, junior priority interest may be created.395 A more extreme 
approach is to grant a post commencement finance provider a super-priority security 
interest that ranks higher than existing security interests.396 The challenge with this is 
the potential ex ante effect of such super-priority on the value of security.397 Apart 
from potential ex-ante effects, such redistributive tendencies raise the possibility that 
secured credit holders would devise means to circumvent the restructuring process, 
thereby depriving a troubled company of essential assets.398 In acknowledgment of 
these issues, the court is given the duty to ensure that the debtor makes sufficient 
efforts to obtain credit using the mechanisms that are less disruptive to secured 
creditors rights. So, before the super-priority security interest is granted under 
Chapter 11, the court must ensure that there is adequate protection for pre-filing 
secured creditors.399  It is noted that international standards like the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide tend to reflect the US position on the subject. 400  
However, countries justifiably approach the issue of priority and security interests for 
new money providers cautiously. Some restructuring frameworks are still silent on 
                                                          
394 11 USC 364 c (1). 
395 11 USC 364 c (3). 
396 ibid s364(d) This is a priming lien which allows the debtor or trustee to seek approval of financing on a priority 
basis, that is the claim can be secured by a lien equal to or senior to an existing lien, if the applicant can establish 
that it was unable to obtain credit otherwise, and there is “adequate protection” for pre-filing secured creditors; 
Payne, ‘The role of Court’ (n 361)147; Sandeep Dahiya  and others, ‘Debtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy 
resolution: Empirical evidence’(2003) 69(1) Journal of Financial Economics 259-280. 
397 Payne, ‘The role of Court’ (n 361) 147. 
398 John Armour, ‘Should we Redistribute?’ (n 167) 1-22.  
399 11 USC 364 (d). The Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) provides trustees with the power to borrow 
money and grant security on the property of the debtor.  See BIA section 30(1)(g).  No special priority is granted to 
such financing, however.  Under the wide discretion granted to courts by the CCAA, they have authorised super-
priority lending, but the court ensures that there is a reasonable prospect of successfully restructuring. See Janis 
Sarra, ‘Debtor in Possession Financing:  The Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts to Grant Super-Priority Financing in 
CCAA Applications’ (2000) 23 Dalhousie L.J. 337, 341-345. 
400 The 64th recommendation of the UNCITRAL Guide relating to the priority for post commencement finance 
states that insolvency law should establish the priority that may be accorded to post commencement finance, 
ensuring at least the payment of the post commencement finance provider ahead of ordinary unsecured creditors, 
including those unsecured creditors with administrative priority. For security interests and priority over existing 
security, recommendations 55 to 67 follow the US pattern, and incorporate a protection mechanism for priming 
liens (a) The existing secured creditor was given the opportunity to be heard by the court; (b) The debtor can prove 
that it cannot obtain the finance in any other way; and (c) The interests of the existing secured creditor will be 
protected. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 2004 (n 4); see also The World Bank, ‘ICR Principles’ (n 4) C9.2. 
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the provision of a funding mechanism and resort to giving the PIP or DIP broad 
powers that may accommodate the provision of new money.401 Others adopt a milder 
system of priority ranking where new money may rank equally with or ahead of 
general unsecured creditors only.402 
3.4.6. Distressed Debt Investment and financial innovations  
The need for fresh finance coupled with the proliferation of financial innovations has 
ushered new entrants and arrangements such as distressed debt investors (DDIs) into 
the resolution of financial distress. These developments have implications for the 
control, coordination and outcome of the restructuring process.  
Over the years, there has been a growth in the distressed debt market,403 a specialist 
market that trades in the debt assets of financially distressed companies. DDIs usually 
seek to exploit the restructuring surplus in a troubled company.404 They typically buy 
such debt at discounted rates, restructure the company and sell at a profit after the 
restructuring. Others may bank on the difference between the value of the company 
if sold immediately and the value after time has passed. They may in the meantime 
deleverage the company, increase its operational capacity or simply wait till the 
market has recovered before selling or floating the company.405  Although they can 
include existing lenders, DDIs increasingly come in the form of hedge funds, private 
equity firms and institutions seeking to use restructuring finance as a means of gaining 
control of firms in which they see some value.406 Complex financial structures, 
particularly credit and financial derivatives that promote a separation of control and 
                                                          
401 For example, BIA s 30(1)(g); Also, English Law provides that sums payable ‘in respect of a debt or liability 
arising out of a contract’ are paid in priority to all other expenses. Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 99(4). 
McCormack has argued that this could be broadly interpreted to give the payment of capital and interest charges 
from a loan contract priority over other payments including administrator’s renumeration. Gerard McCormack, 
‘Super-priority new financing and corporate rescue’ (2007) JBL 701, 729-730. 
402 For example, South Africa’s Business Rescue procedure. Companies Act 2008, s 153. 
403 The 1980s and 1990s in the US and the mid-1990s in the UK. See Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring’ 
(n 301) 341.  
404 Sarah Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Law’ (n 217) 11 (adopting explanation given by LM Lopucki and 
WC Whitford, in ‘Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies’ 
(1993) 14 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 669, 752, of restructuring surplus as the difference between the 
value of the business if it were to be sold at the time of the restructuring and a sale after the restructuring of the 
existing capital structure). 




ownership have had a catalytic effect on the growth of distressed debt investment.407 
This shift in the market has not gone unnoticed. As Baird and Rasmussen describe the 
situation, ‘Today, we no longer have a single bank and dispersed general creditors. 
Dozens of constantly changing stakeholders occupy every tranche, each pursuing its 
own agenda’.408  
Insolvency scholars have approached the proliferation of distressed debt investment 
and financial innovation with mixed reactions. Their arguments centre on how DDIs 
and financial innovations are altering the dynamics of bargaining and control in 
restructuring and the implications of these changes for corporate rescue. 
Some law and economics scholars have argued that the distressed debt market takes 
care of the fundamental economics worries about the efficient allocation of resources 
to the highest and best use.409 It is often the case that DDIs are turnaround experts who 
possess specialist knowledge about valuation and restructuring. They are therefore in 
a good position to make the important decision of whether a company should be sold 
in piece meal, as a going concern or simply restructured.410 Also, because they aim to 
exploit the going concern surplus in the distressed company, DDIs have the right 
motivation and incentive to maximise value.411 Thus, contrary to what many have said 
about these investors, their interests are not necessarily incompatible with the well-
being of the company.412   
It has also been claimed that DDIs have the specialist managerial skills required to 
bring the company out of the woods. The interest of hedge funds in controlling the 
business produces efficient results and should be encouraged.413 Goldschmid argues 
                                                          
407 Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue in a World of Debt’ (n 103) 760 (describes credit derivative contracts that 
transfer defined credit risks in a credit product or bundle of credit products to a counterpart, a market participant 
or the capital market itself. The trading of credit risk has been further advanced by the growth of structured 
financing techniques and the securitisation of such risks. Securitisation is the process involving the rendering of a 
credit derivative into an investment product--as where a bank places loans in a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which 
then issues new securities such as bonds—allowing investors to buy credit linked notes and to gain credit exposure 
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408 Baird and Rasmussen, ‘Antibankruptcy’ (n 363) 651. 
409 Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Law’ (n 217) 3-5; Goldschmid, ‘More Phoenix Than Vulture’ (n 94) 193. 
410 Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Law’ (n 217) 12. 
411 Goldschmid, ‘More Phoenix Than Vulture’ (n 94) 264 Cites empirical research that suggest that supports the 
idea that aggregating claims in the hands of distressed debt investors maximise firm value. 
412 Goldschmid challenges the notion of cold DDIs as cold, ruthless vultures arguing that they add a lot of value to 




that DDIs can infuse a distressed firm with the new energy needed to turn its fortunes 
around and may find it easier to relate with existing management as the relationship 
is not encumbered with prior history and hostilities.414 Besides, they are in a better 
position than senior creditors to take the reins as the effectiveness of senior creditors 
may have become impeded by the negative psychological impact of financial 
distress.415 DDIs may make genuine efforts to understand the company’s problems 
rather than just try to get the problems off their plate like commercial lenders, who 
are often under regulatory pressure, would do. In comparison with commercial 
lenders, it is further argued that the use of restructuring finance provided by DDIs is 
more efficient. Goldschmid argues that when provided by commercial banks, the 
finance is often used for cosmetic purposes such as signalling to suppliers and the 
public that the company intends to continue operating. When the finance is provided 
by a DDI on the other hand, it is less cosmetic, and the funds are meaningfully applied 
towards the debtor’s survival.416  
On the other side are those who argue that DDIs are essentially vultures who hover 
around distressed companies, ready to pick the company apart and make a quick 
profit rather than any real efforts to save the company. The speed with which 
distressed debt investors operate may not always be a good thing for troubled firms 
as they may be more preoccupied with profit margins than the long-term health of the 
company, thus running the risk of sacrificing full rehabilitation for a speedy 
restructuring.417 While costs may be saved in the short term, the company may end up 
only being carefully packaged for failure in the near future. In an empirical study, 
Harner confirms that distressed debt investors often have large amounts of funds at 
their disposal and are usually successful in their efforts to acquire troubled companies. 
                                                          
414 ibid 256, 259 (presents empirical evidence to the effect that both claim holders and restructuring experts find it 
more acceptable to deal with debtors who ‘failed’ them and creditors who made the original deal that failed 
respectively).  
415 They may also harbour a lot of anger and ill feelings towards the management and shareholders. ibid 257. 
416 Goldschmid, ‘More Phoenix Than Vulture’ (n 94) 235-255 (it is argued that when provided by commercial 
lenders, the money is hardly ever drawn). 
417 Harvey R. Miller, ‘Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth’ (2002) 55 VAND. L. REV., 2013, 
2014 (arguing that distressed debt investors will rehabilitate a company only to the minimum degree necessary to 
make it attractive to potential buyers); Eilee Applebaum and Rosemary Batt, Private equity at work: When Wall Street 
manages Main Street. (Russell Sage Foundation 2014) Ch 6 and 7 (for an argument that private equity funds do not 
perform as well as believed and they often fail after a few years, having an adverse effect on labour and jobs). 
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Harner however cautions out that they have the potential to act to the detriment of the 
debtor and other stakeholders.418 Miller also argues that companies are often rushed 
through the restructuring without careful attempts to fix the fundamental operational 
problems thereby raising the risk of recidivism.419 These issues are difficult to manage 
because restructuring frameworks do not seek to strictly regulate the finance 
agreements between distressed companies and finance providers. 
Worse still, it may be difficult to recognise who the creditors of the company are at 
every point in time let alone decipher their interests and motives.420  Huebner & 
Tisdell argue that increasing difficulty in determining the ultimate decision makers 
makes the negotiation of restructuring, a process which relies very much on early 
intervention and speed, difficult. 421  As Baird and Rasmussen recount, ‘The day after 
a petition is filed, the old creditors may disappear and be replaced by those who now 
hold the debt in the company’.422  The cost of communication rises when the parties 
are continually changing.423 This situation may create problems other than 
coordination. The ease with which banks can now divest of their interests in a failing 
company may affect the incentive of banks to monitor the debtor thereby eroding the 
discipline that comes with debt.424 
There is no clear winner in this debate, especially considering the shortage of empirical 
research. The arguments engage the debates about what is considered a successful 
restructuring and from whose perspective- whether one that achieves company rescue 
by keeping the company as a going concern in its current state; or a restructuring that 
only preserves the business of the company to continue in a different entity. Whatever 
side of the arguments comes out on top, distressed debt investment is likely to become 
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419 Miller (n 417) 2016. 
420 Baird and Rasmussen, ‘Antibankruptcy’ (n 363) 680. 
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increasingly prominent in restructuring because it offers an important and scarce 
ingredient- new funds.  
For advanced economies, some optimism has been expressed about the ability of the 
insolvency system to cope with these market changes.425  For developing African 
economies which are the subject of this thesis, foreign distressed debt investors can 
provide some succour by providing rescue finance that may be unavailable locally. As 
we see in chapter five, economic volatility is a real challenge and can occasion 
widespread distress that requires desperate means of resolution, especially where 
economically significant companies are concerned.426 Affected creditors can be 
expected to eagerly embrace DDIs without questioning their motives and implications 
for corporate rescue, especially where regulatory oversight is low or non-existent. 
Beyond the implications of DDIs for rescue in these countries, foreign investors may 
also seize the opportunity to obtain controlling interests in crucial sectors of the 
economy. Depending on the country’s policy on foreign participation in certain 




This chapter discusses key concerns in corporate debt restructuring, including the 
relationship between corporate rescue and debt restructuring, and the roles of private 
bargaining, the law and courts in the restructuring process. Informal procedures like 
the London Approach and its variants may offer some value, especially in developed 
jurisdictions, because they do not rely heavily on institutional infrastructure. 
However, such private workouts can hardly escape changing financial landscapes, 
cross border insolvency, external influence in distress regulation and the shadows that 
the law casts.  As the resolution of financial distress becomes the subject of legislation 
in countries around the world, global actors such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
                                                          
425 Baird and Rasmussen, ‘Antibankruptcy’ (n 363) 699; Harner (n 418) 193-205 (makes recommendations for the 
regulation of DDI activity in insolvency). 
426 Ch 5, section 5.4. 
427 IMF, Orderly Procedures (n 4) 59. 
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UNCITRAL and other IFIs continue to push the notion that many of the challenges in 
the restructuring of distressed companies can be ameliorated by good law. Influential 
platforms like the World Bank Doing Business Reports emphasise the need for 
restructuring laws by ranking countries based on the availability of restructuring 
frameworks that meet a set of standards, while the availability of informal frameworks 
does little to improve a country’s ranking.  Using US and UK restructuring law as 
primary examples, the chapter examines key elements of restructuring law, the 
choices the laws make in facilitating restructuring and the factors that inform those 
choices. It also considers how senior creditors and providers of new money are often 
able to hijack the restructuring process to obtain their desired outcome. The central 
concern of creditors, as law and economics scholars argue is one of efficiency- 
achieving the best result for themselves at the least cost.  
The chapter highlights the implications of different choices in restructuring law for 
developing countries. For one, relying on the court to make discretionary calls 
depends on the quality of the judiciary and requires experienced commercial or 
insolvency judges. As the next discussion shows, there is global pressure for 
restructuring and insolvency law reform as the trend towards harmonisation 
heightens. For developing countries confronted with this pressure, this chapter 
(together with chapter two) provide important grounding by identifying important 














THE GLOBAL HARMONISATION OF INSOLVENCY AND RESTRUCTURING 
NORMS. 
 
To one degree or another, the momentum for reform, the content of reform, and the 
trajectory of reform proceed from or respond to transnational and global contexts.       
(Halliday and Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law 2007) 
 
Introduction. 
In many areas of commercial law, it has become almost impossible to speak of legal 
reforms that are purely domestic in character.428  The previous chapters have 
considered insolvency regulation, the key elements of corporate debt restructuring 
frameworks and the factors that drive policy choices in designing these frameworks, 
all in a domestic context. Increasingly however, external influences are playing a big 
role in these choices. The aim of this chapter is to examine the role of global actors and 
norms429 in shaping how countries respond to corporate financial distress and design 
their restructuring frameworks.  
Between 1998 and 2004, Carruthers and Halliday trace the process of convergence in 
insolvency regulation, from ad hoc resolution of corporate failures in advanced 
economies and ad hoc cross border insolvency rules to national insolvency principles, 
regional harmonisation of insolvency principles and now the current trend of global 
harmonisation.430 This process has resulted in what Halliday and Shaffer term a 
transnational legal order where insolvency laws are propagated transnationally by a set 
of global actors. 
  
Questions were raised in chapter one regarding the universality of insolvency 
regulation and the theories that underlie them. This chapter builds on that discussion 
                                                          
428 Halliday and Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law’ (n 16) 1173.   
429 While there can be informal and non-institutionalised norms in insolvency, the norms referred to in this chapter 
are backed by powerful institutions and in many cases, given the force of law by national governments. See Armour 
and Deakin, Norms in Private Insolvency (n 103) 10-11. Norms in this chapter means a common understanding 
which provides a basis of coordinating the actions of a group of individuals and may have become institutionalised 
or state-enforced. 
430 Halliday and Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law’ (n 16) 1136; The growing recognition of the roles of 
institutions and series of financial crises contributed to the increased interest in insolvency law from the 1990s and 




by considering (a) how insolvency norms are created and propagated across nation 
states (b) how they interact with local actors and institutions of developing economies. 
Importantly, the chapter questions whether the drive towards harmonisation 
provides the freedom and tools that developing countries require to make efficient 
choices in insolvency and restructuring law reform. The position of developing 
economies in this analysis is important because they are often the target of ‘global’ 
norms, guidelines and reforms. The chapter finds that reforms based on these norms 
may appear to advance the harmonisation agenda on paper while yielding little fruit 
in practice. 
 
The first part of the chapter discusses the meaning of global and transnational norms 
and the making of a transnational legal order in insolvency and restructuring law. It 
examines the events that have led to the development of transnational norms and the 
important actors involved.  Drawing from some of the insolvency reform experience 
in jurisdictions like Indonesia, it considers how transnational norms are propagated 
in developing jurisdictions at the national and local levels, and how global actors 
interact with national and local actors.  
 
The second part considers the factors that determine the settling and implementation 
of transnational norms. Diagnostic problems, actor mismatch, institutional mismatch 
and contradictions present difficulties for settling. The chapter finds that these 
mechanisms are triggered even before enactment and stresses the value of carrying 
relevant actors (particularly seemingly weak actors that can foil the reform at the 
implementation stage) through all stages of reform.   
 
Focusing on insolvency scripts from global actors like the World Bank and 
UNCITRAL, and the influence of the World Bank Doing Business Reports, the third 
part considers the tensions between global scripts for restructuring and the local 
institutions they seek to settle into. It finds it problematic that these normative 
guidelines are usually targeted at developing countries, but often fail to take account 
of the institutional needs of these countries. The section concludes by highlighting 
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important lessons and considerations for developing economies as they navigate the 
increasingly globalised world of corporate insolvency. 
4.0. Globalisation of norms and the development of a Transnational Legal Order 
(TLO) in insolvency.  
4.1. Global norms, TLOs and international law.  
It is important to clarify early in this chapter, the sense in which the terms ‘global 
norms’ and transnational legal orders’ are used; and the distinction between these 
concepts and international law.  
International law focuses on the relationship between nation states and usually 
involves state actors.431  On the other hand, the legal ordering of social relationships 
within the nation state is considered a domestic matter. For reasons which are 
discussed shortly, the ordering of relationships within the nation state has taken on a 
more global character. Because they do not fit neatly into the scope of international 
law properly so-called, scholars have sought to understand how this global ordering 
of domestic interactions operates. In his 2009 work, Benedict Kingsbury considered 
the idea of global law in the context of administrative law, emphasising the divergence 
from traditional international law that is largely inter-governmental in nature, to a 
rising transnational framework where there are no strict distinctions between the 
national and international domains. Unlike international law which is consent-based 
and intergovernmental, private regulators, non-state actors and national law makers 
are involved in the globalisation of norms and laws.432  The norms have varying 
degrees of bindingness and several ways of propagation. As Kingsbury argues 
regarding the idea of global laws and norms, ‘there are no shared rules of recognition 
or celebrated courts, no great charters, no textual provisions in national constitutions 
giving it status in national law, no significant long-appreciated history’.433 They are 
however global because they are sets of shared ideas, expectations and laws that are 
                                                          
431 Duncan Hollis, ‘Why State Consent Still Matters-Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of 
International Law’ (2005) 23 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 140-146. But see debates around the fragmentation of international 
law. Arguments that international law is more pluralistic than is often suggested.   David Kennedy, ‘One, two, 
three, many legal orders: legal pluralism and the cosmopolitan dream’ (2006) 31 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. 641. 
432 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law (2009) 20 EJIL 23-57, 28. 
433 ibid 35. 
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created and diffused among nation states without carrying traditional international 
law implications.434 
 
4.1.1. Global norms and TLOs 
The globalisation of norms tends to be more prominent in commercial law as there is 
less resistance here than with subject matters like inheritance, religion and family laws 
that are deeply rooted in indigenous practices.435 Ogus provides an economic 
explanation for competition among legal systems and the convergence that can result 
from such competition. Ogus proposes that there is competition among legal systems 
and whether convergence will occur or not depends on if the laws in competition are 
homogenous or heterogenous.436  Homogenous laws are those that facilitate economic 
transactions, and because they operate to reduce overall costs for all involved, there is 
less resistance to their natural (or even forced) convergence. Heterogenous laws on 
the other hand seek to dictate social and economic objectives that are preferable for 
some and not for others. For such laws, convergence is less likely to arise naturally 
and unsuitable for coercion.  
A relevant question from this literature is whether insolvency law belongs to the 
homogenous group of laws where overall reduction of costs is the more important 
goal, thereby making it an easy target for convergence. Arguments for high 
convergence in insolvency law claim that insolvency plays an important role in the 
international financial architecture. Therefore, it is one of those areas where 
convergence is most obvious and necessary. On the other hand, skeptics maintain that 
insolvency is embedded in local legal, economic culture and institutions that are 
characterised by ‘divergent attitudes to debt and debtors’ and not readily susceptible 
to change.  This provides strong reasons to argue for low convergence.437 This debate 
                                                          
434 Sanjeev Khagram, James Riker and Kathryn Sikkink, Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, 
networks, and norms (U of Minnesota Press 2002) 14. 
435 Amanda Perry, ‘Multinational enterprises, international economic organisations and convergence among legal 
systems’ (2002) 2 Non State Actors & International Law 23-39; Douglass North, Institutions (n 430) 36; Amanda 
Perry, ‘The Relationship between Legal Systems and Economic Development: Integrating Economic and Cultural 
Approaches (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 282, 290. 
436 Anthony Ogus, ‘Competition between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to 
Comparative Law’ (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 405. 
437 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 25. 
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is revisited shortly, as the chapter considers how for different reasons, the trend of 
convergence in insolvency has arisen naturally in some jurisdictions and situations, 
failed to take traction in some and been forced in others.  
Global norms emerge for a variety of reasons and in different ways. They can be built 
in response to shared financial crisis where countries develop ‘similar but 
independent’ responses to global crisis.438 They can also arise in a deliberate and 
sometimes coercive way, through an imposition of policies and standards by powerful 
organisations and governments with a harmonisation agenda.439 Furthermore, the 
influence of international treaties and resulting harmonisations of laws and policies 
can contribute to the building of global norms. Other contributing factors include 
transnational communication and regulatory competition among nations and 
markets.440 This involves lesson-drawing and information gathering facilitated by 
stakeholder co-operation, common affiliations and institutional memberships.441 
Together with globalisation and market integration, these factors work hand in hand 
to produce what can be regarded as global scripts in different areas of policy.   
Halliday and Shaffer have criticised the use of the word ‘global’ as misleading because 
it suggests that legal order is truly global in its geographic reach. Given the amount of 
variation that can be present in the geography, organisation and content of this 
transnational ordering, they consider the term Transnational Legal Orders to be a more 
appropriate representation of what is going on. For them, global norms more 
accurately refer to an effect or result (convergence of ideas among nations) which can 
be achieved by different means, while the TLO is a more deliberate, precise and legal 
ordering of norms across nations.442 The TLO captures both the process and result of 
the legal ordering, and all the actors involved.443  Because the chapter relies heavily on 
                                                          
438 Christoph Knill, ‘Introduction: Cross-national policy convergence: concepts, approaches and explanatory 
factors’ (2005) 12 (5) Journal of European public Policy 769; DiMaggio and Powell describe the channels through 
which the spread of norms occurs using the concept of isomorphism (convergence). They identify mimetic, 
coercive and normative isomorphism as the main channels of propagation. DiMaggio and Powell, ‘The Iron Cage 
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective rationality in Organisational Fields’ (1983) 48 American 
Sociological Review 147-160. 
439 Knill (n 438) 770; Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 9. 
440 Amanda Perry, ‘Convergence among legal systems’ (n 435) 23-39. 
441 ibid. 
442 Halliday and Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’ (n 15) 15. 
443 The result of a TLO is to institutionalise global norms by enhancing coordination transnationally and reaching 
deep within nation states to enforce and implement legal norms.  
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Halliday and Shaffer’s conception of transnational norms, the meanings they have 
attributed to TLOs is adopted here. 444  
Transnational legal orders result in the extension of social ordering beyond national 
boundaries. Halliday and Shaffer define them as a ‘collection of formalized legal 
norms and associated organisations and actors that authoritatively order the 
understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions’.445 It is useful to 
reproduce the authors’ extraction of the three important elements of TLOs. They note 
that: 
- A TLO seeks to produce order in a domain of social activity or an issue area that 
relevant actors have construed as a “problem” of some sort or another;446 
-  A TLO is legal insofar as it has legal form, is produced by or in connection with 
a transnational body or network and is directed towards or indirectly engages 
national legal bodies. Whether directly or indirectly, it engages multiple 
national and local legal institutions, and assumes a recognisable legal form;447 
- A TLO is transnational insofar as it orders social relationships domestically, but 
is practised in multiple sites, across nation-states.448  
A TLO involves bottom-up and top-down analysis, because it captures all levels, from 
the development of legal norms at the transnational level to their propagation and 
enforcement at the grassroots.449 In one analytic frame, the TLO examines the 
processes and actors involved in local, national, transnational and even international 
law making. 
 
                                                          
444 Throughout the thesis however, the term global is also used interchangeably to describe prominent actors in the 
process of harmonisation, and the norms they offer.  By referring to them as global norms and actors, it is not 
intended to suggest that the norms have been accepted by all nations of the world or that the actors are 
representative of all countries. Rather, it loosely describes the scripts of insolvency that these set of actors propagate 
transnationally in the harmonisation process. 
445 Halliday and Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’ (n 15) 5. 
446 The problem under consideration here is the financial distress of companies. 
447 It could take the form of a soft law (non-binding norms intended to shape behaviours and orientations) or hard 
law (mandatory legal norms that are binding, precise and often propagated by coercion) Halliday and Shaffer, 
‘Transnational Legal Orders’ (n ) 15; Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and soft law in international 
governance’ (2000) 54 (3) International organization 421-456 for a more detailed analysis of soft and hard laws, 
their use in international law, advantages and disadvantages.   
448 Halliday and Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’ (n 15) 18. 
449 ibid 3. 
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Figure 1. The three levels of a TLO 
 
The scope and impact of these norms vary widely. As such, a TLO may be fully or 
partially settled depending on its geographical scope and level of acceptance at the 
grassroots.450 Norms at any of these three levels become settled when -   
(i) ‘stakeholders know which norms apply to them in given situations and 
accept the scope of these norms; and 
(ii) the meanings and reach of the norms become stabilized for the great 
majority of those engaged with them for most relevant behaviour.’451   
The TLO becomes fully integrated when transnational, national, and local legal norms 
and practices are concordant and have meanings that closely resemble each other. 
Thus, the wider the gap between the formal law and practice, the less settled a 
transnational norm is said to be. As foreshadowed by law and society literature, 
settling at any level is never a straightforward process.452 It is influenced by several 
factors including the source and process of the norm making. Shortly, the specific 
settling challenges that confront countries in the adoption of transnational norms are 
discussed. 
                                                          
450 ibid 48. 
451 Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, ‘Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in Global Commercial Law’ in 
Terence Halliday, Transnational legal orders (Cambridge University Press 2015) 90. 
452 Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser and Stanislaw Gelfer, ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ (2000) 8(2) 
Economics of Transition 325-368; Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean Francois Richard, ‘Economic 
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’ (2002) 47 European Economic Review 165-195 suggest that how 
a legal system was initially received rather than its origin, determines – whether how it functions today. 
ひInternational conventions
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4.2. The development of a TLO in insolvency regulation. 
4.2.1. The transnational level. 
Transnational norms did not arise in corporate insolvency until the 1990s.453  Before 
this time, there were no international standards governing either domestic or cross-
border bankruptcies. The beginning of change came with insolvency reform in the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom in the 1980s, the rescue of viable 
companies being the most significant reform agenda.454 In other parts of the world, 
corporate insolvency laws were highly obsolete or unused. Asian countries like 
Indonesia and South Korea had insolvency laws that were not used in practice. 
Likewise in Africa, insolvency laws were outdated and unused.455 China had no 
formal corporate insolvency law on the books.456 Change in Anglo-American law 
however triggered a flurry of reforms and began the process of developing 
transnational insolvency norms.  
Five sets of global actors shown below, have been identified as influential in shaping 
these global standards, and consequently the insolvency frameworks of nation states. 
Figure 2. Global actors in the building of an insolvency TLO.457  
 
Two major factors fuelled the rapid development of transnational norms in corporate 
insolvency: market integration and financial crises. The push for globalisation of 
commercial laws was driven by concern that the integration of markets has far 
outpaced the globalisation of the law. This asymmetry has been painted as dangerous 
                                                          
453 Block-Lieb and Halliday, ‘Settling and Concordance’ (n 451) 77. 
454 ibid. 
455 See Ch 6, Table 1. 
456 Roman Tomasic and Zinian Zhang, ‘From Global Convergence In China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 To 
Divergent Implementation: Corporate Reorganisation In China’ (2012) 12 (2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies. 
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and a recipe for global financial instability.458  With markets becoming more 
connected, the occurrence of cross border insolvency increased.  Professional 
associations like the IBA and regional organisations like the European Union began to 
seek more harmonisation of insolvency law among their members.459 Soon, powerful 
governance institutions like the UN (through the UNCITRAL) became involved in the 
harmonisation process. In 1997, UNCITRAL produced its Model Law on Cross Border 
Insolvency.460  
The connectedness of markets also meant that domestic bankruptcies could have huge 
global implications. The Asian financial crises in the late 1990s led to insolvency law 
reforms in that region, led by the G22, The Asian Development Bank, The IMF and the 
World Bank.461 Although the crises and corporate failures exploded within Asia, they 
induced a reaction from global actors and a significant part of the resulting reforms 
aimed to propagate a US-inspired rehabilitation culture.462 In Central and Eastern 
Europe also, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) had an 
agenda to appraise insolvency laws and practices.463  
With series of law making and reform experiences in different countries, International 
Organisations (IOs) and IFIs began to produce sets of normative principles, guidelines 
and standards that were transnational in scope. They published guidelines, insolvency 
principles, and transnational soft laws to guide countries in insolvency legislation. 
Notably, the World Bank produced its Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency 
and Creditor Rights Systems,464 and the IMF published a book which identified the main 
principles of corporate insolvency laws for nations.465  
                                                          
458 Core nations such as US, Germany often work behind the scenes to influence international bodies. In addition 
to implementing the directives of the club of nations, IFIs help to develop global norms and provides diagnostic 
services to ‘ailing’ nations. ibid 25. 
459 ibid 
460 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency.  
<www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html> accessed 10 September 2018. 
461 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 70. 
462 Block-Lieb and Halliday, ‘Settling and Concordance’ (n 451) 78; Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday, 
Rescuing business: The making of corporate bankruptcy law in England and the United States (Clarendon press 1998). 
463 The EBRD embarked on a diagnostic exercise within Europe and produced a report that contained implicit 
norms. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition 
(London: EBRD 1999). 
464 World Bank, ICR Principles (n 4) 
465 IMF, Orderly Procedures (n 4). 
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4.2.1. Have insolvency norms settled at the transnational level? 
In line with Halliday and Shaffer’s objection, reference to global norms in the context 
of insolvency suggests that there is a form of consensus between the nations of the 
world as to what the global scripts on insolvency ought to look like. However, it is 
noted that the process involves a game of power between powerful global actors on 
the one hand and between these global actors and nations at the peripheries of power 
on the other hand.466 Tension between global powers arise in the struggle to determine 
which set of norms emerge as the global standard.  Because global norms privilege 
those of a particular local, they may be better understood as globalised localisms.467 US 
bankruptcy law has been the most influential in the formation of these global norms.468  
Notwithstanding the competition among major global actors (particularly 
UNCITRAL and the World Bank), they moved towards a consensus on insolvency 
norms with remarkable speed and have remained largely unified in their 
prescriptions.469 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide which was published in 2004 
became particularly influential. Global actors like the IMF and the World Bank also 
relied on the Legislative Guide in assessing and implementing insolvency law 
reform.470 By the end of 2012, it could be claimed that transnational norms on 
insolvency had become widely accepted (settled) among global actors. More 
importantly, the norms were incorporated in many developed countries like the US, 
UK, Germany, Canada, France, Poland and some developing countries like 
Indonesia.471    
                                                          
466 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) Part 1. 
467 ibid; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The processes of globalisation’ (2002) Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais and 
Eurozine 1-48, 36. 
468 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 346-347; One explanation for this is the influence and proximity of the 
US to powerful global actors like the World Bank, the IMF and the UN. Also, professional organisations like the 
IBA are proliferated by US lawyers, judges and insolvency practitioners. 
469 For example, in making recommendations for voluntary restructuring, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide refers 
users to the INSOL, Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts. UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide (n 4) 26. 
470 The World Bank and the UNCITRAL in consultation with IMF revised its Principles in 2015 to incorporate 
elements of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. <www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/the-
world-bank-principles-for-effective-insolvency-and-creditor-rights>    accessed 10 September 2018. 
471 The success of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide at the transnational level has been attributed to effort to consult 
with other nations, representative from different countries. The Guide also tried to produce normative guidelines 
that were both specific and general while avoiding an outright replication of the laws of any single jurisdiction. 
Halliday and Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law’ (n 16) 1184-1187. 
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Some of the core norms of these guidelines and standards have been discussed in the 
previous chapter in the context of restructuring. There is no intention to reproduce the 
details of how the norms recommend that issues in insolvency be dealt with here, but 
their broad prescriptions are outlined below.472 
 
Figure 3. Summary of global norms of insolvency and restructuring. 
 
While there is consensus on the broad goals and values that transnational norms aim 
to achieve, the means of achieving these norms can take different forms.473  
Carruthers and Halliday identify four474 variations of global scripts in the field of 
insolvency:475  Single-standard, fully explicated formal rules that that provide for a 
best alternative and are propagated in a formalised, fully articulated form.  For 
example, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The Model Law is 
perhaps the clearest example of a TLO at the transnational level. It gives specific 
                                                          
472 The World Bank, ICR Principles (n 33) 2-5; The UNCITRAL Guide (n 4) 10-14. These core norms are shared by 
global actors and guidelines such as the Legislative Guide, IMF and World Bank Principles. These standards are 
routinely revised to provide more details on how laws can be structured to achieve these norms. Some of the other 
prescriptions include the availability of a regulated body of insolvency practitioners, post commencement 
financing, special insolvency courts etc.  
473 For instance, while the US uses the Chapter 11 reorganisation procedure, the corporate rescue regime in the UK 
is the administration procedure. 
474 They identify a fifth but point out that it has not emerged in insolvency. A Single-standard, fully explicated 
formal rules that represent best practices but diffuses the best among preexisting alternatives and not necessarily 
the best overall. Carruthers and Halliday, ‘Negotiating globalization’ (n 35) 540. 
475 Ibid. 
Insolvency norms ( insolvency procedures generally)
ひMaximisation of value of assets. 
ひLiquidation of moribund enterprises and rehabilitation of 
viable ones.
ひEnsure equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors. 
ひStrike a balance between creditor and debtor rights 
(efficient and impartial resolution of insolvency).
ひEnsure transparent and predictable insolvency law with 
incentives for gathering and dispensing information.
ひRecognition of existing creditor rights and establishment 
of clear rules for ranking of priority claims.
ひProper regulation of Insolvency Practitioners. 
ひRWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa SｷヴWIデﾗヴゲげ ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲが ﾗHﾉｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS 
liabilities near insolvency.
ひCoordinated administration of the insolvency of group 
companies.
ひClear and harmonised rules for cross border insolvency by 
adopting the Model Law.
ひProvide guidance for identification of creditors and assets 
ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWS ｷﾐ デｴW SWHデﾗヴげゲ Wゲデ;デWく
Restructuring norms
•Provide clear rules for commencing a restructuring: e.g. 
persons that can initiate restructuring (debtor and 
creditors recommended).
•Establish measures to ensure for protecting the assets of 
the company through a stay on the actions of debtor, 
creditors or third parties.
•Outline the duties of all parties during the restructuring, 
creditors, IP, debtor, court, including who stays in control.
•Facilitate funding for the continued operation or survival 
of the business. Post commencement finance provisions 
should balance rights of providers and rights of existing 
creditors. 
•Require a restructuring plan and clarify who makes it, the 
content, mechanisms for approval and confirmation. 
•Establish a mechanism for voting, threshold for voting, 
whether voting is done in classes and rules for cramdown.
•The  law should also provide guidance for converting a 
restructuring process to liquidation. 
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directions on issues pertaining to cross border insolvency, is binding on countries that 
have adopted it and actively engages with national law-making bodies to implement 
it in recognisable legal form.476  The second option is fully explicated formal rules that 
set a minimum standard below which countries should not go. This is illustrated by 
recommendations in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide that prescribe minimum 
conditions for countries where they choose between alternative courses.477 Global 
scripts can also come in the form of general principles, ‘to be specified or interpreted 
as appropriate’ i.e. broad goals that can be implemented to fit local circumstances.  
This option allows for the most local variation and gives local actors more 
discretion.478 Finally, insolvency scripts can be presented as a menu of options, with 
different means of achieving a goal. The UNCITRAL Guide starts up in this form by 
discussing different approaches to issues but presents a single recommendation based 
on a preferred approach.479 
 
Global actors have made a necessary compromise to loosely define convergence such 
that underlying norms are not too divergent, even if all the elements of insolvency 
laws do not operate in the same way across jurisdictions. By defining convergence in 
this way, global ‘convergence’ in insolvency law becomes possible and perhaps 
desirable. Another implication of this loose definition of convergence is that 
competition can remain among global actors in terms of what laws other countries, 
particularly developing countries, choose to adopt as templates.480  
                                                          
476 Countries have the freedom to adapt the model law to suit their needs, but it is recommended that they make 
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480 Globalised localism is not just a source of bragging rights. There are practical reasons why countries would 
desire that as many countries as possible adopt their laws. This creates competitive advantage and continued 
relevance in business and other areas. For example, the continued choice of English Law as the governing law of 
contract in many jurisdictions is strengthened by the familiarity of local practitioners with English law and legal 
system. This has the potential to reinforce England as the capital of international centre for commercial law 
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As we discuss shortly however, activities of global actors in the harmonisation process 
(such as the World Bank Doing Business rankings) can have the effect of holding out 
specific legal forms and templates as the preferred or more effective approach.481 This 
can limit the reform options and freedom of countries, particularly developing 
countries, to adopt global norms in ways and at a pace that is most compatible with 
their local institutions. 482 
 
4.3. Propagation of transnational norms by global actors: focus on developing 
countries. 
While the settling of insolvency norms has gone relatively well at the transnational 
level, their transition into national and local norms remains complicated, particularly 
for developing economies.483 The claim that global scripts for insolvency are fairly 
settled among global actors is remarkable but unsurprising, considering that they are 
often the originators of so-called global norms.484 For advanced economies who may 
have lost out in the competition for globalising their local norms, the formulation of 
global norms as we see, is broad enough to accommodate their insolvency institutions.   
It may even be argued that the distance between the national laws of those countries 
and the global scripts that have emerged was never significant to begin with.  
Inevitably, an important piece in the propagation of global scripts of insolvency are 
less powerful developing economies, whose laws and institutions bear a greater 
distance to global scripts.  
Two factors have been shown to be important in determing which economies global 
actors choose to actively propagate global norms in and the methods they adopt: the 
socio-economic interests of the global actors in a developing country and their 
leverage in that country.  Developing countries vary in the level of their integration 
into the global market and their impact on the global economy. The more significant 
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a developing economy is to global actors, the more important it is for global actors 
that the commercial laws of that economy be aligned with global scripts. It has been 
suggested that powerful countries like the USA, use their influence on IFIs to 
indirectly pursue their interests in insolvency law reforms in developing economies. 
These ‘leading creditor nations sought to stabilize financial systems and position 
themselves competitively vis-à-vis each other for entry into emerging credit markets.’ 
485 
As mentioned above, the Asian financial crisis was an important trigger for the 
intervention that led to extensive insolvency reforms. The crisis is reported to have 
‘urgently impelled commercial law reform and institution building’ through the 
aggregation of global best practices and standards.486  
This was because Asia had become important to the global economy and by extension, 
global actors.487 In Latin America, insolvency law reform gained momentum 
following series of financial crises such as the Mexican Peso crisis of 1995, the 
devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999, Argentina’s external debt default in 2001 and 
its banking crisis in 2002 and the direct effect of the Asian financial crisis of 1997.488  
The interests of global powers, particularly the US in Latin America has also 
influenced the trajectory and content of insolvency reform in the region.489Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru have all adopted reorganisation laws and debt 
restructuring frameworks that are variants of the US chapter 11.   
 
Means of propagation 
In addition to global interest is the issue of leverage, which also informs the approach 
to propagation. Global actors adopt different means of propagation ranging from 
emulation, learning, networks, reward systems to strong encouragement and 
economic coercion. In ordinary circumstances, the preferred means has been to show 
the legitimacy of a model by persuading other economies as to its rightness. Labels 
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such as ‘universal, normal, modern, efficient, advanced’ are used to stamp these 
norms with legitimacy, reduce resistance to enactment and allow for easy 
implementation.490 Global actors also legitimate their normative prescriptions using 
internal and external validation, based on their past experiences, achievements 
elsewhere and the subscription of other international institutions to the same or 
similar principles.491 
Coercive pressure is applied where global actors are in a strong position to extract 
compliance from weaker countries. Financial dependence can leave a nation at the 
mercy of IFIs especially in situations of financial crises where they provide rescue 
finance. The IMF has considerable leverage because its relevance in emergency 
situations as a creditor to countries with severe balance of payment deficits puts it in 
good stead to impose conditionalities such as law reform and adoption of its 
standards. The series of events in Indonesia from 1998 to mid-2000s where the IMF 
exerted quasi-coercive pressure by mandating insolvency reforms as one of the 
conditions for providing new loans illustrates this.492 Also, Thailand was in a stronger 
bargaining position and more able to resist external pressure in 1995 than in 1997, such 
that the IMF was more likely to successfully achieve insolvency law reform by 
coercion in 1997 than in 1995.493 Similarly, the emergence of the insolvency law reform 
agenda in India has been partly linked to the ‘negotiation’ of structural adjustment 
loan support from the World Bank in 1991.494 
 
Persuasion is a subtler form of pressure and often comes in form of moral suasion and 
encouragement. This was adopted in Korea, a rich developing country (at that time), 
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that was less susceptible to pressure.495 China presented a more difficult case for 
propagation, having been considered immune to western institutions for a long time 
and defying expectations that it would move from a command to a market economy 
as it developed.496 The Chinese economy was relatively unaffected by the financial 
crisis and global actors did not have as much leverage to impose reform in China.497 
In fact, China enacted an indigenous bankruptcy law that was suited for its economic 
and political structure at about the same time law reform was carried out in the UK.498  
The growing importance of China in the Asian region and the global economy as a 
whole however made it important for global actors to have a sustained interest in 
propagating global norms in China.  
Even if able to resist the imposition from IFIs, China could not remain immune to 
pressures to conform to global standards as its economy became more integrated in 
global markets.499 The work of global actors was therefore made easier by a coinciding 
willingness in China to open up to the incorporation of ‘western institutions’, albeit 
measuredly. China has selectively allowed some global norms of insolvency into its 
insolvency regime and has now ended up with a reorganisation law that is acceptable 
to global actors as sufficiently representative of the norms they profess.500 Intervention 
from global actors501 was achieved largely by suasion and offered in the form of 
technical support. In contrast to the rushed reform in more vulnerable Indonesia, the 
reform process happened at the pace of national and local actors with the close 
involvement of Chinese practitioners. Because the use of conditionality and coercion 
in policy-based lending and aids programs has become the subject of intense criticism 
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and resistance,502 there has since been a general shift towards less coercive forms of 
propagation.  
 
In addition to involvement in legislative reforms in individual countries, global actors 
also supplement their propagation of norms in the Asian region through networks 
and peer pressure. Persuasion is often accompanied with rhetorical stratagems 
involving a combination of comparison among countries, modelling, peer pressure 
and sometimes shaming.503  The Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR) is an 
organisation co-founded in 2007 and run by Organisation of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and INSOL.  FAIR hosts events that 
bring together stakeholders from different countries to discuss insolvency reform 
across the continent.504  
 
4.3.1. Relationship between global actors and nation states 
The interaction of global actor with nation-states could be direct or mediated. Global 
actors relate directly with the government of the nation-states but more often, they 
find it more practical to use intermediaries.505 Intermediaries come in different forms 
- they can be individuals or organisations, possess different competencies and perform 
different functions in the reform process. (See figure 4 to 7 below). 506 
                                                          
502 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Participation and development: Perspectives from the comprehensive development paradigm’ 
(2002) 6(2) Review of development economics 163-182; John Toye, Jane Harrigan, and Paul Mosley, Aid and Power-
Vol 1: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending (Routledge 2013). 
503 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 58. 
504 The World Bank, Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform (World Bank Brief 28 July 2016) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/forum-for-asian-insolvency-reform-fair>. Even if 
not efficient in producing quick and specific outcomes like direct intervention would, it is cost effective for global 
actors to invest into reform in a few countries and then reach other countries in the region through a combination 
of modelling and peer pressure. The next chapter discusses how this strategy is now being developed in Africa. 
Other examples of global actors pressing for the adoption of global standards from a safe distance include, the IMF 
multi-country reviews such as the Article IV reports, The World Bank Doing Business project. The IMF's regular 
monitoring of economies and associated provision of policy advice. IMF Country Surveillance 
<https://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm>; Also, The Report on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC) initiative run by the IMF and World Bank  operate to develop and disseminate  international 
standards and codes. Insolvency and Creditor Rights is one of the three target areas of the ROSC 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rosc;http://www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx> all 
accessed 10 September 2018. 
505 Carruthers and Halliday, ’Negotiating globalization’ (n 35) 577. 
506 As described by Caruthers and Halliday, ibid 577-578. 
109 
 




                                                                  
 
 
Figure 5. First order intermediaries have a direct relationship with the global centre and with the local 







Figure 6. Second order intermediaries act as consultants to national/global actors on their side but have 





    
  
 
Figure 7. Third order intermediaries have no direct contact with global/national actors but indirectly 
affect the process of enactment and implementation by advocating global norms and influencing local 
thinking and practices. Most prominent at implementation stage. 
 
    






Intermediaries can range from indigenous practitioners, foreign law firms to local or 
foreign academics, and have varying skills such as economic, legal expertise, 





























different roles at different stages of the reform process from enactment to 
implementation. Halliday and Carruthers report that global actors look for three 
qualities in intermediaries- competencies, power and loyalty to global standards.507 
While it may be more difficult to find local allies that possess all of these qualities in 
developing jurisdictions, global actors find ways to compensate.508 For example, the 
webs of knowledge, constituted by practitioners and academics can become webs of 
influence through the process of enrolment.509 Enrolment occurs when a weaker actor 
is able to persuade a stronger actor to take on its cause. Thus, ‘weak’ academics and 
individual practitioners who suffer from both ‘legitimation deficits’ and an ‘inability 
to compel implementation’ can persuade more influential actors to push the reform 
agenda.510 
 
4.4. Towards complete convergence: settling at national and local levels 
An important inquiry in the discussion on global convergence of insolvency norms 
and laws is how well laws take root in target countries and the determining factors for 
this settling process. As stated above, settling is a continuous process from the point 
of enactment of laws, the local implementation of those laws and the outcome of 
implementation. 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, theories are divided on the possibility (and 
desirability) of complete convergence, particularly at the local level. While some 
groups argue for ultimate homogeneity of financial architectures, others maintain that 
local varieties and peculiarities will remain.511 Both arguments are supported by some 
evidence – in terms of formal law, there is considerable convergence on the global 
scripts of insolvency, most clearly represented by the UNCITRAL Model Law and the 
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UNCITRAL Legislative Guide.512 However, contradictions and conflicts exist 
underneath this consensus, particularly at the national and local levels. The next 
section considers factors that adversely affect settling at these levels - diagnostic 
problems, actor and institutional mismatch and contradictions, mechanisms which 
Halliday and Caruthers claim result in rounds of recursive law making until the law 
becomes fully settled.513  
4.4.1. Diagnostic problems  
The definition and classification of a problem informs its treatment and the choice 
between alternative solutions. Diagnostic problems arise when the process of 
identifying the problems for which a solution is being designed is faulty.514 The 
process of diagnosing the problem in insolvency legislation (or any legislation indeed) 
can be complicated. There will likely be disagreements between different actors on the 
nature, scope, source and significance of the problem. For instance, debtor associations 
may consider that the main problems are unforgiving insolvency laws and harsh 
recovery practices by creditors. For creditor bodies, weak institutions may top the list. 
Apart from misdiagnosis, some important stakeholder groups may be absent from the 
diagnostic process thereby warping the result of the diagnosis.  
Other stakeholders who are present may be wrong in their assessment of what the 
issues are, or they may be biased in their analysis. Worst still, there may be no attempt 
at diagnosing the problems before introducing a ‘solution’. This diagnostic struggle 
will further lead to a dispute over prescriptions and ultimately resistance from groups 
whose diagnosis and prescriptions have been rejected.515 Diagnostic problems can 
become even more complicated when the momentum and content of reform are 
influenced externally. There is a possibility of overlooking, rushing or taking the 
diagnostic stage for granted. The proliferation of global norms in corporate insolvency 
may be interpreted by target countries to mean that insolvency problems and the 
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means of addressing them are established. This can discourage in-depth diagnosis by 
these countries when they embark on insolvency law reform. Additionally, diagnostic 
gaps and errors made at the transnational level may be imported when these norms 
are incorporated into national laws.  
The degree of diagnostic problems in insolvency norms is also related to the method 
and circumstance of propagation. In a crisis, there is little guarantee that diagnostic 
issues are thoroughly dealt with. Also, the more capable, knowledgeable and effective 
local stakeholders and professionals are, the less the degree of external imposition. 
Contrasting external influence on insolvency reform in Korea and Indonesia countries, 
Caruthers and Halliday note that ‘Korea was less vulnerable than Indonesia partly 
because Korea’s internal capacities for professional diagnosis and prescription were 
much better developed’.516 In Korea, global actors set broad parameters for reform and 
allowed local actors to fill in the details while the reform in Indonesia was more 
intrusive. 517 
4.4.2. Mismatch (actor) 
A dissonance may exist between persons involved in law making and those that 
implement the law in practice.518 Actor mismatch is almost always a problem in 
legislation as it takes great effort to carry all interest groups along in the process of 
deliberations and law making. The exclusion of relevant interest groups may result in 
diagnostic errors and protests from excluded groups at the point of implementation.519 
Even where opportunities are provided for participation, there is a strong possibility 
that relevant actors ignorantly fail to participate, are unable to diagnose the problem 
correctly or identify their interests.520 One effect of this is more heavy-handed 
imposition of global norms with less consideration for local institutions by global 
actors. Again, this problem is exacerbated by crisis events. In Indonesia, ‘the short time 
horizons forced by crisis events and inherent biases in the diagnostic phase of reforms 
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completely excluded integral players in practice— the debtor corporations, many 
private banks, and the Chinese commercial leaders’.521 
4.4.3. Mismatch (Institutional) 
Apart from an actor mismatch, a mismatch between local institutions and 
transnational norms can create settling difficulties. North defines institutions as the 
‘rules or constraints’ that seek to shape human behaviour and interactions.522 Formal 
institutions are precise and stable, making them easy to compare and transfer across 
jurisdictions. And while formal institutions can be easily transplanted by legislation, 
there is no guarantee that they would yield the same efficient outcomes as in the 
countries of origin.523 One reason for this is that the formal institutions on which 
transplanted legislations rely to function may be unavailable or may not function as 
effectively in target countries.  Also, the peculiarities of the informal institutions that 
have become embedded in the host country and their interaction with formal 
institutions can pose.   
Informal institutions affect the actions of stakeholders in insolvency and must be taken 
into account to construct a true picture of efficient choices. Informal institutions can 
include observable practices, social norms and mechanisms that have solidified into 
unwritten codes and conventions within this group of actors.  They can emanate from 
the extension and application of formal rules to solve specific problems. Also, they can 
erupt from repetitive social interactions, loopholes, inappropriate or ineffective laws 
as ways of getting around the problems or transaction costs created by formal 
constraints.524   Lastly, informal institutions have great survival tenacity and will often 
survive change in formal rules.  
Path dependence dictates that institutional practices become more difficult and 
costlier to change as they become reinforced.525 When activities are carried out in 
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certain way over time, more time and cost are invested into that system. The resulting 
outcome is that the relative cost of adopting alternative systems becomes high, making 
it difficult to change them.526 The resistance is even stronger where the government 
and powerful private actors benefit from existing systems and proposed changes 
potentially rob them of those benefits.527   
Thus, ‘changing the law and getting people to use the new law, are two very different 
things’.528 In Japan, like many Asian traditional societies, the adoption of formal, 
debtor-oriented restructuring laws has done little to change the negative attitude 
towards debt and corporate failure. Continued incidences of debt-related suicides in 
that jurisdiction shows that ‘it is far easier to change the laws than the attitudes’.529  
Overtime, formal rules may have the effect of mutating or being mutated by informal 
constraints to produce a different set of rules.530 This presents a peculiar settling 
challenge for developing economies seeking to translate transnational norms to a local 
context. The likely policy response to the emergence of undesirable mutant 
institutions is to view them as problems that must be solved with the introduction of 
better, more ‘modern’ laws.531 Failing to acknowledge that they have only developed 
as a result of the gap between embedded institutions and so-called modern laws, 
further reform will only widen this gap.  
4.4.4. Contradictions 
This is connected to the institutional mismatch problem. Contradictions in the law can 
result from incompatible institutions and conflicting ideologies. Halliday and 
Caruthers argue that when lawmakers are unable to resolve conflicts between 
different interest groups or ideologies, they settle for partial solutions which often 
result in further interpretation problems and indeterminacies.532  Where transnational 
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norms are the subject of such legislations, the conflicts become even more 
complicated. Global actors can impose ideologies that conflict with local political and 
social institutions. The resolution of these conflicts depends on how vulnerable the 
jurisdiction is to external influence. For example, frustrated efforts at insolvency 
reform in Indonesia was partly due to unresolved ethnic, political and ideological 
conflicts between the Chinese who dominated businesses and Indonesians who 
dominated politics.533  
Apart from conflicting ideologies, countries may have divided loyalties to 
organisations or countries that favour conflicting norms. The IMF and World Bank 
have considerable influence on the nation states they provide with last-resort loans.534 
Organisations such as UNCITRAL and INSOL have political, technocratic and 
rhetorical resources which many countries rely on.535 Creditor and/or investor groups 
may push hard for laws that favour their interests. International trade partners may 
also mount their own pressure as a condition for continued investment or trade.536 
While IOs have reached some consensus regarding insolvency norms, attempts to 
pacify different interests (both local and foreign) can still constitute a problem for 
developing countries.537  
4.5. Local resistance: weapons of the weak 
Regardless of the form of pressure used, seemingly powerless nations possess what 
has been termed the ‘weapons on the weak’ which is rooted in their control of the local 
institutions. Some of these ‘weapons’ include avoidance or rejection of conditional 
foreign capital and aid, selective acceptance of recommendations, symbolic 
compliance, deferred compliance, qualified enactment, judicial subversion, perverse 
implementation and failure to enforce.538 These are all strategies that vulnerable 
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countries have been known to adopt in foiling the hegemony of global actors, 
depending on their vulnerability at every point in history.539 Carruthers and Halliday 
argue that seemingly weak actors often let go of the battle they are unable to win 
(enactment) and retreat to the point of implementation to fight the more important 
war.540 These actors range from national actors, to excluded interest groups and 
stakeholders who are dealt the short end of the stick through misdiagnosis, actor 
mismatch or conflicting ideologies.  
At the point of implementation, stakeholders can identify the problems more 
accurately with the benefit of hindsight. In their recursivity theory, Carruthers and 
Halliday claim that this often results in another round of law making to correct errors 
that surface at the implementation stage. It took six years of recursive law making to 
complete the reform process during the IMF’s intervention in Indonesia as ‘every two 
steps forward in formal law-making, implementation took at least one step back’.541  
The picture of the recursive loop of law making painted by the authors may be more 
of a maze than a loop for certain jurisdictions. If the response of stakeholders to an 
incompatible law is to abandon its use, the continuous process of learning and 
returning to the drawing board to fill the gaps becomes untenable, as there would be 
no implementation to learn from. This is more likely to occur where some or all the 
unsettling mechanisms are present, there is no internal political will to see the law 
function correctly and global actors are unavailable to follow up the implementation 
of the norms they have introduced.  
Settling and implementation challenges at national and local sites have not gone 
unnoticed by global actors and they have responded by reiterating the importance of 
local institutions in legal reform. According to the World Bank, not only do formal 
rules matter, but the institutional environment within which the rules are enforced 
also matter.542 However, this admission without more may be of limited relevance to 
                                                          
539 ibid. 
540 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 286-292. 
541 Halliday and Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law’ (n 16) 1160.  
542 World Bank, ICR Principles (April 2001) 8. 
117 
 
developing countries that are constantly confronted with model laws and guidelines 
which require strong formal institutions to function.543      
4.6. Global scripts, formal institutions and local varieties. 
It has been stated that insolvency scripts are largely propagated in the form of 
normative principles, guidelines and model laws.544  These scripts are often 
accompanied by a reminder that local peculiarities must be taken into account in 
reform.  In its 2001 Principles, the World Bank was quick to caution that ‘effective 
systems respond to national needs and problems. As such, these systems must be 
rooted in the country’s broader cultural, economic, legal and social context’.545  
Countries are also encouraged to adopt informal procedures for resolving financial 
distress. However, many of the scripts have focused on providing guidance for the 
reform of formal insolvency frameworks.546 Even with guidelines for informal 
workout procedures, they are often presented in the shadow of the overwhelming 
narrative that informal restructuring only works where formal insolvency law and 
institutions are in place and highly functional.547 The UNCITRAL Guide frankly 
declares, ‘while not based or reliant upon the provisions of the insolvency law, use of 
this type of negotiation depends very largely for its success upon the existence and 
availability of an effective and efficient insolvency law and supporting institutional 
framework’. 548  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, hybrid procedures can help to overcome some 
of the institutional challenges that developing countries face. The UNCITRAL Guide 
considers hybrid mechanisms as a means of combining the advantages of the informal 
mechanisms with those of the formal procedures while eliminating or at least 
reducing the shortcomings of both.549  According to the Guide, informal workouts 
                                                          
543 Davis and Trebilcock, ‘The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics’ (2008) Law 
& Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 08-24, 12. 
544 Here, we consider the World Bank, ICR Principles (n 4); UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 4). 
545 The World Bank, ICR Principles (April 2001) 2; a similar caveat is found in UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 4) 
10. 
546 This is not surprising because informal procedures are not often regarded as insolvency mechanisms properly 
so-called. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 4) Rec 1-5, 21. 
547 See The World Bank, ICR Principles (n 4) B3 and B4; Garrido, Out of Court Restructuring (n 262) para 93- 99. 
548 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 4) 22, 238. 
549 See Ch 3, section 3.3.3. 
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provide an alternative because they are less expensive, subject to the control of the 
parties and can be done with minimum disruption to debtor’s business.550 These 
advantages identified by the UNCITRAL Guide have very little to do with weak 
formal institutions. Thus, the Guide not only anticipates the existence of solid legal 
institutions but also a formal reorganisation procedure, in jurisdictions seeking to 
adopt the hybrid approach.551  
Navigating global scripts can be daunting for developing countries that lack such 
effective formal procedures, as they are troubled by the idea that they cannot 
successfully adopt informal, formal or hybrid restructuring procedures. This focus on 
formal institutions reveals a strong reliance on best practices only.552 The limitation 
for developing countries is that dogmatic adherence to international best practices do 
not account for their current realities- extremely weak formal institutions and mutant 
institutions that produce inefficient results.553 
 
4.6.1. The impact of the World Bank Doing Business Reports 
Admitting the limitation of global standards for developing countries, the World Bank 
pointed out that there is serious difficulty in designing systems that ‘address the needs 
of developing countries while at the same time keeping pace with global trends and 
international best practices.’554 However, this observation is not very helpful to 
developing countries because it is against the same international best practices that 
their institutions continue to be held. The World Bank Doing Business (DB) reports 
have become an influential reference point in the evaluation of the growth rate and 
ease of doing business in economies all over the world.555 The methodology adopted 
                                                          
550 The UNCITRAL Guide acknowledges this and recommends that insolvency law reform be accompanied by 
institutional reform UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 4) 33. 
551 ibid 245. 
552 Dani Rodrik, ‘Second-best institutions’ (2008) No. w14050. National Bureau of Economic Research. Rodrik 
criticises a focus on best practises, arguing that it is unrealistic to expect all countries at different stages of 
development to function optimally with the same set of institutions. 
553 Ibid. 
554 The World Bank, Principles (April 2001) 3; Perry, ‘Relationship between Legal Systems’ (n 435) 286. 
555 Benito Arruñada, ‘Pitfalls to avoid when measuring institutions: Is Doing Business damaging business?’ (2007) 
35(4) Journal of Comparative Economics 732; Davis and Kruse, ‘Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing 
Business Project’ (2007) 4 Law and Social Inquiry 32. 
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by the World Bank for insolvency indicators in the DB reports is influenced by the 
principles considered earlier (the Bank’s ICR Principles and UNCITRAL Guide).556 
Apart from providing information to foreign investors and potential trade partners 
about the economic health of economies, the reports are also intended to direct the 
policy and reform agenda of governments.557  
One of the important indicators for ranking in the DB reports is the resolution of 
insolvency. Indices for ranking insolvency systems include the cost, time, outcome 
and recovery rate in insolvency proceedings. Importantly, the strength of insolvency 
frameworks is measured by considering the formal rules regarding management of 
assets, availability of post commencement financing, reorganisation proceedings and 
creditor participation.558  
The DB reports clearly provide a useful database and information resource about the 
economy and accompanying legal structures of virtually all the countries of the 
world.559 What may however be problematic is the influence the DB ranking has on 
reform agenda of countries, especially developing ones.560 The indices hold up certain 
forms as ideal and provide pressure on countries to attain to tick recommended boxes 
in reform. Not minding the unsuitability of certain procedures to their specific needs, 
many countries would rather ‘window-dress’ and carry the badge of ‘modernity’ than 
seek out less recognised alternatives that benefit them.561 
For example, the availability and design of reorganisation proceedings have been 
recognised by the DB reports as one of the indicators of effective insolvency systems. 
It is unsurprising that many countries have in this period imported reorganisation 
                                                          
556 ibid. 
557World Bank, ‘About Doing Business 2018’ 18 
<www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB18-
Chapters/DB18-About-Doing-Business.pdf> accessed 10 September 2018; Editorial, ‘Unblocking Business’ The 
Economist (15 September 2005). 
558 Doing Business Report, Resolving Insolvency (Methodology) <www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/resolving-
insolvency> accessed 10 September 2018.  
559 The shortcomings of the indices in terms of focusing on specific formal procedures are also understandable 
given that a standardised approach must be adopted in comparing 189/190 diverse economies globally. 
560 Arruñada (n 555) 1- 5 reports how some of the reforms attributed to the Doing Business Reports have done more 
harm than good in countries like Spain and Colombia.  
561 ibid 4-5. 
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proceedings into their laws.562 This is in spite of the WB’s caution that the existence of 
a reorganisation procedure does not guarantee that it can or will be used in practice.563 
The reason for this caution is clear, reorganisation procedures are complex, expensive 
and highly dependent on efficient enforcement mechanisms, expert practitioners and 
judges. These factors remain a challenge even in the US.564  
As Allen and Qian compellingly argue, ‘if there are significant deficiencies in using 
the legal system in countries with the most developed institutions, these deficiencies 
are likely to be magnified in developing countries with poor institutions’.565 The new 
addition to list of ‘insolvency must-haves’ is the availability and priority of post 
commencement finance. The 2016 DB reports reiterate that reorganisation procedures 
by themselves are no longer sufficient. They must be accompanied by clear, explicit 
provisions for post commencement financing to increase the chances of corporate 
rescue. Since 2015 when it was included as part of the indices for measuring 
insolvency, many economies have embarked on reform to make specific provisions 
for post commencement financing.566 The World Bank DB project reported how by 
2016,  countries like Cyprus, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago had introduced 
provisions on post commencement finance as part of an overall effort to strengthen 
and modernise mechanisms for business rescue.567 As we discuss in the next chapter, 
some countries in Africa are also doing the same. 
                                                          
562 The Doing Business 2016 reports that, ‘In the five years from 2009 to 2014, 60 economies implemented 87 reforms 
affecting the Doing Business indicators on resolving insolvency. Reforms in the area of corporate reorganization 
were the most common: 10 economies introduced a new reorganization proceeding, and 21 promoted 
reorganization or made improvements to their existing reorganization framework’. World Bank, Doing Business 
2016, Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency (Full report) 104.  
<http://espanol.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB16-Full-Report.pdf > accessed 8 September 2018. 
563 ibid 102. 
564 Djankov and others (n 130) 1106-1107; The American Bankruptcy Institute, Commission to Study the Reform of 
Chapter 11 (2012-2014) Final Report 12-18. 
565 Allen and Qian (n 496) 119. 
566 The Doing Business 2016 Report (n 562) 102. 
567 ibid 104. Interestingly, developed jurisdictions like the UK are not left out of this drive to conform to 
international standards. The UK Government recently launched consultations for the reform of its insolvency 
framework. The main goal of this proposed reform is to make the law more restructuring-friendly Insolvency 
Service, ‘A review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework’ (25 May 2016) 
<www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-review-of-the-corporate-insolvency-framework> accessed 4 June 
2016. There are four proposals under consideration (a) creating a new moratorium, (b) helping businesses to 
continue trading through the restructuring process (c) developing a flexible restructuring plan and (d) exploring 
options for rescue financing.  
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It is evident from discussion in chapter three that mechanisms such as specific 
provisions for post commencement financing are useful in restructuring. However, 
their mere presence in the law is not enough to guarantee more efficient resolution of 
financial distress. It must be acknowledged that for advanced economies like the US, 
it has taken decades for these attitudes and practices to evolve. They have in the 
process put in place the fundamental groundwork that contributes to the proper 
functioning of these mechanisms. Developing economies would struggle if the 
expectation is that they assimilate these practices and mechanisms at the stroke of a 
pen.  In discussing recently introduced restructuring laws in African countries, the 
next chapter considers some of the difficulties and confusion brought on by sudden, 
extensive changes to insolvency regimes, including PCF provisions. 
4.7. Navigating global convergence in insolvency: some lessons for developing 
economies.  
This thesis would go on to consider the impact of the trend towards convergence on 
countries in Africa. While it may be yet unable to answer a crucial question, it does 
the vital job of raising it- is the trend towards global convergence in insolvency 
beneficial to African countries?  
One of the important lessons from this chapter, which has been extensively explored 
in socio-legal research,568 is that legal reforms must take account of existing local 
institutions and actors, if settling would be achieved. This requires gradual learning 
aided by education, research, and communication,569 a process described as ‘adaptive 
efficiency’.570 It involves learning from failures, eliminating inefficiencies and 
exploring new alternatives; a ‘long and often painful process of adaptation and 
competition’.571 Adaptive efficiency allows societies to explore different ways of 
solving problems.  
                                                          
568 Daniel Berkowitz, ‘Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect’ (2003) 47(1) European economic 
review 165-195; Katharina Pistor, ‘The standardization of law and its effect on developing economies’ (2002) 50(1) 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 97-130. 
569 Shirley (n 527) 640. 
570 North (n 430) 80-82. 
571 ‘The institutions that protect property rights and support strong market economies in Western Europe emerged 
gradually from a long and disorderly process of adaptation and experimentation spurred by competition and 
wars’. Shirley (n 527) 645. 
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Closely following the acknowledgment that local institutions matter is the turn 
towards the more pragmatic approach of horizontal learning among peer developing 
countries. This is captured in Stiglitz’s advice to scan globally but reinvent locally.572 
According to Trubek;  
‘This approach involves detailed comparisons of parallel experiences in 
similarly situated developing countries by experts from these countries. 
Rather than look [only] to advanced country models or universal 
prescriptions from international bodies, this method relies on a bottom-up, 
demand-driven approach in which the developing countries themselves 
identify the issues they wish to deal with, select the peer nations they think 
they can learn from, and engage directly with peer experts in these 
nations.’573  
This form of horizontal learning makes it easier to adapt institutions that are built 
to respond to similar needs. Drawing from experience of experimentation with 
horizontal learning among the BRICs countries, Trubek identifies some of the 
limitations to the study and practice of horizontal learning. They include a 
general weakness of research in developing countries, high cost of comparative 
studies in law and development, continued reliance on legal institutions from 
developed countries, embeddedness of legal traditions and lack of interest in 
horizontal learning by development organisations.574 However, they can be 
overcome with more empirical studies and interactions between scholars and 
practitioners in developing countries.575  
 
Arriving late at the development table has its advantages576 but can be overwhelmed 
by disadvantages. One of the disadvantages is the inability to adapt efficiency by 
                                                          
572 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Scan Globally Reinvent Locally. Knowledge Infrastructure and the Localization of Knowledge’ 
in Diane Stone (ed), Banking on knowledge: the genesis of the Global Development Network (Routledge 2003). 
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learning from past mistakes and current experiences, both domestically and 
horizontally from similarly situated countries.577 In a fast-moving world that urges 
developing economies towards modernisation through the adoption of ‘global’ 
norms, it is unclear that developing countries have the luxury of this adaptive 
efficiency. This limitation has been a feature of the development process of Africa as 
far back as the 16th century.  
It has been posited that perhaps the organic process would have taken deeper roots if 
it had not been interrupted by colonialism’s transplants of institutions that were less 
well adapted to local norms, beliefs and environments.578 Stiglitz offers a forceful 
argument; 
 ‘Colonialism served to eviscerate existing institutions in the affected 
countries, which is almost all of the developing world. It tried to graft on to 
existing cultures foreign institutions and ideas, but in a process of 
imposition…it is not surprising that the graft did not take hold. What was 
left in its place was a void-the old was destroyed and nothing really viable 
had been created in its stead’.579  
After colonialism came development assistance that was driven by a modernisation 
theory, perhaps a well-intended gesture, but having similar effects as colonialism.580 It 
is important to explore and acknowledge the ways in which the recent move towards 
global convergence can also limit that adaptive process.  
 
Other lessons arise from an understanding of institutions and the reliance of global 
norms of insolvency on formal institutions.581 Even before enactment, the gaps 
between proposed laws and local institutions are evident. Supposing that constant 
revision of laws to close the gaps were practicable, the points made above regarding 
the tenacity of underlying social norms will remain unresolved. In insolvency, the lack 
                                                          
577 Shirley (n 527) 3. 
578 ibid 21; Simeon Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer ‘Appropriate institutions’ (Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics 2003) 283-298. 
579 Stiglitz, ‘Scan Globally’ (n 572) 24. 
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of technical knowledge by lawmakers and other actors (such as judicial officers) can 
further compound this problem.  Also, courts are the predominant enforcement 
mechanism for formal institutions.582 Davis and Trebilcock note that ‘predominant 
preoccupation with the court system inappropriately discounts the important role’ 
other institutions play.583 On this basis, it has been proposed that the promotion of 
competitive alternatives to the formal court system where possible, is more 
effective.584 Rodrik suggests that as the world approaches convergence, global actors 
ought to be cautious of using best practices as a way of assessing institutions in 
developing countries.585 Rodrik proposes second-best practices for developing 
countries because a first best practices approach focuses on the minimisation of 
transaction costs for the immediate transaction while ignoring costs that arise 
elsewhere in the institutional framework. This supports the proposition that a second-
best approach allows developing countries to discover and reform loopholes in other 
parts of the system and engage more efficient alternatives such as informal 
mechanisms.586 With the advancement of an outward looking TLO in corporate 
insolvency law, it is important that these lessons are not lost on developing countries.  
 
Conclusion. 
This chapter discusses the emergence of a transnational legal order in insolvency and 
restructuring. There are divergent views about the possibility and desirability of 
harmonisation in insolvency regulation.  The chapter considers the development of 
insolvency norms by global actors and how these norms are propagated across nation 
states. It finds that while there is a form of consensus among global actors on global 
scripts of insolvency, ssettling is much more complex at the national and local levels. 
Developing countries are important to the debates as they are often the target of 
propagation, methods of which can range from coercion, moral suasion to peer 
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pressure. It is therefore important to understand the harmonisation drive from their 
perspective. The chapter draws from the experience in Asian countries like Indonesia, 
China and Korea to discuss the factors that inform the means of propagation and 
interaction of global actors with local stakeholders.  
The chapter finds that although global scripts can provide useful guidance for 
insolvency reform, tensions persist between so-called global norms and local 
institutions. It highlights settling and implementation problems and how they 
manifest at local sites. The importance of getting a correct diagnosis of the problem, 
involving the right local actors in reform and seeking compatibility with local 
institutions cannot be over stressed. 
The chapter considers the main scripts of insolvency produced by actors such as the 
World Bank and UNCITRAL and finds that their focus on formal institutions can be 
problematic for insolvency reform in developing economies. Global actors have 
acknowledged the important role that embedded local institutions play but factoring 
diverse social and informal norms into the globalisation paradigm is an enormous if 
not impossible task for global actors. Thus, developing economies must navigate an 
increasingly globalised word by looking inwards to decide what best meets their 
development needs.  With the pressure to modernise their laws in line with global 
scripts, the chapter acknowledges that developing countries can easily lose the 
adaptive efficiency that is derivable from exploring more compatible institution 
choices and learning from countries that they have more in common with.  
To contribute to the understanding of the emergence of a TLO in insolvency, the next 
chapter considers the recent insolvency reforms in Africa and the impact of global 









EXPLORING THE CONVERGENCE OF INSOLVENCY NORMS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA 
 
There is good news out of Africa. Not all of Africa. But from a large part of Africa 
that quietly, with little fanfare, is on the move. 
                                                              (Steven Radelet, Emerging Africa, 2010) 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the trend towards global convergence in the field of 
insolvency law, examining the creation and propagation of transnational norms of 
insolvency by global actors.  This chapter contributes to that debate by revealing the 
impact of those norms in an understudied but fast-growing region of the world- 
Africa. Compared to emerging regions in Asia and Latin America, the experience in 
Africa has not been a part of conversations about the spread of global norms in 
developing economies.  Carruthers and Halliday note from their repeated 
interventions in different emerging regions, that global actors compile lessons which 
they apply to other jurisdictions and from which normative models emerge. However, 
‘[Big, transitional] and geographically important countries weigh more heavily as 
models for IFIs than small or marginal nations’.587 Thus, while accumulated 
experiences in countries in parts of the world like East Asia and Latin America have 
been studied, the authors acknowledge that ‘African countries are almost never used 
as exemplars’.588  
This chapter will close some of that gap by exploring insolvency reform and practice 
in Africa where insolvency jurisprudence and practice are growing. Given that 
twenty-three of the forty-four (more than half) countries that have adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law are in Africa,589 the continent plays an increasingly significant 
role in the emergence of an insolvency TLO. The chapter discusses the ways by which 
transnational norms have found their way into African countries. Where appropriate, 
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it refers to some of the findings from the empirical study conducted in Africa’s largest 
nation, Nigeria.  
The limitation to the discussion stems from two factors; as stated in chapter one, Africa 
is a diverse continent with fifty-four countries and experiences.590 Thus, the discussion 
cannot capture or represent the experience in all fifty-four countries, and it does not 
attempt to.  Rather, it highlights reform efforts targeted at the continent by global 
actors and discusses some of the experience and changes in countries at the forefront 
of restructuring practice and insolvency law reforms in Africa.591   
Secondly, reform is at its infancy in many African countries. Some countries have 
enacted their insolvency laws for some years but still struggle with implementation. 
For others, enactment is still ongoing, even after a few years of beginning the 
process.592  
This chapter does the important work of laying the foundation for a deeper discussion 
of the evolution of insolvency law and practice in Africa. However, because reforms 
are in their early days, the tensions between the new laws on the books and the law in 
practice are not extensively discussed.  
In capturing the process of insolvency reforms and developments in insolvency 
practice as they evolve, the chapter queries the factors driving the developments, 
including the role of global actors. This promotes the building of a more complete 
picture of the trend towards convergence in insolvency and the impact of that trend 
in Africa.   
 
The chapter is divided into two broad parts, A and B.  In part A, the chapter considers 
Africa’s place in the global economy. The aim here is to better understand the links 
between Africa’s role in global markets, its relationship with global actors and the 
spread of global scripts of insolvency across the continent. The chapter finds that 
financial crises in Africa have not elicited the same reaction from global powers as 
                                                          
590 As emphasised in chapter one however, many countries in Africa have a lot in common, including a shared 
heritage, colonial history, business cooperation and institutional, political and development challenges. 
591 See tables 1 and 2 below. 
592Also, the information available is limited as the documentation of the reform process is not always detailed or 
transparent. As discussion in this chapter shows, some countries are more transparent, organised and forthcoming 
with information about the reform process than others.  
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they did in Asia and argues that one of the reasons for this is Africa’s slow integration 
into the global economy. In recent years, as Africa experiences more growth, interest 
in the continent has increased, with loyalty to new actors like China rising. In light of 
this growing interest, Part A concludes with a discussion of the relatively recent 
activities of global actors like the World Bank and INSOL in insolvency reform in 
Africa.  
 
Part B is divided into two sections, the first section considers changes in restructuring 
practice in selected African countries, and the factors that have informed these 
changes. The aim of this section is to show how local practices are opening up to 
rescue-oriented debt restructuring in the resolution of financial distress. The chapter 
finds that these changes are happening independent of (and in some jurisdictions 
simultaneously with) insolvency law reforms. The second section gives an outline of 
the progress of insolvency law reforms in thirty-six African countries and briefly 
comments on the settling of these new norms at local sites. The chapter identifies the 
ways in which the mechanisms of actor and institutional mismatch, diagnostic 





AFRICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, GLOBAL 
ACTORS AND NORMS. 
 
5.1. Africa’s place in the global market 
Developing countries vary in the level of their integration into the global market and 
their importance to the global economy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
importance of economies in Asia and Latin America and their vulnerability to 
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pressure from global actors influenced reforms in those regions, such that financial 
crisis became a precipitating factor for intervention in insolvency reform.593  
Although they are conspicuously missing from discussions about insolvency reform 
and the spread of transnational norms across developing countries, many African 
countries have also experienced their fair share of financial and economic crises. 594 
Additionally, they have a long history of depending on IFIs for financial aid, credit 
and technical support;595 two elements that spell a high degree of susceptibility to 
pressure from global actors. However, unlike in Asia where financial crisis led to 
intervention that resulted in insolvency law reform because of the growing 
importance of that region as a global player; financial crisis in Africa has not elicited 
the same response. Countries in Africa are not seen to be as important to the global 
financial architecture. 596 
Debates about if and how Africa fits in the global economy are not new. Questions 
have been asked in relation to trade regimes in Africa and the activities of 
multinationals on the continent.597 Where many emerging jurisdictions have 
experienced a sustained increase in trade and foreign direct investment to earn them 
a place as players in the global economy, African countries and their investments have 
been missing. This has led some to the conclusion that Africa resides on the fringes of 
the global economy.598 Africa’s detachment from the global financial markets has even 
been used to explain why the continent did not take a direct hit from a financial crisis 
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that was said to be ‘global’.599 This detachment might also explain the disengagement 
of global actors from insolvency reform in Africa.  
It is not suggested that Africa or its laws and institutions have been untouched by 
global actors.  For many decades, most of the global players who are also the dominant 
actors in the harmonisation process, have maintained a relationship with Africa. 
Notably, the UK and France by virtue of their colonial history have continued to 
influence the legal systems of former colonies, the US has cemented its place as a 
significant aid donor and trade partner, and IFIs like the IMF and the World Bank as 
development partners and creditors of last resort.600  
Loans from IFIs accompanied by conditionalities are not a strange concept in Africa.601 
Thus, if financial crisis and accompanying aid and loans did not produce the same 
revolutionary result for insolvency law in Africa, it was not for lack of leverage. 
Rather, it may be attributed to a deprioritising of private sector and investment related 
reform in Africa. A review of the conditionalities of IMF and World Bank lending to 
African countries suggest a focus on public sector governance, public financial 
management reform, macro-economic reform, accountability and budget process and 
social sector reform.602 Conditionalities have mostly responded to the belief that what 
Africa needed the most was good governance. 603  For other global actors with 
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as a result of corruption, civil service inefficiencies, slow political and public enterprises reforms and macro-
economic imbalances. Maureen Were, Rose Ngugi and Phyllis Makau ‘Understanding the Reform Process in 
Kenya’ in Joseph Mensah (eds), Understanding Economic Reforms in Africa: A Tale of Seven Nations (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006) 30-33; Carlos Santiso, ‘Good governance and aid effectiveness: The World Bank and 
conditionality’ (2001) 7(1) The Georgetown public policy review 1-22. 
603 In 1997, the IMF again suspended aids to Kenya for failing to fulfil the condition of ‘good governance’. This 
prompted a round of economic reforms by the Kenyan government. Were and others (n 602) 31;  C Biau and J Biau, 
‘Governmental Reform in Developing Countries: External Conditionality versus Peer Pressure. The Case of Kenya' 
(2008) Reinvention 1.  The focus on good governance in IMF and World Bank conditionality to developing 
countries in Africa has been the subject of criticism. It has been argued that conditionality has so far failed to 
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influence in Africa, a region that was not considered to be a player in the global 
market, there was little to be gained from pushing the alignment of insolvency laws 
with global norms.  
Apart from the provision of aids and loans, Africa has a history of decades of trade 
with leading nations. This trade has been highly limited to the exportation of 
extractive resources, mostly of crude oil and metal resources.604 With the lack of real 
investment and partnership beyond trade agreements, foreign direct investment into 
and out of Africa has even been more dismal than the volume of trade,605 with most 
foreign direct investment being largely focused on the primary commodities sector.606 
Despite being its largest trade partner and foreign donor for many decades, the US 
(and indeed most of the developed world) did not have the political, strategic and 
economic interests that it did in Europe, Asia, the Middle East or Latin America.  
5.2. Africa’s growing importance in the global economy: An overview of Africa’s 
economic growth. 
The past decade has brought a boost in the growth of African economies and the 
beginning of movement away from the fringes. Africa was recently recognised as the 
second fastest growing continent in the world after South Asia.607 With the increase in 
economic growth and huge developmental projects coming out of Africa, the 
continent has received more global attention.608 
                                                          
achieve reform in governance because as Kapur and Webb explain, ‘reforms rarely succeed unless a government 
shares the conviction that they are essential’. Devesh Kapur and Richard Webb, ‘Governance-related 
Conditionalities of the International Financial Institution’ (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
2000) 8; Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa (eds), Reforming Africa’s Institutions: Ownership, Incentives, and Capabilities (United 
Nations University Press 2003) for a discussion of governance issues, conditionalities and reform ownership in 
Africa. 
604 Scott Taylor, Globalization and the Cultures of Business in Africa: from patrimonialism to profit (Indiana University 
Press 2012) 17. 
605 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment that involves a long-term relationship between two economies. 
It reflects a lasting interest and control by a foreign direct investor, resident in one economy, in an enterprise 
resident in another economy. UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2017 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/tdstat42_FS09_en.pdf> accessed 10 September 2018. 
606 And failing to impact the economies of the countries significantly. Taylor (n 604) 17; Todd Moss, ‘Where does 
Africa fit in the globalization puzzle?’ Yale Insights (23 June 2009) available at 
<https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/where-does-africa-fit-in-the-globalization-puzzle> accessed 10 
September 2018. 
607 AfDB, ’Africa remains world’s second fastest growing region’ (n 7). 
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following-a-sharp-slowdown>; Africa Development Bank, ‘2017 Financial Presentation’  
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/GenericDocuments/Annual_Meetings/AfDB_Fi
































































































Figure 9: FDI inflows and outflows in East and South East Asia 
1996-2016 (US$ millions)
































































































Figure 8: FDI inflows and outflows in Africa 1996-2016 (US$ 
millions)
FDI inflow FDI outflow
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The financial landscape of Africa continues to see rapid changes including the 
introduction of new financial instruments, services and practices. Likewise, new uses 
of funds, new sources of funds, new financial institutions and markets are also 
emerging.609  The influx of foreign investment and consequent cross border 
transactions has been fuelled notably by rising infrastructural development in 
Africa.610 Nigeria’s first Independent Power Plant, the Azura-Edo IPP was funded 
mainly by IFC (a member of the World Bank), FMO (the Dutch Development Bank) 
and some foreign and local commercial lenders.611 Similarly in Kenya, the government 
has actively attracted foreign investment for its power sector reforms with funding for 
its IPPs coming mostly from China.612  
In addition, finance markets are becoming more developed, with South Africa, 
Namibia, Morocco and Mauritius leading the way and Kenya, Botswana, Egypt, 
Ghana and Nigeria following closely behind.613 Apart from African governments 
accessing the global market, local corporations and financial institutions in Africa are 
also making a play for the big stage, with commercial banks issuing bonds on the 
international debt market.614 As they become more actively incorporated into the 
global market, African countries are expected to experience more directly, the effects 
of global economic downturns and vice versa. The developments in African 
                                                          
609 The Bond & Derivatives Exchange (Badex) in Zambia concluded its first live trade at 2.49pm on April 15, a US 
dollar/Zambian kwacha futures contract. Luke Clancy, ‘Lion’s Share’ Africa Derivatives (2 May 2014) 
<www.dreadnought.co.za/Portals/0/African%20Derivatives%20-%20The%20Lion%27s%20Share%20-
%2030%20Apr%202014%20-%20Risk%20Magazine.pdf>; The activities of private equity funds has gained some 
momentum on the continent. Since 2007, about $22 billion has been raised from private equity firms. Lawrence 
Delevingne, ’Private Investors Pile into Africa’ CNBC (17 March 2015) <www.cnbc.com/2015/03/17/private-
equity-investors-pile-into-africa.html > all accessed 10 September 2018. 
610Financing Infrastructure (UN, OSAA policy brief 2015) available at 
<www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/policybriefs/2015_financing_infrastructure.pdf > accessed 10 September 
2018.  To plug the remaining funding gap for infrastructural development, African countries continue to explore 
innovative funding sources. One of this is the consideration of infrastructure bond to raise funding from private 
sectors.  
611 FMO invests in Azura in Nigeria (FMO press release 28 November 2014) <www.fmo.nl/news-detail/d23adf4d-
8883-4224-95de-7f7a8403028f/fmo-invests-in-azura-in-nigeria> accessed 10 September 2018. 
612 Africa Oil and Power, Power Privatisation: Kenya Case Study (5 May 2016) 
<www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/power-privatisation-kenya-case-study/> accessed 10 September 2018. 
613 PwC, Africa Asset Management 2020 (October 2015)  19-102 <www.amafrica2020.com/amafrica2020/docs/am-
africa-2020.pdf> accessed 10 September 2018. 
614 EuroMoney, Sub-Saharan Eurobonds hold up under pressure (6 October 2017). 
<www.euromoney.com/article/b1512pbb2r0p5c/sub-saharan-eurobonds-hold-up-under-pressure>; Paul 
Wallace, Lyubov Pronina and Emele Onu,’ Nigerian Bank Just Sold Most Expensive Emerging-Market Bond’ 
Bloomberg (11 October 2017) <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-11/nigeria-s-fidelity-issues-highest-
yielding-em-eurobond-of-2017> all accessed 10 September 2018; Todd Moss (n 606). 
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economies therefore raise questions about the propagation of global norms of 
commercial law, including insolvency law in these countries.  
As African economies open up, there is more pressure for commercial law reforms. 
This is evident in the recent wave of insolvency reforms across the continent. Some 
global actors play a role in these reforms, but it is uncertain that the rise in Africa’s 
growth would spell a more direct involvement of these global actors in insolvency law 
reforms in Africa. Two reasons for this deduction are the dilution of Africa’s 
conventional foreign partners and the growing resistance to the use of conditionalities 
to compel reform in developing countries.   
5.2.1. Changing loyalties; a note on China’s rising influence in Africa  
China is fast replacing global actors like the US and the IFIs as Africa’s trade and 
development partner of choice. China’s overseas investments in Africa exceeded 
US$107 billion in 2013 and accumulated outbound direct investment stock reached 
over US$660 billion.615  China has also become a major lender to Africa with nearly 
one-third ($6.8bn) of the $25.6bn that China’s state-owned development banks lent 
worldwide to energy projects in 2017 going to African countries.616 China’s 
involvement is both politically and economically strategic; beyond the oil, copper, 
cobalt and iron ore, they also see markets for manufacturing and construction 
companies, and the geopolitical advantage of having fifty-four sovereign nations as 
allies.617   
Certainly, the emergence of China as Africa’s development partner of choice has 
attracted the attention of global powers and some skepticism. Warnings about the 
potential for neo-colonialism, China’s tenuous history with human rights and its 
                                                          
615 These investments are not restricted to natural resources but cover a range of industries including construction, 
agriculture, real estate, wholesale and retail, finance etc. White Paper, China State Council, China-Africa Economic 
and Trade Cooperation (2013) 
<http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986536.htm> accessed 10 
September 2018. 
616 This was ahead of south Asia, with $5.84bn. The loans bring total Chinese energy finance in Africa since 2000 to 
$34.8bn.616.  Africa Eats up Lion’s Share of Chinese Funding’ Financial Times <www.ft.com/content/668968e8-
23b6-11e8-add1-0e8958b189ea> accessed 10 September 2018. 
617 Jing Gu, ‘Is China’s Role in African Fragile States Exploitative or Developmental?’ (2015) (IDS Policy Briefing 
91, Brighton: IDS);        ‘Chinese investment in Africa: Beijing’s testing ground’ Financial Times 
<www.ft.com/content/0f534aa4-4549-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996 > accessed 10 September 2018. 
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unconventional means of operating are replete.618 While African countries are not 
oblivious to these issues, China also offers something that is hard to reject- choice. 
Having been estranged from the globalisation agenda and jaded by the failure of 
western prescriptions like the Washington Consensus619 and the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes620 to deliver needed change, China offers Africa an array of 
seemingly revolutionary options; infrastructural development, trade partnership, 
foreign direct investment and a policy of non-interference in domestic governance as 
the icing on top.621  In addition to Chinese funded projects and investments, some 
African countries are also looking beyond the US and the IFIs to other sources of 
finance, such as international bond markets.622 
China’s adoption of a non-interference policy in internal governance of national 
governments may suggest that where domestic laws and policies are concerned, the 
emergence of China in Africa is a non-factor. While there may be no direct imposition 
of economic and political ideologies through the instrument of conditionality, there is 
no ruling out the gradual propagation of a ‘Chinese way of doing things’ as China 
                                                          
618Tillerson tells Africa that China finance imperils their sovereignty’ Financial Times (March 2018) 
<www.ft.com/content/f6691e18-22da-11e8-ae48-60d3531b7d11>; Keith Somerville, ‘Why Zimbabwe's use of 
elephants to pay off old debt to China is problematic’ CNBC Africa (11 January 2017) 
<www.cnbcafrica.com/news/southern-africa/2017/01/11/zimbabwes-elephants/ >  Yun Sun, ‘China in Africa: 
Implications for U.S. Competition and Diplomacy’ Brookings (3 April 2013) 
<www.brookings.edu/research/china-in-africa-implications-for-u-s-competition-and-diplomacy/> ; David 
Shinn, The Impact of China’s Growing Influence in Africa International Policy Digest (12 July 2011) 
<https://intpolicydigest.org/2011/07/12/the-impact-of-china-s-growing-influence-in-africa/> allaccessed 10 
September 2018. 
619 A set of ten policies implemented by the World Bank and IMF in 1989, which prescribe a reduced role for the 
state, strict fiscal discipline, deregulation and privatization, trade liberalisation, financial liberalisation and increase 
in FDI. Charles Gore, ‘The rise and fall of the Washington Consensus as a paradigm for developing countries’ 
(2000) 28(5) World development 789-804. 
620 Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, ‘The best of times and the worst of times: structural adjustment programs and 
uneven development in Africa: the case of Ghana’ (2000) 52(3) The Professional Geographer 469-483. The collapse 
of Kisumu Cotton Mills (Kicomi) in Kenya, which led to thousands of job losses was primarily blamed on the 
negative sting of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) for its unregulated liberalisation. Kenneth Kwama, 
‘Receiverships: The Safe Way Under’ Standard Digital (23 March 2010) 
<www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000006175/receiverships-the-safe-way-under > accessed 10 
September 2018. 
621  Maggie Fick, ‘ Nigeria unveils economic-reform plan as it aims to secure World Bank loan’ Financial Times (7 
March 2017)  (the world bank and IMF are still a source of credit to many governments including African countries, 
and they still impose conditions for giving out funds, but as mentioned earlier, such conditionalities are 
increasingly coming under attack); Maggie Fick, ‘Ghana on course to end $918m IMF loan programme next year’ 
Financial Times (13 April 2017) <www.ft.com/content/e951f5ba-815e-36ee-9e4b-f2f6c7e4db60> accessed 10 
September 2018. 
622 Kenya seeks to raise 30-year debt after rating downgrade (Financial Times March 2018) 
<www.ft.com/content/c145f044-16f5-11e8-9e9c-25c814761640 > accessed 10 September 2018; EuroMoney, Sub-
Saharan Eurobonds hold up under pressure (n 614). 
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increasingly becomes a model for African countries.623 Furthermore, the possibility of 
China’s influence on law reform and governance in Africa grows as the West loses 
more of its economic leverage, and resistance to western ideas (which include global 
norms and the actors that propagate them) heightens.624 Without these factors, 
perhaps, global actors would have been motivated and now poised to directly 
intervene in insolvency law reform in fast growing Africa.  
As far as corporate insolvency is concerned, China itself only recently opened up to 
external influence with the enactment of the Enterprise Insolvency Law in 2006. The 
reorganisation law and the norms it embodies are far from becoming fully settled in 
China.625 Therefore, just as China itself has had to accommodate these norms, African 
countries, for similar reasons, are likely to continue to succumb to the pressure to 
conform to global norms.626 
Carruthers and Halliday in developing their theory of global convergence in 
insolvency admit that the pressure for and pattern of convergence rise and fall as 
loyalties change or the geopolitical climate of host countries shift.627 Because economic 
conditions and loyalties in developing economies are not static, the interests and 
leverage of global actors in these economies can also vary over time. Indeed, the list 
of global actors that Carruthers and Halliday identify as key to the development and 
propagation of insolvency norms is more fluid at the national and local levels and can 
vary by jurisdiction.  Even at the global centre, as loyalties and leverage evolve, some 
global actors may lose their influence in engineering a global order, while new players 
take their place. With new global actors also come the possibility of disrupting a 
relatively settled set of insolvency norms and/or the pace of propagation and settling.  
                                                          
623 Editorial, ‘How the West Got China Wrong’ The Economist (1 March 2018) < 
www.economist.com/leaders/2018/03/01/how-the-west-got-china-wrong > accessed 10 September 2018. For 
example, it is not unreasonable to ask whether China’s defiance of western ideas about democracy can encourage 
African countries who already struggle with faltering democracies to tow a similar path.  Mehari Taddele Maru, 
‘China-Africa Relations Democracy and Delivery’ Aljazeera (1 May 2013) 
<http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/04/201343011415424904.html > accessed 10 September 2018. 
624 Shinn (n 618). 
625 See Roman Tomasic and Zinian Zhang, ‘From Global Convergence in China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 
to Divergent Implementation: Corporate Reorganisation in China’ (2012) 12(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
295-332 for statistics and a discussion of implementation issues with the EBL. 
626 See Ch 4, page 107 for a discussion of China’s reform. 
627 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 35-37. 
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5.3. The harmonisation process in Africa; global actors and methods of propagation. 
Recent insolvency law reforms in Africa are driven by both exogenous and 
endogenous factors including a desire to encourage foreign investment and 
favourably compete with other emerging jurisdictions.628  Global actors like the World 
Bank, INSOL, IMF and UNCITRAL have been involved to varying degrees in these 
reforms.  Their influence in Africa’s reforms has lacked the direct force that they had 
in Asian countries like Indonesia and Korea but is present nonetheless.  Out of the 
forty-five (45) countries that have now enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law, twenty-
three (23) countries are in Africa.629  
Global actors have turned to less coercive means of propagation including suasion, 
modelling and peer pressure; and intervention has come mainly by way of technical 
aid to governments and locally constituted reform committees using second and third 
order intermediaries. 
Figure 10. Global actors and their intermediaries in Africa 
 
5.3.1. Technical and financial assistance for reform 
The World Bank is one of the prominent global actors that have been involved in these 
reforms both directly and indirectly. Directly, the Bank engages with policymakers in 
African countries to provide technical and financial assistance towards reforms.630 
Their involvement has included consultations with stakeholders (1st order 
intermediaries such as Law Reform Commissions, 2nd order intermediaries like 
                                                          
628 Patel (n 12). 
629 Model Law status update <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html 
> accessed 10 September 2018. 
630David Burdette, ‘Corporate Insolvency Reform Experiences’ (Presented at the INSOL Conference, Insolvency 
Law in the Channel Islands: Modern Themes and Reform Perspectives, 14 October 2011).  
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practitioners and lawyers) to produce reports and recommendations for reform, 
working with technical committees to draft insolvency legislations and organising 
sensitisation programs. For example, in Mauritius, the World Bank in partnership 
with the IMF, worked with a local steering committee to provide consultation and 
technical assistance in the diagnostic and prescriptive process for a new insolvency 
law.631 In Namibia and Lesotho, the World Bank engaged consultants to work with 
local stakeholders in consultation for insolvency law reform.632 Additionally, the 
World Bank sponsored a project for the introduction of a legal framework for the 
licensing and regulation of insolvency practitioners in South Africa.633 The Bank 
provided technical expertise for the review of the insolvency systems in Zambia and 
the drafting of insolvency bills in the Republic of Malawi, the Republic of Seychelles 
and Zimbabwe.634 
Other actors who are less prominent at the global centre have also been directly 
involved in reform in some African countries. For example, USAID was highly 
invested in the different stages of insolvency law reform in Mozambique. Apart from 
assisting the government in the drafting and enactment process, USAID organised a 
training program for commercial judges throughout the country and published a 
guidebook on the new insolvency legislation.635  
Private practitioners and experts from developed countries have also been present in 
the law-making process. The final draft of the Mauritian Insolvency Act was 
                                                          
631 World Bank, Mauritius: Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (World Bank 2004) 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/14423> accessed 10 September 2018. 
632 Professor Andre Boraine of the University of Pretoria, South Africa was engaged by the Bank. See Namibia Law 
Reform Commission, ‘Discussion Paper on Issues Relating to the Insolvency Act 1936’ (February 2015) foreword 
ix; Africa Round Table (ART), (Freedom to Fail? Insolvency for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, Ghana 2016) 
26-27 
<https://www.insol.org/_files/Africa%20Round%20Table/Ghana%202016/ART%202016%20print%20numbere
d.pdf > accessed 10 September 2018. 
633 See Insolvency Law and Practice in Certain African States and the UK (Research Excellence Framework, Impact 
Studies, Nottingham Trent University 2014) <https://impact.ref.ac.uk/CaseStudies/CaseStudy.aspx?Id=23280> 
accessed 10 September 2018 . 
634 The Bank engaged external consultants to work with local stakeholders in those countries. Ibid. 
635 USAID, ‘Mozambique Reforms Business Insolvency Laws’ (October 
2014)<https://20122017.usaid.gov/resultsdata/successstories/reforming-insolvency-laws-mozambique-
priority-private-sector > accessed 10 September 2018.  
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completed with the help of a New Zealand professor, Peter Mc Kenzie (who also 
drafted the Companies Act 2001 and the Companies Act 1984).636    
5.3.2. Propagation through peer pressure, modelling and suasion 
More prominent than direct involvement in legislative reforms is the propagation of 
insolvency norms through networks, peer pressure and modelling. Notably, the 
impact of the World Bank through its projects, particularly the Doing Business project 
is influential and often shows up in narratives about the need for reform. Many 
African countries now measure their progress in terms of ease of doing business and 
legitimise reform proposals with the promise of a better ranking on the DB project.637 
Governments have also demonstrated commitment to the project by investing in 
committees and departments that are dedicated to improving the ease of doing 
business, using the World Bank indicators as a reference point.638  
Supplemental to this is the Africa Round Table event (ART), an initiative of INSOL in 
collaboration with the World Bank and some assistance from the IMF.639 First 
convened in Nigeria in 2010, the ART appears to be an attempt to replicate Asia’s FAIR 
(which was established in 2001), and its stated objectives are: to have a high level 
dialogue with both private practitioners and public policy makers regarding 
insolvency reform in Africa, thereby encouraging reform experiences to be shared and 
challenges to be discussed in an open and frank forum; to elevate insolvency reform 
on the African policy agenda; and finally, to encourage insolvency policy makers and 
                                                          
636 Amar Bheenick, ‘Mauritius: Insolvency Bill’ (31 March 2009) <https://amarbheenick.blogspot.com/2009/03/> 
accessed 10 September 2018.  
637 Burdette, Corporate Insolvency Reform Experiences (n 630); ‘Rwanda Struggles On Insolvency Law’ 
AllAfrica.com (13 May 2012) <https://allafrica.com/stories/201205141215.html>; Juliana Taiwo-Obalonye,’World 
Bank top 10 ranking: Nigeria has exceeded target – Osinbajo’ The Sun (31 October 2017) 
<http://sunnewsonline.com/world-bank-top-10-ranking-nigeria-has-exceeded-target-osinbajo/>; Ludger 
Kasumun, ‘Tanzania: New Plan to Harmonise Bankruptcy Laws’ All Africa (8 March 2018) 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201803080456.html> ;  USAID, ‘Mozambique Reforms Business Insolvency Laws’ 
(n 635); Editorial, ‘Zim Open for Business: Govt abolishes Companies Act, says move to attract investors’ New 
Zimbabwe ( 18 May 2018)  <www.newzimbabwe.com/zimopenforbusinessgovtabolishescompanies-act-says-
move-to-attract-investors/> ;  ‘Ethiopia: Attorney General Tunes Six-Decade-Old Bankruptcy Law’ All Africa  (18 
December 2017) <http://allafrica.com/stories/201712190730.html> all accessed 10 September 2018. 
638 Nigeria and Mauritius are examples of such countries that have invested in such organisations. The Presidential 
Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC) was set up in July 2016 in Nigeria. The Mauritian government 
also has an ease of doing business department within its board of investment. 
639 Patel (n 12) 2. 
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professionals to establish an annual forum to stimulate discourse and learning across 
the region.’640   
The ART complements other global platforms for comparing performance in 
countries.641 While the DB project provides a basis for global comparison, the ART 
provides the necessary proximity among African countries for effective ‘shaming’ and 
peer pressure.642 By creating an avenue for African policymakers, judicial officers and 
insolvency practitioners to report on the progress of reform in their countries, the ART 
stimulates some healthy competition among stakeholders and encourages horizontal 
learning from countries that have implemented reform. For example, at the ART 
events, a country like Mauritius gets the chance to showcase its exceptional ranking 
on the DB report to other African countries, emphasising how that ranking has 
cemented its place as the investment gateway into Africa, and how commercial law 
reforms have influenced economic growth.643 This has in turn occasioned some 
horizontal learning. 644  
Because countries are encouraged to ‘show off’ the progress they have made, the ART 
leverages on the sense of competition among the states to persuade them to bring their 
laws and institutions in conformity with approved standards. By displaying the 
adoption of the global norms that they sanction by some African countries, global 
actors achieve the legitimation of these norms in Africa. Countries that have reformed 
their laws to conform to global standards can serve as success stories to other African 
states, thereby validating the claim that these norms are globally relevant. Also, while 
countries are not coerced to pursue a single standard, they are provided information 
                                                          
640 INSOL International <https://www.insol.org/ART/ > accessed 10 September 2018. 
641 For instance, the IMF Article IV Consultation, The World Bank Doing Business Project and the ROSC. See Ch 4, 
footnote 504. 
642 It is noted that the efficacy of this shaming and peer pressure is highly dependent on attendance at the event. 
But not mere attendance, attendance by the right people. 
643 African Development Bank, Mauritius 2009-2013 Country Strategy Paper-Draft (May 2009) available at 
<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Projecterations/Mauritius%2020092013%20Coun
try%20Strategy%20PaperDraft.pdf> accessed 10 September 2018. 
644 African countries like Malawi find these testimonials and Mauritius’ impressive rankings persuasive and now 
consider Mauritian Insolvency law a useful model for them.  ART 2015 (Restoring Financial Sector Stability and 
Promoting Growth: The role of insolvency regimes, South Africa) 30 – 33 




on guidelines, frameworks and standards created by global actors. Hints about what 
is desirable, and undesirable are dropped at this forum. 645 
Global actors all have factors that impede the adoption of the norms they offer.  For 
the powerful IFIs like the IMF and World Bank, their shortcoming also lies in their 
strength- their economic power and financial incentives which can earn them the 
resentment of national policymakers for interference in domestic law making. For 
other organisations like INSOL and the IBA, their strength lies in their technical 
expertise, but they often lack economic leverage.646 Consequently, global actors have 
had to choose whether to cooperate or compete in the harmonisation process.647 They 
often choose to cooperate, and this cooperation has been instrumental in the 
propagation of global norms in developing economies as illustrated by insolvency law 
reforms in Asia and now in Africa through the ART.  
 
5.3.3. Engagement with local practitioners and other stakeholder groups 
As we learn from comparing reforms in China, Indonesia and Korea, the level of 
intervention can make a difference in how reforms pan out. In Asia, the FAIR was 
complementary to direct intervention. While it is true that global actors have engaged 
directly with governments or used first order intermediaries in African countries, the 
ART remains the major move by global actors towards the deliberate propagation of 
insolvency norms in Africa. Indeed, such a forum can open up opportunities for more 
hands-on involvement of global actors in insolvency reform in individual countries. 
However, it generally operates at a safe distance, allowing countries to reform at their 
pace while nudging them towards ideal forms and standards. 
Practitioner groups form an important part of the strategy of global actors for 
propagation. In their work in African countries, they have given the credit to 
insolvency practitioners from Africa for taking matters into their hands and 
                                                          
645 For example, representatives of the UNCITRAL would weigh in on conversations about issues such as 
reciprocity requirements in cross border insolvency, engaging stakeholders on why this requirement is 
unnecessary if the model law is adopted.  Discussion at ART 2017 (attended by the researcher). 




demanding the attention of global actors as they press for reform.648 The regulation of 
insolvency profession is a recent development in many African countries. This is due 
to the lack of robust corporate insolvency law regimes.649 Nevertheless, some form of 
organisation among IPs is beginning to emerge and actors like INSOL have 
contributed to this. For example, INSOL integrated insolvency professionals’ 
associations in countries like Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa as member bodies.650 
These organisations provide a platform through which global actors can achieve 
reform goals in those countries. Members serve as second or third order 
intermediaries for global actors in insolvency reform.651  
Although dominated by practitioners, the ART makes a point of achieving varied 
representation from all stakeholder groups. As such, they organise an annual closed-
door meeting for high profile participants like judges, legislators, policymakers, 
lender groups and insolvency practitioners to deliberate on the direction of policy and 
reform in their different jurisdictions.  
This method of propagation carries its implications for the speed and trajectory of 
reform. For example, although the ART attracts a rich mix of stakeholders, there are 
limitations to its ability to engineer and supervise the settling of global norms. For 
one, consistent attendance by all relevant stakeholders from different countries is not 
guaranteed.652 Also, some stakeholder groups may be more committed to 
participating in the event than others. As stated above, practitioners are playing an 
important role in driving reform in many African countries and they are often well 
                                                          
648 Adam Harris, reporting in his capacity as president of INSOL said at the ART in 2011 ‘One lone question was 
raised …about why there was no attention given to Africa. Felix Addo of PwC in Ghana takes credit for putting 
his hand up. Since then, Africa has in fact become one of the focus points to which INSOL has turned its global 
attention. INSOL Africa Round Table (16-17 September 2011 Cape Town, South Africa) 
<www.insol.org/library/opendownload/369 >  accessed 10 September 2018 
649 Thus, reference to insolvency practitioners in this chapter and the next chapter loosely describes persons 
(usually lawyers and accountants) who are appointed to act as a liquidator, receivers, receiver managers or more 
recently a restructuring professional. 
650 Business Recovery and Insolvency Practitioners Association of Nigeria (BRIPAN), Ghana Association of 
Restructuring and Insolvency Advisors (GARIA) and South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners 
Association (SARIPA). 
651 Patel (n 12) 3; Insolvency reforms led in Nigeria and Ghana by BRIPAN and GARIPA respectively. 
652 Political instability and constant change of government with no continuity plan in place also poses a challenge 
to sustained deliberations and efforts by participants. For example, change of government in Nigeria has been 
identified as one of the factors that delayed insolvency law reform in Nigeria. Idigbe and Kalu, ‘Recent Strides’ (n 
74).   
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represented at the ART.653 However, the same cannot be said of lending groups and 
government officials from most countries.654  Wihlborg notes that, ‘insolvency touches 
on the very fundamentals of the political and economic system of the country; 
enforcement of an insolvency law can thus be problematic. Powerful domestic groups 
need to be convinced that the law does not threaten them.’655 Considering the degree 
of power that these stakeholders can wield in the reform process, their input in 
insolvency reform cannot be taken for granted. The non-participation of crucial 
stakeholders can heighten the operation of un-settling mechanisms like actor 
mismatch and diagnostic struggles.656 
Also, in the absence of sustained engagement with relevant stakeholders, there is a 
possibility that the efforts of global actors through forums like the ART do not coincide 
with (or have the intended impact on) ongoing reform or emerging restructuring 
practices in African countries. 
The experience documented regarding the evolution of insolvency law transnationally 
shows that expertise alone is not enough and must be combined with political 
authority. The UNCITRAL Model Law provides a lesson on why and how this is true. 
One of the factors reported to have set the law apart from earlier unsuccessful attempts 
to achieve similar and even less ambitious results was that national government 
officials and representatives worked with experts at the formative stage and at other 
stages of the reform.657 
While it is true that engagement with experts and practitioners can contribute to the 
reform process through the enrolment process,658 it is also true that not all experts 
have the power to enlist the help of politically relevant actors; and sometimes, global 
actors who are not fully apprised of local networks within a country can end up 
partnering with ‘experts’ who are not well positioned help them achieve their reform 
                                                          
653See Africa Round Table (Mauritius 2017 Delegate List) at 
<https://www.insol.org/_files/Africa%20Round%20Table/Mauritius%202017/Delegate%20Folder/Delegate%
20List%2031%20Oct.pdf>; <www.insol.org/Past-art-events/> (for previous years) accessed 10 September 2018. 
654 Ibid. 
655 Clas Wihlborg, ‘Institutional development in Africa: The case of insolvency law in Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa (eds), 
Reforming Africa’s Institutions: Ownership, Incentives, and Capabilities (United Nations University Press, 2003) 277. 
656 See Ch 4, section 4.4  
657 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 57. 
658 Ch 4, page 111. 
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aims. As noted in chapter four, global actors need intermediaries that possess three 
qualities- competencies, power and loyalty.659 In some developing economies, it can 
be a difficult task to find these qualities. While a few intermediaries may be eager for 
reform, there may be wide capacity gaps among stakeholders because of their distance 
to the global.660 Also, the few intermediaries with capacity for diagnosis and 
prescription may lack power, and those with power may not be loyal to global 
standards.   Thus, close engagement with different stakeholders at the local site may 
be necessary to access the needed quality of intermediaries.  
The engagement of practitioners and experts with the government is different across 
African juridcitions. For example, in Kenya’s insolvency law reform, the business 
community drove the reform and pushed hard to be heard by the government.  In 
contrast, the Mauritian government has been credited for driving reform and inviting 
contributions from the business community.661 The Mauritian bill is reported to have 
been developed with the widest possible participation with lawyers, accountants, 
bankers and other professionals.662 In other African countries where reforms that 
began many years ago have been slowed despite the efforts of local intermediaries, a 
lack of political backing and loyalty of powerful stakeholders have contributed to the 
slow pace of reform.663  
A case in point is Nigeria’s insolvency law reforms where the local intermediaries are 
mostly professionals (BRIPAN members). One of the reasons why the reforms failed 
to gain traction is the limit to the power of the intermediaries. During the empirical 
study, BRIPAN officials were unable to provide clear answers as to the progress of the 
Insolvency Bill.664  
‘Sometimes, it is ultimately a question of which vested interests has more influence 
or resources to move things along with the legislators’. 
                                                          
659 Carruthers and Halliday, ’Negotiating globalization’ (n 35) 530. 
660 ibid 552-576. 
661 Fancy Chepkemoi Too, A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Insolvency Laws: Which is the Best Option for 
Kenya?  (PhD thesis, NTU September 2015) 264. 
662 Bheenick (n 636).  
663 Burdette, ‘Corporate Insolvency Reform Experiences’ (n 630). 
664 Reform is now headed in a different direction as the insolvency law reform has been consolidated with 
company law reform. 
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However, even if it has little influence on legislative reform, the active participation 
of insolvency practitioners in forums like the ART can impact the practice of corporate 
insolvency, provided that they apply lessons from the forum to their work. By doing 
this, they act as third order intermediaries, passing on global norms to other 
practitioners, lenders and other stakeholders.   Part B of this chapter considers the 
evolution of insolvency law and practice across Africa and the connection with the 
global harmonisation process. These developments are considered in two sections- 
one looks at the changes in restructuring practice, highlighting a shift in the response 
of stakeholders to financial distress and the factors that have influenced this shift. The 




















THE EVOLUTION OF RESTRUCTURING PRACTICES AND INSOLVENCY 
LAW REFORM 
 
5.4. Developments in Restructuring. 
Most African countries can be rightly described as late-comers to the insolvency law 
reform table. In many jurisdictions, corporate insolvency law and practice is largely 
understood as a debt recovery process and thinly constituted by the winding up and 
receivership procedures.665 As African economies grow, these laws now struggle to 
meet the demands of current commercial realities.666 With increase in economic 
activities and foreign investment comes a growing need for supporting institutions 
including rehabilitative insolvency frameworks to cushion the effects of economic 
volatility on businesses. Huge commercial transactions can ordinarily involve 
complex financing and security arrangements. The novelty of such arrangements in 
the African market and the budding state of the institutions add an extra layer of 
complexity to these transactions. As participants in the Azura-Edo IPP deal reported, 
it ‘required an even more dizzying array of contractual innovation and project 
participants than is typical of emerging market IPPs’.667 There is a need for 
practitioners to build the capacity to deal with these transactions and for institutions 
to be better equipped to handle the resolution of financial distress. 
In Africa, governments and private stakeholders increasingly acknowledge the 
importance of sound insolvency practices, especially the rehabilitation of distressed 
but viable companies. Within the limited set of laws and outside the law, they are 
carving a space for the adoption of new strategies for debt resolution and 
restructuring. Some contributing factors are, the realisation that insolvency 
frameworks all over the world have become more forgiving and an understanding 
that more value may be preserved by restructuring rather than destructive recovery 
actions. The impact of both factors is heightened by increased collaborations among 
                                                          
665 Patel (n 12).  
666 ibid. 
667 Nigeria’s first independent power plant. IFC, Nigeria’s Electric Power Sector (Investing in Africa) 5 
<www.energynet.co.uk/webfm_send/1243 > accessed 10 September 2018. 
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practitioners transnationally and a need for restructuring arising from economic 
growth and volatility. Thus, beyond insolvency law reform, the impact of global 
norms of insolvency is also reflected in the informal restructuring practices of African 
countries. Again, practitioners (both local and foreign) stand out in their role as third 
order intermediaries for the propagation of these norms. 
5.4.1. Private workouts 
The insolvency laws of most African countries have only recently begun to 
accommodate corporate debt restructuring and other insolvency alternatives. 
However, private workouts are not an uncommon practice.668 
One of the factors contributing to this is the growing acknowledgment and use of 
alternatives to court-driven procedures, especially in commercial cases. In some 
countries, the law now demands an attempt at Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
before a dispute is brought before the court. In commercial courts in Uganda for 
instance, it is prescribed that commercial disputes are considered for suitability for 
ADR before litigation.669 Likewise, Kenyan, Nigerian and Zambian lawyers are 
encouraged to try ADR before filing any case.670 Mozambican insolvency law requires 
that consensual workouts be executed under the arbitration laws.671 
However, private workouts are mostly ad hoc, unilateral and only bound by the 
internal rules and procedures of each bank. In South Africa, workouts are often 
initiated by the banking sector, with officials on credit committees cooperating with 
the management of distressed companies to restructure its affairs.672 In Nigeria where 
commercial banks dominate the lending market, banks have been known to file 
                                                          
668 From the empirical study detailed in the next chapter, 15 out of 22 commercial banks in Nigeria (including the 
pan African banks), have set up departments that are dedicated to the restructuring of distressed loans. Creditors 
explore the option of restructuring before taking stricter measures against the debtor. 
669The Judicature Act, ss 26-32, 41 (Commercial Court Division) (Mediation) Rules, No. 55 of 2007. 
670 The Constitution of Kenya, Article 159 (2) (c); Order 3 R 2 of the Lagos State Civil Procedure Rules 2012; Order 
31 of the High Court Rule Zambia; Anthony Idigbe and Okorie Kalu, ‘Best practice and tailored reforms in African 
insolvency: lessons from INSOL’ ILO ( 14 December 2012). 
671 Though parties may still agree on other private arrangements for the restructuring of the debtor. See Arbitration 
Law nº 11/99 of 8 July. 
672 Hans Klopper, ‘South Africa’ (2017) 10 The Restructuring Review 319. 
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winding up actions only as a strategy to bring defaulting companies to the negotiating 
table.673  
In 2013, guidelines patterned after the INSOL Statement of Principles for a Global 
Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts were issued by the Mauritian Insolvency 
Service and endorsed by the Bank of Mauritius. It is not yet clear how well Mauritius’ 
guidelines are being used in practice,674 but as restructuring and insolvency receive 
more attention and other countries catch on, guidelines for multi creditor 
restructuring are likely to become part of the insolvency framework in African 
countries.  
5.4.2. Achieving corporate rescue with existing procedures. 
Until recently, corporate insolvency regimes in most African countries revolved 
around winding up proceedings and debt recovery.675 In common law jurisdictions 
like Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, Sierra Leone, receivership is a well-known debt 
recovery procedure.  Receivership allows a creditor or group of creditors with security 
over the company’s assets to appoint a receiver or receiver manager (RM) to take over 
the management of the company or its assets until the debt is realised.  As discussed 
in chapter one, in addition to realising the debt for her appointor, a receiver manager 
is also in the postion to manage and rescue the business of the distressed company.676 
The position of the receiver manager has however not had this effect. 677  Rather, it has 
come to acquire the reputation of a death sentence.678  This is because of the focus on 
the realisation of the assets of the appointing creditor(s), often to the detriment of the 
company’s already fragile health.  
                                                          
673 Ch 6, section 6.7. It is noted that courts in Africa can be slow and inefficient, and this factor contributes to the 
reluctance of commercial actors to get locked into litigation. 
674BLC Robert & Associates (Chambers and Practice Guide, Mauritius). 
<https://practiceguides.chambersandpartners.com/practiceguides/insolvency-2018/mauritius/31-consensual-
and-other-out-ofcourtworkouts-and-restructurings > accessed 10 September 2018; INSOL, Statetement of Principles. 
675 As Table 1.0 below shows, many countries have now adopted or are in the process of adopting rescue-oriented 
laws. 
676 Ghanaian Companies Code Act 179 of 1963, s 650; CAMA, s 389; Kenyan Companies Act Cap 486, s 341; Sierra 
Leonan Companies act 2009, s 330. 
677 Kwama (n 620). 
678 ‘Kenya’s Kiss of Death Receivership Laws to Be Reviewed’ Global Insolvency.com < 




The interviews in Nigeria revealed that every stage of the receivership procedure, 
including the appointment of the receiver, is potentially contentious.  
‘The moment we appoint a receiver, the customer rushes to court seeking an order 
to restrain the receiver from functioning. And once that happens your hands are 
tied, you sit in court while the debt piles up’.679  
Although the lenders in the interviews understood the distinction between the roles 
of a receiver and the receiver manager, they did not think that there was much 
difference in practice. They tended to consider both as recovery devices and struggled 
with the use of receiver management as a turnaround procedure. 
‘Receiver managers do not manage, most times they strip the company, sell the 
assets, get their commission and pay the bank. They interpret their role as recovery 
agents and nothing else’.680  
In more recent times, there is a move towards achieving corporate rescue particularly 
when large companies that are significant to the economy go into receivership.  In 
such cases, the stakeholders (often led by the government) seek to explore the 
corporate rescue potential of the receivership procedure, using it as a mechanism for 
coordinating the company’s creditors to resolve its difficulties. The appointment of a 
receiver manager over Nigeria’s Arik Air is a recent example of a rescue-orientated 
receivership. Arik Air, the airline that took over the ground facilities of the country’s 
first indigenous flag carrier, Nigeria Airways, became distressed as a result of a 
combination of massive financial debt burden, operational challenges and 
mismanagement.681 Owing millions of US dollars to a wide range of creditors 
including banks, foreign partners, regulators, employees and suppliers, it was taken 
over by creditors and put in receivership in February 2017. From the point of take-
over, it was clear that the appointment of a receiver manager was intended to be used 
                                                          
679 Lender 1 (empirical study). 
680 Lender 5 (empirical study). 
681Chinedu Eze, ‘FG Takes Over Troubled Arik, AMCON Says Airline Too Important To Fail’ This Day (10 February 
2017) 1 &10. 
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as a turnaround procedure, as liquidation was taken off the table.682 As part of these 
rescue efforts, a new team of aviation and finance experts was put in place to operate 
the company under the supervision of the receiver manager.683  
The approach to Arik’s financial distress sharply contrasts with the attitude 
surrounding the liquidation of Nigeria’s previous national carrier, Nigeria Airways, 
and Ghana’s flagship airline, Ghana Airways in 2004.684 These airlines suffered very 
similar challenges as Arik but ended up in liquidation at a time when the norm of 
corporate rescue was yet to break into the resolution of financial distress in African 
countries. Thirteen years after its liquidation and with the benefit of hindsight, 
stakeholders have expressed regret over the avoidable death of Nigeria Airways.685  
Similarly, in Kenya, while efforts were being made to reverse the ‘kiss of death’ effect 
of insolvency laws through new legislation, the practice of receivership has also 
reflected this new thinking, again in the case of large companies.686 Kenyan business, 
Uchumi Supermarkets was East Africa’s largest supermarket chain with branches all 
over East Africa before it ran into financial difficulties. The company had been in and 
out of distress since 2006 when it first went into receivership. With some state support, 
the banks have recently declared a readiness to turn around the company’s fate and 
ensure that it comes out of the receivership.687 In Uganda, The Steel Rolling Mills is 
currently in receivership but is due to receive support from the government to 
enhance the likelihood of a turnaround from the process.688  
Also, the arrangement and compromise procedure (an equivalent of the English 
scheme of arrangement) which features in the company legislation of common law 
                                                          
682 Nwafor Polycarp, ‘We are not Interested in Liquidating Arik Air- AMCON’ Vanguard News (27 February 2017) 
<www.google.com.ng/amp/www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/not-interested-liquidating-arik-air-amcon/amp/ 
> accessed 10 September 2018. 
683 Ibid. 
684 Franklin Cudjoe, ‘Ghana Airways, the grim reaper’ The Africa Report (9 September 2014) 
<www.theafricareport.com/Columns/ghana-airways-the-grim-reaper.html> accessed 10 September 2018. 
685 Abdullateef Aliyu, ’12 Years After Liquidation, Nigeria Airways Echoes’ Daily Trust (31 May 2016) < 
www.dailytrust.com.ng/12-years-after-liquidation-nigeria-airways-echoes.html > accessed 10 September 2018. 
686 Global Insolvency.com  (n 678). 
687  Michael Omondi, ‘Bankers agree to lift Uchumi from receivership’ Business Daily (28 January 2010) 
<www.businessdailyafrica.com/-/539552/851318/-/6b7h2n/- > accessed 10 September 2018. 
688 Editorial,‘ Why Steel Rolling Mills is a case both for and against a government bailout for distressed Ugandan 
businesses’ 256 Business News (10 November 2015) <https://256businessnews.com/why-srm-case-is-a-case-
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African countries is gradually being considered a viable option for distressed debt 
restructuring.689 For example, the recent restructuring of South Africa’s EDCON, the 
largest non-food retailer in Southern Africa was completed using the compromise 
procedure in 2017. The agreement was pre-negotiated by 80 per cent of the company’s 
secured creditors and thereafter, court sanction was used to bind other creditors. The 
use of the compromise procedure in this way was facilitated by the involvement of a 
London based law firm, which advised on the restructuring.690 In Kenya, the financial 
restructuring of the $2 billion indebtedness of Kenya Airways was recently completed 
using a scheme of arrangement under Kenyan Companies Act. The scheme was used 
to implement a debt equity swap that resulted in bank lenders converting their debt 
into 38.1 per cent equity ownership of the airways. 691 
These developments show that debt restructuring is becoming more prominent. 
However, it is difficult to make the most of the existing procedures because of negative 
connotations that attend them and or design challenges that make it more difficult to 
use them for financial restructuring of distressed companies.692 These cases are limited 
to companies large enough to attract the attention and support of the state. This leaves 
SMEs which form a large percentage of the total number of companies and make 
important contributions to the economy, without support.693 For smaller companies, 
rescue-oriented receiverships are either non-existent or few and far between.694 
                                                          
689 Dipo Okuribido (n 82) 26-29. 
690 IFLR Correspondent, ‘Edcon's landmark debt restructuring explained’ (22 March 2017) 
<www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/2017/iflr_edcon.pdf > accessed 10 September 2018. 
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on the transaction. 
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the application of the scheme to them. see ibid.  The next chapter also explores the challenges that practitioners in 
Nigeria have faced in implementing a rescue-oriented receivership. 
693 José Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, ‘Why SMEs are Key to Growth in Africa’ World Economic Forum (4 August 
2015) <www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/why-smes-are-key-to-growth-in-africa/ > accessed 10 September 
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694 In Kenya, out of about 50 companies that have been placed in receivership, only a handful have been fortunate 
to get a fresh start. Kwama (n 620). 
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Consequently, there remains a need for strong and effective restructuring 
frameworks.  
5.4.3. Government intervention 
Governments in Africa have begun to show more concern and intervention in the 
survival of companies in distress. As noted above, the appointment of receiver 
managers over distressed large companies is often backed by some government 
support. Government intervention has manifested in different forms, most 
remarkably bailouts and in some cases like Nigeria, the establishment of an asset 
management company to clean up the debt portfolio of commercial banks and resolve 
NPLs.695 The Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) was set up in 2010 
as a government-funded bad bank. In adverse economic conditions, AMCON has 
contributed to restructuring (particularly multi-creditor restructuring of large 
companies) in Nigeria.  AMCON’s portfolio reveals that it purchased more than 12,000 
loans from industries including aviation, gasoline marketing and manufacturing for 
about N1.8 trillion (USD 5 billion).696  The qualities that make it possible for AMCON 
to facilitate restructuring include government backing, special powers to obtain 
expedited judgments from the courts and funds to finance restructuring.697  
In Uganda, the government recently reserved $300 million for the bailout of distressed 
companies that are considered viable and capable of contributing to the economy.698 
In 2017, the Ghanaian government launched an initiative that identified about 100 
distressed but viable companies and earmarked them for government bailout.699 
Government intervention has also come in form of a strong influence on the decisions 
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of creditors regarding the fate of a distressed company. In May 2017, one of Nigeria’s 
top four telecommunications companies, Etisalat, narrowly escaped debt recovery 
action by its creditors due to government intervention.700  
Government intervention in the rescue of distressed companies is a welcome step that 
signals openness to a rescue culture by politically relevant stakeholders. Intervention 
of this nature can however not be a long-term solution. The establishment of a bad 
bank can provide some immediate relief but is only a temporary, ad hoc solution to 
corporate debt problems.701 A case in point is Nigeria’s AMCON, now caving under 
the weight of the debt it has acquired and struggling to find avenues for resolving 
NPLs.702   
Also, the overuse of bailouts poses its own risks to the economy. The arguments 
against a bailout culture range from the moral hazard that can result from the 
dependence of businesses on state rescue to an erosion of the nation’s resources and a 
lack of transparency in the selection and implementation of the bailout process.703 For 
African countries that are battling deep seated problems of corruption, economic 
instability, lack of corporate governance and poor accountability measures, these risks 
become even more palpable.704 In an increasingly competitive market, it will be a 
better use of government resources to provide an enabling environment by putting up 
solid rehabilitative frameworks for viable businesses while allowing the market to 
take care of moribund companies. 
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5.4.4. Distressed debt investment 
Distressed debt investment is gradually making its way into African countries and 
showing potential for growth as one of the mechanisms for corporate debt resolution 
on the continent. Investors, notably private equity funds from the US, the Middle East 
and China have shown some interest in exploring opportunities in Africa’s distressed 
debt.705 They aim to come in through a consensual process, as part of a formal 
insolvency process, troubled M&As, takeovers or a loan to own process. 706 The 
involvement of these actors offers an important element of a successful restructuring, 
new funds.707   In Nigeria, AMCON can also be considered to have cleared the path 
for a distressed debt market.708 Duet Private Equity recently partnered with AMCON 
to establish an investment fund in the Fast-Moving Consumer Goods sector. The fund 
is fully focused on turnaround and distressed situations in the sector, with the aim of 
funding additional capital and debt restructuring needs of selected companies.709 Duet 
has also made similar investments in Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire and Ethiopia.710 In May 
2017, Africa Special Opportunity in its first distressed private equity deal acquired 
OptiCo in South Africa, with the aim of turning around the business.711 Also, financial 
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711Africa Capital Digest, Wrap up of Africa’s Key Private Equity, Infrastructure and Venture Capital (May 29, 2017) 
<https://www.proshareng.com/news/PRIVATE%20EQUITY/WrapUp-of-Africa-s-Key-Private-Equity--
Infrastructure-and-Venture-Capital/35019 > accessed 10 September 2018. 
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institutions are now exploring the creation of private debt resolution vehicles to 
manage distressed loans and sell them off to investors willing to take up the risk.712 
The experience of Etisalat Nigeria in its ongoing restructuring illustrates the growth 
of DDI in Africa. In a process managed by Barclays Bank, a varied mix of investors 
ranging from indigenous companies in the telecommunication sector, investors from 
other parts of Africa, foreign companies in the sector and private equity firms from 
the US and the Middle East have made bids to purchase the distressed company.713   
The availability of DDI holds potential benefits for the rescue of distressed companies 
in Africa as it indicates that rescue finance, an important element of corporate rescue 
is coming into place as insolvency reform is ongoing. For distressed debt investment 
to flourish however, it is important that frameworks and supporting institutions for 
resolving corporate distress are clear and effective. This allows investors estimate the 
risks they are undertaking, and devise exit strategies with more certainty.  
Overall, these developments indicate a growing sophistication in the response to 
financial distress. They also emphasise a need for insolvency law reforms to provide 
appropriate frameworks that complement the efforts of commercial actors. It is against 
this background that the next section considers recent corporate insolvency and 
restructuring law reforms across Africa.  
                                                          
712 Ecobank Transnational Incorporated, the parent company of a pan African bank recently adopted this approach. 
The company set up the first private sector funded debt resolution vehicle in Nigeria to resolve some of Ecobank 
Nigeria’s challenged assets. Nkiruka Nnorom, ‘ETI loses N52.6bn after Tax on Full Impairment Charge Adoption’ 
Vanguard (18 April 2017) <www.vanguardngr.com/2017/04/eti-loses-n52-6bn-tax-full-impairment-charge-
adoption/amp/ > accessed 10 September 2018. 
713Globacom Nigeria Limited, Nigeria’s second largest network; India’s Bharti Airtel, operating as Airtel in Nigeria; 
Dangote Group’s telecoms business unit, Alheri Engineering Limited, which has the backing of U.S.-based 
Blackstone Group with an investment portfolio of $378 billion and a Nigerian subsidiary called the Black Rhino 
Group; Smile Telecoms Holdings, a South African telecommunications group with subsidiaries in Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Uganda; and Helios Towers, Centricus Capital and Africell, a subsidiary of the Lebanon-based Lintel 
Group of Companies, with cellular communications operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), The 
Gambia, Sierra Leone and Uganda; Dubai-based Abraaj Capital, a private equity firm with an investment portfolio 
of $11 billion; Teleology Holdings Limited, a special purpose vehicle led by a former chief executive of MTN 
Nigeria, Mr. Adian Wood, and Ericsson; Africa Capital Alliance (ACA), a leading pan-African investment firm 
based in Lagos; and The Carlyle Group, a U.S.-based multinational private equity, alternative asset management 
and financial services corporation are all in the running to take over the company. Emma Okonji, ‘Glo, Airtel, 
Dangote, Seven Others Advance to Final Stage in 9mobile Bid’ This Day (20 November 2017) 1. 
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5.5. Insolvency law reforms in selected African countries. 
Table 1. 
S/N Country Previous 
insolvency 
law 
State of reform Reform agenda UNCITRAL 
cross-border 
legislation 
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714 See ART 2014 (Jobs in Africa: How insolvency regimes impact economic growth, Uganda) 21 
<https://www.insol.org/_files/Africa%20Round%20Table/Kampala%202014/V3%20FINAL%20Africa%20Rou
ndtable%202014%20delegate%20folder%208%20Oct.pdf > accessed 10 September 2018. 
715 ART 2017 (Plugging the Implementation Gap, Mauritius) 1 
<www.insol.org/_files/Africa%20Round%20Table/Mauritius%202017/Delegate%20Folder/Peer%20to%20Peer
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716 World Bank Doing Business, Djibouti Country Report. 
<www.doingbusiness.org/Reforms/Overview/Economy/djibouti>  accessed 10 September 2018. 
717 ART 2015(n 644) 29; Haimanot Ashenafi, ‘Ethiopia: Attorney General Tunes Six-Decade-Old Bankruptcy Law’ 
AllAfrica (18 December 2017) <https://allafrica.com/stories/201712190730.html > accessed 10 September 2018. 
718 ART 2015 (n 644) 29-30; Emmanuel Bruce, ‘Insolvency, Companies bills to be laid before Parliament’ Graphic 
Online (5 September 2017) <www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/insolvency-companies-bills-to-be-
laid-before-parliament.html> accessed 10 September 2018. 
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719 Kenya Insolvency Act 2015. 
720 ART 2016 (Freedom to Fail? Insolvency for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, Ghana) 26- 27 
<www.insol.org/_files/Africa%20Round%20Table/Ghana%202016/ART%202016%20print%20numbered.pdf > 
accessed 10 September 2018; In 2014, the government of Lesotho released a call for curriculum vitae for advisors 
in the review process. See Government of Lesotho, ‘Private sector competitiveness and economic diversification 
project individual consultancy services request for curriculum vitae for a technical advisor for review and drafting 
of insolvency law and regulations’ Mail&Guardian (3 September 2018) <https://mg.co.za/notice/2014-02-21-
government-of-lesotho-gol > accessed 10 September 2018. 
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721 ART 2016 (n 720) 27; Morrison O.g Sayon,’ Liberia: Cllr. Barbu Wants Timely Passage of Insolvency Law’ All 
Africa.com (4 June 2014) <https://allafrica.com/stories/201406050716.html> accessed 10 September 2018. 
722 ART 2015 (n 644) 30-33; Marek Dubovec and Cyprian Kambili, ‘Secured Transactions Law Reform in Malawi: 
the 2013 Personal Property Security Act’ in Louise Gullifer and Orkun Akseli (eds.), Secured Transactions Law 
Reform: Principles, Policies and Practice (Bloomsbury Publishing 2016) 201-202. 
723 BLC Roberts, ’Guide to law types in Mauritius’ BLC Roberts & Associates ALN (31 May 2017) 
<http://www.blc.mu/blc.mu1/view_news.php?id=25> accessed 10 September 2018. Recall from earlier 
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724ART 2016 (n 720) 23-24; Fabrícia de Almedia Henriques, ‘The new insolvency paradigm in Mozambique’ 
Emerging Markets Africa (2015) 26. 
725 ART 2016 (n 720) 30 – 31. 
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726 LawPavilion, ‘The Proposed Companies and Allied Matters Act 2018: What’s New?’ 
<https://lawpavilion.com/blog/companies-and-allied-matters-act-2018-whats-new/ > accessed 10 September 
2018. 
727 ART 2016 (n 720) 33-34; Louis Degos, James Green, Dara Akchoti, ‘A New OHADA Uniform Act on Insolvency 
and Restructuring in Africa’ K&L Gates (27 October 2015) <www.klgates.com/ohada_uniform_act-10-27-2015/> 
accessed 10 September 2018. OHADA includes sixteen countries; Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Mali, 

















2015 by Law 











































                                                          
728 ART 2015 (n 644) 39-40.  
729 ART 2017 (n 715) 7-8, Seychelles Insolvency Act 2018. 
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730 ART 2014 (n 714) 23-25. 
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732 ibid 27-28. 
733  ART 2015 (n 644) 42-43. 
























5.6. Key features of reform 
It is unclear to what extent consultations with relevant stakeholders or their 
representatives preceded all the reforms.736 In Zimbabwe for example, participation 
in the public hearings was limited because the Insolvency Bill was technical and 
voluminous, and copies had not been made available well ahead of the public hearings 
to allow adequate analysis. As such, most of the participants’ contributions focused 
on the prioritisation of the payment of workers over other creditors.737 This suggests 
an imbalance in the participation of other stakeholder groups in the hearings. One of 
the risks of this is that alienated stakeholders would foil the implementation of the 
law. Indeed, some countries like South Africa have reported public hearings in line 
with the prescriptions for legislative processes.738  
                                                          
735 ART 2017 (n 715) 15-16; For download, see 
<http://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/insolvency%20act%20clean.pdf> accessed 10 September 
2018. 
736 Detailed reports of the consultation process have not been made readily available in many of the jurisdictions. 
Transparency and rigorous debate in law making process is still developing in African countries. Burdette points 
out that defective consultation with relevant stakeholders is a problem and it contributed along with other factors, 
to the shortcomings of the South African insolvency reform, particularly the business rescue provisions. Burdette, 
‘Corporate Insolvency Reform Experiences’ (n 630).  
737 Others centred on personal bankruptcy. See Portfolio Committee on Justice Report on Insolvency Bill (6 March 




&usg=AOvVaw1AQzEpytsr3IrLNNm2A8oV > accessed 10 September 2018. 
738 For example, The Namibia Law Reform Commission have provided accessible reports of the reform process. 
Namibia Law Reform Commission (n 632). Also, South Africa Law Reform Commission reports that part of the 
insolvency reform process received contributions from a range of stakeholders including banks, insolvency 
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Because some of these laws are still in the process of enactment and most of the ones 
that have been passed into law are not fully implemented, information on their use 
and impact on the resolution of financial distress is limited. Nonetheless, a few things 
stand out from the trend of reform.  
 
5.6.1. The drive to modernise by conforming to global standards. 
One quality that these laws have in common is an attempt to modernise current 
insolvency regimes in line with international best practices. This is most prominently 
seen through the introduction of corporate rescue frameworks, exact replicas or 
variants of administration, Chapter 11 procedures and French law (in OHADA 
countries).739   
5.6.2. Lingering impact of historical (colonial) ties on reform. 
Although they are united in the desire to meet global standards, African countries 
have sought to achieve this in a variety of ways, drawing inspiration from a mix of 
jurisdictions.740 External influence in the ordering of laws and legal institutions has for 
a long time been informed by historical connections such as colonisation. For example, 
the Uniform Act in OHADA countries (most of which are former French colonies) 
draws heavily from French law.  Similarly, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and other 
former colonies of Britain have been known to habitually transplant British laws and 
institutions,741 hardly subjecting the assumption that English laws and institutions are 
                                                          
practitioners and judicial officers. See South African Law Reform Commission, ‘Reports on the Review of the Law 
of Insolvency’ (2000) 12, 33.  But Loubser points out that compared to the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which was the 
result of a detailed report that explained every single proposed provision, the Companies Act 2008 containing the 
Business Rescue proceedings was introduced into Parliament only 16 months after the publication of the first draft 
Bill and was approved barely five months later. Anneli Loubser, Some comparative aspects of corporate rescue in South 
African company law (PhD thesis, University of South Africa 2010); Uganda Law Reform Commission, (Report on 
Insolvency Law Reform 
<http://www.ulrc.go.ug/system/files_force/ulrc_resources/Insolvency%20Law%20%20body_0.pdf?download
=1 > accessed 10 September 2018. 
739The laws also attempt to introduce some form of regulation of insolvency practitioners and provide for cross 
border insolvency. 
740 This is understandable as the continent is home to a diverse group of countries with varying legal histories, 
cultures and influences. The near impossibility of achieving convergence within Africa illustrates how difficult it 
is to achieve convergence on a global scale.  
741 Robert Seidman, ‘Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking, Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
(1966) Wis. L. Rev. 999, 1018; Sandra Fullerton Joireman, ‘Inherited legal systems and effective rule of law: Africa 
and the colonial legacy’ (2001) 39 (4) The Journal of Modern African Studies 571-596. Going by proposed insolvency 
law reform, Nigeria is still set on this path. For a criticism, see Bolanle Adebola, ‘Conflated Arrangements: A 
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the best fit for them to rigorous questioning.742 Lawmakers in these countries are not 
compelled to follow the laws of England but tend to do so out of convenience or 
familiarity, a tendency that may be explained by path dependence.743  In the empirical 
study, when asked about the choice of English law, BRIPAN participants 
acknowledged that the proposed Nigerian insolvency bill replicates the English 
Insolvency Act. They disclosed that this was because the reform committee members 
were more ‘comfortable with English law’. Attempts to familiarise the committee with 
other frameworks like the US Chapter 11 reorganisation and the South African system 
that combines elements of the US and UK systems proved abortive.   
‘They just did not understand it, so we gave up’. 
As the discussion in the previous chapter suggests, the drive towards global 
convergence has not displaced the competition among developed countries to have 
their laws and institutions used as models by many jurisdictions.744 Thus, the adoption 
of English frameworks can reinforce the popularity of English law as the governing 
law for commercial agreements, which in turn contributes to the continued relevance 
of England and its legal systems in both domestic and cross border commercial 
transactions. 
The Liberian law (which generally oprates an Anglo-American legal system) bears the 
closest resemblance to US Chapter 11, but has commendably adopted a simple, 
straightforward language and style in its adaptation of Chapter 11. 
Reforms in Africa continue the tradition of popularising a group of templates: US, UK, 
France and to some extent Portugal. However, this trend does not defeat the building 
of a TLO in insolvency law, as there is no single model law for domestic insolvency. 
Indeed, it serves the globalisation agenda less well for developing countries to strictly 
adhere to suggestions by law and development scholars for the local adaptation of 
                                                          
Comment on the Company Voluntary Arrangements in the Proposed Nigerian Insolvency Act 2014’ (2015) 1 
Available at SSRN 2565491.  
742 One of the lessons from the theory is that incremental rather than widely divergent change is a better option for 
insolvency reforms in African countries. Thus, this may not necessarily be a negative trend provided some effort 
at local adaptation is made.  Ch 4, section 4.7.  
743 Prado and Trebilcock (n 525); Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, ‘Economic Development’ (n 452) 165-195. 
744 See Ch 4, 102-104 
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global norms, which may result in extensive changes to those norms. Such variations 
would create more divergence and deviation from a known set of ideal forms in the 
harmonisation trend.  
5.6.3. Reference to global standards and guidelines 
Although local practitioners and actors in the reform process have demonstrated an 
awareness of global norms like the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, it is not clear that 
the recommendations of the UNCITRAL Guide have impacted reforms 
significantly.745 Most of the reforms have involved varying degrees of transplant from 
developed countries with which African countries share some connection. This is 
likely based on an assumption that developed jurisdictions have incorporated 
international best practices into their laws, thereby providing ready-made templates 
and a shortcut to incorporating global standards.   
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide offers alternative ways of incorporating insolvency 
norms into legislation and this can be of benefit to developing countries seeking to 
adopt these norms in a way that is compatible with their institutions.746 It is likely that 
insolvency reforms in Africa have failed to harness this benefit.  This trend also 
challenges the postulation that the US enjoys the privilege of globalised localism in 
insolvency law as most countries continue to favour the law of countries to which they 
are accustomed. However, as discussed shortly, the influence of the activities of global 
actors like the World Bank Doing Business projects, and by extension elements of US 
reorganisation law can be seen in the choices made by some countries.  
5.6.4. Other issues thrown up by countries’ template choices 
Notwithstandng that many countries remain true to the conventional tendencies in 
their choice of templates,747  the proliferation of global norms opens African countries 
up to new forms of influence.  For example, Malawi’s 2015 Insolvency Law is largely 
based on the English administration procedure but deviates from the English Act by 
                                                          
745 For example, reform in Ethiopia is said to be based on the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. Also, Law Reform 
Commissions refer to the UNCITRAL Guide. See for example, Namibia Law Reform Commission (n 632) 83-84, 
91. 
746 Note however that the Guide goes further to recommend a preferred approach. Ch 4, 104. 
747 Nigeria, Kenya, Cape Verde and Mozambique are examples. 
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introducing provisions for post commencement finance.748  Reform in Mozambique 
made the choice of transplanting the Brazilian Insolvency Act 2005.749 Although 
Mozambique and Brazil have a shared colonial history and language that explain this 
choice, the reform can engender the kind of horizontal learning advocated for 
developing economies in chapter four.750  A similar horizontal learning can be seen in 
Zambia and Zimbabwe’s choice of South African law as template.751 
As African countries navigate insolvency law reform, they are confronted with legal 
systems with which they are familiar on the one hand; and norms that have gained 
popularity as the global standards against which economies are measured, on the 
other hand.  The effect of these new influences can either present an opportunity or be 
problematic. For one, it can aggravate the un-settling mechanisms discussed in 
chapter four. With global norms (represented most prominently by US reorganisation 
law) competing with conventional templates in African countries, there are increased 
chances of contradictions among stakeholders.   The influence of US law is manifest 
in the terminology of new laws which mostly adopt the use of ‘reorganisation’ even 
while describing a UK administration procedure.752  This is likely connected to the 
reach of platforms such as the Doing Business projects. Beyond terminology, the 
tensions also manifest in reforms that aim to adapt both US and UK law, by combining 
elements of a DIP and PIP system. 753  
Stakeholders in Nigeria have debated the form corporate rescue mechanisms should 
take in the country. While certain groups believed that a US-inspired, DIP 
reorganisation framework is more suitable, others are convinced that a UK style 
creditor-oriented framework is a better fit.754 While English Law seems to have 
                                                          
748 A former British colony, Malawi’s law is said to draw from the laws of Mauritius which in turn draws largely 
from New Zealand. See Dubovec and Kambili (n 722) 202. 
749 Fabrícia de Almedia Henriques (n 724) 26 The Brazilian Insolvency is based on the US Chapter 11 procedure 
which has been adapted to facilitate expedited restructuring in Brazil. Olivares-Caminal and Frigerio, ‘Expedited 
Debt Restructuring in Latin America; a Regional Overview’ (2010) IDB Working Paper Series, No 113. 
750 Ch 4, section 4.7. David Trubek, ‘Scan Globally, Reinvent Locally: Can We Overcome the Barriers to Using the 
Horizontal Learning Method in Law and Development?’ (2014) 258.  
751 See Table 2 below. 
752 For example, Malawi and Seychelles. See Table 2. 
753 Liberia’s 2016 law is an example of an insolvency law that adopts a hybrid system, a reorganisation procedure 
with the debtor-in-possession supervised by an administrator. S 8.24 (3) Insolvency and Restructuring Act 2016. 
754 Adebola, Corporate rescue (n 43) 332. Admittedly, this struggle is not peculiar to Nigeria or even developing 
countries. A similar conversation has been debated in the UK. See Insolvency Service, ‘A review of the Corporate 
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emerged victorious in this contest, the fact that there was a debate at all may indicate 
that global norms may be inspiring change in previously uncontested areas. The 
incorporation of different frameworks may be a manifestation of unresolved conflicts 
among stakeholders.  As the contradiction mechanism identified by Halliday and 
Carruthers suggests, policymakers may avoid resolving this conflict by internalising 
them in formal law in a bid to pacify different interests.755 Reforms in Africa remain 
largely untested but inherent inconsistencies in the laws could result in vagueness, 
creative application or disuse ultimately.   
On the positive side, the combination of different systems may not always result in a 
contradiction or be the result of unresolved conflicts among stakeholders. Rather, it 
may be a genuine attempt to produce a superior legislation that combines effective 
tools from different jurisdictions.756  
5.6.5. Unified or Dualistic Insolvency systems 
The reforms have taken different forms in terms of structure and form of legislation. 
As Keay points out, choosing between a unified or dualistic system is a key decision 
with implications for implementation.757  Some of the advantages in having a unified 
insolvency legislation include cost savings, harmony and efficiency, while the major 
disadvantage is lack of clarity.758 As Table 1 shows, some of the insolvency legislations 
combine personal and corporate insolvency759 or a standalone act that regulates 
corporate insolvency,760 while a few countries have included restructuring 
frameworks in their companies Act.761 Countries have different reasons for making 
                                                          
Insolvency Framework’ (25 May 2016) <www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-review-of-the-corporate-
insolvency-framework> accessed 10 September 2018. 
755 Halliday and Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law’ (n 16) 1149- 1150. 
756As discussed in chapter three, the power-sharing arrangement between debtor management and an 
administrator has been adopted in some developed jurisdictions in a bid to achieve a better balance between two 
systems. For example, Canada under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, sections 11.7 & 23.  
757 A dualistic system has different legislations for companies and individuals while a unified system has different 
procedures for individuals and companies in one statue (or procedures that largely applies to both personal and 
corporates in one statute). Andrew Keay, ‘To unify or not to unify insolvency legislation: International experience 
and the latest South African proposals (1999) 32 De Jure 64-65. 
758 ibid 71-74. 
759 Kenya, Seychelles, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Malawi, Mauritius and OHADA have unified insolvency acts 
that separate the procedures for individual and corporate insolvency in one legislation. Liberia and Mozambique 
and OHADA have unified personal and insolvency such that same procedures can apply to both.  
760 Zambia has a corporate insolvency Act. 
761 South Africa, Tanzania and proposed in Nigeria.  
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the choices that they did. For example, Nigeria like South Africa, started out with a 
standalone corporate insolvency bill but has now gone in the direction of 
incorporating the administration and CVA procedures as part of ongoing company 
law reform.762 The difficulty with this choice is that important issues in insolvency 
such as regulation of practitioners and directors’ liability are not fully resolved by the 
law.  For South Africa, the decision to separate the rescue procedures (contrary to 
proposals for unification) 763 has been attributed to an intention to separate the 
procedure from the negative connotation that often attends insolvency.764 To 
contribute to the shift in orientation and attitude, it was thought important that the 
rescue process was not associated with the term ’insolvency’.765   
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762 Contributing factors such as low political support for insolvency reform and conflict among stakeholders are 
discussed in the next chapter. Ch 6, section 6.12.1. 
763 Proposals for unification drafted by Professor of Law, David Burdette. See David Burdette, ‘Final Report 
Containing Proposals on a Unified Insolvency Act: Part 1 Final Report and Explanatory Memorandum’ (The 
University of Pretoria, Faculty of Law, Centre for advanced Corporate and Insolvency Law 2000).  
764 View of local stakeholders in empirical research by Wanya Du Preez, ‘The status of post-commencement finance 
for business rescue in South Africa’ (Phd thesis, University of Pretoria 2012) 115. 
765 Ibid. 
766 Note that the procedures identified here are in addition to existing procedures such as arrangements and 
compromise, receivership, administrative receivership that already existed in these countries. These are not 
included, neither are liquidation proceedings. 
767 Like in England, a Qualifying Floating Charge Holder can commence in special cases. Kenyan Insolvency Act 
(Kenyan Act), s 534 cf section 14 Sch B1 Insolvency Act 1986 
768 Plan may include a CVA or Scheme of arrangement. Kenyan Act, s 566(3).  See also Kenyan Insolvency 
regulations 2016, s 110-127. 
769 In some cases, PIP may dispense with need for creditors’ approval (deemed consent): if all creditors can be paid 
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770 Supported with provisions for adequate protection of crammed down creditors’ rights. 
771 Approximately USD10million. The law leaves room for regulations to prescribe more eligibility requirements. 
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774 See Rita Donato (Couto, Graca e Associados Limitada), Mozambique – Law and Practice’ Chambers Global 
Practice Guide (Chambers and Partners 2016). 
775 This illustrates the lack of clarity that can arise from combining personal bankruptcy procedures with 
corporate framworks. See Keay,’To Unify or Not’ (n 757) 72-73. 
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the plan; approval of 
the plan is received 
from two classes of 
creditors or, if there 
are only two classes 
of creditors, approval 
being received from 
at least one of them; 
and 
in respect of any class 
that rejected the plan, 
an affirmative vote of 
more than one third 
of the creditors 





found guilty of 
fraud or 
mismanagement 
of company).  
 
Rescue to be 














Debtor can initiate by 




to be approved by 
creditors and then 









Threshold is creditors 
which represent more 
than 3/5 of the total 
value of the credits in 
each voting class. 
Moratorium 
No moratorium. 
The procedure is a 
mediation 
procedure 
governed by rules 
of the arbitration, 
mediation and 







may be appointed 
to help with the 
implementation of 
the plan. 
No provision but 
parties may agree 




process) Art 2  
 
Who 
Debtor alone or 
jointly with 
creditor(s). Art 5 
Restructuring plan 






















difficulties, which are 
proved or 
predictable, but not 
yet insolvent. Art5.1 
Objective is to reach 
agreement with 
creditors. Conciliator 






















In the event of 
asset 
sale/liquidation, 







Debtor alone or 
jointly with 




financial or serious 
economic problems, 
but not insolvent. Art 
6 
Aims to restructure 
the company. 
Proposed 
arrangement to be 
drafted by debtor and 
agreed by company 
and its creditors 
under supervision of 




required. To stipulate 
specific measures for 
the restructuring. 
Court decides if to 
approve preventive 
arrangement or not. 
Art 7-8 
 
Creditors to agree on 
settlement but court 
has ultimate power to 
sanction. Art 15(2) 
Moratorium 
Stay on all 
enforcement 
actions for 
duration. Art 9 
 
Control 




Provides for post 
commencement 
finance. 














Debtor or creditor 
can initiate subject to 




Cash flow insolvency 
required. Art 28 
Restructuring plan 
Proposal drafted by 
debtor to indicate 
reorganization 




financing resources & 




The majority in 
number of unsecured 
Moratorium 






creditors. Art 75 
 
Control 
Supervised DIP:  




Provides for post 
commencement 
finance. 











Art 33-1, 166,167. 
                                                          
776 Note that Article 145 provides for a simplified reorganisation which is mostly centred on debt reduction and is 









but rights may be 







supervision of a 
court appointed 







(preceded by a 
provisional 
administration 
which results in 









The company is or 
will be unable to pay 
its debts. Art 40 
Restructuring plan 
Proposals to be made 
by provisional 
administrator may 
include deed of 
administration for 
company to reach a 
settlement with 
creditors. Art 49 
 
Deed of 
administration to be 
executed by company 
and proposed 
administrator.  
 to specify among 
other things, property 
to be affected and 
extent to which 
company would be 
relieved from debt. 
Art 52&53 
 
Creditors meeting to 

















who can exercise 
all powers of 
directors and 
must approve all 
acts of directors. 
Art 63&65 
PCF 







The creditors, debtor, 
directors and 









administrator. Art 85. 
 
Voting 
75 per cent of votes 
by creditors or a class 
of creditors affected 
by the proposed 
reorganisation.  
No cram down except 
resolution stipulates 




creditors can seek 







control. Art 89 
Provides for post 
commencement 
finance. Art 94 
 
PCF must be 
approved by 
majority vote of 
creditors or any 







                                                          
777 No express requirement of insolvency. 
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security may be 







The debtor (directors) 
and creditors. s206 
 
When 
Company is insolvent 
or likely to be 
insolvent.778 
Restructuring plan 
Creditors to decide if 
to execute rescue 
plan.  
 




A majority in number 
representing 75 per 
cent in value of the 
creditors of creditors 












allowed to remain 
but powers very 
limited as they are 
to seek written 
permission of 
administrator for 
all acts as officer 
of the company. 
s216 
PCF 









New finance may 
be secured using 
only 
unencumbered 
assets. S 215 





resolution or affected 












Business rescue plan 
to be proposed by 
administrator. Plan to 
include details of 
assets, changes to 
rights and obligations 
and projected three 
years financial 





a) supported by 
holders of more 75 
per cent of the 
affected persons’ 
voting interests; and 
(b) include at least 
fifty percent of the 
independent 
creditors’ voting 
interests, if any. 
S152(2) 
Moratorium 





Directors are not 






approval of all 
acts of directors 
and removal if 
needed. S137(2) 
PCF 








rescue. To have 





New finance can 
be secured with 
unencumbered 




Tanzania Administration Who Restructuring plan 







                                                          
778 Defined as inability to pay debt as they become due, s204. 
779 Includes a regulator, shareholder, member, director, creditor or an employee, a former employee of a company, 




and debtors can 











PIP proposal to be 
sanctioned by 
Creditors. s 262 
 
No provision for 
cram down. 
 











PIP appointed by 
court, company or 
QFCH 
PCF even though 
administrator has 
general powers 





property of the 
company’.            














No requirement of 
illiquidity 
Restructuring plan 
Proposed plan may 
include composition 
of debts or a scheme. 
s240 
  
Plan to be sanctioned 




No voting classes or 
threshold prescribed. 
Moratorium 

















s243(4)   







(preceded by a 
provisional 
administration 
which results in 
the execution of 







The company is or 
will be unable to pay 
its debts. S138(2) 
Restructuring plan 
Proposals to be made 
by provisional 
administrator may 
include deed of 
administration for 





administration to be 
executed by company 
and proposed 
administrator.  
 to specify among 
other things, property 
to be affected and 
extent to which 
company would be 
relieved from debt. 
s148 
 
Creditors meeting to 





place. S142 (f). 
But secured 
creditors only 
bound if deed 
affects them and 
they vote in 







who can exercise 
all powers of 
directors and 
must approve all 
acts of directors. 
s153&155 
PCF 







Each creditor entitled 
to cast number of 
votes proportionate 
to the value their debt 
bears to the aggregate 
of total debt, OR if 
there is more than 
one class of creditors, 
to the aggregate of 
the debts owing to all 
creditors of the class 
to which that creditor 
belongs. A resolution 
is adopted if it is 
approved by a 
majority of the votes 
cast. s147, Third 
schedule s4. 
Zambia  Business rescue 
proceedings 
Who 
Members by special 
resolution or affected 






prospects of rescue. S 
21 
Restructuring plan 
Business rescue plan 
to be proposed by 
business rescue 
administrator. Plan to 
include details of 
assets, changes to 
rights and obligations 
and projected three 
years financial 




Threshold is holders 
of more 75 per cent of 
the affected persons’ 
voting interests; and 
(b) include at least 
fifty percent of the 
independent 
creditors’ voting 
interests, if any. 
S43(2)(a)(b) 
Moratorium  









full control over 
company 
including 
approval of all 
acts of directors 
and removal if 
needed. s32 (1) 
(1), 29(2). 
PCF 









rescue. To have 




costs are paid). 
s27(1) 
 
New finance can 
be secured with 
unencumbered 
assets and have 
priority over 
unsecured assets 






resolution or affected 





Business rescue plan 
to be proposed by 
business rescue 
administrator. Plan to 
include details of 
assets, changes to 
Moratorium  












                                                          
780 Includes a regulator, shareholder, member, director, creditor or an employee, a former employee of a company, 
registered trade union representing employees of the company and the Registrar. Corporate Insolvency Act, s2. 
781 Includes a shareholder, creditor, any registered trade union representing employees of the company, or 





prospects of rescue. S 
122(1), 121(f) 
rights and obligations 
and projected three 
years financial 




Threshold is holders 
of more 75 per cent of 
the affected persons’ 
voting interests; and 
(b) include at least 
fifty percent of the 
independent 
creditors’ voting 
interests, if any. 
S144(2)(a)(b) 
 










rescue. To have 




costs are paid).  
 
New finance can 
be secured with 
unencumbered 





5.7.1. Commencement  
As discussed in chapter three, the question of when a restructuring may be 
commenced is crucial. Most of the laws require illiquidity or prospective illiquidity as 
a condition for commencement.782 These laws find a balance between the complexity 
of a balance sheet test and the indeterminacy of not laying down criteria for 
commencement, by settling for a cash flow test.783 For a few jurisdictions however, 
preventive mechanisms that do not require insolvency to trigger them are also 
introduced.784  
5.7.2. Control  
In terms of control, the laws are divided along the lines of PIP systems and a hybrid 
(supervised DIP) procedure. None of the laws considered here have adopted a full 
DIP system as obtains under the Chapter 11 procedure.785 Upon closer look at 
jurisdictions that have adopted a hybrid system, the supervising professional has 
effective control of the company even though directors remain in office. This is 
                                                          
782 The laws adopt different terms in prescribing this. In Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa for example, the 
criterion for commencement is stated to be ‘financial distress with reasonable prospects of rescue’. 
783 As discussed in chapter three, a cash flow test is preferable in the context of debt restructuring.  Ch 3, page 74. 
784 the CVA procedures introduced in Kenya and Tanzania to supplement the administration procedure do not 
have an insolvency requirement; also, the OHADA conciliation and preventive settlement procedures do not 
require insolvency (but that company be experiencing difficulties). 
785 Including reorganisation procedure in Liberia modelled after the Chapter 11 procedure. 
181 
 
because many of them require the approval of the professional for directors to act in 
their capacity as officers of the company.786 The overall implication of the hybrid 
system may be that debtors do not resist the restructuring procedure with as much 
force as they would a procedure that fully displaces them.787 
 This is useful in African countries where family-owned businesses are rife, and 
owner-managers can be territorial.788 Also, the hybrid system can substantiate the 
claim (especially to debtors) that the newly introduced procedures are indeed 
different from recovery-based practices that dominated insolvency practice prior to 
reform.  Keeping the directors in place may drive home the point that the philosophy 
behind the new procedures is to keep the company alive. Some of the laws also aim to 
address the concern about keeping managers who may have caused the downfall of 
the company in the first place. For example, Mozambican law only allows a DIP 
restructuring when directors have not mismanaged the company or been 
fraudulent.789 
5.7.3. Decision making 
Table 2 shows that decision-making powers are shared between the court, insolvency 
practitioner, creditors, the company and its directors. All the laws, after the fashion of 
the templates they adopted, depend on the court in varying degrees to approve a 
range of decisions from the commencement of the restructuring process to the end. In 
Liberia, the court through the assigned judge is involved in virtually all decision 
making throughout the restructuring. The court is tasked with responsibilities 
including appointing an administrator, deciding whether directors remain in place, 
authorising post commencement finance, and the licencing of administrators.790   As 
the discussion in the previous chapter stresses, in a country with overburdened 
                                                          
786 See Mauritius Insolvency Act, ss 222 & 224; Rwanda Insolvency Act, Art 63&66; Seychelles Insolvency Act, s 
126 and South Africa Companies Act, s152(2. 
787 Alternatively, directors may see through the text of the law to its practical effect which has the potential to 
handicap them significantly. 
788 See Idigbe and Kalu, ‘Best practice and tailored reforms’ (n 670); The next chapter gives an account of the 
territorial nature of owner-managers in Nigeria and the resistance that attends attempts to displace them. 
789 Ch III of decree; see also Liberian Insolvency Act, s8.24 (9).   
790 See Table 2 above. 
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courts,791 the goal should be the adoption of systems that reduce rather than 
perpetuate overdependence on courts.792 This institutional mismatch can result from 
diagnostic struggles that occur when law reformers fail to properly diagnose issues 
that are central to reform before a new law is enacted. If unpredictable and inefficient 
court systems is rightly identified as one of the fundamental problems that face 
insolvency practice in African countries, then insolvency law reform should reflect 
this diagnosis by proposing systems that ameliorate rather than complicate the 
problems. Even if the issues were clearly diagnosed, the problem of indeterminacy 
may also set in where stakeholders are unsure of how to resolve the problems 
identified.793 For one, the templates (laws of developed countries) from which they 
receive guidance do not contemplate these issues as they are designed for stronger 
institutions. 794 
In contrast, the PIP procedures rely more on the practitioner for a range of decision 
making. The implication of this is that training is required for practitioners and judges. 
Insolvency regulation is at its infancy in most African countries. Although some of the 
legislations provide for registration and licencing of practitioners,795 this process 
would require an investment in intense training programs and re-orientation.     
In terms of voting, some laws prescribe that decision making be conducted in specified 
classes and stipulate the threshold for decision making.796 For others, thresholds are 
complex or vague.797 This is again potentially problematic for implementation. The 
hope is that future amendments or accompanying regulations would provide more 
clarity. 
5.7.4. Restructuring finance.  
                                                          
791  See Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System (Africa Report N°107 International Crisis Group 6 April 2006) i-3   
on Liberia’s difficult road to recovery after years of civil war and continuing impact of crisis and corruption on the 
judicial system. Weak judicial systems is a problem that many African countries have in common and it is 
discussed in some detail below. 
792 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 4) 30-35 for example, addresses judicial and institutional competence, 
suggesting that roles of court be reduced and more responsibilities given to other /better equipped participants 
793 Halliday and Carruthers,’The Recursivity of Law’ (n 16) 1149. 
794 There is therefore a strong case for learning from jurisdictions that have successfully adapted global standards 
to fit their institutional frameworks. 
795 Kenya Regulations, part IV; Malawi Insolvency Act, part ix. 
796 For example, Liberia. 
797 See Malawi and Uganda for examples. 
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Provision for new money is one of the main prescriptions of global norms for 
insolvency reforms. Some jurisdictions in Africa have embraced this norm by 
including provisions for post commencement finance, even in cases where the 
countries they borrowed from have not.798 Rwanda stands out in requiring creditors 
to vote on PCF. Some of the provisions cautiously approach the issue of PCF and only 
allow providers of new finance to have priority above unsecured creditors.799 Some 
others keep the possibility open for the court to decide800 while some countries like 
Liberia follow Chapter 11 in providing a range of options including priority over 
existing security in some cases.801 South Africa (imitated by Zambia and Zimbabwe) 
makes a unique choice of including employee claims which arise after commencement 
in the definition of PCF and gives such claims priority over other new finance and 
existing unsecured credit. South Africa is the only country that has a relatively 
substantial implementation record and the next section discusses how the PCF 
provisions have turned out to be one of the most problematic issues with 
implementation in that jurisdiction. 
5.8. Toward the implementation of new debt restructuring procedures in Africa 
Some of the reforming countries have gradually begun to implement their new 
restructuring procedures even though implementation gaps have yet to become very 
clear. This section gives a broad description of the institutional environment in which 
these laws are expected to operate and highlights some of the experience with 
implementation in a few jurisdictions. Some of the discussion here pre-empts the focus 
of the next chapter which gives a detailed account of the challenges with insolvency 
practice from the perspectives of stakeholders, and the socio-cultural and institutional 




                                                          
798  Malawi is an example. 
799 Rwanda and Seychelles. 
800 See Malawi. 
801 The Liberian law also goes further to provide for distressed debt investment. See Table 2. 
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5.8.1. Weak judicial systems and corruption: common institutional deficiencies in Africa 
One of the significant issues that have been identified with the settling of laws at the 
local level (particularly where developing countries are concerned) is the 
compatibility of local institutions and practices with the law. In the previous chapter, 
it was stated that implementation gaps open up as a result of institutional mismatch 
and courts are one prominent example of such institutions. An effective judicial 
system is central to the effective implementation of insolvency global standards as 
they often depend on the existence of an independent, well-informed, fair, objective 
and competent judiciary.802   
Judicial systems have been found to be problematic in many developing countries for 
different reasons. Carruthers and Halliday report how the judiciary in some Asian 
jurisdictions was the least developed arm of government.803 Because it already had a 
pool of quality judges to choose from, Korea reformed its courts relatively quickly by 
establishing insolvency courts and making the courts more independent. Indonesia 
on the other hand was more problematic. At the start of insolvency reform, the state 
of courts in Indonesia was such that,’ creditors and debtors seldom used courts. Court 
powers were limited; they failed to recruit high quality judges, and their 
independence was deeply compromised by political and market interventions. 
Indonesian courts had little experience with significant commercial cases. Over 
decades, Indonesia’s state bureaucratic-led economic development reduced the 
powers and independence of the courts almost to irrelevance’. 804  In closing the 
implementation gap that opened after insolvency law reform in Indonesia, the IMF 
sought to correct some of these institutional issues by negotiating policy changes in 
the court system. Proposed changes included the creation of commercial courts, 
recruitment of high-quality judges and in some cases, specialist judges, more 
independence of the judicial system etc. These changes proved extremely difficult to 
achieve because of factors such as ‘lack of political will to reform the justice system, 
resistance from the Supreme Court and other judges to a special status for commercial 
                                                          
802 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 4) 33-35; World Bank, ICR Principles (n 4) D1 – D8. 
803 Terrence Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between Global Norms 
and national Circumstances’ (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform 2006) 15-20. 
804 ibid 20. 
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court judges; and a laxity by the government in taking corruption seriously in any part 
of public administration’.805 
 
Countries in Africa have longed battled similar issues as Indonesia. Judicial systems 
are known to be weak and overburdened; judges are not always competent in complex 
commercial matters and courts have lost the confidence of both locals and 
foreigners.806 Although many African countries have established commercial courts 
whether as divisions of a high court system or as stand-alone courts, these problems 
persist.807 The tenure of these judges is not always guaranteed and there have been 
incidences of indiscriminate layoffs. The courts are often hijacked by an overbearing 
government out to consolidate their power and have come to be viewed as a tool in 
the hands of the ruling powers to crush the opposition.808 The difficulty with getting 
high quality judges in the field of commercial law is not disconnected with 
unfavourable compensation packages and tenure for judges. Thus, reforms aimed at 
improving the remuneration, financial and administrative independence of judges can 
be effective at attracting high-quality lawyers with commercial experience to the 
bench. Many countries are yet to effect those reforms and as a result, successful and 
experienced commercial lawyers consider themselves better off in private practice.809  
In the empirical study conducted for this thesis, the issues plaguing the Nigerian 
judicial system frequently came up in the interviews. All the banks identified the 
courts as one of the major problems in debt restructuring and recovery. Participants 
                                                          
805 ibid.  
806 Marcel Fafchamps, Market institutions in sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and evidence (MIT press 2003); Rodrik, 
‘Second-best institutions’ (n 552) 100-104. 
807 Kenya, Nigeria, the Gambia, Uganda, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Liberia, Zambia, South Africa, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe (proposed for 2018), Burundi, Mali, Mauritius, Sudan are examples. Some countries in 
Africa depend on other African countries to staff their courts. Gambia for instance has long depended on recruiting 
judges from Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Editorial, ‘Gambia swears in several homegrown judges’ The Vanguard (15 
May 2017) <www.vanguardngr.com/2017/05/gambia-swears-several-homegrown-judges/>  accessed 10 
September 2018. 
808 Franck Kuwonu,’ Judiciary: Fighting graft needs muscles’ (August – November 2016) Africa Renewal  
809 In a recent attempt in Nigeria to attract higher quality judges by calling for the nomination of reputable lawyers 
to be appointed directly to the Supreme Court. This move was met with stiff opposition. Joseph Onyekwere, 
‘Nomination of lawyers for Supreme Court bench stokes controversy’ The Guardian (21 February 
2017)<https://guardian.ng/features/law/nomination-of-lawyers-for-supreme-court-bench-stokes-controversy/ 
> accessed 10 September 2018. 
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bemoaned how the simplest court processes including ex parte applications and 
applications to court for directions, are attended by long, frustrating delays. 
‘Instead of invoking confidence, the mention of court only invokes signs of 
uncertainty and resignation. If local people dread the courts that much, imagine 
how foreign investors would feel.’ 
 ‘Debtors use the court to buy time, so we avoid it when we can. The case I am 
currently working on with our lawyers started in 1995, when I was in secondary 
school.’ 
‘Courts do not follow the rules. We file a motion ex parte but somehow the debtor 
finds out, they allow them to intervene and file all sorts of frivolous applications’. 
Also, judges sometimes misunderstand, misapply or fail to apply the law.810 These 
problems are caused by a combination of infrastructural, substantive and procedural 
deficiencies which are not peculiar to insolvency or commercial law cases.811  Because 
of poor infrastructure, judges are overburdened and must deal with cases spanning 
different areas of the law simultaneously, preventing them from gaining deep 
knowledge and expertise in a specific area. A lender concluded that these 
irregularities explain why commercial contracts now increasingly choose English law 
as the governing law, to avoid Nigerian courts. It also explains why some companies 
resist this choice as it deprives them of the opportunity to use the loopholes in the 
Nigerian judicial system to their advantage.   
5.8.2. The corruption problem 
                                                          
810 An IP expressed his frustration in a receivership case where a corporate debtor was contesting the receivership. 
In response to the IP’s point that the loan agreement clearly provided the powers that the IP sought to exercise to 
take over the company, the judge ruled that the clause was unenforceable because the owner of the company (who 
signed the debenture on behalf of the company) was dead. This lack of an understanding of the basic principle of 
corporate personality by the court gravely reduces stakeholders’ confidence in the ability of the courts to grasp the 
more complex issues that arise in corporate insolvency and restructuring.  See also Debola, Corporate Rescue (n 
43) 315. 
811 Peter Obutte, ‘Corruption, Administration of Justice and the Judiciary in Nigeria’ (2016) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727319>; Johnson Amadi, ‘Enhancing Access to Justice in Nigeria with Judicial Case 
Management: An Evolving Norm in Common Law Countries’ (2009) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1366943> all 
accessed 10 September 2018. 
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The problems with institutions like courts are inextricably linked with a corruption 
problem, 812 a deep-seated issue in many African countries which has been identified 
as a major threat to sustained economic growth.813 Institutions are weak, and this 
makes it possible for political leaders and public servants to misuse resources and 
abuse their power without being checked, forming a vicious cycle that leaves 
institutions in a deplorable state. African countries score low on transparency tables 
and there are persistent reports of bribery and cutting corners in virtually every facet 
of society, from petty to grand corruption schemes.814 It was recently found based on 
a survey in 28 African countries, that one in five Africans paid bribes to obtain official 
documents, and the police and courts which are meant to safeguard citizens’ rights 
are considered to be the biggest culprits.815  
In the empirical study conducted for this thesis, the problem of corruption 
unsurprisingly came up in all the interviews.   Lenders criticised other lenders, courts, 
companies, IPs and lawyers for being dishonest and engaging in underhanded 
practices. A common example of corruption within the banks is collusion between 
bankers and corporate debtors. A bank official would plot with the debtor that the 
official would make a case to the bank management for the debtor’s debt be reduced.  
The debtor then pays the official a percentage of the reduced amount. In other cases, 
for a percentage of the loan amount, a bank official grossly overvalues assets being 
offered as collateral to help the debtor secure a higher sum. The banker is 
subsequently paid a proportion of the loan. IPs also accused other IPs, lenders, courts, 
companies, and lawyers of corrupt practices. According to two IPs, both lenders and 
                                                          
812 It is noted that some African countries in recent years have taken decisive steps to curb corruption and their 
efforts have altered the perception of corruption to some degree, reflecting in their corruption perception indices. 
Examples are Rwanda, Cape Verde, Botswana, Mauritius, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal. See Paul Banoba, ‘A redefining 
moment for Africa’ Transparency International (21 February 2018) at 
<www.transparency.org/news/feature/a_redefining_moment_for_africa  > accessed 10 September 2018. 
813 Uwimana (n 27). 
814 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 available for download at 
<www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 > accessed 10 September 2018. 
815Milena Veselinovic, ‘Why Corruption is Holding Africa Back’ CNN (28 January 2016) 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/24/africa/africa-corruption-transparency-international/index.html> 
accessed 10 September 2018. 
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companies deliberately fail to keep proper documentation, in order to provide several 
loopholes to make creative arguments about the level of indebtedness.816   
It must be noted that reports of corruption are often perception-based, which makes 
it difficult to obtain objective data on corruption.817 However, this perception whether 
based on factual evidence or not is widespread and its effects are real.   The 
perceptions and attitudes are important because they influence commercial laws and 
commercial arrangements in different ways,818 and are bound to impact the 
implementation of new insolvency laws. One of the most significant effects is a 
pervasive sense of distrust that has become a socio-cultural element of business 
environments in African countries. In Fafchamps’ empirical study in sub-Saharan 
Africa, he found that people avoided going to court to settle business disputes for 
these reasons. Questioning businesses in Ghana on whether they would use the court 
in settling disputes, less than 10 per cent of the participants said that they would.819 
Research by Afrobarometer reveals that in Togo, only 37 per cent of citizens somewhat 
trust the court system, with Liberia and Sierra Leone coming closely behind at 32 per 
cent.820  The impact of corruption and associated lack of trust on insolvency and 
restructuring practice is also seen in the empirical study conducted in Nigeria 
discussed in the next chapter.  
5.9. The Implementation experience in some African countries 
As the implementation of restructuring laws begin to gain momentum in Africa, there 
have been a few success stories and stories of difficulties.  
                                                          
816 An IP said that he had seen many incidents where a corporate debtor would have three different sets of accounts- 
one for the lender, one for tax purposes and the real one. 
817 Measuring corruption in Africa: The international dimension matters (United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa, African Governance Report IV 2016) 
<www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/agr4_eng_fin_web_11april.pdf  > accessed 10 September 
2018. 
818 The next chapter probes this issue in relation to Nigeria. 
819 Fafchamps (n 806); Table 4.5. 
820 For full statistics, see Pauline M. Wambua and Carolyn Logan, ‘Togo’s judicial system marked by popular 
distrust, perceptions of corruption’ (Afrobarometer, No. 147, 18 May 2017) 
<http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno147_access_to_justice
_in_togo.pdf > accessed 10 September 2018. 
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South Africa has the most tested business rescue law. Since 2011 when the Business 
rescue procedure came into operation, 2867 business rescue proceedings have been 
commenced.821 By March 2018, a total of 1176 business rescue cases were pending.822  
The major hurdles first encountered in South Africa stemmed from the poor 
regulation of practitioners, lack of expertise and understanding of the corporate rescue 
regime, distrust among stakeholders and abuse of the process.823 Cases of rescue 
practitioners unjustifiably placing businesses in rescue in order to earn practitioners’ 
fees, inability to determine the viability of the company, companies using the 
procedure as a delay tactic have been reported.824 The effect of this has been that 
financiers are extremely wary of proposals for the business rescue procedure. 825 
Also, there remains an orientation problem in South Africa as many stakeholders are 
yet to adjust from the debt-recovery mindset to a rescue-orientated practice. Pre-
existing problems of mistrust, incompetence and poor infrastructure contribute to the 
slow progress of a rescue culture as the ‘inherent distrust’ among management, banks 
and creditors and government have become magnified because stakeholders 
(particularly lenders) are being prodded away from the familiar territory of debt 
recovery.826 Creditors are a very crucial part of building a rescue culture and some 
practitioners have shared the view that creditors have ‘unofficially made a policy 
decision that they are not in favour of business rescue’, even where there are justifiable 
reasons why they should get involved.827 
Thirdly, the unavailability of rescue finance has been identified as one of the 
significant reasons for the low success rate.828 Practitioners also report implementation 
challenges arising from the interpretation of certain provisions (particularly the PCF 
                                                          
821 See Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) 
<http://www.cipc.co.za/files/3915/2639/0127/Business_Rescue_Status_Report_March_2018_v1.0.pdf  > 
accessed 10 September 2018. 
822 ibid (Year 2016). Some success stories include Dial-a-Bed, Beares, Optimum Coal Mine, High Veld Steel etc. See 
Piers Marsden, ‘Business Rescue Growing Pains’ (March 2016) The Quarterly Journal of INSOL International 10-
12. 
823 Du Preez (n 764) 105 - 120 ; ART 2017 (n 715) 12. 
824 Du Preez (n 764) 106-109. 
825 ibid 119-121. 
826 ibid 114. 
827 ibid 119. 
828 Marsden (n 822) 10. 
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provisions) by practitioners and the courts. This difficulty arises from a combination 
of deficient institutions and ‘novel concepts and bad drafting’. 829 The PCF provisions 
have raised questions and attracted confusing court decisions especially regarding the 
priority of existing security holders in relation to employee PCF claims and other 
claims.830 One of the causes of confusion is the unclear priority ranking system. The 
Act uniquely provides that employment related claims arising after the business 
rescue procedure has commenced ranks above other creditors.831 However, the 
position of pre-existing secured creditors is not clarified in this ranking, creating 
confusion as to where they stand.   
This deviation from the Chapter 11 PCF provisions has been explained as a contextual 
adaptation of international standards, to address the protection of employee rights in 
South Africa.832 However, the drafting and execution has resulted in implementation 
problems because of ambiguity. Zambia and Zimbabwe are likely to have inherited 
this ambiguity and accompanying implementation difficulties by adopting South 
Africa’s PCF provisions wholesale. OHADA countries also potentially stand to face 
similar challenges as seen in South Africa because the priority for PCF in the Uniform 
Act also suffers from a lack of clarity.833  
Notwithstanding the low rate of success following the introduction of the South 
African Business Rescue procedure, the sustained increase in the number of filings 
suggests a commitment to business recue objectives and the implementation of the 
law. 
Kenya has recorded some implementation of its new law, notably with the country’s 
biggest supermarket and retail chain, Nakumatt going into administration in hopes 
for a turnaround.834 The administration is ongoing (at the time of writing) but one of 
                                                          
829 ART 2017 (n 715) 12. 
830 Juanitta Calitz and Giles Freebody, ‘Is post-commencement finance proving to be the thorn in the side of 
business rescue proceedings under the 2008 Companies Act?’ (2016) 49(2) De Jure 265-287. 
831 Companies Act, s 135; Table 2.0 above. 
832 Loubser (n 738) 10. 
833 On first reading, it seems to suggest that all PCF has priority over all creditors including secured and privileged 
creditors. See UACP, arts 166 & 167. 
834 Abdi Latif Dahir, ‘Kenya’s largest supermarket has gone bankrupt and rivals are set to snap up its empty stores’ 
Quartz Africa (31 October 2017) <https://qz.com/1116051/kenyas-nakumatt-files-for-bankruptcy-as-shoprite-
prepares-to-fill-its-empty-stores/>; Kennedy Kangethe, ‘Nakumatt files for voluntary administration, PKF 
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the early lessons from the administration order is the steepness of the learning curve 
that the concepts introduced by Kenya’s new law presents for stakeholders, 
particularly judges. 835 At the first hearing for the administration order, the judge 
identified the lack of clarity and guidance for actors involved in the process as a 
challenge.836 Some practitioners have also attributed implementation gaps to the lack 
of understanding of the new law by stakeholders.837 
Since its law came into effect in 2013, Uganda recorded its first administration in 2017, 
when Uganda Telecom Limited was placed in administration. Because UTL is state-
owned, the government has been closely involved in the administration.838 The 
commitment of the government to the rescue of the company can significantly increase 
the chances of the administration resulting in a turnaround of UTL. 839 This has the 
potential of boosting the confidence of stakeholders in the newly introduced 
administration system. It however limits the prospects of assessing the 
implementation of the law on its own merits at this stage. 
In countries like Seychelles and Mozambique, where new corporate rescue laws were 
enacted five years ago, there is still little clarity as to the use of the law.840  Similarly, 
Mozambique has seen little implementation of its 2013 law. One of the difficulties 
identified with the implementation of this law is interpretation and application 
because of the new philosophy and different terminologies brought by the law.841 
Perhaps due to failure to carry all relevant actors along in the reform process (actor 
mismatch), ad hoc insolvency experts have been reported as not giving ‘due attention 
                                                          
consultant to take over management’ Capital Business (31 October 2017) 
<www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2017/10/nakumatt-files-voluntary-administration-pkf-consultant-take-
management/ > all accessed 10 September 2018. 
835 The administration order was given on 22 January 2018. See court order at Kenya Law, Insolvency Cause 10 of 
2017 <http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/146499/> accessed 10 September 2018. 
836 See para 6 of judgment at Kenya Law, Insolvency Cause 10 & 13 of 2017 (consolidated) 
<http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/143828/ > accessed 10 September 2018. 
837 See ART 2017 (n  715)  3. 
838 Ronal Mugabe, ‘URSB takes charge of UTL’ New Vision (29 April 2017). 
<www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1452214/ursb-takes-charge-utl > accessed 10 September 2018. 
839 Editorial, ‘Signs of recovery at UTL, government says’ TeleGeography (29 June 2017) 
<www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2017/06/29/signs-of-recovery-at-utl-government-
says/ > accessed 10 September 2018. 
840 ART 2017 (n 715) 6- 7. 
841 ibid 3-4. 
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to the process’.842 As participants of the ART 2017 pointed out, the implementation of 
the law continues to be affected by a lack of knowledge of the law by businessmen, 
embedded cultural conceptions about insolvency procedures and lack of sanctions for 
non-submission to the law.843  
Also, the Rwandan law enacted in 2009 was not used because of a lack of clarity on 
the reorganisation procedures, plans and timelines. After 2012 and 2014 reforms 
which aimed to provide more clarity for insolvency processes, the country has now 
passed a 2018 Insolvency Act to correct these issues.844 This may be a manifestation of 
recursive cycles of lawmaking predicted by Carruthers and Halliday.845 However, the 
question remains whether that reform is driven by the goal of making the law a better 
fit for local institutions rather than a desire to meet up with international standards 
and improve the country’s Doing Business ranking.846 
Conclusion  
Restructuring and insolvency systems in Africa are evolving. This chapter considers 
the actors involved in these reforms and Africa’s role in contributing to the building 
of an insolvency TLO. It finds that the operation of global actors in African countries 
have lacked the direct force that they had in Asian countries like Indonesia and Korea, 
even though there have been no shortages of economic crisis and susceptibility to 
foreign influence in Africa. This is understandable, as Africa has not always occupied 
a significant position in the global economy. Increasingly however, interest in Africa 
is growing, although the influence of conventional partners from the West is now 
being diluted by new partners, particularly China. As interest grows, the role of global 
actors like the World Bank, the IMF and UNCITRAL in insolvency law reform have 
                                                          
842 ART 2016 (n 720) 28-29.  These issues are predicted by the literature on legal transplant and discussion in the 
previous chapter. As Dani Rodrik asserts, ‘even under the best possible circumstances, an imported blueprint 
requires domestic expertise for successful implementation. Dani Rodrik, ‘Institutions for High-Quality Growth: 
What They Are and How to Acquire them’ (2000) 35 (3) Studies in Comparative International Development 70; 
Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, ‘Economic development’ (n 452) 170. 
843 See ART 2017 (n 715) 1-5, 8-10. Country reports for Kenya, Cape Verde and South Africa for examples. 
844 World Bank Doing Business Report 2014, Rwanda country report 168 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB14-Full-Report.pdf > accessed 10 September 2018. 
845 Halliday and Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law’ (n 16) 1160. 
846 Rwanda Struggles On Insolvency Law’ (n 637).  
193 
 
centred on technical support in reform and modelling through platforms like the ART 
and the World Bank Doing Business Project. 
The chapter highlights the changes made or proposed to restructuring law in thirty-
six jurisdictions and briefly comments on the settling of these new laws. Recent and 
ongoing changes in insolvency regimes suggest that while the momentum and content 
of reform is significantly influenced by external factors, the need for restructuring 
frameworks is also becoming more apparent to local stakeholders.   As reforms are 
ongoing, restructuring practices are also evolving. This creates a real opportunity to 
pass laws that are adapted to practical issues, institutional demands and development 
needs. It is however only likely to happen if the stakeholders involved in restructuring 
practice also have some input in the reform. In some countries, there are suggestions 
of significant detachment between the promoters of reform and end users of the law, 
which again highlights the value in carrying all stakeholders along, before a law is 
enacted.   
The chapter finds that the content of reform may be responding more to the need to 
conform to global standards than to domestic needs and institutions. In effect, rather 
than domestic need or policy orientation as discussed in chapter one, the content and 
momentum for reform is overwhelmingly influenced by external factors. Some 
countries have deviated from the usual habit of a full transplant from a developed 
country with which they share some connection and have introduced changes based 
on global norms. For some countries in Africa, global norms have not done very much 
to change the tendency to fully transplant the laws of countries with which they bear 
historical (mostly colonial) connection. Some other contries have taken baby steps 
away from this tendency. Many countries have also adopted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law for Cross-border insolvency. In this way, reforms in Africa are contributing to the 
building of a TLO in insolvency as they continue to popularise insolvency legislations 
of powerful countries and increasingly incorporate global norms like the PCF 
provisions. 
As latecomers to the development table, African countries may not enjoy the same 
luxury that countries with home-grown insolvency laws like the US and the UK 
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enjoyed in crafting laws that were compatible with their local institutions and 
development needs. While the opportunity for such organic reform may have been 
interrupted by globalisation and the proliferation of global norms, African countries 
can take advantage of the absence of direct coercion in the propagation of those norms 
to produce versions of insolvency law that are most compatible with their institutions. 
Some of the institutional constraints that can pose a challenge to the settling of new 
laws were raised in this chapter and as reform and implementation progress, the 
tensions between new laws and existing institutions and practises can be explored in 
more detail.  Using Nigeria as empirical case study, the next chapter continues this 
discussion with a detailed account of the experience of stakeholders with evolving 
insolvency and restructuring practice.  The chapter describes local institutions and 
how stakeholders interact with them, with the aim of gaining deeper insight into the 
environment into which new restructuring legislations are being introduced and how 
















THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
PRACTICE IN NIGERIA: AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the development of insolvency and restructuring 
norms in Africa and the role that global norms and actors are playing in these 
developments. This chapter describes the experience of stakeholders with corporate 
insolvency and debt restructuring in Nigeria. Recall that chapter one discussed the 
design of this empirical study, the conduct of the study, its limitations; and engaged 
in a general discussion of the Nigerian legal framework for corporate insolvency and 
restructuring.847  
As discussion in previous chapters of this thesis reveals, scholars, development 
experts, IFIs and other commentators have for a long time emphasised the importance 
of local compatibility in reform. What is clearly missing from the literature is 
substantial empirical research to unearth what these local elements are.848 Relevant 
local elements would differ across countries and for different subject matters, and this 
chapter aims to contribute in its own narrow field of restructuring and insolvency. It 
investigates the different factors that have shaped the relationship of stakeholders 
(lenders, insolvency practitioners and lawyers) among themselves and with 
insolvency laws and institutions. It also seeks to understand ongoing changes in 
restructuring practice, the role of global actors and/or norms in engendering those 
changes and the tension between existing practices and emerging developments in 
insolvency, all from the perspective of stakeholders. The empirical study was 
conducted principally by interviewing lenders (commercial banks), insolvency 
practitioners, lawyers and secondarily debtors, through a participant observation of 
an ongoing debt restructuring.  
 
                                                          
847 Ch 1, section 1.4 




Background to interviews 
Following the drop in commodity price and a forex crisis, Nigeria plunged into an 
economic recession that had an adverse effect on businesses in different sectors of the 
economy in 2016.849 In the face of economic hardship, the lapses in the provision of 
rehabilitative frameworks for distressed companies became more apparent.  
In 2012, BRIPAN850 supported by INSOL International, had produced a draft 
Corporate Insolvency Bill (The BRIPAN Bill). The BRIPAN Bill sought to promote 
business restructuring, the regulation of insolvency practice and cross-border 
insolvency.851 The Bill was largely based on English law, meaning it sought to 
introduce the CVA and administration procedures into the country. BRIPAN got the 
support of the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade & Investments to sponsor the Bill 
as an Executive Bill and it went through some reviews and approvals, including its 
first legislative reading. However, since the 2015 change of administration in Nigeria, 
the BRIPAN Bill saw very little progress.852  Later in May 2018, it was revealed that the 
BRIPAN Bill would no longer be pursued, as insolvency reform had been consolidated 
with ongoing companies’ law reform.853 The restructuring procedures (administration 
and CVA) are now included into the Companies and Allied Matters Bill, currently 
undergoing legislative process. The interviews with BRIPAN executives and other 
stakeholders, throw more light on issues surrounding the reform. They also describe 
how commercial lenders and insolvency practitioners engage with proposed reform, 
revealing how problems of actor mismatch, institutional mismatch, misdiagnosis and 
contradictions potentially arise. 
                                                          
849 Fick, Nigeria Economy Suffers’ (n 38). 
850 The Business Recovery & Insolvency Practitioners Association of Nigeria (BRIPAN) is the only professional 
association of its kind. While BRIPAN does not have regulatory powers, it offers training and has taken the 
forefront in insolvency legislative reform. However, one need not be a member of BRIPAN to act as an IP. 
851 Anthony Idigbe, ‘Progress of Insolvency Law Reform’ ILO (15 November 2013) 
<www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Insolvency-Restructuring/Nigeria/Punuka-Attorneys-
Solicitors/Progress-of-insolvency-law-reform> accessed 10 September 2018; Recent Strides (n 74). 
852 ibid. 
853 LawPavilion (n 726). The details of the ongoing company law reform is neither clear nor readily accessible as 
no consultation documents or reports have been made available. 
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While the country awaits a restructuring framework, distressed companies, 
commercial banks, insolvency practitioners and regulatory bodies have made some 
efforts to restructure debt informally, though not always successfully. This empirical 
research explores the use of existing insolvency frameworks and the challenges that 
confront stakeholders as new restructuring practices emerge.   
The interviews reveal that interactions among stakeholders are coloured with distrust 
and suspicion. This is accompanied by a lack of confidence in institutions such as 
courts and regulatory bodies. The law and practice of corporate insolvency is limited 
to debt recovery practices. Lenders judge the effectiveness of laws and institutions by 
their ability to aid prompt recovery of assets. While Nigeria can be said to be a creditor 
friendly jurisdiction because it prioritises recovery, a popular view among lenders was 
that the judicial system is biased towards debtors and often allows itself to be hijacked 
by debtors to the detriment of lenders. Lenders consider debtor recalcitrance to be a 
major problem in Nigerian corporate borrowing, especially with big companies that 
are often backed by powerful owners who have the tools to bend the rules to their 
advantage. The courts are criticised for being slow and unmindful of the complexities 
of business and the technicalities involved in corporate matters. Insolvency 
practitioners are also criticised for being unskilled in commercial matters. Lenders are 
criticised by other stakeholders for being impatient, preoccupied with profit, ill-
equipped to restructure and lacking good lending practices.   
From the interviews, the attitude to proposals for reform ranged from apathy, 
ignorance and scepticism to guarded optimism.  Most participants were disinterested 
in reform efforts, others thought that efforts were misdirected while a few lenders 
thought that it could do some good.  
The rest of the chapter presents the empirical study using themes and sub-themes, 
supported with excerpts from the interviews where appropriate. Each section 






The interviews are thematically structured in five broad sections. The first section 
considers corporate lending, informal debt restructuring and the challenges that 
lenders and IPs face in the process. It is helpful to clarify that although it applies to 
large companies to some degree, this section of the interviews relates more to small 
and medium corporate debtors.  The second section discusses the legal framework 
and instruments that affect debt restructuring and how stakeholders interact with 
these frameworks in practice. The third section narrows on multi-creditor 
restructuring and the issues that arise in the process. It is in this section that the 
interaction of stakeholders with large companies is explored. Section four discusses 
the proposed reform, from the perspective of lenders, BRIPAN members and 
insolvency practitioners. The fifth section briefly considers developments in the debt 
market that are likely to impact corporate debt restructuring in the near future.  
   
SECTION ONE: LENDING STRUCTURE AND INFORMAL DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING. 
6.0. The structure of business lending in Nigeria. 
Bankers reported largely similar lending procedures. Business lending in Nigeria 
often takes the form of term loans and in some cases, revolving facilities.854  Most 
banks reported that term loans typically have a tenure of 12 months but have in recent 
times become shorter because of the rise in NPLs and regulatory constraints, with 
loans now maturing between 30 to 180 days.855  
In a typical corporate lending, requests for loans come in through account officers.  
Depending on the amount of money involved, the request is passed to management 
represented by the Managing Director (up to N200 million), Management Credit 
Committee (N300-500million), Board Credit Committee (above N500 million to 1.5 
billion) or the full board (above N1.5 billion). Smaller loans are considered to be 
                                                          
854  A revolving loan allows the credit to be drawn (up to a limit), repaid and redrawn for as long as the 
arrangement stands. A term loan, broadly speaking provides a lump sum upfront and regular repayments 
including interest are required to be made over a fixed period.  
855 The short tenure of loans impacts the kind of concessions banks are prepared to give in debt restructuring. 
Restructuring that draws out the loan for an extended period of time are avoided. 
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around N5-10 million and they are often handled by other managers such as an 
executive director or a regional manager.856 Before approval by the relevant approving 
authority, credit checks would have been carried out by the credit administration 
department. The legal department also ensures that all conditions precedent are met 
before the loan is disbursed. The loan review department takes over once the debtor 
begins to draw from the facility, monitoring repayment and ensuring that the loan is 
always classified correctly. Depending on the way the loan is performing and length 
of default, it may be classified as substandard, doubtful or lost.857 When default 
occurs, the loan review department investigates the default and makes 
recommendations. After considering the nature of default and likely causes, they may 
decide to place the company under a watchlist and/or restructure the debt. If 
performance is not enhanced, the account begins to deteriorate until it gets to the point 
where it is classified as lost. Once deemed lost, the account is moved from the branch 
office to the remedial department and this is where debt recovery begins.  
The role of reputation in lending and recovery 
The Nigerian banking system has had its fair share of problems, plagued with 
problems of undercapitalisation, poor regulation, cronyism and corruption.858 
Corporate lending can also be reputation-based, with the status of a company’s 
promoters playing a major role in lending decisions. Some banks have been accused 
of making lending decisions based on relationships, tribal or familial connections 
rather than credit worthiness.859  Problems in the Nigerian banking industry came to 
a head in 2009, resulting in intervention by the Central bank through several reforms 
and stricter regulations. Bank directors were sanctioned for colluding with debtors 
and giving out undocumented loans, embezzling funds, manipulating records 
                                                          
856 There are slight variations in figures across the different banks. 
857 The CBN prudential guidelines classify loans based on performance. Defective loans can be substandard, lost 
or doubtful. Central Bank of Nigeria, Prudential Guidelines for Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria (July 2010) 32-
34. 
858 ‘After the Boom, a Purge’ Africa Confidential (28 August 2009) 
<www.africaconfidential.com/articlepreview/id/3205/After_the_boom%2c_a_purge > accessed 10 September 
2018. 
859 Emmanuel Majebi, ‘Sack of Five Bank MDs, is Tribalism the Issue?’ The Vanguard (20 August 2009) 
<www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/sack-of-five-banks-mds-is-tribalism-the-issue/> accessed 10 September 2018. 
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amongst others.860  The purging of 2009 curbed some of the excesses in the banking 
system. However, relationships and reputation still have a strong presence in the 
Nigerian corporate lending scene.  
The reaction of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to the rise in NPLs is an 
acknowledgement of the significance of reputation in Nigerian corporate lending. One 
of the regulator’s strategies in 2009 was to publish a list of the biggest non-performing 
loans, naming the debtors and their directors/majority shareholders. Many of the 
debtors were big companies operating an owner-manager structure. The aim of the 
publication, particularly the move to publish the names of the promoters in national 
newspapers was to shame these reputable individuals into payment. 861 The CBN 
periodically mandates banks to publish this list when their NPLs begins to rise above 
acceptable levels.862 
During the interviews, it was sometimes difficult for bank participants to distinguish 
between individual and corporate lending. For both lending decisions and in response 
to a borrowing company’s financial distress, bankers placed a lot of emphasis on 
directors and owners and their assessment of their ability to pay in their personal 
capacity.863  Relationships and reputation play a role in the way loans are structured 
including the use of security. Understandably, this would often be the case with SMEs, 
which are usually one-man businesses. However, the interviews revealed that the 
bigger the company involved, the higher the tendency for the lending to be reputation-
based.   
Lawyers reported that lenders are always eager to negotiate a personal guarantee and 
take a lot of comfort in having recourse to the personal assets of owner/managers. A 
personal guarantee may be of more value to a lender than other collateral, where the 
                                                          
860Africa Confidential (n 4); ‘EFCC Declares Ibru Akingbola Wanted’ The Vanguard (24 August 2009) 
<www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/efcc-declares-ibru-akingbola-wanted/> accessed 10 September 2018. 
861 The list would show only a handful of private debtors, with a high percentage being limited companies, and a 
substantial number in the oil sector. 
<www.cbn.gov.ng/OUT/PUBLICATIONS/PRESSRELEASE/GOV/2009/ADVERTORIAL_18082009.PDF > 
accessed 10 September 2018. 
862 Lolade O, ‘CBN, Deposit Banks will Publish List of Serial Debtors on August 1’ (12 June 2015) 
<http://bizwatchnigeria.ng/cbn-deposit-banks-fix-august-1-publish-serial-debtors-list/ > accessed 10 September 
2018. 




promoters of the company are reputable and wealthy or perceived to be wealthy. 
Where smaller companies with less influential promoters are concerned, security in 
the form of fixed assets like land and buildings becomes very important.  For lenders, 
the bigger the loan (or the company), the less likely it is that the loan will be secured 
and the more likely it is that the debtor can negotiate a reduced interest rate.864  
‘I can lend billions of naira to companies like Dangote Plc865 unsecured, but for a 
smaller company, I can ask for their mother’s head before I give them 5 million’.866  
6.1. Informal (unilateral) debt restructuring.  
From the perspective of banks. 
All the banks claimed that they often consider debt restructuring when a corporate 
debtor defaults. Debt restructuring or more accurately, rescheduling prominently 
featured in the processes they described. Although the procedures are similar, there 
were slight variations in the departments responsible for implementation. Some of the 
banks had a department for remedial services and loan restructuring; others left the 
task to the same department responsible for monitoring the account. In some banks, 
only the approving authority for a loan could make a restructuring decision while 
other banks would trust a head of department or committee with the decision. Once 
they see signs of trouble,867 the relevant department invites the representatives of the 
company for an informal chat.868 This meeting is important for a few reasons- it helps 
the bank to determine the reasons for default and the challenges being faced by the 
company.  It also allows the bank to decide whether to restructure the company’s debt 
or not.  When asked about the criteria for making the decision to restrucure, the 
                                                          
864 It is noted that there are ongoing reform efforts towards strengthening the secured credit transactions regime in 
Nigeria. Notably, a credit risk management system (credit bureau) and a collateral registry have been established. 
If implemented effectively, these developments should address some of the issues identified by lenders such as 
debtor recalcitrance and enforcement of security interests. Secured Transactions in Moveable Assets Act 2017, ss 3 
and 8; CBN Act No.24 of 1991, ss 28 and 52. 
865 DangotePLC is one of the most successful, if not most successful chain of businesses in Nigeria. 
866 Lender 9. The downside of this is that some companies may be viable only by reputation but experiencing 
serious liquidity issues or even nearing economic distress.  
867 Signs of trouble include where the loan is not running in line with expectation, returns are not in tune with the 
projected/expected cash flow, the turnover is lower than expected, and for term loans where payments are 
periodic, if some payments are missed.   
868 One bank (Lender 1) admitted that at the first sign of trouble, it would scrutinise its loan documentation and 
collateral (if any) and get battle ready. After looking at the bank’s legal rights and ensuring that the lender is in a 
strong fighting position, the lender approaches the company to demand payment.  
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lenders all approached the question by categorising debtors as: willing and able, able 
but unwilling, unable and unwilling, unable but willing. They claimed that this matrix 
gave them a clear guide on whether to restructure, and how to go about the 
restructuring.  They could differentiate between these categories of debtors by their 
‘character’.  
Although they clearly attached a lot of value to it, the banks had some difficulty giving 
a clear indication of what they defined as ‘character’. Their answers suggested that 
they have acquired a radar for discerning which managers passed this character test. 
They were convinced that if confronted with a ‘genuine’ company, they would ‘just 
know’. A common example that they gave of acceptable character was of debtors that 
show a willingness to discuss rather than try to use the court to buy time.   The 
character of the company owners/managers ranked so high on the banks’ list of 
criteria that they suggested that the viability of a business was not always a barrier to 
restructuring. For example, one lender spoke about a hospital business being funded 
by his bank.  The hospital is in a remote area with very few, low-paying clients.869 
Though it is clear to the bank that the hospital in its current state can never generate 
enough cash flow to pay, the bank is willing to continue to accommodate the debtor.  
‘The business is not viable, but they are sincere and have dealt with us in good 
faith.’870 
Five banks did mention viability of the business as one of the factors that influence 
their decision to restructure the loan.871 They claimed that they determine this by 
conducting an analysis of the company’s business and looking into its cash flow. 
When asked what tools they use for this analysis and whether they engage 
professionals to carry out the review, the banks all thought that this was unnecessary 
as they were perfectly capable of making the assessment.  
                                                          
869 He admitted that these issues should have been considered before the loan was approved. From conversations 
with lenders and other professionals, this kind of laxity on the part of lenders is not uncommon in Nigeria.  
870 Lender 13.  
871 Lenders 1, 2, 8, 3, 14. 
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In some cases, the restructuring described by the bankers is intended to delay the 
regulatory requirement for banks to provide for loans classified as lost.872 Although 
the classification of a distressed loan cannot be upgraded based on a mere 
restructuring of the debtor’s obligations, banks can buy some time by asking the 
debtor to pay some part of the debt and restructuring the rest of it, even if they do not 
truly believe that obligations would be met in the future. This allows the bank to make 
a real case for reclassification or at least delay the further deterioration of the loan. 
If a company is deemed qualified for a restructuring and the recommendation is 
approved by the appropriate authority, a restructured facility is executed. On the form 
that restructuring often takes, it is often the case that the tenure of the loan is extended 
and or interest rate is reduced for a period. Less often, debt restructuring can include 
the forgiveness of part of accrued interest and or principal. Where restructuring fails 
to result in an improvement in the company’s performance, the case is transferred to 
the legal department for recovery. When asked how well informal restructuring 
works, lenders could not provide numbers or estimates. They however stated that in 
their experience, financial distress results from a combination of factors, mainly 
economic hardship and mismanagement. Companies always wait until it is too late 
before asking for help and the rescheduling of debt does little to tackle these issues. 
So, it is not surprising that distressed companies often end up defaulting on a 
restructured payment. 873    
One recurring theme in the banks’ restructuring practice is that while banks may take 
the first step to engage defaulting corporate debtors, they often expect the request for 
debt restructuring to come from the debtor. This is connected to their philosophy that 
the right candidate for restructuring will show the willingness without being 
prompted.  
Bank lending and restructuring practices from the perspective of Insolvency Practitioners. 
                                                          
872 Banks provide for lost accounts by provisioning i.e having the Central Bank of Nigeria deduct the sum off the 
bank’s deposit with the CBN. CBN Prudential Guidelines (n 857) 35. 
873 Participants had not given much thought to keeping a record of whether companies recovered after a 




IPs were of the view that lenders are too lax in their attitude towards lending and 
monitoring. As an instance of this laxity, they criticised the tendency of banks to loan 
huge sums of money based only on the reputation of the owner of a company.   
‘Lenders are swayed by big names, I think it is a cultural thing’. 874 
Apart from failing to do a critical business assessment before giving out funds, IPs 
also disagreed with the approach of lenders to monitoring. They pointed out that 
lenders neglect the debtor and only make belated monitoring efforts after the 
company is far gone.  
In addition to poor due diligence, IPs criticised the fact that banks do not get help 
where appropriate because they assume that they are finance experts. Their methods 
and views of restructuring according to one IP, are dated and narrow. IPs confirmed 
that lenders’ idea of restructuring is limited to a few basic steps such as extension of 
tenure and waiver or reduction of interests. While these may be useful for companies 
that only need some breathing room to recover from a temporary cash flow problem, 
banks apply this one-size fits all solution to all companies without properly diagnosing 
the cause of distress. As a result, what the banks claim to be a restructuring practice is 
often superficial and ineffective rescheduling. 
‘At the point of lending or restructuring, most banks assume that their in-house 
loan review department can do a good job of assessing the viability of a business, 
but they cannot. They are not trained to and are often too overwhelmed to do a 
thorough job’.875 
‘Most of them only understand debit and credit, they have no knowledge of 
finance’ 876 
6.2. Problems encountered in informal debt restructuring  
Bankers emphasised that there are wider considerations that impact restructuring in 
individual cases and the restructuring culture generally. It was particularly important 
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for them that the constraints they face as commercial lenders and the effect of these 
constraints on how they respond to financial distress, be understood.  
6.2.1. Debtors recalcitrance and mismanagement, a socio-cultural phenomenon? 
Lenders’ views 
Debtor recalcitrance came up in all the interviews. Although lenders acknowledged 
that there were different categories of corporate debtors as highlighted above, they 
held the view that the unwilling category (whether able or unable to pay) dominated 
the numbers. They repeatedly attributed the attitude of debtors to ‘culture’, pointing 
out that the lackadaisical attitude of debtors to debt is a sociocultural phenomenon in 
Nigeria.  
‘Nigerians as a people do not believe in paying bank loans. People actually see bank 
loans as part of the national cake.’ 877 
It was clear from the responses of lenders that there is a deep-seated distrust for the 
debtors that they deal with, especially companies. Lenders revealed that in their 
experience, the people that have capacity to pay are the ones who do not want to pay.   
The root cause of this is that corporate debtors are often knowledgeable and well-
connected. They are fully aware of all the loopholes in the system and they have no 
scruples about taking advantage of them.  
’At times when you go after bad loans, the knowledgeable ones among them would 
ask you why you are bothering them when you must have fully provided for the 
loan’.878   
‘The small debtors are not a problem as we can easily deal with them. They have no 
judge or minister to talk to. The big company owners are the real criminals.’879  
One of the strategies that corporate debtors use is to get ahead of the ‘race to collect’ 
by filing frivolous actions against the banks. Typically, the claim would be that they 
have been overcharged by the bank or that the bank overestimated the debt figure. 
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The lenders considered this an antic to delay the recovery process, as the debtors are 
aware of how long court processes can take in Nigeria.880 These experiences contribute 
to the reluctance of lenders to initiate a restructuring. 
Other constraints identified by lenders include the failure of corporate debtors to 
recognise early signs of trouble and their tendency to mismanage the company.  
Lenders also thought that this mismanagement or lack of a maintenance culture was 
another socio-cultural phenomenon that reflects some deep-seated problems in the 
Nigerian society- corruption and incompetence. 
Lenders acknowledged that it may become necessary to make changes to the 
management of a troubled company. They however find it difficult to intervene when 
a viable company is plagued by corrupt or incompetent management.881 The situation 
is further complicated by what they consider yet another cultural issue- a 
predominant family business structure and accompanying territoriality.  Most 
companies in the lenders’ experience, are structured such that the owners are also the 
managers.882 Even in the big companies, the patriarch of the family commonly sits at 
the head of the board, with other family members constituting the board. Because 
company owner/managers consider the business private property, they resist any 
attempt by outsiders to get involved. 
‘Because they see the company as a family legacy, many owners believe it is better 
for the company to die than for an outsider to come and take over’.883 
IPs’ views on debtor recalcitrance and mismanagement  
IPs confirmed that owner/managers use a combination of aggression, political 
influence and emotional blackmail to harass creditors and insolvency practitioners. In 
some cases, they extend this behaviour to third party investors and potential buyers. 
                                                          
880 While some of these suits may be indeed tactics to delay recovery, an insolvency practitioner disclosed that 
there have been several incidences where banks have indeed overcharged interests, whether deliberately or as a 
result of carelessness.  
881 Note that there is also a legal concern, which is fear of being seen as a shadow director under the section of 245 
of CAMA. Only one of the lenders however felt that this was a real concern as claims based on shadow directorship 
are a rarity in Nigeria. The other lenders all cited the territorial nature of company owner/managers as the 
challenge. 
882 This echoes the discussion in chapter three about concentrated ownership and control in developing economies. 
883 Lender 9. 
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IPs also pointed out that the Nigerian legal system has loopholes that make it easy for 
debtors to default and walk away.884  
6.2.2. Regulatory and macro-economic factors 
All the lenders identified the government as one of the core sources of challenges in 
debt restructuring.  The different ways by which the government is implicated include 
unfavourable business policies, high cost of funds, non-payment of debts, excessive 
regulation and unstable economic policies. 885  Most of these are bigger macro-
economic issues that are outside the scope of this research. However, the issues of cost 
of funds and regulation deserve some attention.    
In the lenders’ view, one of the major obstacles to debt restructuring is the high cost 
of funds in Nigerian banking. The rate at which they lend to companies is determined 
by the borrowing rate from the CBN and the interests paid on fixed deposits. High 
rates from these sources has set commercial lending rates between the ranges of 29-35 
per cent.886 The lenders acknowledged that only companies with a strong backbone 
can survive these rates, especially in the difficult economic climates.  
Also, banks pointed out that they are over-regulated by the government, through the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Following the country’s banking crisis and 
restructuring from 2010-2015, banks have been placed under closer scrutiny by the 
regulator.887 The lenders reported that they often struggle to keep up with CBN’s 
policies and their discretion is highly limited by the need to seek the permission of the 
CBN for most transactions. Generally, there is an air of uncertainty around what kinds 
of transactions banks can validly do. Bank officials reported that the CBN keeps its 
oversight powers over banks flexible such that it can step into any transaction it 
considers ‘unacceptable’ on one-off bases. This, they claim affects their ability to freely 
                                                          
884 One suggested that more forceful prosecution of the directors of failed companies might make a difference.  
885 They however did not fail to give credit where it was due. They referred to the recently established credit bureau 
which has promising prospects of curbing career debtors. 
886 The CBN official rate is benchmarked at 14-16%. The interest rate is generally informed by inflation rates. 
Trading Economics,’Nigeria Interest Rate’ (2017-2018) <https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/interest-rate > 
accessed 10 September 2018.   
887 Seth Apati, The Nigerian banking sector reforms: power and politics (Springer 2011) 1-15. 
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and creatively restructure debt. An example is their ability to take on shares of a 
distressed company (debt for equity swap) as part of a restructuring package.888  
Lenders also disclosed that the government plays a more direct role in making debt 
restructuring difficult. In their view, the government is the most recalcitrant debtor 
within the economy. They admitted that many distressed companies that banks are 
currently pursuing for debt recovery were put in that state by the government.889  It 
often happens that companies that work with the government have their contracts 
revoked or remain unpaid for years, especially when a change in government occurs. 
This affects both the companies that deal directly with the government and small 
businesses that work as subcontractors for them.   
‘What kind of restructuring are you doing in such a situation? Will you invite the 
government to be part of the restructuring?’890 
6.3. Corporate rescue: the attitude of lenders. 
Because of the close relationship between corporate rescue and debt restructuring, the 
interviews aimed to understand the attitude of lenders towards corporate rescue.  
Generally, lenders acknowledged the need for corporate rescue in some cases but 
sought to avoid the responsibility because of the challenges discussed above.   
One banker lamented the wasteful piecemeal sale of companies’ assets, revealing that 
he was in the process of selling a company’s warehouse for church use.  
‘Can you imagine? A warehouse that should be productive and contributing to the 
economy…we are selling it at a ridiculous price for church services. Not even to 
another business! It is not a good sign that warehouses are being given up for 
church.  It’s hurtful for the economy.’891  
Another lender shared his experience with an ongoing receivership; 
                                                          
888 One of the policies of the CBN mandated banks to divest their non-banking businesses. Banks now carry on 
investment through separate entities. Central Bank of Nigeria, Regulation on the scope of banking activities& 
ancillary Matters, No. 3, 2010, ss 5 and 8. 
889 The same trend has been observed in Uganda. Uganda Law reform Commission Report on Insolvency (n 738) 
clause 2.2.19. 
890 Lender 9. 
891 Lender 9. 
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‘All of us know that it is wrong to strip that kind of company, it is a big company. 
Everyone I have mentioned it to, including the receiver we appointed, has been 
shocked. The company is a manufacturing company with certifications that no other 
country in West Africa has. But the bank wants its money’.892 
 ‘It is very hard to wait for companies to break even. So, even if you know that they will 
be viable in the next few years, you may still go ahead and sell the company’s assets to 
get a quick exit’.893 
However, when it becomes unrealistic to sell, lenders may tow the path of ‘rescue’. A 
lender illustrated this by pointing out the window to an oil rig in the distance. The rig 
had been taken over by another bank in a recovery action and parked in that spot for 
many years.  
‘A rig like that would cost millions for servicing and security over time.  Why not 
restructure the debt, leave the rig with the owner and pray that they get contracts 
to work the rigs?’894  
Another banker relayed how his bank recently waived 6 billion naira out of 11 billion 
naira, because the company promised an immediate payment of N5 billion. These 
‘concessions’ are not driven by noble notions of rescue, rather they are dictated by 
difficulty of enforcement. Should lenders find it easier to extract the value of their 
claims, they would dismember the company without caring that the business is still 
viable. One lender stated that one of the reasons for the seemingly brutal attitude of 
banks towards corporate rescue is that apart from pressure from shareholders, bank 
managers stand the risk of legal and regulatory sanctions if they are seen to have failed 
to pursue recovery diligently.895  
 
                                                          
892 Lender 3. 
893 Lender 1. 
894 Lender 3. 
895 He referred to the prosecution of some prominent bank executives and pointed out that although they were 
fraudulent, failure to put their best efforts into debt recovery was a big factor. BBC News, ‘Former Nigeria bank 
CEO Cecilia Ibru jailed for fraud’ 9 October 2010 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11506421> 




6.4. Restructuring finance: lenders’ views. 
In chapter two, additional finance was identified as one of the most important 
elements of a successful restructuring. Lenders were asked about their views and 
experience with providing new money to distressed companies. 
Here, the general sentiment was that ‘it is unwise to put good money after bad money’. 
They explained that their experience over time has cemented this view. One lender 
relayed how a N500 million debt became N2 billion within a year, because the bank 
‘made the mistake of providing additional finance’.896 This skepticism is even 
heightened where the finance is sought not as part of an informal restructuring, but in 
a formal process like a receivership. For them, a formal process carries with it a sense 
of finality that companies hardly recover from. 
 Some of the lenders considered the provision of additional finance to be outside the 
banks’ scope of operations. They believe it is the duty of the government to provide 
such funds to troubled companies.  Other lenders admitted that banks ought to be able 
to do that in a ‘normal’ society, but the cost of funds and the bank’s responsibilities to 
its shareholders prevent them from doing so. 
However, not all banks were completely opposed to providing additional finance.  
One lender pointed out that banks already provide rescue finance by refinancing big 
companies with a new facility that carries new terms and lower interest rates.897 He 
reported that oil companies have in recent times benefited from refinancing following 
the drop in oil prices.  
Relationships also play a role in the decision to offer new money. One lender would 
consider providing additional finance based on their previous relationship with the 
debtor, if the debtor has an impeccable character and is competent. Another said that 
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they would only consider giving new finance to a borrower to pursue a new line of 
business ‘but not the struggling one’.898  
 
Summary of Findings: lending, informal institutions and debt restructuring. 
Out of Court debt restructuring is a known practice in the Nigerian corporate lending 
industry. It is typically unilateral, involving the debtor company and one bank. Even 
where the distressed company has several bank creditors, restructuring is still done 
unilaterally because there is no mechanism for coordinating multi creditor workouts.  
The banks operate loan remedial units that bear some similarities to the English Bank 
Support Unit (BSU) situated within head offices of banks in England and tasked with 
the turnaround of distressed SMEs.899 Although the remedial units observed in 
Nigeria were not said to be exclusively committed to SMEs, lenders revealed that 
larger companies and loans are often taken outside such units to be restructured by 
most senior management with more authority.  
Unlike the BSU however, the responsibility of remedial departments to rescue 
companies in distress is not as pronounced in Nigeria. There are no clear guidelines 
or criteria for entry or exit from these remedial units and decisions seem to be left to 
the discretion of department heads.  
In terms of the restructuring process itself, debt forgiveness is rare, so are debt equity 
swaps, refinancing, asset sales or any kind of corporate restructuring. This is 
consistent with the findings of Frank and Sussman in the BSU, where banks rarely 
take a soft stand, making refinancing and debt forgiveness uncommon. Considering 
the views of lenders about debtor recalcitrance, Frank and Sussman’s argument that 
the disinclination from a soft approach may be a way of dealing with strategic default 
by corporate debtors is plausible in relation to Nigeria. Much of the restructuring is 
                                                          
898 Lender 1. This confirms the restructuring professionals’ point later in the chapter that debt restructuring would 
often need to be combined with some corporate restructuring to regain the faith of lenders in the business. 
899 Frank and Sussman’s research on how UK banks deal with the financial distress of SMEs was discussed in 
chapter two. Franks and Sussman (n 207) 65-96. 
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better described as a fictive rescheduling of debt which does little or nothing to 
improve the health of the company.  
Frank and Sussman indicate that more concessions might be seen where bigger 
companies are involved as the decision makers have full authority in such cases. 
Again, this is consistent with the findings on multi creditor debt restructuring of big 
companies in Nigeria, discussed below. 
Consistent with studies regarding the perception of professionals about their own 
work, bank officials in the interviews displayed great confidence in their expertise900 
and the accuracy of their discretion when it comes to issues of default and financial 
distress. They saw no need to explain their administrative decisions as they expect to 
be trusted to be capable of making the right call by virtue of their positions. However, 
other professionals challenge their claim to expertise- finance experts and lawyers 
who consider bankers to be ill-equipped to make the assessments about the viability 
of companies. 
This professional dilemma complicates, (or is perhaps complicated by) a pervasive 
sense of distrust among the stakeholders. Lenders regard debtors with suspicion, 
accusing them of a lack of integrity and management skills. They also consider courts 
to be complicit in companies’ evasive schemes by accommodating frivolous suits 
designed by clever companies to avoid payment.  
In speaking about the attitudes and actions of other stakeholders, participants 
attributed some of the practices they identified to culture, which they considered to 
be peculiar to Nigeria (and sometimes Africa). For example, IPs believed that 
reputation-based lending is informed by wider socio-cultural elements such as a 
cultural tendency to worship the rich and influential; and exalt social status over 
merit. Similarly, debtor recalcitrance is considered another manifestation of the 
‘Nigerian factor’, a cultural tendency to cut corners and shirk responsibility.901 As 
                                                          
900 Eliot Freidson, ‘Theory of professionalism: Method and substance’ (1999) 9(1) International Review of Sociology, 
127 (professionals claim that they deal with problems so complex and esoteric such that it is difficult for outsiders 
to understand or make choices for them; Keith Hawkins (ed.), The Uses of Discretion (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992); 
Terrence Johnson, Professions and Power (London, Macmillan 1972). 
901 Confirming findings in study by Adebola. Adebola, Corporate rescue (n 43) 191. 
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expected in any qualitative study, some of the claims must be taken with caution. For 
example, the trends that participants identified as cultural must be read with the 
understanding of the nebulousness of culture as a concept.    
Finally, lenders consider debt restructuring, turnaround finance and corporate rescue 
desirable goals that can be beneficial to companies and the economy but feel 
constrained and unable to effectively restructure distressed companies and pursue the 
goal of corporate rescue as a result of a combination of factors- opportunistic 
behaviour of debtors, the difficult macro-economic environment they operate in and 
regulatory constraints. In many cases, they pursue debt restructuring as an initial 
reaction to default. However, this is mostly a fictive debt rescheduling that may buy 
some time for both the debtor and the creditor, but with no real expectation that the 
company will recover from distress.  
 
SECTION TWO: HOW STAKEHOLDERS INTERACT WITH EXISTING 
INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS. 
 
The interviews explored stakeholders’ perception of and experience with the legal 
framework and institutions for insolvency and debt restructuring.902 This helped to 
understand (i) how stakeholders interpret and interact with corporate insolvency law 
in practice and (ii) the shadows that these laws cast on informal debt restructuring.  
6.5. A debt recovery culture 
The responses of bankers revealed that the understanding and practice of corporate 
insolvency among Nigerian lenders is largely centred on debt recovery.903  Although 
they all claimed to have procedures for informal debt restructuring as described 
above, it plays a less significant role in dealing with corporate financial distress. 
An interesting practice which all the lenders admitted to, is the movement away from 
the conventional means of recovery such as foreclosure and receivership, towards less 
orthodox (and sometimes aggressive) recovery techniques, the most common of 
                                                          
902 Recall that perceptions of the judicial system from the interviews were discussed in the previous chapter. 
903 The means of recovery available under the law are foreclosure actions, sale (with or without recourse to the 
court), simple action for debt sum and receivership. 
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which is the involvement of law enforcement agents. Lenders have found a way to use 
the available space in law enforcement to replace or get around the inadequacies of 
the legal system. They do this by looking out for actions of the debtor’s management 
that may be interpreted as fraudulent, for example, a bounced cheque.904  The banks 
deploy special criminal prosecutors like the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC), whose mandate is to handle cases of fraud and economic crimes. 
This device works for lenders because using agencies who attach little importance to 
the concept of corporate personality is an easy way to ‘lift the veil’.  In the lenders’ 
experience, directors tend to respond better to the fear of prosecution than civil action. 
These are not genuine attempts to prosecute criminal actions. Rather, they are 
strategies to drive corporate debtors to the negotiating table and readjust the balance 
of power so that lenders can negotiate from a position of strength.905  
 Other lenders revealed that they publicly shame and harass managers of small 
companies with the aid of the police, sometimes in their church or their houses.906   
In response to the high demand for debt recovery, some persons (usually lawyers, 
accountants, former bank workers) have carved a niche for themselves as professional 
debt recovery agents. All the banks stated they kept a list of recovery agents handy 
and often engage their services.907  
6.6. Receivership 
6.6.1. Lenders’ views. 
In theory, it should be easier to deal with corporate debtors because banks would 
typically take a debenture on the company’s assets and easily appoint a receiver or 
Receiver Manager (RM) to realise the debt. However, as reported in the previous 
chapter, receivership is often a difficult and litigious process.908  
                                                          
904 Criminal Code Act, s 473. 
905 Banks may not have considered (or perhaps are unbothered) that this could be interpreted as offending the law 
against attempts at extortion or gain by threat of criminal action. Criminal Code Act, s 408. 
906 One lender described what he tagged the ‘STORM’ method where about ten bank officials would storm the 
company’s premises to intimidate them into compliance. 
907 Some of these debt recovery agents also act as insolvency practitioners in receivership or winding up. 
908 Ch 5, section 5.4.2. 
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For example, lenders reported that even where the debt instrument empowers a 
creditor to appoint a receiver/RM, receivers hardly come into place without the 
involvement of the court. This is because of the need to seek some protective orders, 
such as an order mandating the Commissioner of Police to provide security for the 
receiver. A move necessitated by the resistance (sometimes physical violence) that 
often attends an attempt by the receiver or RM to take over a company.909  
Lenders also thought that a receiver management’s potential for turnaround was 
limited by lack of industry knowledge and expertise by IPs.  Usually lawyers (and in 
fewer cases accountants) are appointed as receivers/RMs. Many lenders believed that 
lawyers who act as receiver managers do not have sufficient patience and skill as ‘they 
just want their 20 per cent commission’.910  When asked why they continue to appoint 
lawyers to act as receiver manager inspite of this, lenders explained that since 
receiverships are often contentious, it is more effective to put in a lawyer who is battle-
ready, rather than appointing another professional who would still need to engage a 
lawyer.    
There is also the interesting angle of using receivership as a bargaining chip, to harass 
debtors into offering a restructured payment.  Lenders exploit their knowledge of the 
territorial nature of owner/managers.  Corporate debtors resist receivership because 
they consider it a death sentence.911  The threat of a receivership can force managers 
(who are bent on retaining control) to raise payment by all means necessary, especially 
where they are unable to come up with ways to challenge the receivership in court.  
‘Sometimes, we try to get ahead of the company in the game. We find a clever lawyer 
who knows his way around the court and can ensure that the debtor’s case never 
sees the light of day. At the end of the day, the company is forced to come to the 
negotiating table’.912  
                                                          
909As later see from the IPs’ perspective, it is not strange for a receiver/RM to be confronted with physical threat 
and danger to his person. 
910 Again, we must question whether receivers do this based on the knowledge (and perhaps direct instruction) 
that the banks want their money out as quickly as possible.  
911 And lenders and IPs admit that it often is. 
912 Lender 10. 
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For lenders that are able to pull this off, it is a win-win situation. If the company 
refuses to cooperate, lenders cut their losses and continue with the receivership.  
The combination of lack of expertise, resistance from corporate debtors, shortcomings 
of the judicial system and lack of transparency makes a rescue-oriented receivership 
unappealing.  As noted in the previous chapter however, some restructuring still 
occurs in receivership. This is revisited in the discussion of multi-creditor 
restructuring below. 
6.6.2. IPs’ views 
As stated earlier, most lenders appoint lawyers as IPs in Nigeria. When asked, some 
of the lawyers admitted that they are not always in the best position to serve as RM.  
‘I believe that if you really want a turnaround, anyone with no understanding of 
the business of the distressed company has no business being a RM. I am a lawyer 
and we make money from it but that is the truth. At the end of the day, we still end 
up hiring experts who want to be paid thousands of dollars per day. That is a lot for 
a dying business’.913  
IPs also admitted to feeling torn between the lender(s) and borrower, and having a 
hard time balancing their duties to both parties.  
‘You don’t want to be seen as doing anything prejudicial to the interests of the 
company. At the same time, you don’t want to be seen as betraying the lenders who 
appointed you. It is quite tough’.914  
In the end, most IPs tend to do the bidding of the lenders. This according to one of 
them, makes them take a heavy-handed approach to the process as they do not want 
to be considered weak or inefficient by the banks.  
One IP admitted that taking a softer, more conciliatory stance as a RM has made him 
less popular, but in the cases where the stakeholders really desired a turnaround 
                                                          
913 IP 2.  
914 IP 8. 
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(because of the importance of the company involved), they have sought him out.915 
Other issues identified with receiver managers were corruption and lack of 
integrity.916 
 
6.7. Winding up 
6.7.1. Lenders’ views 
Like some lenders do with receivership, winding up petitions for most of the lenders 
are used as a threat to bring the debtor to the negotiating table. They pointed out that 
this is particularly effective for politically exposed persons, who fear the reputational 
damage and are therefore forced to negotiate a payment plan.  
‘I must be honest, I cannot recall any winding up where we went through with the 
process. At first, they think we are not serious but once we get a court order to 
advertise the petition, they quickly come to discuss a restructuring plan’.917  
Thus, winding up petitions are targeted at companies that are believed to be going 
concerns or where the owner/managers have ‘something to offer’.918 For companies 
that have become insolvent or with less wealthy owner/managers, lenders do not 
consider them worth the trouble of a winding up procedure. They simply find ways 
to take what they can and walk away. 
Interestingly, some courts may have begun to catch up to this practice and are reacting 
by exercising their discretion not to grant the winding up order.919 One of the cases 
that three lenders brought up in the interviews was that of a big importing business 
that was indebted to a number of banks. In a winding up petition filed by one of the 
lenders, the directors of the distressed company argued that they might be able to pay 
                                                          
915 It would therefore seem that lenders know that it is possible to turn around companies, with patience and 
some sacrifice, but they mount the pressure for quick recovery on IPs because they are unwilling to wait. 
916 One IP mentioned names of RMs that have been caught in the act of embezzling already scarce funds from 
companies they were appointed to manage, without any legal repercussions. 
917 Lender 9. Another lender admitted that they wind up in extreme cases. When asked for his definition of extreme, 
he referred to debtors that never intended to pay from day one. 
918 Meaning even if the company is not viable, it might have influential owners whom, if pushed to the wall, will 
obtain funds from other sources to pay off some of the debt. 
919 CAMA does give the court considerable discretion in this regard. On hearing a winding up petition, the court 
has several options- it may dismiss it, adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally, make any interim 
order, or any other order that it thinks fit. CAMA, s 411. 
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in the future if the court gave them time. Even though the legal requirements for the 
winding up were met, the court, to the surprise of the lenders, granted the company’s 
prayer. In their view, the company was no longer viable, but the court was only 
swayed by the reputation of the company.920  
6.7.2. IPs’ views on winding up. 
IPs confirmed that they are hardly ever engaged to wind up distressed companies.  
Most of the liquidation they do is in relation to corporate restructuring. In their 
experience, when a company is truly insolvent, it is uncommon to see creditors take 
the trouble to wind up the company. Rather, the banks strip the company by selling 
the assets and then abandon the shell. 
6.8. Arrangement and compromise (‘schemes’) 
6.8.1. Lenders’ views 
Commercial lenders had little to say about schemes and could only relate to its use for 
corporate restructuring, usually to achieve a capital reduction or a demerger. The 
scheme is often outside their contemplation for distressed debt restructuring, even 
though it provides a framework for such restructuring. When probed further, two of 
the lenders disclosed that schemes are less attractive because of the previously 
discussed uncertainty around the kinds of arrangements that the CBN would 
sanction. 
6.8.2. IPs’ views on schemes 
Insolvency practitioners also had reservations regarding the use of schemes, but their 
answers were based more on a technical understanding of the procedure. Two IPs 
highlighted that schemes of arrangement in Nigeria suffer drawbacks such as the lack 
of moratorium and an inability to obtain a universal stay of proceeding. These issues 
are further complicated in Nigeria by the weak state of the courts.  
                                                          
920 While it is a good step that courts are conscious of the need for corporate rescue, there must also be certainty 
and these decisions must not be based on sentiments but on clear proof that a company is not better off liquidated. 
The participant also made the point that since the company was past the point of turnaround, such a court other 
only gives room for the company directors to quickly hide away and sell assets and leave a shell for the creditors. 
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Considering that many Nigeran contracts increasingly choose English law as the 
governing law, it became important to explore whether a scheme involving Nigerian 
creditors can be done in the UK and enforced in Nigeria. Legal practitioners could not 
provide easy answers to this question. One lawyer thought that such a scheme might 
run into enforcement difficulties. Rather than being considered as a foreign judgment 
that can be registered in a Nigerian court, it could be interpreted as an attempt to apply 
the UK Companies Act in Nigeria. Two other lawyers were more optimistic about the 
possibility of sanctioning a UK scheme in Nigeria. In their view, Nigerian law allowed 
parties freedom to choose the law to govern their contract. If they have chosen English 
law, their choice would be honoured by the courts and such a scheme will be 
registrable as a foreign judgment.921 It may however not be possible to cram down a 
whole class of creditors or bind creditors in Nigeria that have not participated in 
scheme. The lawyers opined that because the system is still developing, the rules can 
be quite flexible and well-respected lawyers can take advantage of this to pitch 
innovative ideas to the court.   
Summary of findings: concentrated ownership and control, a debt recovery culture 
and mutant institutions. 
Stakeholders emphasised that from their experience, the owner-manager company 
structure is predominant in the Nigerian corporate environment. This impacts 
corporate lending and informs the response of stakeholders to financial distress. 
Lenders believe that most owing companies can find a way to raise the funds, whether 
from the business or other sources. They reported that with creative recovery 
strategies, managers always find a way to pay at least a proportion of the debt. This 
incentivises lenders to focus on diligent, and sometimes aggressive recovery. In 
pursuing recovery, lenders did not draw a clear distinction between the company’s 
directors and the company itself, even where big companies were concerned.  
 The interviews also provided more clarity on how the insolvency legal framework is 
perceived and used by stakeholders. Stakeholders have an uneasy relationship with 
                                                          
921 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 2004, part 1& s 10(a) and the Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Judgments Act 1958. 
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the law and the courts that administer them. Courts are largely used as a tool by a 
party who seeks to get around the law rather than enforce it. For debtors, it provides 
a form of forced moratorium, to keep the creditor from pursuing recovery but with no 
rescue plan in place. For the creditor, winding up and sometimes receivership petitions 
are often a tool to achieve an arm-twisted-behind-back form of restructuring.  For the 
IPs, legal institutions provide a means to achieve recovery at all cost.  Frameworks like 
schemes that are complex and provide little openings for such easy manoeuvre are 
seldom used. Also, because corporate rescue has not taken root in the system, there is 
no difference in the execution of a simple receivership and one managed by a RM.    
Again, more skepticism among stakeholders of each other’s professional expertise is 
revealed, this time directed at lawyers and judges. Lenders consider lawyers ill-suited 
to act as receivers because they lack the skills required to understand business and 
finance. They however feel bound to keep engaging lawyers because of the potential 
of receiverships to get litigious.  
It is noteworthy that the issues identified by the participants here are aggravated by 
lack of transparency, corruption, a weak judicial system and poor corporate 
governance. These recurrent themes in the interviews were discussed in the previous 
chapter. There were anecdotes and examples to suggest that corruption is woven into 
the fabric of the society, again suggesting that it is a cultural problem. Whether this 
perception is rightly shaped by reality, imagined or exaggerated, it feeds the culture 
of distrust and suspicion among stakeholders. Because there is no legal framework to 
regulate the actions of parties, this lack of trust poses a serious challenge for corporate 
debt restructuring. 
SECTION THREE: MULTI-CREDITOR RESTRUCTURING: A GROWING 
PRACTICE IN NIGERIA. 
One of the goals of the interviews was to understand the experience of stakeholders 
with multi-creditor restructuring. As discussed in chapter three, it is important for a 
distressed company with multiple creditors that all creditors can agree to a 
restructuring plan rather than unilateral (and conflicting) action by each creditor. 
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Multi-creditor restructuring happens less frequently in Nigeria and in addition to the 
constraints discussed above, it comes with unique challenges of its own. 
 
6.9. The lenders’ account of multi-creditor restructuring 
Coordination problems 
Most of the lenders struggled with the question on multi-creditor restructuring 
because of their limited experience with it. Their answers revolved around 
coordination problems and a lack of moratorium, reflecting some of the issues 
identified with private workouts in chapter three.922 
It was difficult for most lenders to think of multi-creditor restructuring other than in 
cases where there had been coordination at the time of borrowing. Thus, they 
struggled with the idea of a multi-creditor work out where the facility was not a 
syndicated loan, or the creditors were not united by a debenture trust deed.923  
There is room for coordination where different creditors are party to a syndication or 
a debenture trust deed. With the latter, the lenders loan the company money at 
different times but become party to one debenture trust by seeking the permission of 
the existing lenders. When the company runs into difficulties, the appointed trustee 
coordinates recovery. However, lenders admitted that within this set up, 
circumstances still arise that make it necessary for each party to fight for its own 
interests. The tendency is for the bank with highest exposure to try to get ahead of the 
others, even though they are all equally ranked in priority. This would often result in 
litigation. A lender cited an ongoing case where the three lenders decided to appoint 
receivers individually rather than appoint a trustee, because one bank made the first 
move to do so.  
Thus, even where there was coordination at the time of borrowing, coordinating to 
resolve financial distress is difficult. Nevertheless, some lenders shared their 
                                                          
922 Ch 3, section 3.3.1.  
923 Having identified syndication as a criterion for multi-creditor restructuring, lenders pointed out that they were 
not very common, at least for the smaller banks (this happens to be about 50% of the banks in Nigeria).  
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experiences with multi-creditor workout both for syndicated and non- syndicated 
borrowing. 
Self-interest and lack of moratorium 
One of the banks narrated an ongoing case of a publicly-owned company with 
multiple bank lenders. When the company became distressed, the bank’s lawyer 
suggested what he termed a ‘multilateral creditor scheme ‘where all the banks come 
together, conduct a joint audit of the company and make a restructured payment plan 
based on the business review. 924   
The proposed scheme got no traction because while the discussions were still ongoing, 
one of the banks filed a winding up suit. When asked to suspend the petition and give 
the scheme a try, the bank refused.  According to the lender, this was because the 
petitioning bank strangely believed they were in a stronger position by being the first 
to present a winding up petition. Strange because (i) all the banks gave a negative 
pledge and were equally ranked as there was no collateral and (ii) the petitioning bank 
was the bank with the least financial exposure. Therefore, in a winding up proceeding, 
there was no reason why they would be in a better position than the other banks. 
However, this may not be completely irrational reasoning considering the previously 
discussed use of winding up petitions as a threat. The managers of the company may 
be forced to scamper around to pay the company that delivers this threat, even though 
they are not the ones with the biggest exposure and have no priority over other banks.  
In a different interview, another lender confirmed that the main reason why multi-
creditor restructuring would not work is because some lenders would always believe 
they can benefit more outside of the process.  He admitted that if his loan is fully 
secured, anything short of selling the charged assets would be unacceptable to him.  
‘Any one that has something valuable would not want to join the consortium at 
that point. There would be winners and losers, and the security holder is likely to 
                                                          
924 Lender 9. The participant stated that he suspected that the distressed company had put the lawyer up to it.  
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be on the losing side as he may not get optimal return. In that case, I would prefer 
to go unilaterally’.925  
In the ‘multi-lateral scheme’ example, the participant also disclosed that apart from 
the lack of cooperation from the bank that petitioned for winding up, other lenders 
(including his bank) were reluctant about the process.  One of the issues was the 
period of time they would have had to wait for the company to recover. Another 
constraint was the reluctance to inject new money into the business and a general lack 
of faith in the process, perhaps due to the absence of a legal framework. As one banker 
said regarding a proposal for multi-creditor restructuring;  
‘our lawyer believes that we should give this joint restructuring a try, some of us 
think that he just wants to use us for an experiment’.926  
Relationship among lenders 
Two banks thought that they would be reluctant to do a multi-creditor workout, 
especially when the other banks involved are bigger. They claimed that there is a 
culture of bullying in the banking industry and in a multi-creditor workout, they 
could expect that the bigger banks would stifle the smaller ones in an attempt to 
improve their position in the restructuring process.927    
One lender pointed out that some banks are more responsive and cooperative than 
others. Unresponsive banks are not diligent with monitoring and they are often very 
impossible to deal with. They are notorious in the industry for being ruthless and 
unyielding and this makes it difficult to partner with them.  
‘There are some banks that once I hear that they are in a consortium or syndication, 
I would not even go near it’.928  
 
                                                          
925 Lender 8. This is in line with the discussion in chapter one of the rational aversion of secured lenders to 
reorganisation. 
926 Lender 7. 
927 Because the smaller banks form the larger proportion of banks in Nigeria, this lack of trust potentially stands 
in the way of the growth of multi-creditor restructuring in the country. 
928 Lender 5. 
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Potential coordinating committee for informal restructuring 
Interestingly, commercial banks in Nigeria have found a way to cooperate and 
coordinate themselves for other purposes. This is seen in the Bankers’ Committee, an 
association created by the bankers. The bankers described the committee as a private 
body that bankers and customers can approach for information, to lodge a complaint 
and resolve bank-customer disputes. The Bankers’ Committee is funded by all the 
banks and in the view of one lender, can be a useful starting point for achieving 
coordination among the banks.929 Other banks were however less enthusiastic about 
the committee’s value to multi-creditor workouts, stating that a more independent 
body that was not affiliated to the banks would be in a better position to coordinate 
the process.   
6.10. Multi-creditor restructuring from the perspective of IPs 
Insolvency practitioners provided more nuanced answers to questions around multi-
creditor restructuring. Some of their responses demonstrated how the views 
expressed by lenders play out. One of the insolvency practitioners recounted their 
experience with a big oil company (‘the case’). Because it provides a practical example 
and explores most, if not all the issues highlighted by the other IPs, this case will be 
the focal point from which the views of IPs on multi-creditor restructuring are 
presented.  
The case of the oil company  
The company was a large company in the oil and gas industry, owned by a patriarch 
whose sons also served as chairman and board members. The company was on the 
brink of insolvency as a result of being unable to generate the cash flow to pay over 
four billion naira ($5 million) owed to a consortium of five Nigerian banks, a foreign 
creditor and an institutional lender.930 The banks had joint security over some of the 
assets (in the form of a debenture trust) and some members of the consortium had 
individual charges over other assets. After struggling to restructure unilaterally, 
                                                          
929 This committee could potentially play the role of authorised committees like the Indonesia JITF under the 
Jakarta Initiative, in the implementation of guidelines for informal debt restructuring. Ch 3, 63-64. 
930  Excluding debt to other creditors such as suppliers and trade creditors. 
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lenders put the company into receivership by appointing a receiver manager and 
attempted a multi-creditor workout during the receivership.  The receivership was 
useful for surmounting some of the coordination problems highlighted by the lenders. 
Coordination problems and decision making 
All the IPs emphasised that one of the main issues with multi-creditor restructuring is 
that lenders find it so hard so decide among themselves.  One of the factors that made 
lenders come to the restructuring table at all in the case was the involvement of 
AMCON.931 Unfortunately, while AMCON is often able to bring lenders to the table, 
there is a limit to the resources it can provide and its ability to demand cooperation 
from them. Despite the fact that the receivership provided some form of coordination 
through the RM, there was no mechanism for decision making. 
The IPs in the case narrated how they drew up several term sheets and lenders could 
not agree to any one of them in the end. In their experience, lenders find it hard to 
decide because of two factors, distrust (of the company, the IPs and other lenders) and 
the perception that they are (or could be) in a stronger position than the others.  
The effect of security interests 
One bone of contention among the lenders was security. The banks that thought they 
had good security over some valuable assets proved to be the most difficult parties 
during the restructuring process. They refused to agree to virtually all the proposals, 
on the basis that they would be in a better position outside the restructuring process. 
This is a rational position to take, if one has existing and enforceable security.  
Interestingly however, they did not realise that the security they took such great 
comfort in was only valuable on paper. This case clearly shows how security provides 
little comfort in the Nigerian lending industry. Once the lenders moved to take action 
against the company, the bulk of the assets were quickly depleted by the owners and 
the lenders had no clue until the receivership was well under way.932 It was upon 
                                                          
931 AMCON had bought some of the debts of the company from some banks and therefore participated in the 
restructuring as a creditor. 
932 The IP pointed out that it was not uncommon for lenders to put their faith in assets that they have neither seen, 
valued nor made efforts to monitor. 
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investigation by the IP that they realised that some vanished into thin air, some were 
in bad shape requiring millions to be revamped, and others were the subject of court 
action where the claim value exceeded the value of the assets, leaving the life of the 
company hanging on a few solid assets. 
In this situation, the banks that had security over those good assets were not about to 
compromise. To make it worse, lenders blatantly disregarded their commitments 
under the loan documents. It did not matter that all the loans were extensively 
documented and properly executed.  A proposal from the restructuring professional 
was to pool the assets together for the restructuring while maintaining the priority of 
payment.  Again, this proposal was rejected, as the secured creditors insisted that the 
other creditors buy into the security by contributing new money. 
Commercial orientation of lenders 
Another major issue that IPs found in multi-party restructuring was that banks were 
not always commercially realistic and flexible. They often came with a fixed idea of 
how a restructuring should go - a corporate debtor who is willing to bend over 
backwards and pay the debt by any means necessary, failing which the bank pursues 
aggressive recovery. Their understanding of restructuring was also limited to granting 
longer tenures or reducing interest rates. They therefore found it difficult to adapt to 
different kinds of debtors and commercial realities. In the case, the IP pointed out that 
this behaviour manifested in different ways.  For example, the lenders immediately 
demanded that the RM sell the company’s assets once he gained control. It took a lot 
of convincing by the IP for the lenders to agree to work the assets instead, as selling 
them would not have yielded more than 10 per cent of the amount owed.933  Also, 
during the restructuring, the lenders paid little attention to the cost implications of 
their decisions. Forgetting that they were now the residual beneficiaries, they 
mounted up costs, claiming the debtor was to bear the costs of the restructuring.   
One recurring issue in the restructuring processes is that banks dominate the 
restructuring and creditors such as suppliers (trade creditors) are often left out. This 
                                                          




remains the case even where the larger proportion of the debt is owed to suppliers.934 
Many large servicing companies would usually have a massive number of suppliers 
and this is one of the often-overlooked factors that can destroy the whole process. IPs 
pointed out that banks are often blind to supplier obligations and insist on 
restructuring debtor’s obligations without factoring these obligations in. This always 
results in unrealistic figures and projections for the restructuring. Admittedly, 
coordination may be more difficult to achieve with the involvement of suppliers. 
However, the exclusion of their interests from the process creates difficulties as the 
company eventually gets drowned by demands from suppliers. In the case, although 
trade creditors were not involved in the restructuring, the IP reported that they 
constantly harassed the borrower and the RM. In his view, this was one of the reasons 
why the restructuring could not have worked.   
Attitude to new finance 
IPs confirmed that turnaround finance, which is arguably the lifeblood of 
restructuring is also a major challenge. Once they have entered a formal insolvency 
process, the provision of additional finance is usually out of the question for banks as 
they are become anxious to exit the process. In one IP’s experience, the grant of priority 
to providers of additional finance causes considerable difficulties that they are often 
unable to resolve.  He cited an ongoing multi-creditor restructuring where a proposal 
had been made for additional facility with enhanced priority for the finance providers.  
The existing creditors however refused to offer this priority as they argued that they 
were all making concessions in the restructuring and these concessions were 
tantamount to rescue finance because without them, the restructuring would not 
work. 
 IPs have sought to explore other sources of rescue finance such as equity investment 
with little success. They admitted that the entrant of DDIs into the market would make 
a huge difference but were not very optimistic because while some investors are 
                                                          
934 For example, in the ongoing Etisalat case, a huge percentage of the debt is owed to HIS Towers even though the 
restructuring is dominated by the consortium of banks. Akinpelu Dada and Ozioma Ubabukoh, ‘Etisalat, lenders 
disagree over $1.2bn loan repayment’ The Punch (23 June 2017) <http://punchng.com/etisalat-lenders-disagree-
over-1-2bn-loan-repayment/ > accessed 10 September 2018. 
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beginning to trickle into the field, the debt market remains underdeveloped. They also 
believed that it would take investors who have a very high appetite for risk to invest 
in Nigeria’s distressed loans. 
Lack of cooperation from debtors 
The RM in the case reported that the first challenge they faced was intense resistance 
from the company owner/managers to the receivership. It took months of court 
hearings, intervention from law enforcement and persuasion, before the receiver 
manager could finally take over the company. During this time, the IP involved had 
cause to believe that their personal safety was under threat.935  
One other issue identified by IPs was the attachment of distressed companies to idle 
assets. These assets are non-core assets like landed property and buildings that can 
provide funds for the business to be turned around. In an ongoing case observed in 
the process of this research, the total debt figure was about 500 million naira (USD 1.4 
million) while the idle assets that could have been sold came up to 250 million naira 
(USD 690, 000). The company remained adamant to recommendations to sell the assets 
claiming they could get more value for the assets under better economic conditions. 
While this is a conceivable argument, they seemed to miss the point that one of the 
reasons they were on the brink of insolvency in the first place was the adverse 
economic condition and they stood to lose both the business and its assets.  
IPs argued that attachment to idle assets is more of an emotional than commercial or 
rational reasoning. For them it is closely related to the tendency of owner/managers 
to desperately hold on to a sinking company, against all reason.  Restructuring 
professionals were of the view that many owner/managers would rather have a 
hundred per cent stake in a dying company than ten per cent in a healthy one.936  
The role of foreign actors 
Interestingly, the large restructurings that have happened recently and are currently 
underway in Nigeria involve foreign creditors (and their advisers) from jurisdictions 
                                                          
935 Other IPs confirmed that this was not an uncommon experience with receivership.  
936 Since this kind of dilution is likely to happen in Distressed Debt Investment, an IP pointed out that it is 
potentially a barrier to its use as a restructuring tool. 
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with more developed restructuring and insolvency laws. The interviews sought to 
investigate the influence of these creditors on multi-creditor restructuring, 
particularly whether they have tried to apply modern restructuring principles in the 
way they handle the process.  IPs admitted that the decision to restructure distressed 
companies can be partly attributed to exposure to ‘new ways of approaching debt 
problems’ globally and the fact that many big Nigerian companies increasingly have 
foreign creditors and investors. This means that foreign professionals such as 
international law firms and investment banks are often involved in the process. The 
Nigerian government in a bid to protect jobs and other systemic risks associated with 
the collapse of big companies, also weighs in on the decision and participates in the 
process, usually through AMCON. IPs however stated that while foreign creditors are 
open to participating in a rescue process, their presence has not made a significant 
difference.   
‘Foreign creditors don’t come with the approach of corporate rescue even though 
that is what happens in their countries. They want their money immediately’.937 
An IP relayed his experience in the financial restructuring of a big company where 
foreign creditors prolonged the process by demanding a government guarantee as the 
condition for their participation in the process.  
 
Summary of findings: multi creditor restructuring, coordination problems and 
lack of clear guidelines. 
Multi creditor debt restructuring is gaining some popularity as a stakeholder response 
to the financial distress of big companies. This restructuring can occur purely as an 
informal process or as part of a formal process- usually receivership. Restructuring of 
this kind is often accompanied by a corporate rescue goal. In some cases, the process 
enjoys government support, because of the economic significance of the corporate 
entity in question. The trend towards the restructuring rather than 
recovery/liquidation of big companies increasingly involves foreign actors (creditors, 
                                                          
937 IP 1. 
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investors, lawyers and other professionals) even though their participation does not 
always make a significant difference to the process. 
 
Attempting a restructuring within a receivership provides a form of moratorium and 
means of coordinating creditors, but several challenges remain. Even though CAMA 
contemplates the use of receiver management as a rescue device, it is still viewed as a 
recovery process, even by IPs.  For example, damaging enforcement actions by 
security holders is not curtailed, and it is evident from the case that this can impede 
the process. Also, the absence of clear guidelines creates confusion for all involved. 
Like with informal restructuring, there is no requirement to come up with a clear 
rescue or restructuring plan, neither is there a mechanism for decision making.  The 
provision of turnaround finance is also problematic.  
In the interviews, lenders were opposed to the idea of super priority for rescue finance 
as they considered that this would be an unfair advantage over other creditors who 
have submitted to a restructuring. Also, the receivership and restructuring are treated 
as separate processes. In the case, the IP explained that there were two separate work 
streams for the receivership and the restructuring. The receiver manager oversaw the 
recovery while a separate team handled the restructuring. Treating the receivership 
and a restructuring that occurs within it as two separate procedures not only creates 
confusion, it also has adverse cost implications for an already distressed borrower. 
These issues indicate the need for a framework for multi-creditor restructuring to 
provide clear guidance for the process and resolve coordination problems. 
  
SECTION FOUR: PROPOSED REFORM 
Another major aim of the empirical study was to understand the views of stakeholders 
regarding the proposals for corporate insolvency law reform in Nigeria. The questions 
focused mostly on the proposed introduction of administration and the CVA 
procedures.   
6.11. The Lenders’ views on the reform proposals. 
When asked if they were familiar with the proposal to reform corporate insolvency 
law by introducing these procedures, only two lenders knew that an insolvency bill 
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existed.938 They however had no idea about the changes that the Bill was trying to 
make.939  
It became the task of the interviewer to give the lenders some education about what 
the Bill proposes and how the administration and CVA procedures work. 
Based on their reaction to proposed changes, there were three categories of lenders: 
The first were those who disagreed with the introduction of administration for 
different reasons. For example, some of the lenders in this category immediately saw 
similarities between administration and receiver management and transferred their 
skepticism of receiver management to the administration procedure.   
The second group of lenders had their reservations but thought that the law might do 
some good, to the extent that the rules are clear, and the law learns from the pitfalls of 
receivership.  
The last group did not engage with the substance of the reform. They either thought 
it was unnecessary, unlikely to happen or irrelevant to their work.  
Category 1940 
On learning that corporate rescue is a crucial component of the administration 
procedure (unlike in receivership), and that the administrator enjoys more 
independence from the lenders in the performance of his duties, many lenders became 
skeptical. Almost all the lenders941 expressed resistance to any rules that might have 
the effect of binding them to a restructuring process. They maintained that the banks 
are already very heavily restrained by regulation and when it comes to decisions 
around debt recovery, there should be ‘no additional regulation in a bid to save businesses’. 
These lenders did not dispute the value in debt restructuring but would like the 
freedom to decide when and how to go about the process. They considered it unwise 
                                                          
938 One of them read about it in the news and the other heard about it through a friend that was an executive 
member of BRIPAN. 
939 They pointed out that they should ordinarily be contacted about reforms that might impact them and asked to 
make comments, but they had not been intimated of any such plans regarding the Bill.  
940 Seven lenders fell in this category. 
941 Two of the lenders thought that having a framework that binds all lenders to a rescue process was a good way 
of ensuring corporate rescue.   
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to waste time in administration only to begin a long, court-driven recovery process 
when the administration falls apart. 
 ‘How are we sure the assets are not deteriorating while we wait around for an 
administrator to turn the business around? Are the insurance policies for the assets 
still in place?’942 
 ‘At the end of the day, whose interests are we protecting? The lenders can sell their 
assets, so it’s not them you are helping, you are just elongating everyone’s 
suffering’.943 
A related point that lenders made was that as long as problems like high cost of funds 
remain unsolved, there is a limit to how many concessions banks will be willing to 
give or how long they want to wait.  
‘In England, you have close to a perfect system, here you have a lot to deal with. In 
Nigeria, the procedure is likely to become prolonged and court-driven’ one lender 
pointed out.’  
Additionally, lenders expressed the fear that debtors would exploit the administration 
process and only initiate it as a delay tactic. Although administration is largely a 
creditor-controlled process, banks believed that it would encourage default from 
debtors who are already recalcitrant and eager to take advantage of every loophole. 
Also, the lenders reasoned that the court system will continue to be a problem with 
administration.  
‘Do you know what would happen in Nigeria? They will kill themselves in court 
right from the appointment stage, even more than they already do in receivership, 
because a lot is at stake for creditors here.’944  
These issues are complicated by a deep distrust among stakeholders in the Nigerian 
debt market. Lenders do not trust corporate debtors, their colleagues in the industry, 
courts and insolvency practitioners. 
                                                          
942 Lender 3. 
943 Lender 8. 
944 Lender 9. 
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 ‘The administrator will come with the aim of stealing his own portion of the little 
money available.’945 
On what would happen if the law is eventually passed, some lenders doubted that it 
would get passed. Others predicted that if it did get passed, they would either not use 
the law, find ways to avoid its provisions through prolonged litigation or reducing 
the amount of corporate lending that they do altogether.946   
Category 2947 
Some lenders recognised that pursuing individual enforcement does not guarantee 
that a lender will get more returns. With a framework unifying the lenders and 
providing an avenue for coordination, it may be possible to achieve a value-
preserving restructuring.  
These lenders thought that a legal framework that provides for a moratorium would 
be very helpful as it would reduce litigation and eliminate extreme recovery practices 
by lenders. One of the lenders also mentioned that administration would help to 
provide better management for distressed companies. He imagined that the effect of 
administration would be that insolvency practice is no longer dominated by lawyers 
but by IPs with technical expertise.   
Category 3948 
This group of lenders did not delve into the merits or demerits of administration and 
CVA. They were either detached from insolvency law generally and/or simply 
dismissed the reform as unnecessary or misguided.  
                                                          
945 Lender 1. 
946 According to one lender, banks are already beginning to boycott corporate lending because of the difficulties 
that attend enforcement and recovery. They are increasingly shifting towards retail lending.  
‘Let me give 100 million naira to 50 individuals, they won’t all die or default at once. Better than giving 
all that money to a company that can suddenly go bankrupt’. 
947 Six lenders fell in this category. 
948 Two lenders fell in this category 
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‘It is the IPs that are trying to put the law together, so we are not the ones going to 
use it. Insolvency law might concern us, but I have not taken any particular interest 
in it’. 949 
The lenders thought that the proposed reform was just another irrelevant law that 
only sounded good in theory. 
‘If we get our court system right, we won’t need them. There is no lack of laws, we 
only need to use what we already have effectively’.950   
‘What we need are commercial courts that can dispose of cases very quickly’.951  
A lender thought that it was generally a bad idea to provide formal guidelines for debt 
restructuring and corporate rescue. He said that this could be limiting because in his 
experience, most of the creative ideas that have worked in distress situations have 
come from the most unexpected sources.  
‘Policies are straitjacket, but every corporate debtor is unique. In a moving economy 
like ours, we need to constantly review policy based on experience’.952 
6.11.1 Lenders’ views on a debtor in possession system. 
All the lenders were asked for their views on the US DIP system, and whether it would 
be a better alternative to administration. Except for one, lenders were largely opposed 
to a debtor in possession framework because of their distrust for the debtors in terms 
of management, integrity, competence and willingness to pay.953 Lenders believed 
that a system that leaves debtors in charge arms those debtors with ‘more powers to 
misbehave’. A lender lamented that a form of debtor in possession system is already 
                                                          
949 Lender 11. 
950 Lender 13. 
951 Lender 13. 
952 Lender 13. This echoes the arguments by Allen and Qian that in fast growing regions, the ability to conduct 
business and settle disputes outside the formal institutions may be superior to a strained resort to western-style 
institutions. This is because of the costs associated with constant revision of laws to adapt them to the rapidly 
changing economic environment. Allen and Qian (n 496) 118. 
953 These issues have been discussed earlier in the chapter. 
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creeping in through the backdoor. This comes in the form of the courts granting the 
prayers of distressed companies for more time to run the business.954  
 
6.12. IPs’ views on proposed reform.   
Like the lenders, IPs were divided in their views about the relevance and effectiveness 
of the reform.  
6.12.1. BRIPAN members  
Describing the reform process, the BRIPAN executives who were interviewed stated 
that a committee was set up to deliberate on the BRIPAN Bill. The committee was 
made up of representatives of banks, some companies and insolvency practitioners.955 
Answers were vague on whether the larger body of stakeholders had been consulted 
for comments on the Bill. One participant pointed out that a few stakeholders were 
consulted while another one suggested that stakeholders, particularly bankers, were 
often too busy to respond to such requests. One of the participants revealed that the 
Bill produced by BRIPAN had met with some competition in the senate as a different 
group proposed a different insolvency bill for legislation. At the time of the 
interviews, participants were uncertain about how these issues would be resolved or 
what the fate of the Bill would be.956 
6.12.2. Views of other insolvency practitioners about reform proposals. 
Category 1 
Not all IPs (including some that were members of BRIPAN) had heard about or taken 
any interest in the Bill. They however had opinions about the changes that the Bill 
proposes to make. 
                                                          
954 An example is the winding up petition discussed above, where the court denied the petition in response to the 
company’s arguments that it had prospects to continue contributing to the economy. 
955 The committee’s choice of English law has been discussed in the previous chapter. See Ch 5, 166-167. 
956 In May 2018, it was announced that the Companies Act reform had passed its third reading. The Companies 
and Allied Matters Bill purports to introduce the administration and CVA procedures. In this new form, it is 
unclear to what extent BRIPAN and other stakeholders in insolvency reform were involved in the reform process, 
but the reform is not as comprehensive as the BRIPAN Bill envisaged. 
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One of the IPs said that a restructuring framework is needed, even if only to provide 
a moratorium. The law will also help the courts to make recue-oriented decisions. 
‘The courts currently have no basis to deny dissenting lenders, and a law that gives 
them such grounds will do some good’.957 
Another insolvency practitioner thought that the proposed reform would have some 
positive impact because ongoing informal restructuring attempts could benefit from 
some formalisation. In his view, the adjustment process might be difficult, but the 
market would eventually buy into the law and align its practices with it. This 
adjustment process would require a reorientation for stakeholders, who must learn to 
use the court as a facilitator rather than an obstruction. He used arbitration as an 
example of a system that was initially misunderstood. Until recently, arbitration was 
almost always a first stage to litigation.  However, through years of education and 
advocacy, courts are beginning to understand that the whole idea of arbitration is to 
limit court intervention to a bare minimum.  
An IP pointed out that one of the values that the reform would bring is to make it easy 
for companies to move across insolvency procedures in an efficient manner. In his 
view, it is quite challenging to make the transition from a restructuring to a recovery 
process and vice versa.  
Most IPs also admitted that a restructuring framework would take care of the lack of 
clarity and uncertainty in the market. This is often a problem in restructuring because 
they are constantly on edge that all the hard work can be toppled by one creditor or 
regulator that disagrees. Because there is no enabling framework, the parties are often 
unsure of the legal implications of restructuring strategies and this makes 
stakeholders reluctant to invest time and effort in restructuring. As one of the lenders 
pointed out, they often regard restructuring plans as experiments.  
Category 2 
Not all the IPs were enthusiastic about the proposed reform. One IP said that he had 
not seen the law and did not need to do so for him to conclude that it was unnecessary.  
                                                          
957 IP 6. 
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He maintained that existing laws provide the needed framework for restructuring and 
they only need to be enforced properly.   
Another IP pointed out that because the market is lacking in transparency, integrity 
and trust, whatever reform is introduced will eventually be neutralised to the function 
the way receivership does. There will continue to be a need to deploy law enforcement 
agencies and engage in endless litigation to enforce the law. In his view, the situation 
becomes even worse if prepacks find their way into the system as there are no proper 
safeguards and checks on corporate fraud.  
Other objections came from practitioners who saw no real difference between receiver 
management and administration. In addition to this, one IP’s objections were 
informed by his opinions of the promoters of the Bill. He pointed out that they have a 
very limited understanding of finance as they are mostly litigation lawyers, and ‘this 
is evident in the way they practise receivership’. In his view, the reform is unlikely to 
change anything because it would be dominated by the practice of the drafters, 
whether in the way it is worded or in its interpretation and enforcement.  Thus, even 
if a commercially sound law is passed because of the transplant from English law, the 
practice remains the same.  
 
Summary of findings: proposed reform, disengaged stakeholders and divided 
views. 
Participants responded to the proposals for insolvency law reform with mixed 
reactions. Lenders were either completely ignorant of moves to change the law, in 
strong disagreement with, or unbothered by the proposed changes.  
When asked to choose, 14 out of 15 lenders thought that a creditor-oriented 
administration regime was more appropriate for Nigeria than a debtor-controlled 
system. Insolvency practitioners also shared this view.  Lenders however struggled 
with the idea of a law that would curtail their freedom to resolve corporate debt as 
they deem appropriate. They were of the view that the regulatory constraints they face 
and the difficult debt environment within which they operate make it unacceptable 
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for them to be locked into rescue efforts. As noted in the previous chapter, this group 
of stakeholders have the power to foil the settling of the law at the stage of 
implementation. Indeed, lenders in Nigeria are not oblivious of their power as 
creditors and of the loopholes in Nigerian institutions. Some lenders said that if a law 
that had the effect of placing them in this position gets passed, they would boycott the 
law or resort to creative application.  
 
Other participants objected to the reform on grounds that existing laws are sufficient, 
and the only reform needed was institutional reform. They insisted that laws would 
work if the institutions, especially the courts, work as they should. While it is right 
that an efficient court system is vital, it would seem that the lenders who thought that 
this was enough held that opinion because of their focus on debt recovery and not 
insolvency and restructuring law as a whole.  
Insolvency practitioners were more open to the enactment of a framework for debt 
restructuring although they highlighted the need for reorientation and institutional 
reform to avoid a duplication of existing framework in practice.  Considering that 
stakeholders (including some IPs) have already assumed so easily that there is no 
difference between administration and receiver (management), the concern that a new 
law would make no difference in practice is understandable.  
 
In general, most participants seemed disengaged from global norms of insolvency. For 
lenders, even though they were aware that advanced countries aim to rescue viable 
companies, they extricated themselves from these norms on the ground that the 
environment within which they operate calls for different methods, unlike advanced 
economies that have ‘near perfect systems’.  
IPs were more aware of systems like Chapter 11 and UK administration, even though 
many of them had no knowledge of the proposed reform in Nigeria. Practitioners who 
were not members of BRIPAN felt disenfranchised from the reform process.  
IPs who were directly aware of and/or involved in insolvency reform represent a very 
small percentage of practitioners in Nigeria. This may be due to the fact that 
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insolvency practice is not regulated in Nigeria, making almost any legal practitioner 
or accountant eligible to practice as an IP. The few IPs involved in the reform did not 
express optimism about its progress. While global actors such as INSOL and the 
World Bank are supportive of the reform process, the BRIPAN-led reform is short on 
political support.  
SECTION FIVE: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESTRUCTURING PRACTICE. 
Nigeria is beginning to experience some changes that can impact the restructuring 
practice in the country. The two developments that came out most prominently from 
the interviews are - the initiation of restructuring by skilled professionals and the rise 
of distressed debt investment.  
6.13. Skilled restructuring professionals (RPs)958, Lessons from a participant 
observation. 
Professional service providers and business consultants have taken a keen interest in 
debt restructuring in recent times.  Some interesting observations came out of 
speaking with this group of practitioners and observing an ongoing debt 
restructuring. Although RPs have on occasion been engaged by lenders in multi-
creditor restructuring to conduct business reviews and cash flow projections, they 
have started taking a more active role by initiating and driving debt restructuring. 
This means that they have had to go through distressed companies to initiate the 
process rather than wait to be engaged by lenders after the decision to restructure is 
made.  
The contribution of RPs is useful because it gives us some insight into the role and 
perspective of corporate debtors, even though no debtor was directly interviewed in 
this research. 
The restructuring professionals pointed out that one of the reasons that lenders 
seldom initiate restructuring is because the lack of coordination among them makes it 
hard to decide to restructure. RPs have therefore stepped in by adopting the strategy 
of finding distressed companies through market research in order to propose a 
                                                          




restructuring to them. They target troubled companies that either have high prospects 
for a turnaround or the backing of a foreign major shareholder. The restructuring 
professionals are efficient at this because they have the required resources, skill set 
and connections both within and outside the country. After the research, they put a 
proposal together and approach the company owners/managers.  Apart from the 
restructuring process itself, they perform two important functions. The first is an 
independent business review to enable them (and potentially the lenders) draw an 
educated conclusion about the viability of the company, and the value to be derived 
from restructuring. Secondly, once they have established that the company is viable, 
they play the crucial role of restoring the relationship between the company and its 
creditors and bringing them to the table. Because of the reputation and skills of these 
restructuring experts, creditors are more open to discussion. Also, the fact that the 
restructuring professionals are private, independent experts rather than regulatory 
bodies makes it easier to convince creditors to consider a multi-creditor restructuring.  
This practice is however not without its challenges.  Firstly, it is difficult for the expert 
to control the actions of the debtor as they are technically employed by them.  
One situation where this manifests most strongly is when change of management is 
crucial to the survival of the company. RPs lack the authority to displace the 
management that they report to.  They admitted that this kind of control may be easier 
where they are engaged by the banks. Apart from change of management, RPs find 
that they must work hard (sometimes without much success) to elicit compliance with 
their recommendations from the debtors.  
An ongoing case observed by the researcher illustrates these points clearly. The 
distressed company was one of the top manufacturers of iron aluminium in the 
country. The company had a large market share, with their products being a 
household name across Nigeria and parts of West Africa. Unfortunately, the company 
was indebted to six banks and was not generating enough cash flow to meet its debt 
obligations. After being instructed by the company, the RP conducted an IBR that 
revealed that the company was viable, and its products were in high demand. Lenders 
were brought to the restructuring table and the various debts were reorganised into a 
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‘syndicated facility’ where all rights and priorities remained intact. The syndication 
was to make the process easier and streamline decision making. The RP came up with 
a restructured payment schedule based on new cash flow projections and was tasked 
with the responsibility of monitoring the company and providing periodic reports and 
recommendations based on the company’s performance. It soon became clear that the 
company was not going to meet its next set of obligations under the restructured 
schedule.  
One of the factors that the RP identified as a major issue was poor management. It was 
clear that the management had become jaded, lacking in enthusiasm and creativity. 
This reflected in their attitude not just towards the running of the company, but also 
towards the restructuring. It took weeks of chasing and coercing for management to 
respond to the IP’s requests for information,959 they did not always honour meetings, 
rejected several suggestions for salary cuts and continued to take expensive trips 
abroad. The RPs however felt constrained to act and could not include these in their 
reports to the creditors.960  Notwithstanding these challenges, RPs were optimistic that 
increased involvement of skilled professionals (especially if they can go through the 
lenders) is bound to fuel the growth of debt restructuring in Nigeria.   
6.14. Distressed Debt Investment 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Distressed Debt Investment (DDI) is gradually 
becoming part of the conversation in the African debt market. Although stakeholders 
had some reservations about the use of DDIs in Nigeria, there is more optimism as the 
debt market grows, evidenced by the proliferation of bonds in the country.961 Also, 
with AMCON no longer purchasing NPLs from them, banks have begun to look for 
creative ways to deal with distressed assets on their hands. An IP cited the case of a 
Nigerian bank in the process of selling its troubled assets to a private equity fund.  
                                                          
959 The IP pointed out that this was caused by a combination of incompetence and having too many skeletons to 
hide. 
960 One can draw the preliminary conclusion from the RPs’ experiences that while some managers may be 
genuinely interested in early intervention and debt restructuring, a debtor in possession system may not be ideal 
in the Nigerian context.   
961 Babajide Komolafe, ‘Eurobond: Nigeria’s External Reserve to Hit 54 Month High of $45 billion’ Vanguard (19 
February 2018) <www.vanguardngr.com/2018/02/eurobond-nigeria-external-reserves-hit-54-months-high-
45bn/  > accessed 8 September 2018. 
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Another bank recently set up a debt resolution vehicle where the banks would transfer 
all its troubled assets to the vehicle and then explore options for the resolution of those 
assets.962 In a bid to supplement the work of AMCON, the CBN in April 2017 
announced proposals for the licencing of Private Asset Management Companies in 
Nigeria.963  
Banks considered the introduction of distressed debt investors in the Nigerian loan 
market a feasible solution. In their view, these investors are better placed for 
restructuring and corporate rescue, as they are not bound by the same constraints. 
However, banks would approach DDIs with some caution and would only be inclined 
to transfer distressed loans to DDIs if valuation is transparent and fair. 
Summary of findings: the emergence of skilled restructuring professionals and 
distressed debt investment 
As restructuring acquires a new layer of complexity because of the involvement of 
foreign investors, shareholders and creditors, multi creditor restructuring is beginning 
to gain momentum. The role of investment bankers, professional services firms and 
accountants is also becoming more prominent. Increasingly, restructuring 
professionals who have previously maintained a distance from the recovery-
dominated insolvency system are coming into the picture. These professionals are 
expanding the roles of professionals in insolvency practice beyond acting as receiver 
or liquidator.  Indeed, these experts have become proactive in seeking out viable 
companies and offering their services as restructuring professionals. Because they are 
affiliated with sister firms in economies where global norms of rescue are relatively 
established, they are positioned to introduce global norms of restructuring into the 
Nigerian market. Thus, the gradual entrance of distressed debt investment into the 
market is well timed as it provides much needed turnaround finance and exit for 
commercial lenders.   
                                                          
962 Ecobank Transnational Incorporated, the parent company of a pan African set up the first private sector funded 
debt resolution vehicle in Nigeria to resolve some of Ecobank Nigeria’s challenged assets. The transaction is still 
in its early days but indicates a move towards a robust distressed debt market in the country. Nnorom (n ). 
963 Whether this encourages, or stifles distressed debt investment as a result of over-regulation, remains to be seen. 
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The efforts of RPs are not without challenges, as coordination problems and the lack 
of a restructuring framework remain unresolved. Their work provided an opportunity 
to gain some insight into the experience of distressed companies. From observing the 
conduct of managers of a distressed company undergoing restructuring during the 
study, they were reluctant to sell any of the company’s assets, including idle assets, 
uninspired to bring in new leadership or ideas and reluctant to cut down on their 
compensation and spending. Managers were eager to benefit from the concessions 
that came with the restructuring but slow to reciprocate by putting in the efforts to 
bring the company out of the woods. Rather, they constantly expressed helplessness 
in the face of adverse economic conditions. These observations lent some credence to 
the claims of lenders regarding the attitude of debtors. They also put RPs in a difficult 
position as they struggled to elicit compliance from the manager whom they 
represented while trying to maintain their reputation and the cooperation they 
worked so hard to get from lenders. RPs made it clear that they would work more 
effectively if they are engaged by lenders.964  
The role of professionals in institution building has been the subject of some 
research.965 In insolvency, professionals like lawyers, accountants and judges, have 
been known to contribute to reform in both advanced and transitional economies.966 
The level and nature of contribution from these sets of professionals have taken varied 
forms in different jurisdictions.967 For Nigeria, while judges and lenders have been 
more passive in the process of legislative reform, a small group of IPs have been 
directly involved in the reform. Lenders have however contributed to the shaping of 
insolvency institutions by establishing a recovery-dominated practice.  Restructuring 
professionals are positioned to alter this dynamic by actively steering stakeholders 
towards a robust restructuring practice, even in the absence of an enabling framework. 
 
                                                          
964 As discussed earlier, lenders tend to consider themselves capable of handling a restructuring. 
965 Daniel Muzio, David M. Brock, and Roy Suddaby, ‘Professions and institutional change: Towards an 
institutionalist sociology of the professions’ (2013) 50(5) Journal of Management Studies 699-721.  
966 Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday, ‘Professionals in Systemic Reform of Bankruptcy Law: The 1978 U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code and the English Insolvency Act of 1986’ (2000) 74 Am. Bankr. L.J.  (2000) 35. 
967 For example, Carruthers and Halliday found that judges in the US were actively involved in legislative reform 




The impact of institutions on law and law reform been a recurrent theme in this thesis. 
In the last two chapters, it was emphasised that local institutions can significantly 
impact the implementation of laws.  This chapter sheds some light on local institutions 
and insolvency and restructuring practices in Nigeria.  
It finds that insolvency practice is indeed dominated by debt recovery. Lenders 
acknowledged their preference for quick recovery which can lead to unwarranted 
value destruction, blaming regulatory constraints, debtor recalcitrance, lack of 
knowledgeable turnaround experts, lawyers’ preference for quick compensation and 
institutional deficiencies. One of the prominent themes in the study is the influence of 
owner/manger reputation in the debt resolution strategy of lenders. While banks have 
internal guidelines for lending and resolving financial distress, the guidelines are fluid 
enough to accommodate reputational considerations.  This makes lenders less 
concerned about the viability or otherwise of the company and more influenced by 
their assessment of the promoters’ personal financial viability. Related to this is the 
concentration of ownership and control of most companies, leading to a territorial 
nature of managers and resistance to insolvency procedures. 
There is also a pervasive sense of distrust, which is expressed towards other 
stakeholders and the institutions. Coupled with this distrust is the fact that 
stakeholders considered other groups of stakeholders as incompetent. The empirical 
study illustrates how socio cultural and institutional issues that are commonplace in 
most African countries- institutional deficiencies, corruption, poor corporate 
governance and a gap in professional capacity, play out in insolvency and 
restructuring practice.  These issues impact the use of both insolvency procedures and 
informal restructuring, magnifying coordination problems among creditors in the few 
cases of multi-creditor restructuring. It is in the breakdown of such rescue-inspired 
restructuring that one sees a manifestation of the arguments in chapter three that the 
actions of creditors are not necessarily motivated by a desire for corporate rescue, 




However, there are indications of the beginning of change with multi-creditor 
restructuring and increased involvement of professional service firms, engendering a 
shift from a recovery-based practice to restructuring and other insolvency alternatives. 
There is also the possibility of judicial activism and the establishment of corporate 
rescue through case law as courts become more aware of the need for it. Likewise, 
banks show a cautious willingness to embrace other insolvency alternatives, to the 
extent that regulatory constraints allow them. The stage is set for a suitable 




























RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
Introduction 
This thesis set out to consider emerging trends in restructuring and insolvency law 
and practice across Africa. It makes a two-way inquiry into the impact of the drive 
towards global harmonisation of insolvency norms on recent reforms in Africa on one 
hand, and the contributions that Africa is making to the harmonisation trend in 
insolvency, on the other hand. It finds that Africa is indeed catching up to the global 
impetus to modernise insolvency and restructuring laws. Many countries in Africa are 
for the first time adopting restructuring frameworks as a viable means of resolving 
financial distress. 
From the onset, the project acknowledged both the value and limitations in a 
consolidated discussion of the experience in Africa, reiterating that Africa is a diverse 
continent of fifty-four countries with divergent experiences and legal history. At the 
same time, many countries in Africa do have a lot in common, including a shared 
heritage, colonial history, business cooperation and institutional, political and 
development challenges. While qualitative study was conducted only in Nigeria, the 
thesis documents restructuring developments in thirty-six countries,968 and the efforts 
of global actors in Africa. It points out some common issues and trends shared by 
countries in Africa and how they play out in insolvency reforms. These provide a 
background for the discussion in this chapter, which draws out policy implications of 
the findings of the research to Nigeria and other African countries. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part gives an overview of work done 
so far in the research. The second part gives a summary of the findings of the thesis 
and the theoretical and policy implications of these findings. 
 
                                                          
968 Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Mauritius, Malawi, Liberia, Mozambique, Seychelles, Zambia, Uganda, South Africa; 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial 




PART A. RESEARCH OVERVIEW: OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY. 
The central objective of the thesis was to paint a more complete picture of the trend 
towards globalisation in insolvency by telling the story of Africa’s evolving 
restructuring practices and insolvency law reforms. The objectives of the thesis are 
three-tiered. At the first tier, it aimed to investigate the relationship between global 
developments in insolvency and emerging developments in Africa. The second tier 
sought to evaluate developments in insolvency and restructuring at the national level, 
including restructuring laws being introduced across Africa. The third tier centred on 
activities at the local level with the aim of understanding the engagement of local 
actors with ongoing reforms and posing questions about the compatibility of new laws 
with existing practices. The thesis focused on corporate debt restructuring because of 
the importance that corporate rescue has come to gain globally as a goal of insolvency 
law. Indeed, much of the developments in Africa, formal and informal, revolve 
around corporate rescue and debt restructuring.  
In chapter two, the thesis analysed theoretical perspectives in insolvency law as a 
background for understanding the underlying goals and principles in the resolution 
of corporate financial distress. Chapter three built on this by considering key elements 
of restructuring law and frameworks. One of the objectives of the chapter was to draw 
out the potential policy implications of choices made in the design of restructuring 
law, particularly for a developing economy. This served as a useful background for 
discussing new restructuring laws adopted by African countries in chapter five. 
Chapters two and three established that insolvency laws are social tools which reflect 
the needs and values of a society, making them subject to change as the socio-
economic realities of jurisdictions evolve. These lessons were substantiated with 
examples of new contestations in insolvency regulation, the propositions that question 
the mandatory nature of insolvency law, the entrants of new actors into the insolvency 
scene and the use of innovative financial strategies by stakeholders to achieve their 
desired outcomes in insolvency.  
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With these lessons in mind, chapter four considered the drive towards harmonisation, 
highlighting the tension between the global convergence of insolvency norms and 
context-specific insolvency policymaking, particularly for developing countries. The 
chapter relied on Halliday, Carruthers and Schaffer’s works on transnational legal 
orders in insolvency, and the role of global actors in designing insolvency norms and 
propagating them in developing economies. Their in-depth analysis of the reform 
process in Asia provided a useful tool for evaluating current developments in Africa 
and identifying similarities and differences in the approach to insolvency reform.  The 
chapter also engaged neo-institutional theory which builds on socio-legal ideas to 
analyse the interactions between institutions (formal and informal) and law reform. 
These bodies of work helped to understand and challenge emerging developments 
from global, national and local perspectives. 
Chapters five and six represent the climax of the three-tiered objective of the research 
in relation to Africa. At the first tier, chapter five assessed the impact of global norms 
and actors on insolvency reform in Africa and at the same time considered Africa’s 
contribution to the building of a transnational legal order in insolvency law. At the 
second tier, the chapter explored reform at the national level, discussing recent and 
ongoing insolvency reforms in twenty-eight African countries, the role of global actors 
and norms in the reforms, and the common elements in both the process and content 
of reform. In addition to law reforms, the chapter also observed that changes in the 
responses of stakeholders to financial distress might reflect a more rescue-oriented 
approach to the resolution of financial distress.  Using an empirical approach, the third 
tier looked beneath the surface of laws reforms to understand local institutions, actors, 
practices and their potential effect on proposed reforms in Nigeria. 
Chapter six detailed the outcome of empirical study in Africa’s largest and one of its 
most influential economies, Nigeria. The empirical study not only provided a clearer 
picture of how restructuring practices are evolving, it also provided some insight into 
the experiences and constraints of stakeholders in the ongoing construction of a debt 
restructuring regime, and how they are being shaped by global norms and actors. The 
combination of these inquiries culminates in this chapter which concludes the thesis 




In summary, the findings of the thesis demonstrate that choices made in resolving 
corporate financial distress and the design of restructuring laws are influenced by a 
variety of factors including historical, economic and institutional factors. Developing 
countries are often the target of propagation of transnational norms, but the approach 
to propagation of norms differs over time and from one jurisdiction to the other. The 
involvement of global actors in African countries has been less direct and forceful than 
observed in Asia. However, subtler forms of pressure remain. 
The research also finds that activities at the global and national levels do not always 
coincide with what goes on at the local site. While the propagation of global norms in 
African countries seems to be achieving considerable success at the transnational level, 
enactment and implementation at local sites is a different consideration. The 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide has been put forward as proof that harmonisation of 
broad ideas while leaving fine details for local tailoring is possible and a step in the 
right direction.969 One of the reasons for this endorsement is that rather than try to 
ignore the differences between jurisdictions, it seeks to accommodate them. This thesis 
however finds that many countries in Africa are not engaging with the Legislative 
Guide in ongoing reforms. They have instead taken the easier path of importing 
templates from jurisdictions with which they have a legal or historical connection or 
which they consider meet global standards. Global actors acknowledge that designing 
a set of guidelines that allows countries to adopt insolvency laws which meet global 
standards and are at the same time compatible with local institutions in developing 
economies, is a difficult task.970 The research finds that the task is even more difficult 
when as part of the same trend towards harmonisation, there are influential systems 
that ranks all countries based on a set of criteria that rely heavily on institutions that 
are lacking in developing countries.   
                                                          
969 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, Guide to Enactment and Interpretation 25; Halliday and 
Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law’ (n 16) 1184-1187. 




Qualitative study in Nigeria threw light on the experience of local actors, finding that 
informal debt restructuring has gained some momentum, especially following recent 
financial crises.  However, efforts are frustrated by factors ranging from a lack of clear 
guidelines to distrust among stakeholders and institutional inadequacies. The 
relationship of local actors with global actors/norms and with proposed reforms was 
also found to be insignificant, with only a small group of practitioners engaging with 
reform.  
The next part outlines the key findings of the research in five sections and draws out 
the theoretical and policy implications of the findings. Where policy implications 
relate specifically to the empirical part of the research, it is acknowledged that the 
discussion is based on what was discovered in Nigeria, and the extent to which they 
could apply to other African countries is indicated.  
 
PART B.  KEY FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY. 
7.1. Actors and the influence of global norms 
Key findings 
One of the aims of the research was to investigate the roles of different actors at the 
global, national and local levels in insolvency law reforms. Figure 10 below shows the 
main actors involved to different degrees in reform efforts across Africa. 




ひIFIs- World Bank, IMF.
ひOther IOs- INSOL, 
UNCITRAL.
ひUSAID
ひForeign law firms & 
academics (acting as 
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The thesis found that the mode of engagement of global actors in African insolvency 
reforms is not as intense as their involvement in Asian insolvency reforms. For 
example, insolvency reforms imposed as conditionalities for financial assistance are 
much less common. While this should imply that countries in Africa would have the 
freedom to adapt to reform efficiently, pressure is still present in subtler forms such 
as suasion and peer pressure. IFIs like the World Bank and IMF have been influential 
through direct engagement with national stakeholders, projects like the Reports on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes and the Doing Business project and by 
establishing a regional forum, the Africa Round Table (ART), for deliberating on 
insolvency reform in Africa. INSOL International has particularly made strides in the 
region with the ART and its support of practitioner groups in individual countries like 
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. The World Bank also works behind the scenes in 
some countries to offer technical assistance to stakeholders in the reform process. The 
influence of the UNCITRAL is also indirectly present through the Cross-Border Model 
Law which a significant number of African countries have adopted.971  
Locally, prominent national actors include government bodies such as government 
ministries charged with the responsibility of improving of commerce and investment, 
attorneys general, law reform commissions and legislators. In Nigeria, the PEBEC has 
as one of its primary aims, law reform aimed at improving the country’s ranking in 
the Doing Business Project. National actors possess the political authority required for 
the progress of reform and have varying levels of interactions (direct and indirect) 
with global actors.972  
Of all the groups of actors at the local level, the involvement of insolvency 
practitioners (mostly lawyers and accountants) stands out, both in their engagement 
with global actors and national reform efforts.  
7.1.1. Missing actors  
One of the trends observed in ongoing reforms is the low levels of participation by 
stakeholder groups. For many countries in Africa, the education, consultations and 
                                                          
971 See table 1. 
972 Ch 5, section 5.3.3. 
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involvement of stakeholders that should have come pre-enactment have been 
postponed to the stage of implementation.973 
Debtors: From the empirical study and analysis of reform activities in Africa, the thesis 
found that debtors are not prominent actors in the reform process, notwithstanding 
their importance at the implementation stage. The detachment of companies from 
ongoing conversations about proposed reforms is reflected in their absence at forums 
like the ART and local forums. 974 
Lenders: The thesis also found that while lenders are more engaged than debtors, they 
are still largely missing from the reform process at the global and national levels. 
Chapter five highlighted the poor engagement of lender groups with regional reform 
activities of global actors in Africa.975 The same low levels of involvement were 
evident from the empirical study in Nigeria. Lenders were either completely ignorant 
of moves to change the law or disinterested in the proposed changes. 976 
Insolvency practitioners: IPs were found to be the most active stakeholder group in 
reform activities. However, it is not clear that their involvement and contributions are 
representative enough. The empirical study revealed that there is limited coordination 
among IPs which may be attributable to the lack of regulation or licencing 
requirements for insolvency practice. Because BRIPAN, the group leading insolvency 
reforms in Nigeria, only involves a limited class of practitioners, insolvency 
practitioners who are not members of the association feel disenfranchised from the 
reform process and do not engage with the activities of the ART.  
Judges: INSOL and the World Bank through the ART have made some efforts to 
include the voice of the judiciary in the ongoing developments in African insolvency 
reforms. Locally, they have encouraged the education of judges in their collaborations 
with local insolvency practitioners. The participation of judges in insolvency law 
                                                          
973 Chapter five documents how some countries that have enacted new insolvency laws now report the lack of 
awareness and understanding among most practitioners as one of the main difficulties with implementation. See 
section 5.9. 
974 Ch 5, section 5.3.3. 
975 ibid. 
976 Ch 6, section 6.11. 
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reform across different jurisdictions is however still relatively low, at all three levels- 
global, national and local.   
7.1.2. Implications of actor involvement for theory and policy 
• Using the reform experience in the UK, the US and Asia as examples, Halliday, 
Block-Lieb and Carruthers have argued that debtors are often missing from 
forums of global and national insolvency norm making for a variety of reasons.  
They found that these three jurisdictions had in common, a low direct 
participation of debtors, for different reasons ranging from ignorance about the 
relevance of insolvency law to them, public shame and loss of face that attends 
insolvency, the difficulty in achieving collective effort among such a diverse 
group, debtors preferring to influence judicial rule making rather than 
legislation, other stakeholder groups dominating the process and silencing 
debtors, or representation of debtors’ interests by other stakeholder groups like 
insolvency practitioners.977 In the US, where corporate failure is treated with 
less ridicule and harshness and entrepreneurial risk is encouraged, the absence 
of debtors may be more attributable to the refusal of debtors to recognise their 
interests in a law that was so infrequently reformed and; the representation of 
debtor interests by other groups such as lawyers and politicians.978  
 
From the empirical study in Nigeria, a combination of these reasons is likely. 
With the lack of engagement of stakeholders with existing insolvency laws and 
the infrequency of insolvency reform, it is plausible that debtors and even 
creditors do not recognise their interests in reform or the relevance of 
insolvency law to them. Also, unlike the UK and the US where lender groups 
and businesses have active associations that made it easy to coordinate their 
interests and contributions to law reform, organised debtor or lender groups 
are either not available or inactive in Nigeria.979  
                                                          
977 Halliday, Block-Lieb and Carruthers, ‘Missing Debtors’ (n 520) 2-4. 
978 ibid 8-9. 
979 The authors report that even with representation in law reform committees, organised debtors made no 
significant contributions or submissions. ibid 7-9. 
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Furthermore, the study revealed that insolvency law has indeed not been a 
conventional platform for resolving financial distress in Nigeria. For instance, 
the only top bank executive that was aware of reform proposals was reported 
as saying that he was unconcerned because insolvency law did not affect 
banks.980  As such, the authors’ explanations regarding the absence of debtors 
are limited to debtors in the context of Nigeria (and indeed many African 
countries). They also extend to other groups of stakeholders and are 
exacerbated by a general lack of coordination among different stakeholder 
groups, restricting participation in law reform to only small groups of people. 
 
• The question that follows is what, if any, and how significant is the effect of the 
absence of some stakeholders on the outcome of reform? Halliday, Susan Block-
Lieb and Carruthers argue that missing debtors do not produce significant 
unwanted outcomes, as the interests of debtors are often represented quite 
effectively by practitioners whose interests coincide with the debtors’.981 In the 
US for instance, the insolvency law that was produced, was debtor-orientated, 
despite the absence of debtors’ participation in the reform process.982 As the 
empirical study in Nigeria found, although debtors were unwilling to speak 
about their experience of financial distress and restructuring, restructuring 
professionals who routinely represent them stepped in to provide the 
perspective of debtors and their experience with debt restructuring. However, 
it is not clear that this representation is present in actual reform efforts, given 
that the participation of insolvency practitioners themselves is limited in that 
regard. The poor quality of stakeholder representation across board can have 
undesired implications for reforms, heightening the potential for actor 
mismatch and misdiagnosis and creating difficulties at the implementation 
stage.983 
                                                          
980 Ch 6, page 234. 
981Terence Halliday, Susan Block-Lieb and Bruce Carruthers (n 520) 11-12. 
982 ibid 38. 
983 Ch 4, section 4.4. 
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• The absence of a large percentage of stakeholders has the effect of swelling the 
pool of potential agents of resistance to both the enactment and implementation 
of a new insolvency law.  From experience elsewhere, the banking community 
has been known to wield significant power, influencing the making of 
insolvency laws,984 and where impossible, sabotaging its application. 
Carruthers and Halliday point out that, ‘temporal separation of designers of 
legal instruments from their implementers undermines the political viability of 
instruments, since they do not spring from established power bases’.985  Given 
that some of the side-lined practitioners in Nigeria have been known to lead 
major restructuring efforts in the country and have therefore gained both the 
expertise and the reputation required for the enrolment process discussed in 
chapter five,986 the enactment of a context-specific insolvency law could benefit 
a great deal from their involvement.  This group of stakeholders also has the 
power to foil the settling of the law at the stage of implementation. As chapter 
six reports, some lenders in Nigeria alluded to their ability to get around 
whatever new law is made if they do not agree with the changes.  The lesson to 
policy makers is simple, if the goal is to achieve meaningful reform rather than 
mere window dressing, it is wise for reform efforts to involve as many 
stakeholders as possible to ease the process of implementation.  
 
7.2. Restructuring practices at the local sites: a snapshot of existing procedures and 
emerging unilateral and multi-creditor restructuring practices from the empirical 
case study.  
Key Findings 
The study in Nigeria showed that insolvency practice is dominated by (sometimes 
aggressive) individual debt recovery, using formal mechanisms such as the 
receivership procedure and other innovative strategies. Regulatory constraints, debtor 
recalcitrance, lack of knowledgeable turnaround experts, lawyers’ preference for 
                                                          
984 Paterson, ‘Notions of Fairness’ (n 225) 605. 
985 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2)46. 
986 Enrolment occurs when a weaker actor is able to persuade a stronger actor to take on its cause. ibid 68-69. 
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quick compensation and institutional deficiencies are blamed for this. However, 
restructuring practices are evolving.  The study found that most banks now have units 
that aim to restructure debt obligations unilaterally, but private workouts are mostly 
limited to debt rescheduling where the tenure of the debt is extended, or interest 
reduced. Multi creditor restructurings are fewer and farther between but there is a 
growing practice heightened by economic crisis in Nigeria.987 However, multi creditor 
restructuring often involves big companies and have been known to occur with a 
receiver manager in place. The position of the RM and presence of government 
influence (usually through AMCON) provides some regulatory backing akin to what 
is found within the London Approach and variants of it discussed earlier. Multi 
creditor restructuring is neither coordinated nor governed by clear guidelines as 
obtains under those systems. A new practice multi-creditor restructuring initiated by 
restructuring professionals from professional services firms is also growing. 
The thesis found that these different forms of restructuring suffer numerous 
challenges including blind or fictive restructuring that glosses over the important 
question of viability, the lack of coordination among creditors, the fear of oppression 
of small banks by bigger banks, regulatory constraints, lack of supportive institutional 
infrastructure and low levels of cooperation by debtor management.  
7.2.1. Implications of developments in restructuring practice 
• The incidence of unilateral restructuring by banks should not lead to the 
conclusion that a corporate rescue culture is established among stakeholders, 
particularly lending institutions in Nigeria.  Although lenders acknowledged 
the long-term economic value in keeping distressed companies alive, they 
consider such rescue missions the responsibility of the government, especially 
considering the government-induced regulatory constraints that they claim 
prevent them pursuing rescue. Thus, the response to financial distress is still 
overwhelmingly dominated by debt recovery and where restructuring occurs, 
it is often a fictive rescheduling of payments obligations to take some pressure 
                                                          
987 Chapter five also reports a similar pattern in other African countries like Uganda, Kenya and Ghana. Ch 5, 
sections 5.4.1 & 5.4.2. 
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off the creditor while they consider enforcement prospects. To achieve 
meaningful restructuring or even rescue, policy should be directed towards 
clear viability tests that establish that the restructuring has real prospects and 
requires a substantial plan for achieving both the short and long-term goals of 
the restructuring. It must however be borne in mind that a forced attempt to 
prioritise the rescue of distressed companies as a going concern is likely to meet 
with resistance from creditor groups.988 
• The increasing use of the receivership process to achieve a multi creditor 
restructuring of big companies in place of its conventional debt recovery role 
has not been very successful but it can help to ease transition into the proposed 
administration procedure.  This is because it gives all stakeholders, particularly 
debtor companies the opportunity to get acquainted with the idea of an 
administrator taking over the management of a company for the purpose of 
restructuring it. Likewise, it can prepare creditors for the shift in the duty of the 
appointed professional who before now, served at their pleasure to recover 
debt at all cost, even if value-destroying. It also exposes practitioners to the 
expectations of administration which focuses on rehabilitative restructuring 
rather than mere recovery. Furthermore, the difficulties encountered in the 
process foreshadow some of the challenges that may emerge in the use of 
proposed restructuring frameworks. It is important that these lessons are 
applied in the design and implementation of proposed insolvency law to 
prevent the new law from producing the same outcomes as receivership. 
 
• One of the issues identified with receivership twinned multi-creditor 
restructuring is the oppression/highhandedness of smaller banks by big banks 
and regulatory authority (AMCON). Smaller banks admitted to avoiding 
restructuring involving more influential banks for this reason.  As discussed in 
chapter three, fairness concerns are fluid and differ with the jurisdiction and 
nature of procedure in question. Restructuring law must account for the 
predominant fairness concerns among stakeholders for example, by providing 
                                                          
988 See Ch 3, section 3.1. 
258 
 
for a clear decision-making mechanism for creditors. As discussed below, 
Nigeria is tending towards the adoption of the UK administration procedure in 
largely the same form. Given that the threshold for creditor decision making 
on restructuring proposals under the English administration procedure is dealt 
with separately by the Insolvency Rules, care must be taken by African 
countries importing the law wholesale not to import a vague or incomplete 
decision-making process that can exacerbate the problems being experienced 
in practice.  
• Another lesson from the experience with multi-creditor restructuring is the 
changing roles of practitioners in distress resolution. As restructuring acquires 
a new layer of complexity because of the involvement of foreign investors and 
practitioners, and multi-creditor restructuring begins to gain momentum, the 
role of investment bankers, professional services firms and accountants is 
becoming more prominent and insolvency practice is expanding past the debt 
recovery functions of the receiver.  Consequently, beyond the ability to file or 
respond to court injunctions, more technical expertise is now required to deal 
with the complex arrangements that can show up in multicreditor 
restructuring. This changes the demands on the legal system and legal 
practitioners who are now no longer needed to just flex their legal muscles in 
devising delay tactics, defending unnecessary legal battles or writing demand 
letters. Lawyers would increasingly be needed for more tasking and creative 
work- to push complex arrangements borne out of restructuring plans through 
the legal system. They would be needed to comment on the legality of such 
plans and sometimes, make novel arguments to the courts, thereby shaping the 
direction and development of insolvency jurisprudence and practice in the 
country.  
• In light of this, the training of professionals and regulation of insolvency 
professionals become crucial. As discussed shortly, some countries, 
particularly those that have enacted unified insolvency laws have made the 
move of regulating insolvency practice.989 For countries like Nigeria that are 
                                                          
989 Kenya for example. Insolvency Regulations, part IV. 
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tending towards incorporating restructuring frameworks into existing 
Companies Act, there is the chance that ancillary but germane issues like this 
are left out.  Policymakers must consider hastily following up enacted laws 
with comprehensive regulations to deal with issues left out of the Act.  
 
7.3. Some Socio-cultural and institutional elements 
Key findings 
The thesis found from the empirical study that in lending relationships, the reputation 
of the debtors’ promoter(s) strongly impacts lending decisions and how creditors 
respond to financial distress. Connected to this is the fact that many businesses are 
structured such that ownership and control of companies are concentrated. Many 
companies, both small and large, are family-owned and controlled, resulting in a 
territorial nature where companies are regarded as personal property and outsider 
control is met with heavy (sometimes life-threatening) resistance.  
The study also found a pervasive sense of distrust among stakeholders, an element 
which may resulted from years of witnessing or hearing reports of corruption, 
mismanagement and lack of integrity across the society. Corroborating existing 
research on the subject, the study found that courts including specialised commercial 
courts are plagued with jurisdictional and infrastructural challenges ranging from 
inconsistent interpretation of the law which results in uncertainties, lack of capacity 
to grasp complex commercial matters, lack of appreciation for commercial expediency 
leading to unjustifiable injunctions and unnecessary delays, heavy caseloads and 
perceptions of corruption.990  The study found the combined effect of these issues to 
be the avoidance of formal insolvency procedures and the proliferation of innovative 
debt recovery strategies by creditors. Such strategies include the use of crime 
enforcement agencies to blackmail distressed debtors into payment.  
 
                                                          
990 Chapter five highlighted that corruption is often measured in terms of perception. Whether they are proven 
cases or not, the widespread perception of corruption is just as problematic as it impacts decision making, the 
relationship among actors in insolvency and their actions in ways that are discussed shortly. Ch 5, section 5.8.2. 
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7.3.1. Implications of findings on socio-cultural and institutional issues. 
• Debtor-creditor relationships are embedded in the (legal) culture of a nation.991 
Similar to what obtains in East Asia, major indigenous businesses in Africa are 
family-owned and there is an overwhelming need to keep the business within 
the family.992 This provides some insight to the resistance (sometimes resorting 
to physical harm) that debtor companies have been known to put up against 
insolvency procedures in Nigeria.  
• An important element that has made all the difference in China’s relational 
capitalism is trust.  This ingredient is missing not just in Nigeria but in African 
business environments. There have been reports of how a gradual sense of 
distrust has grown in work environments in Africa.993  A pervasive lack of trust 
and confidence holds some implications for reform. As the interviews reveal, 
the sense of distrust is not limited to debtors and the judicial system, but also 
extends to the law-making process and the national actors involved. This 
creates a problem for proposed law reform, where stakeholders are unable to 
deliberate or reasonably agree on a framework for restructuring.994 As Halliday 
and Carruthers caution, ‘if locked in a stalemate among competing powerful 
actors, then rule-making bodies will opt for vague formulations. 995  
 
• The impact of institutions on legal rules and law reform has been visited earlier 
in this thesis.996 It was discussed in chapter five that institutional challenges 
observed in the empirical study (such as inefficient courts and corruption) are 
commonplace in many African countries. As neo-institutional thought 
indicates, the role of institutions in increasing or decreasing transaction costs is 
                                                          
991 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 113. 
992 Asian Development Bank, ‘Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region’ in Law and Reform at the 
Asian Development Bank (Manila, ADB 2000); Mfonobong Nsehe, ‘The 10 Leading Family Businesses In Africa’ 
Forbes (8 Jan 2014) <www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2014/01/08/the-10-leading-family-businesses-in-
africa/#292c924d5274>; Kurt Davis, ‘The African Family-Owned Business: A Partner For Private Equity’ Ventures 
(22 Sep 2014) <http://venturesafrica.com/the-african-family-owned-business-a-partner-for-private-equity/> all 
accessed 10 June 2018.  
993 Niels G. Noorderhaven and Bassirou Tidjani, ‘Culture, governance, and economic performance: An explorative 
study with a special focus on Africa (2001) International Journal of Cross-Cultural Management 35 
994 An example is the report about the two conflicting insolvency legislations presented by different groups for 
enactment in Nigeria. Ch 6, page 236 
995 Halliday and Carruthers, Bankrupt (n 2) 78. 
996 Ch 4, sections 4.4.3 & 4.7. 
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connected to the incentives and disincentives they provide to economic 
actors.997  Thus, the institutional structure may incentivise economic actors to 
bend rules, engage in sharp practices and employ underhanded methods, 
mostly because they have more to gain from breaking the rules than from 
keeping them.998 Some of the practices observed in Nigeria, like debtors 
capitalising on the deficiencies of the court system to delay the debt recovery 
process and the use of force to prevent the commencement of receivership are 
products of ineffective institutional interaction. Also, loopholes in criminal law 
enforcement institutions and the inadequacies of court systems have opened 
up a space for creditors to get around insolvency law and approach debt 
recovery as if it were a criminal matter. These practices do not only raise 
transaction costs, they further perpetuate the cycle of distrust among 
commercial parties.999  The result of such is that these practices evolve into 
mutant institutions that become difficult to change by merely passing a new 
law.  
• As the theory of path dependence suggests, institutional practices become more 
difficult and costlier to change as they become reinforced.1000 As discussed in 
chapter four, the resulting outcome of entrenched informal systems is that the 
relative cost of adopting alternative systems become prohibitive. Thus, even if 
actors are offered better alternatives, the cost of switching may preclude such 
a transition because the activities have become entrenched to the point of being 
self-reinforcing.1001 As unwritten rules of enforcement have emerged and 
mutated formal rules in insolvency, policymakers may consider that these 
mutant institutions can be corrected with the ‘modern’ laws and global norms 
being introduced across the globe. They must however note that informal 
constraints have great survival tenacity and a sudden introduction of new 
                                                          
997 North, Institutions (n 430) 8. 
998 This is a common feature of economies where enforcement mechanisms are ineffective resulting in weak formal 
institutions, blatant corruption and ultimately high transaction costs. Ibid. 
999 Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, ‘Does Africa need a cultural adjustment program?’ in Harrison, Lawrence E., and 
Samuel P. Huntington (eds) Culture matters: How values shape human progress (Basic books, 2000) 65, 72. (He 
describes how Africans tend to be excessively convivial and reject open conflict to the detriment of business).  
1000 Prado and Trebilcock (n 525) 341; Ch 4, sections 4.4.3. 
1001 Prado and Trebilcock (n 525) 341. 
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formal rules does not stop them from persisting. The realisation that ‘we are 
not writing on a blank slate’ is a useful lesson for policy makers in ongoing 
insolvency law reforms. 
• As Nigeria (and other African countries) seek to adopt new restructuring 
mechanisms, some questions call for consideration: how do we prevent 
proposed administration, CVAs and other restructuring mechanisms being 
introduced from becoming plagued by the same ills that currently affect 
receivership? Would stakeholders continue to interpret and implement the law 
exactly like receivership, thereby turning a restructuring tool into a debt 
recovery tool?  Would administration not trigger the same level of resistance 
from territorial debtors like receivership currently does? These concerns are 
especially valid because participants in the empirical study already failed to see 
a real difference between the administration procedure and a receivership.1002  
• The point in raising these questions is not to suggest that deliberate attempts to 
change formal law should never occur. Indeed, they should, because 
entrenched practices such as those observed in Nigeria, may have become 
clearly ineffective and incompatible with economic growth.  The prescriptions 
for policy here are two-fold (i) that new restructuring laws be accompanied by 
changes in other laws and institutions that impact the incentives of actors in 
restructuring. Some of those connected laws include secured transactions 
legislations to strengthen enforcement of security interests and strong 
corporate governance and directors’ liability to alleviate debtor recalcitrance. 
Also, it goes without saying that judicial reforms be implemented to expedite 
court hearings and eliminate complicity in delay and other underhanded tactics 
by parties.  
• The challenge with this first prescription is clear, policymakers currently 
involved in the reform of insolvency law may not be in a position to reform this 
range of laws and institutions. Even if they were, there is no guarantee that 
those reforms would happen simultaneously with insolvency reforms, or even 
                                                          




soon after. While we await judicial reforms and comprehensive commercial law 
reforms, what is realistically within their power in designing insolvency laws 
is to acknowledge these institutional deficiencies and their effects.  For one, 
laws should take account of inadequacies of courts and judges by limiting 
reliance on them for decision making in the restructuring process. Where it is 
necessary to do so, clear guidance should be given to judges, without 
completely robbing them of discretion. Judges should also be given room to 
seek directions/guidance from independent professionals who understand the 
complexities of business.  
• The second prescription is that change should not only target formal 
procedures but should also be aimed at informal institutions and practices 
which have the effect of either mutating or complementing formal procedures. 
As Davis and Trebilcock argue, ‘predominant preoccupation with the court 
system inappropriately discounts the important role’ other institutions play.1003 
On this basis, it has been proposed that the promotion of competitive 
alternatives to the formal [restructuring] frameworks can be effective.1004 
Competition from informal institutions if well structured, can exert a positive 
influence on the development of legal institutions to make them more efficient 
and adaptable to changes.1005 As chapters five and six reveal, stakeholders in 
African economies are increasingly making efforts to restructure corporate debt 
informally. Among other things, trust, coordination problems and lack of clear 
guidelines undermine those efforts. To provide an effective complement for 
emerging restructuring frameworks, policy makers should consider setting up 
proper dynamics for informal debt restructuring. These include clear 
guidelines sanctioned and backed by recognised authority as seen in the 
London Approach and its variants.1006  
 
7.4. Key changes introduced by restructuring law. 
                                                          
1003 Davis and Trebilcock, ‘Optimists versus Skeptics’ (n 543) 9. 
1004 ibid. 
1005 ibid; Allen and Qian (n 496) 141. 
1006  Ch 3, section 3.1. The Nigerian Bankers’ Committee is an example of lender coordination that can be applied 
in corporate debt restructuring. Ch 6, page 224. 
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The substantive elements of restructuring law introduced by recent and ongoing 
reforms are discussed in some detail in Chapter five. Here, the key elements are 
summarised. Law reforms have borrowed from different developed jurisdictions like 
the UK, the US and France, but a common trend is that countries’ choices have been 
influenced mainly by the law in the jurisdictions with which they have historical 
connections. For example, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda and proposed law in Nigeria have 
adopted the UK administration and CVA procedures in largely the same form.  
OHADA follows French law and introduces the conciliation, preventive and 
reorganisation procedures.  For Liberia which operates an Anglo-American common 
law system, the new restructuring law bears close resemblance to the US Chapter 11 
procedure. There is some evidence of horizontal learning with Zambia and Namibia’s 
reliance on South Africa’s 2008 Business Rescue procedure which in turn combined 
elements of UK and US law.  
Some of the legislations are stand-alone laws that deal with corporate insolvency 
alone.1007 Some have unified corporate and personal insolvency reforms in one 
legislation,1008 while other reforms have come in the form of the inclusion of 
restructuring frameworks in the Companies Act.1009 
All the frameworks introduce a moratorium which prevents, among other 
enforcement actions, secured creditors from pursuing enforcement without the 
permission of the PIP or court. 
Some procedures require illiquidity, prospective illiquidity or financial distress as a 
criterion for commencement,1010 while others do not.1011 Also, some systems have 
adopted a practitioner-controlled framework 1012others adopt a practitioner-
supervised DIP system. 1013 
                                                          
1007 Zambia for example. 
1008 Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Liberia and OHADA countries. 
1009 Nigeria’s proposed reform, Tanzania and South Africa. 
1010 Zambia, South Africa, Liberia, administration in Kenya, Malawi. 
1011 For example, CVAs adopted in Kenya and Malawi and proposed in Nigeria. 
1012 Kenya, Uganda, Malawi. 
1013 Countries like Liberia, South Africa and Zambia. 
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Some laws introduce provisions for restructuring finance.1014 Among these, Liberia 
follows the US in allowing providers of new money to be given priority over existing 
security holders in certain circumstances.  Countries that have adopted the UK 
administration procedure wholesale do not provide for restructuring finance. 
 Courts are tasked with a range decision making, supervision and approvals, as 
obtains under the laws that have inspired these new frameworks. Liberia particularly 
depends heavily on an assigned judge to make decisions ranging from the designation 
of the administrator to the approval of creditor committees.  
7.4.1. Policy implications of changes introduced by restructuring laws 
• Control: chapter three discussed the proposition by Hahn that jurisdictions 
with concentrated ownership and control are better suited for a PIP system 
while jurisdictions with dispersed ownership should adopt a DIP system.1015 
Companies in Nigeria (and many other African countries) predominantly 
operate a concentrated business structure, but they may not fall neatly into 
Hahn’s analysis. A DIP system accommodates the interests of possessive 
owner/managers and protects them from the agony of admitting to corporate 
failure, thereby encouraging them to cooperate with the restructuring process. 
However, it has the effect of being interpreted by creditors as seizing power 
from them and giving it to debtors. Given the level of distrust and reports of 
mismanagement and debtor recalcitrance highlighted earlier in this chapter, 
this is bound to meet with intense resistance from creditors. The safeguards for 
protecting creditors’ interests in developed jurisdictions that operate a DIP 
system rely on courts to ensure that the rights of creditors are balanced while 
the debtor remains in control. Such reliance on the court is problematic for 
many African countries where the court systems can be weak, with judges 
being unequipped to handle complex commercial issues and creditors lacking 
faith in the judicial system.  A PIP system on the other hand is subject to 
resistance from debtors, as the receivership experience in Nigeria shows. For 
                                                          
1014 Liberia, Zambia, South Africa. 
1015 Hahn, ‘Concentrated ownership’ (n 329) 143; Ch 3, section 3.4.2. 
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African jurisdictions that have adopted PIP systems, it is noteworthy that 
debtor cooperation may be achieved by emphasising the rescue potential of 
restructuring mechanisms and clearly distinguishing between the procedure 
and other value-destroying procedures. If debtors perceive that the process 
offers an opportunity for turnaround, there is a higher chance of cooperation 
with the process.    
A hybrid between the two options may however be more effective and some 
countries have already made this choice.1016 An effective restructuring law in 
the context of most African countries has been described as one flexible enough 
to allow for a DIP framework thereby accommodating the territorial attitude of 
debtors; but prudent enough to safeguard the rights and interests of 
creditors.1017 Such flexibility is provided by laws that allow debtor management 
to stay in place under the supervision of a professional whose duties are clearly 
outlined. This allows decision making to fall on a restructuring expert who has 
powers to elicit the company’s cooperation. One of the lessons from the 
empirical study in Nigeria is that with some education and advocacy, 
insolvency practitioners, particularly lawyers and other professional service 
providers are in a good position to drive a strong restructuring practice and 
rescue culture.   
• Shifts in creditor rights: one of the dynamics being introduced by insolvency 
legislations are changes to the rights of creditors in relation to a distressed 
debtor. For many decades, insolvency practice in most jurisdictions has centred 
on creditor-driven debt recovery through foreclosure, receivership and other 
related procedures.1018 Systems are now shifting from frameworks that gave 
creditors all the control, to those that restrict the timing and pace of their 
enforcement powers.  Restructuring laws impose a moratorium on recovery 
actions (even by secured creditors) while the restructuring is ongoing. It is 
expected that creditors would resist their relegation from the top of the list, 
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1017 See Idigbe and Kalu, ‘Best practice and tailored reforms’ (n 670). 
1018 Fabrícia de Almedia Henriques (n 724).  
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especially where they feel (like seen in Nigeria) that formal enforcement 
devices are weak and susceptible to manipulation.  
In a bid to appear to take serious steps towards establishing corporate rescue, 
policy makers may be tempted to make drastic changes to the rights of 
creditors. It should be noted that an implementation gap is almost always 
present in reform, but it becomes more obvious and problematic where there is 
a sudden and wide gap between existing institutions and new laws.1019 To ease 
the transition into new systems, policymakers should consider making changes 
to creditor rights incrementally. This is perhaps one benefit that the UK 
administration procedure offers with its cautious prioritisation of the need to 
maximise creditors’ interests. 
Also, while post commencement finance is a useful mechanism in restructuring 
law, policymakers must be wary of importing the mechanism wholesale with 
the complexities that come with it. Implementation is at infancy for most 
countries but chapter five highlights the struggle with post commencement 
finance in South Africa,1020 and is instructive to other countries to cautiously 
introduce provisions that drastically alter the priority and interests of creditors.  
• Decision making: Another policy consideration is the need to make the 
decision-making process among creditors as easy and straightforward as 
possible. Voting thresholds should be clear and jurisdictions would benefit 
from avoiding the complexities that can attend the class voting system. As 
discussed in chapter three, class voting can be valuable but also problematic.1021 
Given that most laws do not provide for the cram down of groups, it may be 
worth limiting the possibilities to voting in fewer but larger groups, rather than 
many small groups.  
Also, policy makers must be wary of relying too heavily on courts for decision 
making. It may be worth considering shifting some of the responsibilities 
placed on courts by the templates being used, to a restructuring practitioner or 
other efficient regulatory authority. It is acknowledged that judges can play an 
                                                          
1019 Mariana Prado and Michael Trebilcock (n 19) 341. 
1020 Ch 5, page 190-191. 
1021 Ch 3, page 83 
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important role through their activism and the use of their discretion. As 
insolvency laws settle in different countries, the role of judges in the process 
should be constantly re-assessed. Frequent training and the appointment of 
commercial lawyers as commercial judges should also be considered. 
• Unified legislations versus consolidation with company law: One of the 
decisions that policymakers are confronted with in the process of drafting 
insolvency legislation is the form that such laws should take. Nigeria for 
example started off with a stand-alone bill but is now tending towards 
including the administration and CVA procedures in its Companies and Allied 
Matters Act, as done in Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia.  Understandably, 
including insolvency law reform in a Companies Act streamlines the legislative 
process and is likely to make it easier to garner support and interest for the 
legislation, especially in jurisdictions where law making is extremely tedious. 
However, there is a tendency for important components of insolvency law to 
slip through the cracks as it is hard to give the subject the attention it deserves. 
For example, incidental but important issues such as insolvency practitioners’ 
regulation may be missed or deferred to regulations that might take another 
long process to deliver. Another implication is that the legislation misses an 
opportunity to reform personal bankruptcy laws as unified insolvency 
legislations would do. In African countries where the lines between the identity 
of a company and its owners can get blurry, such joint reform of both personal 
and corporate bankruptcy can be useful. 
 
Looking ahead: future research and concluding remarks 
As Africa becomes increasingly important to the global economy and interest in the 
continent grows, it is imperative to understand the continent’s understudied but 
significant contributions to emerging global trends in insolvency law and practice. The 
objective of this thesis was to highlight the developments in restructuring law and 
practice in Africa, and the roles of global actors, global norms and local actors and 
institutions in those developments.  
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In the process of meeting these objectives, the thesis has taken the reader through a 
journey which began with both the traditional and unconventional theoretical 
perspectives for regulating corporate financial distress, engaged the key elements of 
debt restructuring frameworks, then discussed the trend towards global convergence 
in insolvency law and analysed some emerging developments in insolvency law and 
practice across Africa, which is where the journey ends, for now.  
This thesis has laid the right foundation and set the stage for questions to be raised 
regarding the direction of reform on the continent. However, there is still a lot to learn 
about the insolvency reform process in individual African countries, including an 
outline of the history of insolvency regulation and the unique experiences of actors 
involved in the reform process. More research in this area will provide a basis for 
comparing reform experiences across jurisdictions on the continent.  
Overall, reforms continue to progress in Africa, with subtle but effective pressure 
mounted by the World Bank Doing Business project, closely followed up with the 
INSOL/World Bank ART.  Remarkably, out of the forty-five countries that have 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, twenty-three are 
African. To the extent that reforms in Africa are replacing obsolete insolvency regimes 
with recognised legislations that reflect global norms, Africa is indeed contributing to 
the harmonisation of insolvency law. One must however not be too soon to conclude 
about the depth and reach of this harmonisation.  The purpose of harmonisation is not 
harmonisation for its sake, rather it is to support the integration of markets, such that 
as cross border insolvency or the potential for it increases, the means of resolving 
financial distress are not too divergent. An important element in the building of a TLO 
is the settling process, with the ultimate goal being that transnational, national, and 
local norms and practices are concordant and have meanings that closely resemble 
each other. Thus, before any claim may be laid to true harmonisation, one question 
that must be answered is whether reforms reflect what obtains in practice, or new laws 
fall into disuse or end up morphing into unintended outcomes upon interaction with 
existing institutions. Also, it is vital to constantly question, especially for developing 
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countries whether reforms are responding to development needs, or to the pressure 
to conform or to both. These are areas of note for future research. 
Lessons from neo-institutitonal theory and the law and development movement 
explored in this research emphasise the importance of understanding local 
peculiarities and their compatibility with new laws. This indicates the need for more 
empirical studies to unearth what these peculiarities might be. This thesis has begun 
to fill the gap by consucting empirical research in Nigeria, but it is acknowledged that 
more research is needed to understand the practical impact of the changes introduced 
by insolvency reform on a country by country basis.  
 
As laws settle across Africa and implementation gaps open up, there is bound to be 
more clarity regarding what works and what does not. It is expected that law would 
settle at different paces and in different ways across jurisdictions. Given that some 
countries have had a head start with reform and implementation, policy makers in 
countries undergoing reform should aim to learn from the victories and challenges in 
those countries, in order to effectively tailor the templates that they have chosen to 
local contexts. There is already some evidence of such horizontal learning in the choice 
of law, but it is even more useful to learn from the outcome of implementation. This 
is one advantage that the ART offers, provided that the forum can continue to capture 
the interest of the relevant stakeholders and decision makers across the continent.  
 
The contributions of the thesis are not constrained to African countries and policy 
makers alone. They provide material for evaluating the harmonisation process in 
insolvency law, including the methods adopted by prominent global actors in pushing 
insolvency reform agenda in developing regions. Also, the policy lessons derived 
from the project are useful in other areas of commercial law that are seeing a similar 
drive for globalisation. Just as this thesis has extracted lessons from developments in 
Asian insolvency law, lessons from the experience in Africa documented here would 
also be instructive to other developing jurisdictions.  A resounding lesson for 
policymakers is not to try to run before learning to walk and to acknowledge that there 
are fundamentals that make the advanced aspects of modern insolvency regimes 
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work. Enactment of new laws is a laudable move, but only a first step in the right 
direction. There is more work to be done and time would reveal the growing pains 



































A. LENDERS (COMMERCIAL BANKS) 
About the interviewee 
1. Could you tell me about your role in this organisation? 
a.  How long have you had this role? 
Factors that inform lending and relationship with borrowers 
2. What kind of factors inform your decision to lend? For instance, does the size of the 
borrowing company influence lending decisions and the conditions of the loan?  
3. How often (if at all) do you lend on unsecured basis? 
4. Do you maintain close contact with corporate customers during the lending period, 
for example by periodic monitoring or do you give them complete space until there 
is a reason to contact them? 
Response to default 
5. How do you typically respond when a borrowing company has not met its debt 
obligations? 
a. How soon do you take these steps? 
b. Is your response informed by the cause of the default?  
Out of court restructuring/work outs  
6. Do you try to privately work out the financial problems of the defaulting company? 
a. What forms do these workout/restructuring efforts take? 
7. How do you determine whether a company is still viable and a good candidate for 
debt restructuring? 
8. Do you have any set of internal rules/procedure that you use for debt restructuring? 
9. What are the major problems you experience with restructuring? 
10. Do you generally find the management of the defaulting company to be co-operative 
in the restructuring process? 
11. Do your restructuring efforts include the provision of additional finance?  
Multiple banking/ regulatory influence 
12. I would like to know how you deal with other creditors when the debtor has 
multiple creditors. For instance, do you coordinate with other banks often or is this 
difficult to achieve? 
13. Have the activities of AMCON had any effect on your response to financial distress, 
especially multi creditor restructuring?  
14. Do you find pressure, moral suasion from other banks/AMCON persuasive in 
dealing with distressed companies? 
Use of Legal devices and engagement with the law 
15. Do you often move to wind up the corporate debtor?  
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a. If no, why not?  
b. If yes, how soon after default and what factors inform this decision? 
16. Do you often use the receivership? 
a. Under what circumstances do you appoint a receiver?  
b. What is the role of the receiver in such situations? 
17. Do you have any experience with schemes of arrangement? 
a. Have you had cause to use it to restructure a distressed company? 
18. Are you aware of the proposed Corporate Insolvency Bill?  
b. How did you learn about it? 
19. What is your view about the changes being proposed by the law? 
 
B. INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS (ACCOUNTANTS AND SOLICITORS) 
About the interviewee 
1. What do you do as an insolvency practitioner?  
a. How long have you been doing this? 
Response to default- recovery and liquidation 
2. How do you typically handle distressed companies?  
3. Would you consider your role to be limited to debt recovery; to involve corporate 
rescue/rehabilitation; or as determined by your appointor? 
4. How commonly do you see liquidation of companies occur in your work?  
a. What factors influence the decision to liquidate? 
b. Does it often happen that companies that could have traded out of their 
difficulties are liquidated? 
c. What factors are responsible for this? 
 
Corporate rescue and debt restructuring 
5. Have you been involved in the debt restructuring or rescue of a distressed company?  
6. How successful would you say these restructuring efforts have been? 
7. What challenges do/did you encounter in the restructuring process?  
a. Do any of these challenges stem from the law/courts? 
b. How do lenders/debtors respond to rescue efforts? 
Engagement with the law 
8. When acting as a receiver, do you find that your position allows you to rescue the 
company or its business?  
9. What legal/institutional changes do you think will promote rescue/restructuring 
practice?  
10. Have you tried to use a scheme of arrangement to restructure a distressed company? 
a. What was your experience with this? 
11. Do you know about the new corporate insolvency bill?  




C. BRIPAN (Association spearheading insolvency law reform in Nigeria) 
1. What does the Association do?  
a. What is your position in the Association? 
b. What role is the Association playing in Nigerian insolvency law reform? 
Corporate Insolvency Bill – domestic factors 
2. What are the main factors that influenced the draft insolvency bill (the need for 
reform and the choice of ‘model’ law)? 
3. Did the current practices among stakeholders inform the content of the bill 
significantly? 
a. For instance, is the law geared towards addressing some of the challenges that 
stakeholders face with private work outs? 
4. What role did stakeholders like commercial lenders play in the draft bill? 
5. Apart from the proposed law, what other changes can be made to improve corporate 
debt restructuring mechanisms  
Insolvency Bill- external factors 
6. Did any international organisation play any role in the reform process?  
7. Are you aware of current bankruptcy law reform in other African countries? 
8. Have you had the opportunity to interact with insolvency practitioners from other 
countries?  
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